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URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORT REGULATION IN PAKISTAN 
ABSTRACT 
The regulation of urban public transport in Pakistan is the responsibility of provincial governments. As 
in many other Less Developed Countries government regulation has generally been inappropriate, 
misdirected, and often corrupt. As a consequence poorly administered public transport, provides 
inefficient, unreliable and low quality services, which contributes to the choice of alternative modes of 
travel. In turn this adds to a worsening of congestion, inequalities of access, and other urban transport 
problems. Attempts at improvement have often been short lived and ultimately unsuccessful because 
they have failed to escape from the net of the established but ineffectual regulatory bureaucracies. 
In Pakistan there is a growing concern over regulatory issues. In some cities in Punjab province, the 
regulation of urban public transport is being channelled through Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) formed specifically for this purpose. In Faisalabad an NGO introduced improved stage carriage 
services in 1994, and assumed delegated responsibilities for the quantity, quality and fares regulation of 
services under its control. Following the successful experience in Faisalabad, public transport services 
in Lahore under the NGO control commenced in June 1997. In both cities, some public transport 
services are still being regulated directly by the government. 
An analysis is presented of public transport operation under both government regulation and policies, 
and under the new form of NGO regulation, through case studies from the cities of Faisalabad and 
Lahore. The methods employed include a literature review, collection and collation of secondary data 
sources, direct observation, correspondence, in-depth interviews conducted with key officials and public 
transport operators, household surveys and passenger surveys. 
An evaluation of the effectiveness of the new form of regulation is made, covering the performance and 
the quality of services offered under both regulatory regimes. It is argued that government regulations 
and policies have reduced the quantity and quality of public transport services whereas services under 
NGO regulation are a measurable success, providing substantial improvements and commanding wide 
acceptance both by passengers and by private operators. The key factors involved in this success are 
realistic fares, the involvement of private operators in decision making, freedom from the constraints of 
government bureaucracy, and strict enforcement of service standards. The Faisalabad experience has 
acted as a learning process, raising awareness and understanding about public transport issues, a process 
of vital importance given the absence of expertise. It has also demonstrated that there is a market for 
better quality services at higher fares in Pakistan. 
Conclusions drawn include that the NGO has provided an effective 'arms length' mechanism for 
decision making, which has circumvented problems associated with government bureaucracies. In the 
absence of more radical reforms this mechanism offers the best prospects for further improvements to 
public transport services in Pakistan in the medium term. In other Less Developed Countries, with 
similar regulatory problems and similarly deficient bureaucracies, it may also be possible to emulate 
this success. Recommendations are made for further research. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Urban Public Transport Problems in Less Developed Countries 
Public transport problems are significant in urban areas due to the fact that around half of the 
world's population lives in these areas. The number of large cities is increasing rapidly. 
Tolley and Turton (1995) reported that in 1950 there were only 5 cities with more than 5 
million residents, but by the year 2000 this number is projected to over 50, with some 40 of 
these cities in the developing world. According to the World Bank estimates, on average 
urban populations in developing countries are growing at about 6 percent per annum. The 
total urban population in these countries was estimated at 800 million in 1980 and was 
expected to have more than doubled to 2000 million by the year 2000 (World Bank, 1986). 
This urban population growth has resulted in a large number of trips and massive increases 
in transport demand. Armstrong-Wright (1993) anticipated that there is a greater likelihood 
that public transport will be used in preference to walking or cycling, especially with the 
increased distances involved as a city grows. He argued that most LDC cities are 
characterised by low car ownership, and personal motorised transport is still beyond the reach 
of the large majority. Moreover, any general increases in real incomes are likely to encourage 
greater use of public transport, as well as higher car ownership levels, since the urban poor 
often cannot even afford public transport. Other factors contributing to the growth in public 
transport demand are the locational patterns of the urban poor and longer distance journeys 
(Maunder, 1984), changing life styles such as growing number of women in labour force, and 
the youthful age structure of society (Fouracre and Maunder, 1987). As a result, it is to be 
expected that there would be enormous potential increase in the demand for urban public 
transport in rapidly expanding LDC cities. 
Most trips in LDCs are made in some form of public transport or on foot/bicycle. Public 
transport in LDC cities is characterised by a wide range of vehicles in use and services on 
offer. These include; full size buses and minibuses at different levels of technology; 
paratransit vehicles such as shared taxis, converted pickups, vans, autorickshaws (motorcycle 
engine powered 3-wheel vehicles), animal drawn carts and pedal rickshaws. In most cities 
taxis are available for individual use. In a few large cities, a form of rail mass transit also 
exists or in under construction (Armstrong-Wright, 1993). 
In most LDC cities public transport is road based, with a variety of vehicle types employed 
in one of two main ways: either providing bus-like services with fixed routes and fares, or 
taxi-like services (White, 1990). As Jacobs et al (1986) pointed out many of these cities will 
still be relying exclusively for many years to come on road based systems. This view point 
was supported by a TRRL study of urban rail transit development in LDCs. The study 
indicated that such projects could only be sensibly justified in economic terms for very high 
flow corridors (more than 70,000 passenger trips per day), associated with other factors for 
success such as high and sustained growth in population and wealth. Only a few corridors in 
a few cities will be able to meet this criteria (Fouracre and Gardner, 1992). The World Bank 
considered that the major drawback of rail transit projects is their massive construction and 
operating costs which may prove excessively burdensome on city Budgets (World Bank, 
1986). 
Bayliss (1981) confidently predicted that "the bus will become an even more important 
carrier in large cities, because the expansion of car ownership and rail facilities will be 
unable to keep pace with growing demand. " To date there is nothing to discredit this view 
point in LDCs. 
There were considerable increases in bus fleets, routes operated and passengers carried during 
the 1970s in LDC cities (Barat, 1985; Jacobs et al, 1986). In many cities buses provide the 
main means of transport for a significant share of journeys. In Kingston, Jamaica, it has been 
estimated that 43 percent of all work trips (Heraty, 1980), in Kuala Lumpur 34 percent 
(Eastman and Pickering, 1981) and in Indian cities an average 38 percent (Fouracre et al, 
1981) were by bus, with dependence on this mode being higher for the lower income groups 
(Hilling, 1996). A World Bank estimate put the number of daily bus trips at 600 million in 
third world cities in 1980, with that number expected to double by the year 2000 (World 
Bank, 1986). More recent evidence suggests no change in these general trends. In the African 
cities of Abidjan, Nairobi and Kinshasa, for example, bus passengers increased at average 
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rates of between 6 to 10 percent per annum during 1980-90 (Transurb Consult-Inrets, 1991). 
Notwithstanding such increases many studies reported that both the quantity and the quality 
of public transport services was inadequate. In many cities the services were overcrowded, 
were of low quality, and were insufficient in spatial coverage (World Bank, 1986; Affan, 
1986; Bolade, 1987; Camara and Banister, 1993). In consequence, the number of paratransit 
services had been growing (World Bank, 1986; Hilling, 1996). 
Armstrong-Wright (1993) considered the reasons for the inadequacy of road based urban 
public transport. First, there was a lack of investment in new vehicles and spares due to the 
imposition of low fares and restricted access to funds. Second, traffic congestion and/or 
poorly paved roads caused slow journey speeds and breakdowns leading to high operating 
costs. In addition, operators were confronted with severe congestion as a result of the growing 
volumes of cars. Finally, there were inappropriate government regulations and restrictions on 
the choice of vehicles. 
Traffic congestion occurs in all cities of both LDCs and DCs. Cities in LDCs confront all the 
traffic problems found in DCs, such as insufficient capacity of roads, on-street parking and 
vehicle loading, conflicting traffic movements, and heavy through traffic (Affan, 1986). 
However, in LDCs congestion is often worse despite the low rate of motorised vehicles per 
capita, because of narrow streets, multiple street uses and high population densities 
(Armstrong-Wright, 1993). In addition the LDC cities, have to contend with on-street trade 
activities, many hand-drawn and animal-drawn carts, poor road surface conditions, streets 
clogged with stationary and broken down vehicles, bad traffic management and a lack of 
traffic regulations. According to Proudlove and Turner (1990), activities of living, sleeping, 
working and trading take place in the street, and increasing motor vehicle traffic is caiising 
more and more congestion in third world cities. Although delays apply to all vehicles, buses 
are particularly susceptible. Jacobs et al (1991) reported a reputation of poor bus productivity 
and long journey times in LDCs due to traffic congestion. 
In general, many of the problems of urban public transport are associated with government 
regulations and policies formulated for its planning and operation. These regulations cover 
three aspects of provision; fares, quality and quantity controls; as well as on-street regulation. 
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In most LDCs, fares are controlled by governments. It is rare for fares to be regulated on the 
basis of reliable financial or economic analysis, with operators under pressure to keep fares 
low despite rising costs (Briggs, 1989; Armstrong-Wright, 1993). Quantity controls, being the 
restrictive market entry for various type and size of vehicles, have also had detrimental effects 
on the efficiency and effectiveness of public transport. The enforcement of quality standards 
and on-street regulation is weak, which is reflected in reckless driving practices and 
inadequate route networks and service frequencies (Armstrong-Wright and Thiriez, 1987). 
World Bank studies have pointed out that over regulation of urban transport services is often 
evident (World Bank, 1975; World Bank, 1986). It can be argued that government regulation 
has failed to achieve its aim to protect the public. 
Gwilliam and Van de Velde (1990) explain the need for regulatory reforms resulting from 
market failures. 
"Market regulation typically arises when government feels itself unable to achieve its 
objectives while the market is free. So it sets up political, administrative and regulatory 
structures to achieve those objectives. Economic agents adapt their behaviour to the 
regulation, and economic performance is the outcome. The longer a regulatory regime is 
in place, the greater is the possibility of regulatory failures associated with distorted 
inducements and regulatory capture. Demand for regulatory reforms thus tends to arise 
from the changes from the perceived balance between the opposing dangers of market and 
regulatory failure" (Gwilliam and Van de Velde, 1990: 333). 
To overcome the problems attributable to public transport regulation, various regulatory 
reforms have been implemented in both DCs and LDCs; for instance in Britain, Chile and Sri 
Lanka. The policy reforms employed in these countries vary from partial to full quantity and 
fares deregulation (White, 1995; Fernandez, 1994; Roth and Diandas, 1995). The outcomes 
of the regulatory reforms also vary from country to country (see chapter 3 for details). It can 
be argued that the balance of advantages and disadvantages from regulatory reforms will 
depend on local circumstances and the nature of regulatory regimes which apply at that time 
(Russell and Anjum, 1997). Gwilliam and Van de Velde also suggested that "regulation can 
be best judged in terms of the specific objectives of government and history of the 
regulatory environment" (Gwilliam and Van de Velde, 1990: 333). 
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In Pakistan, urban public transport has been' and in most places still is subject to extensive 
regulation. As a consequence of inappropriate regulation and government policies, the quantity 
and quality of public transport services do not meet the travel demands of a rapidly growing 
urban population. As a result, potential passengers choose alternative modes of travel. In order 
to address this problem, in some cities the regulation of urban public transport is now 
channelled through Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) formed specifically for this 
purpose. The NGOs have assumed delegated responsibilities for the quantity, quality and fares 
regulation of services, innovation of potential interests and wider application elsewhere. 
This research examines urban public transport regulation in Pakistan by setting the aims and 
objectives outlined in the following section. 
1.2 Aims and Objectives of the Research 
A systematic approach in conducting a research involves developing explicit research 
questions and formulating specific aims and objectives for the research. Weiss and Bucuvulas 
(1980) indicate that research suggests that studies which are rated higher on methodological 
quality are also rated higher on their usefulness. Some styles of research require researchers 
to firm these up at an early stage, others encourage their modification as the research 
progresses (Robson, 1996). In conducting this research on regulatory frameworks for urban 
public transport, the aims and objectives were formulated at the early stages and refined 
gradually. 
The general aims of this research are (a) to understand the problems of regulating urban 
public transport in Pakistan, and (b) to provide the basis for a more rational framework that 
can assist with the formulation of regulations and policies in Pakistan. In particular, the 
research explores the following specific objectives. 
1. To review government regulations and policies regarding quantity controls, fares, 
safety and other quality controls, subsidies and grants, together with their associated 
institutional arrangements, and to assess their influence on quality of service; 
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2. To examine the market for services at different fare levels, for different income and 
population groups, and specifically to study the potential for better quality services; 
3. To analyze recent regulatory and traffic management interventions and their effects 
on quality of service; and 
4. To identify and make recommendations for public transport planning/regulatory 
improvements which would be attractive and potentially feasible to implement in the 
Pakistani context. 
1.3 The Research Approach 
At the outset a research proposal was drafted on the basis of secondary data sources and the 
researcher's personal knowledge of the public transport problems in Lahore. The research 
proposal was further refined in the light of broader literature review on provision and 
planning of urban public transport in DCs and particularly in LDC context. Key issues related 
to urban public transport planning are fare regulations, quantity and quality regimes, on-street 
traffic management/regulation, and subsidies and taxation policies affecting operators. 
Keeping in view these issues, secondary data on public transport in Lahore was gathered 
through correspondence. Data procurement through correspondence remained a continuing 
feature throughout the course of the research. Preliminary analysis of this data was made. It 
was realised that in order to have a deeper understanding of urban public transport regulation, 
operation and its problems, a field visit was required. Consequently, six major cities in 
Pakistan were visited during July-September 1995, data was collected on various aspects of 
urban public transport policies and regulation. From these cities, Lahore and Faisalabad were 
selected as case study cities. Reasons for adopting this approach and the basis for the 
selection of the case studies are presented in Chapter Two. 
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Data collected during this field visit was analyzed, gaps identified, and case study survey 
work was planned. A further literature review was undertaken, in particular to identify good 
practice models of urban public transport regulation, utilizing the experience of DCs. Then 
a second field visit was made to conduct comprehensive surveys in the case study cities and 
to collect requisite information from Federal Government offices. The methods employed for 
the collection of data for the research are described in Chapter Two. A final stage of analysis 
was then undertaken. A summary of the research approach is presented in Figure I. I. 
1.4 Structure of the Research 
The thesis is organised in eight chapters. Chapter 1 introduces a summary of urban public 
transport problems, aims and objectives of research, the approach adopted and the structure 
of the research. 
Chapter 2 describes the methodological base for the thesis and methods employed for the data 
collection and analysis for this research. 
Chapter 3 reviews urban public transport regulation and policies as documented in the 
literature. The various regulatory regimes along-with strengths and weaknesses, and their 
impact on public transport services are described. The outcomes of deregulation policies 
implemented in DCs and LDCs are also reviewed in this chapter. The literature review 
provides a basis for identification of public transport regulatory improvements for Pakistan, 
as discussed in chapter 7. 
Chapter 4 presents background information about the country and reviews the overall 
government policies and initiatives regarding urban public transport in Pakistan. The current 
regulatory systems in practice and their effects on urban public transport in various provinces 
are also described in this chapter. The need for a detailed case study analysis is also 
highlighted. 
Chapter 5 provides evidence from the city of Lahore where poorly administered public 
transport has resulted in inadequate supply and low quality of services. The regulatory 
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arrangements for public transport are reviewed and their impact both on publicly-owned and 
private sector services is evaluated. The evidence of demand from a household survey is 
analyzed and public transport problems in the city are discussed. 
Chapter 6 evaluates the overall public transport situation in Faisalabad with particular 
reference to the services offered and their effectiveness under regulation through an NGO. It 
provides an account of the organisational structure, operational characteristics, and regulatory 
regimes and their enforcement by the Society. The impact of regulation and enforcement on 
the performance and quality of services offered by the Society is also evaluated. This chapter 
also compares user views about the stage carriage passenger services currently offered under 
two different regulatory regimes. 
Chapter 7 synthesises the analyses presented in the previous chapters. The analysis is further 
supplemented by a discussion of results from in-depth interviews focusing on wider regulatory 
issues. The findings are discussed in terms of the implications for practice in reforming the 
present regulatory regimes for public transport. A comparative analysis of government 
regulation and NGO based regulation, with its impact on public transport services, is 
provided. In this chapter reasons are also presented for the success of NGO regulatory model. 
The final chapter presents a summary of deductions from the research. Future research issues 
stemming from these conclusions are explored along with recommendations for current 
practice and policy. 
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Chapter 2 Methodology 
2.1 Introduction 
"A methodology is a general approach to studying a research topic. It establishes how one 
will go about studying any phenomenon" (Silverman, 1993). This chapter describes the 
methodological base for the thesis, introducing the methodology followed and the methods 
used to conduct the research. 
This research deals with a range of regulatory and traffic management systems and review 
of policies affecting urban public transport in Pakistan. Hence a variety of methods are 
employed in conducting the research, and are devised in the context of specified research aims 
and objectives. The methods include; literature review, personal observation, the use of 
current and historical data, in-depth interviewing, study of relevant documents and records 
from local, provincial and federal departments/agencies associated with urban transport, 
correspondence, household surveys and passenger surveys. These methods are described in 
the following sections. 
The research is primarily based on literature review and a case study approach. Reasons for 
this approach and the basis for the selection of case study cities in Pakistan are presented in 
section 2.3. Section 2.4 gives a detailed account of the methods applied in this research. A 
summary of methods employed for data collection is given at the end of this chapter. The 
final section of this chapter describes the analysis. 
2.2 Literature Review 
Background readings on urban transport planning were undertaken, and a comprehensive 
literature review on urban public transport and traffic management in LDCs was conducted. 
In addition, the literature was also reviewed on regulatory frameworks for road based public 
transport in developed countries with special reference to Great Britain. The literature review 
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covered books on public transport planning and research methods, articles published in 
journals, international conference proceedings, Ph. D. theses, reports prepared by international 
agencies (particularly the publications of the World Bank), reports prepared by the TRL, UK 
and annual proceedings of the seminars/conference organised by the PTRC, UK. 
2.3 Case Study Approach and the Selection of Case Study Cities 
`A singular case, the sign of the four' remarked Holmes (Casley and Lury, 1987). 
Much real world research is effectively `Case Study Research'. Robson (1996) describes that 
a case study is a strategy of doing research using multiple sources of evidence, which 
involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon. There is direct 
interest in the `thing' to be studied in its own right (whether this is a country, a town, a 
village, a person or whatever) rather than as a statistical sample from a population (Robson, 
1996). Detailed case study is required to identify cause and effect mechanisms, while broader 
survey is required to show that such mechanisms are generally applicable, by establishing 
statistical correlations. Casley and Lury (1987) emphasise that case studies are particularly 
appropriate when a high level of analytical content is required. Recently there is a growing 
trend to opt for case study approach in conducting social research (eg Yin, 1989). 
A case study approach is seen as necessary for a number of reasons. In developing countries 
data are not readily available (Romaya, 1996) and collection of intensive data in these 
countries is almost always an expensive operation (Casley and Lury, 1987). Therefore, the use 
of the case study approach is appropriate. The study of all the factors that make-up regulatory 
regimes for public transport system and influence its service quality, is data-intensive. To 
understand problems and to gain knowledge about public transport services in all cities of 
Pakistan would demand extensive field work simply because of the inadequacy of secondary 
data sources and the difficulties associated with the use of mailed questionnaires. In addition, 
the essential methodological feature of a case study is that it enables in-depth, detailed 
analysis. That is its strength, and it means that study is generally carried out by a professional, 
sometimes with a few qualified assistants. For these reasons, a case study strategy is followed 
in this research. 
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To gain an overall understanding of urban public transport regulation, operation and its 
problems throughout Pakistan, most major cities (Lahore, Peshawar, Quetta, Islamabad, 
Rawalpindi, Faisalabad) in all provinces were visited during July-September, 1995. In-depth 
interviews with public transport operators and regulators were conducted in addition to the 
collection of secondary data sources. Information from Karachi was obtained through 
correspondence as this city could not be visited because of law and order problems. From 
these cities, Lahore and Faisalabad were selected for detailed case study. 
Lahore was chosen as one of the case study cities primarily because it is one of the large 
cities of LDCs, the provincial capital of Punjab and the second largest city of Pakistan. The 
city accommodates an estimated population of over 6 million. Lahore is also typical of many 
large cities in LDCs, including others in Pakistan, and shares and exemplifies many of the 
public transport problems to be found in them. Public transport services are seen to be 
inadequate and offering poor quality. In addition, Lahore was selected as a case study city for 
the following reasons. First, the researcher's personal knowledge of the city and awareness 
of public transport problems as well as contacts with various government officials; second, 
the availability of relatively large amounts of data from previous studies; third, the familiarity 
of the research supervisors with Lahore. 
Faisalabad is the second case study city undertaken for this research. Faisalabad was founded 
in the colonial period and is now one of the fastest growing cities in Pakistan. It is a large 
industrial centre with an estimated population of 1.63 million in 1994 which is expected to 
reach 2.5 million by the end of the year 2000 (EPAP/World Bank/ADB, 1993). It was chosen 
primarily, because of its innovative public transport regulation. The government has 
channelled the regulation of urban public transport in Faisalabad through the Faisalabad Urban 
Transport Society (FUTS), a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) formed for this purpose. 
The Society started stage carriage services, with the active participation of local private 
operators in 1994. It has assumed delegated responsibilities for the quantity, quality and fares 
regulation of services under its control. Therefore, Faisalabad provided an opportunity to 
study this new form of public transport regulation and to analyze its effectiveness in the 
context of overall public transport provision there. 
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2.4 Methods Employed for Data Collection 
Most literature on methods for collecting data on social sciences is concerned with the design 
of data collection and use of appropriate methods of investigation (Burgess, 1984; Oppenhein, 
1992; Norman and Yvona, 1984). Relatively few publications are specifically related to the 
equally important issue of the means of collecting data, i. e. a series of actions to develop field 
skills in collecting data. 
The methods for data collection used included, apart from the literature review; collection and 
collation of secondary data sources; direct observation; in-depth interviews conducted with 
key officials; public transport operators; household surveys; and passenger surveys. The roles 
for these methods are explained in the following sections. 
2.4.1 Collection and collation of secondary data 
The secondary data sources collected and utilized from Pakistan included; reports prepared 
by the National Transport Research Centre Islamabad; reports and studies and plans prepared 
by various consultants development authorities and agencies for major cities of Pakistan; 
reports and reviews prepared by publicly-owned corporations; publications of Federal and 
Provincial Governments, such as Five Year Plans, the Economic Survey of Pakistan, hand 
books of the Statistical Division, Government of Pakistan. In addition, articles and news given 
in the Pakistani newspapers were also utilized. 
2.4.2 Direct observation 
Personal observations are also a useful source of information. This method was initiated by 
anthropologists, and has been used by social researchers such as urban planners (Silverman, 
1993). Observation in research context means deep examination of a particular aspect of study 
by the researchers themselves. Some researchers prefer to apply participant observation to get 
a deeper understanding of the situation (Bryman, 1988). 
As a teacher at the DCRP and as a planning consultant, the researcher has been involved in 
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conducting various urban planning surveys in different cities of Pakistan. The researcher 
supervised surveys conducted by the final year town planning students in connection with the 
preparation of structure plan projects for various cities, viz Attock, Mansehra, Abottabad and 
Sahiwal. As a consultant, the researcher has undertaken planning surveys including traffic and 
transport surveys as part of projects such as the Comprehensive Study of Transportation 
System in Lahore (JICA/TEPA, 1991) etc. Involvement in various such projects has provided 
opportunities for a deep observation of various planning issues, and particularly, those related 
to public transport problems provided a valuable source of information. 
During the course of this study too, an attempt was made to gain deeper understanding of the 
situation through some participant observations. During the first field visit in 1995, some 
observational work was done in a limited time. The researcher observed very closely the 
traffic conditions and operation and functioning of various public transport operators in the 
six major cities of Pakistan visited. Personal notes and photographs were always taken to 
highlight typical situations. These notes and photographs were used in subsequent analysis. 
In 1996, the researcher made in-depth observations in the two case study cities. To know 
about the working of private sector operators and to confirm general passenger responses 
about the service, the author travelled himself from time to time in different public transport 
modes. The practices of drivers and conductors' behaviour with passengers were observed. 
Similarly, the stoppage pattern by drivers and the boarding behaviour of passengers was 
observed while standing at some of the busiest bus stops. The functioning of the traffic police 
was also observed closely while standing at road inter-sections for some time. 
Apart from in-depth interviews conducted with the officials of the regulatory bodies and 
public transport operators, an attempt was made to explore details of problems related to 
issuing of route permits and vehicle fitness certificates. The researcher attended the office of 
the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority (RTA) and the Motor Vehicle Examiner in 
Lahore. The working of the staff was observed for a few days and personal notes were taken 
from existing office files. He also met with private operators who visited the RTA office to 
inquire about the fate of their applications regarding route permits for their vehicles. These 
meetings provided opportunities to the researcher to develop awareness of workings below 
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the surface of bureaucratic procedures. In Faisalabad, office proceedings under the new form 
of regulation were also observed by attending the FUTS office. Information was gathered 
about all aspects of regulation and enforcement, such as the allocation of routes and 
procedures for imposing fines on defaulters. 
The researcher also utilised information on public transport issues appeared in various 
newspapers and on internet. 
2.4.3 In-depth interviews 
In general the aim in using in-depth interviews is to obtain different viewpoints which 
increase the ability to interpret data. The interviews in this study were based on the interview 
guide approach. An interview guide is a list of questions that are explored in the course of 
the interview. The interview guide also enables the interviewer to probe and explore issues 
that will elucidate and illuminate that particular subject. Nonetheless it leaves the respondents 
to express their views and experiences in their own words rather than in preconceived 
categories devised by the researcher (Patton, 1987 & Bryman, 1988). The advantages of this 
approach are that: 
0 the interviewer has decided how best to use the limited time available in the interview; 
" it helps to make interviewing across a number of different people more systematic and 
comprehensive by delimiting in advance the issues to be explored; 
" logical gaps in the data can be anticipated and closed; and 
The use of this in-depth qualitative interview approach ensures that responses are in no way 
constrained (Patton, 1987). Many researchers now believe that the aim of a case study using 
in-depth interview approach is not to derive the findings from a sample of a population by 
using frequencies and statistical generalization, but to test whether theory applies in practice 
(Silverman, 1993). 
In-depth interviews were carried out to get deeper understanding of manifold problems related 
to public transport regulations and policies in Pakistan. These interviews were conducted (in 
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two rounds (July-September 1995 and November-December 1996). The interview guide 
(schedules of questions, see Appendix-1) used in this study were designed on the following 
basis: first, to overcome the constraints of the set questionnaire format; second, to obtain 
information on the public transport regulatory issues; third, to explore issues which the 
secondary sources had not fully dealt with; fourth, to gain knowledge of individuals' 
experiences about regulatory constraints and the ways in which they perceive public transport 
problems in their own words. 
Senior government officials involved with policy making, with the regulation of urban public 
transport, and with on-street regulation and traffic management and enforcement were 
interviewed. These include officials from the following departments and agencies: Federal 
Ministry of Communication and Works; Central Board of Revenue; Secretary, Department of 
Transport Punjab; Secretaries of the Provincial and Regional Transport Authorities; Traffic 
Police; Motor Vehicle Examiners; Traffic Engineering Agencies; and Publicly-owned 
Corporations. Moreover, public transport operators, including FUTS, and public transport 
drivers were also interviewed. 
There is a general tendency in government offices in Pakistan that the officials do not always 
keep office records in order. They have a large number of files piled-up in cupboards without 
a proper filing system. Sometimes the record keepers themselves take days to trace a required 
file. Moreover, officials are generally not ready to be interviewed without having knowledge 
in advance of the questions to be asked. The senior officials then usually consult with their 
subordinates about the required information. To address this problem, the interview schedule 
along with a covering letter was mailed (recorded delivery) to the government officials. Later 
on, the author visited their offices on the date specified in the covering letter and got a date 
and time for the interview. It also happened that some officials were not prepared simply 
because their subordinates had not provided them with the requisite information. However, 
they were prepared to be interviewed a few days later i. e in rearranged interviews. On the 
other hand, the private operator associations, individual operators and staff of the FUTS did 
not take time for the preparation of interviews and these interviews proceeded directly and 
on schedule. 
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Each of the interviews with government officials lasted approximately three to four hours. The 
interview took so long because some officials were also attending to other persons during the 
course of the interview. For the sake of consistency and reliability, the author did not make 
the use of research assistants in conducting the in-depth interviews. Interviews with the 
government officials were not recorded on a tape recorder because it was felt by the officials 
that if every single word would be recorded on a tape then they would have to be conscious 
in responding the questions. However, a video was made of some government officials in 
Lahore and the officer who introduced the FUTS. The video contained only material where 
the officials were explaining something positive about public transport. After completion of 
each section of the questionnaire, the researcher read back the responses briefly to get the 
respondent's consent to the authenticity of their responses. At the end of each interview, 
detailed notes were recorded on the questionnaire. 
2.4.4 Correspondence 
A questionnaire or a list of required information was prepared on the subject matter of the 
survey and mailed to the respondents. The respondents were required to record the necessary 
items of information. This method is generally cheaper and quicker as regards the collection 
of information than the direct observation or interview method, provided that the rate of 
response is adequate and responses are accurately recorded by appropriate respondents, and 
the documents are returned within a reasonable time. 
The method of mailed questionnaire was not employed as a main means for data collection 
in this research. However, correspondence was used, through mail and telephones to obtain 
initial, supplementary and updated data. Some data on public transport problems and the 
regulatory systems in Lahore were accumulated through mailed correspondence, at the initial 
stages of the study. 
Data on public transport services in Karachi were procured by sending the schedules of 
questions alongwith covering letter to friends of the researcher (town planners working in 
Karachi). These friends passed on the schedules to the relevant officials and mailed these 
schedules back to the researcher after collecting them from the officials. This method was 
very quick and worked well in terms of generating comprehensive 'responses and filling in 
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data gaps, at very limited cost. 
Later on, most of the data was collected by the researcher through two field visits to Pakistan. 
During these field visits, some friends and relatives of the researcher were introduced to the 
various government officials and FUTS staff. Data gaps were filled through subsequent 
correspondence, with the friends and relatives mailing required information to the researcher 
after obtaining it from the relevant offices. Moreover, the friends also sent information about 
the latest developments related to public transport in Pakistan. Telephone calls were also made 
when it was necessary. 
2.4.5 Household surveys 
Passenger interview surveys provide information only on those who use the public transport, 
i. e. the current market. Nothing is learned about potential users/or users of competing modes. 
A more comprehensive understanding of the total demand for transport and how this varies 
with city structure and affluence helps in planning future developments and investments. A 
household survey should go a long way to meet this requirement (TRRL, 1987). Household 
surveys can give a general view of urban travel patterns, and this method is valuable for 
collecting information on the total amount of travel and its distribution by trip purpose, mode, 
distance etc. But home interviews are expensive to conduct for a major city like Lahore. The 
researcher made use of the existing data collected for the `Comprehensive Study of 
Transportation System in Lahore' (JICA/TEPA, 1991), and conducted a survey, which 
consisted of home interviews with nearly 1400 persons (above 5 years age) from 220 
households living in two different areas of Lahore. This survey was carried out in November 
1996. 
Selection of areas: Regarding validity, this depends on `the extent to which a survey 
accurately represents the social phenomena to which it refers' (Hammersley, 1990). For the 
household survey this depended on the selection of suitable areas in which to conduct the 
survey. Various areas inadequately served by public transport were identified (see chapter 5, 
section 7.3). Two distinct areas with different income levels were selected for household 
survey: Jauhar Town and Baghban Pura. These areas are described in chapter five. 
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Definition of household: Although there is a general agreement that household is both a 
convenient and appropriate sample unit for many surveys, there is no universal agreement as 
to its definition . Generally, household means, a group of people who live and eat together 
in the same house (Oxford Dictionary, 1991; Longman Dictionary, 1988) or a social unit 
comprised of those living together in the same dwelling place (Webster's, 1961). The 
definition of household differs from one country to another, and even within one country the 
definition may change from one survey to another. The definition adopted for the purpose of 
this study was "a household is a housing unit comprised of persons living together and 
using the same kitchen". For instance in Lahore, particularly in middle and high income 
residential localities, there are households who employ full time helpers. These helpers 
(male/female) usually live in a room specifically constructed within the premises of their 
house. In such cases, helpers are also considered as the members of the households. 
Questionnaire design: The survey questionnaire was specifically designed to examine that 
there exists a market for improved quality of services to be offered at higher fares. To assess 
the potential for public transport market, the survey included questions about various bus 
services at specified higher fare levels to cater for different passengers. The design of the 
questionnaire was based on the preliminary findings of the research which emerged from the 
first field trip made in 1995. 
The questionnaire developed included questions on household composition; vehicle ownership; 
household incomes and expenditures on travel; views about existing public transport services; 
main mode of travel of household members by trip purpose; intention to use better quality 
public transport at higher fares; and preferences for quality of service indicators (see 
Appendix-2). The local culture was considered and questions were asked in ways 
understandable to the people of Lahore. Difficult words and complicated terms were avoided 
for better communication between the interviewers and the interviewees. 
Fieldwork organisation: The things that usually do not get into the books, such as how a 
researcher gets into organizations or other research settings, how a researcher gets on when 
(s)he is there, how (s)he gets out in a way which will facilitate researchers getting back again 
are vital for all research involving people (Buchanan et al, 1988). For the purpose of 
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conducting household surveys, the researcher organised the field work in the following 
manners. First, maps of the selected areas were procured. Second, a pilot survey was 
conducted to test the appropriateness of the questionnaires drafted in Edinburgh. Third the 
questionnaires were slightly amended in the light of the pilot. Fourth, five research assistants 
were arranged and trained about the various aspects of survey (for details see chapter five). 
Promises of practical application from the information gathered from research can be seen as 
stimulating respondents to take part in the research (Oppenheim, 1992). But the researcher's 
experience in previous studies revealed that such promises also raise issues of expectations, 
which in turn can bias responses. The respondent's thinking may have a greater impact on the 
applications of findings, instead of providing the facts the researcher is looking for. The 
respondents were therefore categorically informed about the nature of this academic study and 
to have no expectations of improvements resulting from it. 
Interviews were conducted in afternoons and on week ends in order to interview all members 
of the households. The nature of the research and purpose of the survey were explained to the 
head or an adult member of the household. Some households declined to be interviewed. 
Some information was obtained from the 'head' of the household such as number of vehicles 
owned by the household members, household income and travel expenditure. Consensus views 
of the household members were recorded about existing and future use of public transport 
services and the preferences given to various aspects of service quality. However, individual 
views were recorded where there were divergences of views or interest in services; for 
instance, work or education institutional trips. The research assistants handed over the 
completed survey forms to the researcher who checked the survey forms and made sure that 
they were filled properly. 
2.4.5 Passenger surveys 
Researching 'with' is more effective than researching 'on' (Robson, 1996). In this regard it 
is important to be with users of public transport and their views should be solicited. 
Passengers views were sought in order to obtain information regarding patterns of travel and 
use of public transport, as well as attitudes and opinions about the service. To seek 
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users'views of the service and their opinions as to how improvements could be made to 
public transport services, passenger surveys were conducted in Faisalabad. Presently, two 
types of stage carriage passenger services are operating in this city; suzuki services which are 
regulated by the Government and FUTS services which are regulated by the NGO. In August, 
1995, passengers views were only obtained about fares charged by the FUTS service. 
However, comprehensive passenger surveys were conducted both for the suzuki and FLITS 
services in Faisalabad in December, 1996. 
There are various techniques which are applied to obtain passengers views about services. For 
instance, a single card may be sufficient, where the information to be obtained is fairly 
simple. Information can be quickly recorded by handing such cards to passengers for 
completion (TRRL, 1987). However, in Pakistani cities it is hard to apply this method because 
65 percent of the population is illiterate (World Bank, 1993). Instead the survey method used 
was oral interviews. 
Comprehensive survey forms were developed in order to obtain several sets of information 
on both types of public transport services operating in Faisalabad. Four research assistants 
were arranged from the Agriculture University and Ayub Research Institute in Faisalabad. 
These assistants had experience of conducting socio-economic surveys. However, they were 
briefed about the passenger surveys by the researcher. In total, 280 passengers were 
interviewed: 140 passengers on suzuki services and the same number using FUTS service. 
The surveys were conducted during working days, covering peak and off-peak periods. The 
survey forms completed by the research assistants were handed in daily and were checked by 
the researcher overnight. In order to get a representative picture, passengers from different 
sections of the routes were randomly selected and interviewed. Most interviews were 
conducted at bus stops (see chapter 6). 
2.5 Analysis 
Analysis of data gathered through this study was undertaken in three main stages. The first 
stage of analysis deals with information gathered through mailed correspondence, at the initial 
stages of the study, and data collected during the first field visit to Pakistan over July - 
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September 1995. A paper was presented at the AESOP conference on the basis of preliminary 
information gathered through mailed correspondence (Russell and Anjum, 1995). Secondary 
data was also analyzed, and this was supplemented by inductive analysis of the qualitative 
data derived from the initial in-depth interviews conducted during first field visit. The AESOP 
paper was supplemented and modified in the light of analysis made in 1996, and a review 
article on public transport planning in Pakistan was published in Transport Reviews (Russell 
and Anjum, 1997a). 
Some new and interesting initiatives emerged from the field study visit in Faisalabad. An 
analysis of these developments was undertaken and a further paper was written up and 
published in Transport Reviews (Anjum and Russell, 1997). Findings from the study were 
also presented in an annual research seminar held in the school on March 13,1996. Data gaps 
in the study were identified and needs for further analysis were clarified. A paper was also 
presented at the Inter-Schools conference held in Huddersfield University (Anjum, 1996). 
The second stage of analysis deals with data collected through the second field visit to 
Pakistan in 1996. During this visit comprehensive surveys were conducted in the case study 
cities, and additional information was collected to fill in data gaps. Data from both household 
surveys and passenger surveys were tabulated. Simple frequency tables were prepared and 
some analysis was undertaken using the SPSS package for social sciences. Analysis of cross 
tabulation from the questionnaire results was undertaken to assess the association between 
variables. In addition, graphics were produced using the Harvard Graphics package. A few 
maps were prepared by using a mapping software (Map Viewer). The qualitative data derived 
from the follow-up interviews was also analyzed at this stage. A paper was presented, on the 
basis of this more comprehensive analysis, at the International Conference held in Leeds on 
May, 1997 (Russell and Anjum, 1997b). 
The third stage of analysis was undertaken when all available information, including 
information collected through subsequent correspondence, was analyzed in the light of the 
structure formulated for the study. An overall synthesis of analyses is presented in chapter 
seven 
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Table 2.1 : Summary of methods employed for data collection arranged by objectives 
Objectives Methods Employed 
Review of regulations and policies and Data collected from secondary sources 
their impact on quantity and quality of 
service Data collected on the Federal Government policies for imports and 
taxation of public transport vehicles 
Interviews conducted with the Federal Government officials 
Interviews conducted with the officials of Provincial Transport 
Authorities, Regional Transport Authorities, Secretary Transport 
Government of the Punjab, Motor Vehicle Examiners and Traffic 
Police 
Interviews conducted with private and public sector operators, and 
private operators associations 
Interviews conducted with public transport drivers 
Analysis of market for services at Information collected from secondary sources 
different fare levels 
Use of household survey data conducted in 1990 in Lahore 
(IICAI TEPA, 1991) 
Use of passengers survey data conducted in 1990 in Lahore 
(JICAITEPA, 1991) 
Passengers surveys for FUTS and suzuki services in Faisalabad 
Household surveys conducted in Lahore 
Regulatory and traffic management Literature reviewed 
interventions 
Case studies from Lahore and Faisalabad regarding public transport 
regulatory interventions 
Use of secondary sources on existing traffic management measures 
employed in Pakistan 
Interviews conducted with officials of Traffic Engineering agencies 
and Traffic police 
Identification of public transport Literature reviewed 
planning/ regulatory improvements for 
Pakistan Studies of the public transport system in Pakistani cities 
More specific case studies from Faisalabad and Lahore 
Data from household survey conducted under the FDA study (FDA, 
1997) 
Evaluation of service quality offered by the FUTS 
Interviews conducted with FUTS officials 
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Chapter 3 Urban Public Transport Policies And Regulation: 
Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature on government regulations and regulatory policies for 
urban public transport in LDC context. In some sections there is an overlapping of issues as 
regulation and deregulation are discussed from differing perspectives. Section 2 discusses 
prevalent government policies which tend to undermine the role of urban public transport. The 
main policies involved are direct intervention of government in the operation of public sector 
services, policies towards subsidies, and financial incentives and taxes affecting operation. The 
origin and basis of regulation are reviewed in section 3. Section 4 covers the various 
regulatory measures directly associated with public transport operations, and on-street traffic 
management measures indirectly affecting public transport performance. Enforcement issues 
associated with regulation are the subject of section 5. Section 6 illustrates the impact of 
public transport regulatory regimes and their enforcement with a brief case study from India. 
To overcome the problems attributable to regulation, deregulation policies have been 
implemented in many countries. These policies vary from partial to complete quantity and 
fares deregulation. The various deregulation measures introduced in DCs and LDCs are 
reviewed and the literature on the outcomes of deregulation is analyzed in sections 6 and 7. 
Section 8 reviews the various alternatives of competition. Good practice regulatory models 
of urban public transport both in DCs and LDCs are reviewed in section 9. The final section 
presents a summary of findings. 
3.2 Urban Public Transport Policies 
3.2.1 State intervention and public ownership 
The review of literature confirms that in many LDCs, the problems of urban public transport 
have been compounded due to the nature of the involvement of government. The main forms 
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of government intervention affecting operators include; the imposition of social and unfunded 
obligations, and maintenance of unremunerative services; and direct political involvement in 
the managerial affairs of state bus companies. The public ownership of public transport 
services, in particular, has often been a channel for improper intervention (Hoen and Kuik, 
1992; Armstrong-Wright, 1993; Gwilliam, 1997). 
There has been a persistent belief in government agencies that various aspects of public 
service (for example provision of a reasonable level of service and fares for those in outlying 
locations) can only be maintained through the continued existence of a publicly owned 
operator. In fact, the objectives of government are often not being accomplished through the 
presence of publicly owned bus services (World Bank, 1986). As evidence witness Istanbul 
(Turkey), where subsidy was provided to a nationalised bus company with the objectives to 
keep fares down for the urban poor and serve outlying areas. In fact this company was 
reported to serve most of the dense, high income areas, whereas the minibuses and Halk buses 
(private unsubsidised services) serve predominantly low-income areas at the same fares 
charged by the public bus company. Moreover, these private services are sometimes banned 
from serving high income areas simply in order to protect the publicly-owned services (Feibel, 
1987). 
Armstrong-Wright (1993) states that one of the principal reasons for the failure of public 
sector operators is that the companies are subject to direct political involvement in managerial 
affairs such as recruitment of staff, and commercial strategies. High costs of these services 
are associated with excessive staffing. In general, the operating bus to employee ratios are 
high in LDC cities, as reported for Lagos 13; Jakarta 14; Calcutta 21 and Accra 28. Gwilliam 
(1997) also emphasises that in many countries the number of staff per vehicle in the public 
sector, which should not exceed about 5 in any well managed company - has exceeded 20. 
He reports that in Caracas, the number of staff per operating bus had reached 60 before public 
sector bus operations were discontinued. In some countries a reduced staff per vehicle ratio 
has not affected the overall functioning of publicly owned bus undertakings. For example, in 
a bold operational streamlining, staff per vehicle was reduced from over 10 to 5 by the 
Transport Board in Barbados. As a result, revenue support to the Transport Board was 
drastically reduced but there was otherwise no improvement in the overall performance due 
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to various government interventions (Memoire, 1996). 
A common form of government intervention is the imposition of obligations on the operators 
to offer free or reduced fares to a wide range of passenger categories (see section 4.2). With 
the disappearance of the fiscal basis for such subsidy in many countries, the continuing legal 
commitment to widespread low fares has contributed to a financial crisis resulting in 
deterioration of assets and services. For example, in the states of the former Soviet Union for 
the first four years after political liberalization up to 70 percent of riders travelled free, cost 
recovery was as low as 10 percent, and the number of buses on the road declined rapidly 
(Gwilliam, 1997). 
As the financial condition of the public sector services has declined it has become 
increasingly difficult to afford to maintain vehicles, which have dropped out of service. As 
services have declined, so has patronage and revenue, which has fuelled further decline. 
Consequently in some cities in LDCs, most of these services have either disappeared or been 
privatised (Gwilliam, 1997). For instance, publicly owned bus services provided in some 
Nigerian cities disappeared due to bad management of revenues and poor performance (Ezeife 
and Bolade, 1984). In Lagos, between 1985-87 the state corporation's depots comprised 
grave-yards for buses but things have improved a little since then (Maunder and Khezwana, 
1994). 
In some LDCs, after recognizing the drawbacks of public ownership of bus undertakings, 
governments have privatized them (Gwilliam, 1996). In Kingston (Jamaica), as a result of 
huge monthly financial losses ($ 1 million) the assets of Jamaica Omnibus service were leased 
to the private sector in the mid 1980s . Similarly, in Argentina, following a period of growing 
inefficiency and cost, the operation of public bus services was abandoned in 1992. Vehicles 
were transferred to owner operators (Gwilliam, 1996; Gwilliam and Scurfield, 1996; Salvucci, 
1997). 
In LDC context, some authors still believe that the performance of bus undertakings can be 
improved under a suitable form of ownership, such as a public-private joint venture, and 
independent management. 
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"To combine adequacy and efficiency of public transport services, the existing public 
transport and private transport companies may merge together to form a joint public 
transport venture..... It may secure an optimum supply of new buses to supplement its 
services in less well used routes and on narrow roads.... The management of this company 
may adopt all private business practices.... It must have the freedom to fix its fares in view 
of its both running and fixed costs and determine its own routes" (Affan, 1986: 81-82). 
In a number of LDC cities bus companies are owned partly by public authorities and partly 
by private enterprises. In some cases, a large share of the company is held by an overseas bus 
manufacturer or supplier. There are several examples of this arrangement which appeared to 
be successful in improving the financial performance of companies (Armstrong-Wright and 
Thiriez, 1987; Maunder et al, 1994). The following examples illustrate this arrangement. 
Maunder et al (1994) report that in order to address public transport problems, and to attempt 
to ensure more adequate and efficient services, the government of Zimbabwe participated 
directly in the urban public transport sector. For instance in Harare, the government acquired 
51 percent shares in the Zimbabwe Passenger United Company (previously in private 
ownership) in 1988. The remaining 49% of shares were held by the United Transport Group 
(owned by a UK based company, Stagecoach). An important aspect of the new partnership 
was a management contract which gave the United Transport Group the responsibility of 
management of the company for a period of six years without any direct government 
involvement. The impact of this form of participation was a gradual reduction in average 
passenger waiting time, a significant decrease in the number of breakdowns, a higher level 
of fleet availability, and a substantial improvement in bus productivity (Maunder et al, 1994). 
However, the findings from another study by Mbara and Maunder (1995) show that stage bus 
patronage decreased, principally as a result of fare increases, but some of the loss in 
patronage has clearly been due to non-fares effects such as inflationary factors, drought and 
economic recession. 
Armstrong-Wright and Thiriez (1987) reported another example of mixed ownership 
prevailing in Dakkar. In the SOTRAC bus undertaking 64 percent of the shares were owned 
by the state, 27 percent by an overseas bus manufacturer, and the remainder by local private 
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interests. A three-year contract formalised the relationship between SOTRAC and the Land 
Transport Directorate of the Ministry of Equipment, responsible for setting fares and 
monitoring performance. Subsidy for the SOTRAC was fixed at a maximum of $ 3.5 million 
in 1986. It operated 458 full size buses, of which 85-90 percent were put into service every 
day. The company employed 7 staff per bus. The contracting approach and mixed ownership, 
with regular fares revision and compensation for concessionary fares, resulted in substantial 
increases in productivity and financial performance. 
These examples illustrate that public ownership, in LDC context, need not necessarily result 
in inefficiency, provided suitable institutional constraints are in place to ensure the 
management is independent and at arms length from government. 
3.2.2 Subsidies and grants 
Subsidies for public transport can be given for either or both capital and operating expenses 
(World Bank, 1986; Giannopoulos, 1989). 
a. Operating subsidies 
Public transport services are owned and operated by both state operators and private 
enterprise. Where the state has assumed control the profit motive is not always uppermost and 
prices charged to consumers can often be the equivalent to or less than the actual cost of 
transportation. The deficit is usually covered by a subsidy, which is often applied as a part 
of a deliberate policy to encourage the use of particular service which may be uneconomic 
but is seen by the state as worthy of support on social grounds (Giannopoulos, 1989; Tolley 
and Turton, 1995). 
According to the World Bank (1986) governments generally grant operating subsidies with 
the primary objective of providing the public with adequate services at lower fare levels. 
Authorities justify subsidies mainly on two grounds. First, the government has the 
responsibility to provide the public with satisfactory services at affordable fares. Second, 
subsidies will encourage motorists to use public transport instead of using their own cars and 
thus reduce road congestion. 
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Many examples of heavily subsidised services can be found in the DCs where subsidies are 
given both public and private sector operators. Simpson describes that "It is common for 
public transport operators to receive contributions, usually from the local government, for 
reduced fares for the disabled, large families, school children, the elderly or other groups 
for whom it is recognized that public transport provides a service below the cost of 
operation and below the level of benefits to the passengers. Moreover, most public transport 
authorities provide a service more frequent than is justified on economic criteria, 
particularly off-peak" (Simpson, 1994: 182-83). 
In most cases the goal of subsidy has been only partially achieved. The impact of subsidies 
given to public transport in DCs were studied by the TRRL in 1980. The following are the 
findings of the TRRL study as reported in a World Bank study (1986). 
" Where subsidies were introduced patronage increased because of more intensive use 
by existing users rather than attracting additional users. 
" Subsidies given to attract car drivers generally have had very little effect because of 
the high value placed on the convenience of private cars. 
" Subsidies designed to reduce fares and improve service quality have had limited 
success. Only about half the subsidy was actually reflected in lower fares, and there 
was little improvement in service. 
" In most cases, increased subsidies have resulted in lower productivity and in 
substantial leakages of the subsidy into large staffs, wages, and unit costs. 
" In most of the countries studied, subsidies once introduced have grown substantially. 
Subsidies in LDCs are generally provided to publicly owned public transport services to 
operate at low fare levels that are affordable by the urban poor. The literature shows that the 
contemplated benefits from subsidies are generally disappointing and difficult to sustain. In 
his review of urban public transport in third world cities, Armstrong-Wright (1993) states that 
high subsidies were being received by urban bus companies; for instance in Calcutta, $ 10 
million, Cairo, $ 26 million and Bangkok, $ 30 million. In Sao Paulo, the public bus service 
received a massive annual subsidy of $ 90 million. In these cities, actual effects are quite 
different from those intended. One of the major causes of failure to achieve anticipated results 
is that the existence of subsidies eliminates the incentive to reduce costs or to increase 
29 
revenues. This in turn usually leads to further inefficiency, greater deficits, and a need for 
additional subsidies. For instance, in Calcutta, the guaranteed subsidy is reported to have 
removed all incentives to reduce costs, and consequently the system is unable to expand. 
Therefore, the objective of subsidies could not be achieved at all (Umrigar et al, 1988). 
Privately owned services are generally not provided with subsidy in any form even when fares 
are controlled and set at low levels. As a consequence, when low fares are implemented it is 
expected that private operators may compensate their losses from low fares by allowing more 
passengers and overloading at the expense of quality of service (Umrigar, et al, 1988). It can 
be argued that if a private operator provides a similar level of services to that provided by 
public operators (benefitting from subsidies), then the private operator is proving better in 
delivering the product. 
b. Capital grants 
The use of capital subsidies as a means of funding urban transport infrastructure, rolling stock 
and equipment is widespread throughout the world. It does not raise the same objections 
usually associated with operating subsidies, and may stimulate funding from other sources 
(World Bank, 1986; Simpson, 1994). Armstrong-Wright (1993) argues that capital subsidies 
are justified because these will permit the provision or improvement of systems with 
widespread economic and social benefits. Often the benefits stretch beyond the immediate 
users and it may be difficult to capture from all beneficiaries their share of the costs. He 
states, for instance, that most of the Brazilian busways, with widespread benefits, receive 
capital subsidies for this reason, as do metros. 
In LDCs, capital subsidies are frequently given to prestige projects for political reasons 
without the support of appropriate feasibility studies. Often, politicians reject more appropriate 
but less impressive options. For example in Lima, "a costly elevated metro is replacing, in 
part, the segregated busway which has a very good performance record and is very cost 
effective. Less prestigious alternatives were rejected by top politicians. However, because 
of the high cost and future financial burden, the completion of the metro is now in doubt 
and could be a political embarrassment" (Armstrong-Wright, 1993: 78). 
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c. Paradigm shift 
The literature shows that in many DCs, the organization and management of public transport 
during the past two decades has been increasingly influenced by the need to control the 
spiralling demands for subsidy in view of the ever-increasing competition from the private 
car (Simpson, 1994; Cox et al, 1996 & 1997). Armstrong-Wright (1993) reports the eventual 
withdrawal of subsidies to bus corporations in Hong Kong and in some LDC cities such as 
Nairobi, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore and Porto Allegre. 
Simpson (1994) reports that it is often pointed out that levels of subsidy are very low in the 
UK both for capital and operational costs. Many European cities have operational subsidies 
of over 40 percent, some over 60 percent, whereas UK cities mostly have less than 20 
percent. It means most UK cities compare well in delivering value of money in local public 
transport services. The recent trend in most DCs is towards targeted rather than blanket 
subsidies. 
3.2.3 Financial incentives to private operators 
Unlike the situation in some developed nations, there are generally limited financial incentives 
available for private public transport operators in LDCs. The review of the literature shows 
that instead of giving financial incentives, heavy taxes are levied to private operators in most 
LDCs. The intention of taxes and fees is simply to collect revenue for the government or to 
influence the use of different modes or vehicles. Taxes and fees are often rigorously collected 
from formal channels for the purchase of vehicles, fuel, spare parts, registrations, and licences 
(see for instance Fouracre et al, 1994). However the literature also indicates that in a few 
countries, governments have provided incentives to public transport operators on occasions. 
In Sri Lanka, the government has relaxed import restrictions and gave tax incentives to 
operators for the purchase of new vehicles in order to overcome public transport capacity 
problems (see section 7.3). In Brazilian cities, most of the bus fleets are bought with National 
Development Bank funding, which provides lower interest rates than normal bank loans 
(Cannell, 1996). 
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In some LDCs, commercial banks provide various credit services for the purchase of new 
vehicles and spare parts. The procedure for obtaining commercial bank loans is often so 
restrictive that it is difficult for private sector bus operators to benefit from these credit 
facilities. For example in Ghana, local banks have offered loans to operators on the assurance 
of operators' unions or cooperatives. The conditions for such loans are a 30 percent down- 
payment and repayment within 24-30 months at interest rates of 25-31 percent. These loans 
are also supported by full-value collateral or bankers' guarantees. The high down-payment and 
the collateral requirements are the main deterrents for the operators seeking such loans 
(Kwakye, 1995). 
3.3 Regulation of Urban Public Transport 
3.3.1 Origin of regulation 
Gwilliam (1989) states that the traditional reason for regulation concern was the perceived 
failure of markets to generate economically or socially optimal outcomes. The absence of a 
perfect market, especially in developing countries, caused government to own, control or 
influence, among other things, the pricing system, at least of public utilities (Moore, 1993). 
3.3.2 Basis of regulation 
"Irrespective of the structure of the industry involved or type of competition involved, 
regulation has a single aim. That aim is to protect the public" (Bell and Cloke, 1989: 94). 
The widely agreed list of factors in favour of regulation includes: (a) facilitating a 
comprehensive network, including unremunerative links; (b) providing access to non-mobile 
social groups; (c) ensuring safety of operation; (d) protecting infrastructure; and (e) creating 
order out of potential chaos. Gwilliam and Scurfield argued that "total free entry may lead 
to undisciplined and uncoordinated bus operation in urban areas. While regulation is not 
justified on scale economies grounds, but some form of intervention in market process may 
be justified on grounds of economies of scope, the need to maintain safety, environmental 
quality, affordability and some minimum level of public service" (Gwilliam and Scurfield, 
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1996: iv). These arguments are discussed as below. 
(a) Scale economies 
"Urban bus operating costs are highly divisible, and bus operations offer little if anything 
in scale economies" (Gwilliam and Scurfield, 1996: v). 
A large number of studies have looked at the bus business in terms of economies of scale. 
According to Oram (1979), although consolidation and rationalization of poorly coordinated 
private operators had benefits, economies of scale have generally not been found to exist in 
bus transport. A literature search, drawing on US, UK and Indian experience showed no 
significant evidence of the existence of economies of scale in bus operations (Miller, 1970; 
Lee and Steedman, 1970; and Koshal 1970). 
The literature shows that dis-economies of scale have occurred in large bus undertakings in 
developing cities. For example, in Singapore, Bangkok, and Seoul where in the expectation 
of achieving economies of scale and better quality of services, authorities had amalgamated 
several small bus operators into a single, large corporation, the decision of consolidation has 
had adverse effects, as costs have risen steeply and services have deteriorated. Moreover, in 
some studies it has been found that there is no correlation between cost and company size 
(Harris et al, 1984; and Armstrong-Wright and Thiriez 1987). A similar experience is found 
in Colombo and Buenos Aires where the large enterprise remained unsuccessful in coping 
with sustained growth in demand. In contrast, there are cases where large undertakings have 
been successful in achieving economies of scale such as the Cheran Transport Corporation 
in India (see section 6). Moreover, the post deregulation experience in UK appears to indicate 
that large companies do bring some benefits to the travelling public. They are able to invest 
in new fleets and plan services for the longer term (Simpson, 1996). 
(b) Coordination 
According to Gwilliam and Scurfield (1996) regulated operation can ensure strong service 
coordination including integrated route structures; through ticketing; coordinated scheduling 
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of services; multi-modal coordination; and centralized information supply. This may justify 
monopoly franchising only if the benefits generated exceed the extra cost imposed. Strict 
avoidance of duplication of services, either within a mode or among different modes, reduces 
competitive pressure. For example, the existence of such competition explains the high service 
levels and relatively low costs of public transport in many of the richer Latin American cities. 
(c) Safety and environmental protection 
Restricted entry is generally believed to facilitate better safety and environmental standards 
by protecting the financial capability to secure high levels of maintenance and by giving the 
regulator an easier monitoring task and greater leverage in enforcing safety requirements 
(Kang, 1995). The empirical evidence of British experience in bus industry shows that there 
has been no distinguishable impact on safety in a deregulated environment, where appropriate 
provision has been made for the direct implementation of safety controls (Evans, 1994). This 
implies that quality regulation alone can be sufficient. 
Controls over the number of vehicles in the market are supported to avoid envisaged dangers 
of traffic congestion and environmental pollution. More specifically, quantity control of small 
vehicles is most often argued for based on their contribution to traffic congestion. Mogridge 
(1983) stated that small vehicles are seen as the root cause of Jakarta's traffic problems by 
reducing the average speeds of other vehicles, and by being inefficient users of road space 
when compared with full size buses. Fouracre and Maunder (1977 & 1978) also argue that 
the congestion effects of small vehicles are greater than large buses. Contrary to this the 
Department of Transport (1984) argued the replacement of large by more frequent smaller 
vehicles would on balance reduce congestion by attracting passengers from cars. Gwilliam and 
Scurfield (1996) suggest that in LDC context it is better to address environmental impacts 
directly with the relevant technical or operating standards or constraints than to approach them 
indirectly through entry control. 
(d) Affordability 
Affordability to passengers is generally considered the basis for fares regulation. It is believed 
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that high money costs for the journey to work accentuates poverty. The World Bank 
conventional wisdom has been that journey to work costs exceeding 10 percent of income for 
more than 15 percent of the workforce could be seen as discriminatory (Armstrong-Wright 
and Thiriez 1987). However, in the absence of subsidy, the imposition of uneconomically low 
fares on operators is likely to reduce the availability of services and limit access to jobs, and 
may thereby accentuate rather than alleviate poverty (Gwilliam and Scurfield, 1996). Such 
fares regulation typically reduces the quality of vehicles operated, reduces frequency and thus 
increases overcrowding and waiting times. Ultimately it can lead to withdrawal of services. 
(e) Minimum level of service 
According to Simpson (1994) in some cases, land use and residential location distortions may 
justify the maintenance of unremunerative services; as for example, between distant townships 
and work locations in South Africa. Monopoly only supports unremunerative services at no 
fiscal cost if there is profitable basis for cross-subsidy. Without that basis even peak levels 
of service may be very low and waiting times long, as in the case of Lagos (Gwilliam and 
Scurfield, 1996). For routes which are loss making or where a high number of off-peak 
services is desirable, authorities can buy in services/routes and set minimum service levels 
by employing competitive tendering for service supply contracts (see sections 8&9.2). 
3.4 Regulatory Regimes 
Public transport receives a good deal of regulatory attention from government. This usually 
takes the form of entry controls, quality controls, and fare level controls for public transport 
operators (Bell and Cloke, 1989). In addition, authorities attempt to regulate the operation of 
traffic, including public transport, through on street regulation and traffic management 
measures. This section presents a review of regulatory and traffic management measures for 
urban public transport, particularly in LDC context. 
3.4.1 Entry controls 
It was believed that a free market in public transport would produce an excessive supply. 
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Consequently, the load factors would be low and the average cost per passenger would be 
unduly high. This was the basis for entry regulation (Gwilliam, 1989). Entry regulation 
controls the quantity of firms or vehicles that provide public transport services (Okpala, 
1981). In practice however, studies of the use of quantity controls in LDC context show that 
this rarely achieves the desired effect and the results are, very often, equally undesirable 
(Fernandez and De Cea, 1985; Black and Dardak, 1992). 
Quantitative limits are often imposed in an arbitrary and unscientific manner; they tend to 
become fossilized and subject to political manipulation (Briggs, 1989; Wahab, 1994). For 
instance in South Africa, an operating licence is required for Kombi-taxis (15 seat van-type 
vehicles), but Joy (1995) reported no criteria are applied in issuing a licence for Kombi-taxis. 
Moreover, there is evidence of corruption in the issuing of the licences. 
In situations where entry limits are too high they are obviously ineffectual. Farrel and Last 
(1985) reported that during the 1960s urban bus companies in Korea were typically operated 
by private owners or families with a few staff, and some of the owners leased their vehicles 
to other persons or their drivers on a daily or monthly basis. As a result, the bus industry 
could not develop. Kang (1995) describes that in order to rationalise the bus companies the 
government implemented compulsory administrative and legal measures. This forced a transfer 
in the nature of the operations from private companies to corporations, requiring the 
possession of office building and land for depots, imposing obligations to employ staff 
education and training managers, vehicle maintenance and so on. Most operators accepted 
these regulatory requirements without protest, according to the traditional customs of 
following the guidance or orders of government in licensed business industries. Some 
operators got monopolistic profits and remained in the industry for a long period. However, 
these strict limitations on entry into the bus industry had adverse effects such as the lack of 
competition which discouraged innovatory services. Recently, the government has begun 
easing restrictions on entry (Kang, 1995; Kim, 1998). 
The literature shows that where entry controls are poorly enforced or where there are no entry 
controls, additional barriers can develop to entry through unofficial entry control. Routes 
legally open to any operator, can be closed by a group of operators, and entry can be 
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expensive and/or unpleasant. Public transport in Ghanaian cities bear witness to this practice 
(see section 4.3). As a result of this monopolistic behaviour usually the quality of services 
suffers, excessive fares may be charged, and there is inadequate response to the needs of 
public (Armstrong-Wright and Thiriez, 1987). 
On the other hand, in the absence of any entry controls operators can operate where they 
wish. For instance, in Papua New Guinea, there were no entry restrictions on the operation 
of public transport services until 1986. As a result, operators operated in a demand responsive 
manner diverting from route to route (Khezwana and Maunder, 1994). A similar situation has 
been reported for public transport services in Nigerian cities (Tjahjono, 1996). 
3.4.2 Fare regulations 
Fare regulations determine the price of public transport services. The intent of fare regulation 
is to protect the interest of public by preventing fare gouging and wide variations in fares; and 
eliminating excess profits caused by entry regulation (Grava, 1980). Briggs (1989) asserts that 
in many countries, it is believed that government should control the fare levels because the 
fare structures are considered politically sensitive. Fares are generally regulated by 
governments at low levels, in the belief that this will be beneficial for the urban poor 
(Srinivasan et al, 1983, Cameron et al, 1986 and Bhau, 1989). 
To authors such as Grava (1980) and Armstrong-Wright (1993) fares in LDCs are rarely 
regulated on the basis of reliable financial or economic analysis, with operators under 
pressures to keep fares low despite rising costs. Fare policies in North African countries, as 
described by Mitric, are summarised as follows. Firstly, fares are fixed without the 
consideration of operating costs. Secondly, the citizen's ability to pay has always been 
declared a main concern in fare setting, but there is no evidence of affordability calculations. 
Thirdly, fare increases are made too infrequently, with increases in fares only after 10 years 
in some cities (Mitric, 1990). 
The literature indicates that fares are set at low levels in most of the LDCs. Very serious 
problems arise where fares are artificially held down. Operators incur large financial losses 
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simply because regulated fares are kept below costs (see section 6). Other problems relate to 
flat fares. In places where flat fares are imposed by regulation, the operators evade the fare 
regulations by shortening routes or by dividing the routes into two stages or they are reluctant 
to serve areas some distance from city centre. These anomalies are found in many developing 
countries (Armstrong-Wright, 1993). In Nigeria, for example, flat fares are imposed by the 
government. The operators evade the fare regulations by shortening routes or by dividing the 
routes into two stages. This practice has created problems for passengers in Lagos, as many 
of the five million daily bus passengers have to interchange many times in crowded 
conditions because of short routes and insufficient number of buses (Armstrong-Wright and 
Thiriez, 1987; Armstrong-Wright, 1993). 
In some developing countries, reduced fares are fixed for special groups such as students or 
civil servants. Funds contributed by the authorities, in the form of specific compensation, 
operating subsidies or capital grants, often fall far short of making up for the concessionary 
fare (Darbera, 1993; Memoire, 1996; Gwilliam, 1997). In a few countries, no compensation 
is made to private sector operators for fare reductions for certain groups; for example in 
Morocco. 
"The lack of compensation for heavily discounted school passes in Casablanca provides a 
dramatic illustration of the above problem. The price of the school pass remained 
unchanged from 1977 to 1986. The school trips represented about 19 percent (in 1987), 
with an estimated 64 percent discount off regular fares. Had the compensation been paid 
(and none was), the publicly-owned bus corporation might never have had operating losses" 
(Mitric, 1990: 14). 
Similarly in Santiago (Chile), most bus services are provided by small private operators under 
a deregulated market (see section 7.3). Yet operators are required to charge one-third fare to 
school children for which there is no compensation. "In practice, therefore, they [crews] 
choose to carry adults instead of children. This issue is a problem in similar circumstances 
elsewhere. Subsidy support is needed if private operators are to provide important CSOs 
[Community Service Obligations] that clearly would not be provided for commercial 
reasons" (Kilsby and Smith, 1996: 205). 
38 
Fare increases are not authorized regularly and in line with inflation. When fare increases are 
granted it is often as a result of operators' strikes. Briggs states that "unfortunately in many 
developing countries, decisions on fare policy are based on little more than assertions and 
value judgements reflect political pressures and ideological positions, with actual fare levels 
have been determined through a negotiating mechanism constituted largely of threats and 
counter threats (Briggs, 1989: 53). In China public transport fares were reported not to have 
been increased for many years. As a consequence, the profitability of the companies was often 
inadequate and the buses in each city were deteriorating (Kneebone, 1987). Similarly, in many 
other LDCs fares are not reviewed regularly, which has resulted in poor quality of services 
(Armstrong-Wright and Thiriez, 1987; Bolade, 1988; Khezwana and Maunder, 1994). Darbera 
asserts that "governments [in LDCsJ do not have the political will to increase fares 
periodically, the system rumbles from one crisis to another: when adjustment is long 
overdue, the quality and the quantity of service decline" (Darbera, 1993: 46). 
The literature reveals that low fares have often been cited as the major factor in the persistent 
poor performance of large bus undertakings in most LDCs. For instance in Harare prior to 
1988, the level of fares approved by government fell short of what was required for the 
company to invest in fleet renewal and expansion to adequately meet increasing patronage. 
Hence profitability was enjoyed at the expense of an ageing fleet frequently prone to 
breakdowns; thus unreliable service levels were offered to the travelling public especially 
during the off-peak period when approximately two thirds of the fleet were garaged in the 
depot (Mbara and Maunder, 1994). Low fares have also affected the fleet capacity, efficiency, 
and quality of service. As a result, some operators shorten the length of certain routes, 
overcharge passengers, overload their vehicles, withdraw services, and ignore vehicle 
maintenance (Bajedo, 1990; Armstrong Wright, 1993; Fouracre et al, 1994; Kang, 1995; Roth 
and Diandas, 1995). Jacobs and Bowker (1994) stated the causes of the decline in bus system 
in Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia). They argue "most of us have seen how the bus system has 
deteriorated in Kuala Lumpur to the point where it is now seen as providing a poor service. 
To a large extent this is a result of inadequate investment on the part of the private 
operators. One has sympathy with the operators because bus fares have not been allowed 
to rise for many years. Clearly, major investment is now needed in the bus system..... This 
can only come about if private operators are allowed to charge realistic fares. This means 
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that the travelling public will have to pay higher fares. However, we believe that provided 
users can see they are getting a much better service then they will be prepared to pay for 
these" (Jacobs and Bowker, 1994: 8-9). The impact of fare regulation on both public and 
private sector operators is also reviewed in section 6. 
3.4.3 Quality controls 
Quality control refers to the powers and procedures by which the authorities regulate the 
safety and operation of public transport services (Hibbs, 1985). The following are areas where 
quality control may be applied: safety standards, emission standards, size and type of vehicles, 
and route assignments. 
(a) Safety standards 
Safety standards pertain to: mechanical fitness of vehicles, insurance coverage, and driver 
competence. Most would agree on the need for standards of vehicles safety and driver 
competence. Generally, there is a substantial concern that profits under private ownership are 
obtained at the expense of quality and safety (Mbara and Maunder, 1994). It is reported that 
private operators are inclined to cause undue traffic congestion and unfair competition (Roth 
and Diandas, 1995; Diandas, 1989). However, the evidence on the safety and quality of public 
transport vehicles is limited and mixed. In some LDCs, a main cause of accidents is seen to 
be the mechanical non-fitness of vehicles. For example, in the Khartoum Region, one of the 
main causes of accidents was reported to be the obsolescence and lack of maintenance of 
bakassi (small capacity public transport vehicles) and taxis (Affan, 1986). 
A review by Hibbs (1985) shows that safety standards exist in most LDCs. But the literature 
reveals that these are generally not being enforced properly (Barrett, 1988; Thomson, 1983; 
Kwakye, 1995). It is nevertheless clear that with the effective enforcement of inspection rules 
and regulations, vehicles standards, and driving competence tests, the situation could be 
dramatically improved in most LDCs. All quality control standards require effective 
enforcement if they are to be observed. 
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(b) Size and type of vehicles 
The primary factors influencing the regulation of modes by size and type are perceived 
congestion effects, traffic accidents and pollution. Size and type of vehicles are specified to 
control the introduction of additional vehicles. Publicly owned undertakings have generally 
comprised of large and standard size buses, whereas private operators although do operate 
large buses, they usually prefer to use smaller vehicles. Generally, it is the use of smaller 
vehicles which is restricted through government regulations and policies (Armstrong-Wright 
and Thiriez, 1987). The most predominant argument in favour of the control of small vehicles 
is that they compete only on the most profitable routes and do not serve low demand areas 
or times. For instance, in Indonesia, current public transport policy is to control the number 
of minibuses and not to allow the conversion of cars and trucks into minibuses (Black and 
Dardak, 1992). Similarly in Manila (Philippines), public transport service on the highest 
volume roads is reserved predominantly for large buses, and the smaller jeepneys have been 
prohibited from operating on these roads (Case, 1980; Gwilliam and Scurfield, 1996). 
Another argument in favour for defining size of vehicle has been to control congestion. Small 
vehicles have been considered to be less efficient, and relegated to a secondary and supporting 
roles on routes away from large bus routes (see the following section). Walter (1979) has put 
these assumptions into question. He argues that if one considers the waiting travel time of 
passengers, minibuses or small buses are often more efficient than large buses. The increased 
frequency of service compared with conventional services has been an important factor in the 
popularity of minibuses with the travelling public in UK (Simpson, 1994). Nonetheless, the 
operation of small vehicles can exacerbate traffic congestion (see section 7.2). 
In most LDCs, the small buses and paratransit vehicles are both very responsive to demands 
and cost effective. According to World Bank (1986), small vehicles are usually less economic 
than larger ones in their use of road space and energy per passenger kilometre, but they are 
cost effective and popular with users. Armstrong-wright and Thiriez (1987) and Armstrong- 
Wright (1993) emphasise that apart from better utilization, smaller capital outlay, and ease 
of maintenance, the other features that favour the use of small capacity vehicles (minibuses, 
microbuses) are: 
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" drivers of small capacity buses often have to meet less stringent requirements for 
driving permits than the drivers of full size buses and thus can be paid less. Moreover, 
inspection requirements for small buses may also be less costly than for larger buses; 
" although small buses result in a higher ratio of drivers to passengers, this is not a 
significant disadvantage in most developing countries where labour costs are low; 
" fares are easier to collect on small buses than full size buses and the chances of 
revenue leakage are much reduced; 
" small buses are easier to manoeuvre and are quicker in congested traffic conditions. 
In some areas smaller buses are the only form of public transport able to negotiate the 
labyrinth of narrow streets; and 
" in low density areas small capacity buses can remain financially viable despite lower 
levels of demand. Users of small vehicles may benefit from more frequent services. 
It is clear that for viability, operators need to be given freedom to choose from a range of 
large, medium or small vehicles offering low quality service at low fare to more comfortable 
vehicles at high fares. Operators select suitable vehicles because they are familiar with road 
conditions, levels of demand, and operating costs (Armstrong-Wright, 1993). 
The literature also indicates that many people in LDCs are willing to pay for better quality 
services. The use of shared taxis indicates that many passengers are prepared to pay increased 
fares for convenient and comfortable services (Armstrong-Wright, 1993). Similarly in Jakarta, 
higher income groups prefer microbuses (8 seat vehicles converted from large size cars) 
because they are more comfortable, have seats available, and offer shorter waiting times. Low 
fare levels are also important determinants of mode choice for users of stage buses, especially 
for longer distance trips (Black and Dardak, 1992). 
c. Route assignments 
Route assignment includes route planning on the basis of accessibility, timetable, bus stops 
and terminals. Passengers are interested in knowing the timetable, the schedule, and when the 
first and last vehicle leaves the terminal. A timetable is also required by the operators if they 
intend to coordinate transfers and so increase passengers. However, the high frequencies found 
on most minibus routes in developing countries often obviate the need for schedules as 
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waiting times are low (Schuurrman, 1985; Allos, 1986). 
The purpose of route network regulation is to assure that mode is accessible to users. Stops 
and terminals should be regulated to ensure that service vehicles stop where they will not hold 
up traffic flow. Routes for operators can be regulated to minimise competition between 
operators and to reduce congestion on some routes. The literature shows that the regulations 
are observed in LDC context only in the presence of strict and visible enforcement (Khezwana 
and Maunder, 1994; Lee, 1990). 
In most of the LDCs, route planning is done without any specific criteria, and route networks 
are usually neither revised nor extended regularly in the face of growing demand for public 
transport. Moreover, the regulatory authorities do not seek the views of private operators in 
determining the route network. For example in Malaysia, Wahab (1994) reports that the Road 
Transport Licensing Board has no technically or professionally qualified staff to deal with the 
present issues of public transport. The board does not follow any specific criteria for the 
regulation of public transport services. The lack of planning for bus stops, routes, capacity, 
frequency, etc are a reflection of such deficiencies. Operators are not given opportunities to 
present their ideas for improving services, and they face unnecessary bureaucratic delays when 
requesting permission for basic operational changes. The authorities on the other hand are 
usually less sensitive to problems, and can seldom produce alternative strategies to improve 
services when needed. Another issue related to route network planning is that networks are 
not modified in the face of public transport service demands. For instance the network of 
routes operated by Bangkok Mass Transit Authority in the 1980s was relatively small in 
relation to both size of fleet and city. This network was not suitable either to passengers or 
operators (Harris et al, 1984). By contrast in Hong Kong the bus routes are specified by the 
regulatory authorities in consultation with the operators and new routes are also added in 
newly developed residential areas (see section 9.1). 
In a few LDC cities however, route networks defined by authorities appear appropriate with 
regards to vehicle size. Armstrong-Wright and Thireiz (1987) report that in Jakarta large buses 
usually ply major commuter routes and obtain high load factors with frequent services. Most 
midibuses (30 seater) and microbuses (14 seats) provide feeder services to main bus routes. 
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Similar public transport operations are found in Nairobi under franchised arrangements. 
Another impressive practice is seen in Istanbul. Here high occupancy vehicles are 
concentrated on main roads, largely operate in exclusive right-of-way, and serve high volume 
of passengers, whilst most minibuses serve low density and difficult areas. 
A well defined route network has been developed in Curitiba (Brazil). Cannell (1996) reports 
that in Curitiba in the early 1970s, eight conventional bus routes were converted into 2 
express routes. These operated on 20 km of the exclusive busways, together with 45 km of 
feeder routes, transporting 50,000 passengers per day. The route network was gradually 
extended over the years with the inclusion of new trunk and feeder routes. Moreover, 
interdistrict routes were created, linking various districts of the city without the need to pass 
through the city centre. The network uses transfer terminals that permit integration between 
routes. The integrated transport system is popular with passengers. In addition, the city and 
traffic benefit from the system as the total number of buses in the downtown is greatly 
reduced (Smith and Hensher, 1998). 
Generally in most LDCs, there has been poor route definition in relation to demand, 
insufficient route coverage, and a lack of scheduling. Routes are specified for operators but 
the private operators disregard the agreed routes. Moreover they do not comply with schedules 
(if there are any), wait at terminals to fill up the buses, serve only the profitable routes, and 
provide infrequent services on low demand routes (Bolade, 1989; Maunder, 1990; Mitric, 
1990; Armstrong-Wright, 1993; Roth and Diandas, 1995). For instance in Malaysian cities, 
poor services exemplified by unreliability, overcrowding, poor route coverage, discomfort and 
long journey times, are among the reasons why passengers began leaving the bus services and 
switching to other modes such as private transport (Wahab, 1994). Sadullah (1995) reports 
the general complaints by passengers about bus services in Kuala Lumpur. The complaints 
include discomfort because of unavailability of seats and overcrowding; unsatisfactory 
conditions at bus terminals; no timetables; and long waiting times. Forty percent of the bus 
users are reported to have to wait more than 20 minutes for their buses. 
Some of these problems, however, have been addressed by route associations in a few LDC 
cities. It has been argued that operator associations can regulate the operation of public 
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transport very successfully (Armstrong-Wright and Thiriez, 1987). A good practice example 
of route regulation by associations is that prevailing in Buenos Aires in Argentina. In Buenos 
Aires, the government issues licences to operate routes to legal associations, regulates fares 
(albeit at relatively high levels by Latin American standards), and minimum frequencies of 
operation. The remaining aspects of bus service operation are regulated by operators' route 
associations (empresas). The functions of empresas are to select and employ individual 
operators by contract, to provide orderly schedules and administrative services. The important 
function of the empresas is to assure fair distribution of income among operators, usually in 
accordance with vehicle mileage. The empresas compete vigorously among themselves for 
patronage. The major outcomes of this regulation by the associations are as follows. Vehicles 
are generally well maintained. The quality and frequency of service is improved (Gwilliam 
and Scurfield, 1996 and Salvucci, 1997). 
On the other hand cooperation among the operators may cause problems such as restrictive 
practices to eliminate competition and control of access to market. Kwakye (1995) states that 
in Ghana, due to the little control applied by the government, a number of transport unions 
and cooperatives exert strong control over the operation of private sector services. The unions 
regulate access by operators to the route terminals. Vehicles are held at terminals and not 
released until they are full. There is no strong evidence of an insufficient number of vehicles, 
and much of what exists is poorly utilised and/or of the wrong type (Fouracre et al, 1994; 
Kwakye, 1995). Moreover, most routes are radial which involve one or more interchanges for 
cross city travel. As result of poor network coverage the general quality of the urban public 
transport system is poor, and there is a high cost of service to the users. The poor quality of 
service is most noticeable in Accra, exemplified by the lengthy waiting times, long in-vehicle 
times and poor access to bus services (Abane, 1993). 
3.4.4 On-street traffic management and regulation 
The review of literature demonstrates that many of the world's cities face increasing problems 
of traffic congestion. Buses are forced to compete for road space with all other road users and 
hence frequently fail to deliver acceptable levels of service (Gardner, 1992). Armstrong- 
Wright (1993) reports that in LDCs, a large proportion of road space is used by private cars 
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and slow moving vehicles, particularly during peak traffic periods. The most affected mode 
of the anarchic conditions is public transport. In particular, bus services in many LDC cities 
suffer from a very poor image because these are often considered as unreliable and inefficient 
due to delays caused by traffic congestion. To combat this situation, authorities are 
increasingly turning to more cost effective solutions. More specifically, traffic management 
has been identified as a very effective method of decreasing congestion and improving the 
flow of public transport. Traffic management, in particular bus priority measures, have been 
implemented to address the ever increasing problems for bus public transport from congestion. 
According to the IHT (1987), the term `traffic management' is used to explain the process 
of regulating the use of prevailing road space to meat defined objectives without employing 
considerable new road construction. Traffic management is generally undertaken to 
accomplish some, or all, of the following objectives: 
0a reduction in road accidents; 
0 environmental improvement; 
" improved access for people and goods; 
" improved traffic flows on primary and distributor roads. 
The largest potential for improvement in traffic management can be achieved through better 
driver behaviour, regulation, enforcement and road safety (Latchford, 1986). However, a 
conventional response to chaos and traffic congestion has been the widening and construction 
of new roads in many LDCs and DCs. Many LDCs allocate most of their transportation 
budget to expanding roads and highways. This is a short term view of a city's transportation 
needs and creates many hidden costs, such as high levels of pollution and traffic congestion 
(Birk and Zergas, 1993). 
"To relieve congestion, many countries have opted to expand road network....... But these 
solutions are costly and strain already hard pressed budgets...... Some traffic specialists 
claim that with a package of far less measures, designed to re-organise road space more 
efficiently, congestion can be dramatically reduced" (Koepell, 1982). 
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Armstrong-Wright (1993) states that there is growing trend to employ more cost effective 
measures, in particular, traffic management is becoming more recognised as a very effective 
means of reducing congestion and improving flow of public transport. The implementation 
of traffic management measures varies from city to city. Some of these have concentrated on 
particular trouble spots and some have involved comprehensive traffic management measures 
and road improvement schemes embracing a large part of the city. For instance a 
comprehensive traffic management scheme has been successfully implemented in Abidjan, in 
Cote d'Ivoire. 
In Abidjan, the government undertook the integrated measures to overcome serious traffic 
problems with specific emphasis on the needs of public transport. The traffic management and 
improvement measures involved: a system of one way streets; traffic signs and road markings; 
installation of 136 computerised traffic signals; footbridges for the movement and safety of 
pedestrians; new road links for a high speed express bus network; facilities like new 
terminals, bus stops and depots; the provision of a busway and reserved bus lanes in central 
area; and effective steps to improve the enforcement of traffic and street trading regulations. 
The government has also established a traffic management and transport study group to study 
and monitor these initiatives. The Traffic Police appear to operate quite efficiently and this 
has contributed to the success and effectiveness of these measures (Barrett, 1988; Armstrong- 
Wright, 1993). 
Many countries have considered the use of road pricing and car user restraints as means of 
reducing road congestion and to improve, in particular, conditions for public transport. Several 
different systems of restraint are used or at least attempted in DCs and LDCs (Button, 1984; 
Jones, 1989; Armstrong-Wright, 1993). In Singapore, where little more can be done in terms 
of expanding the existing road network to accommodate growing motorised traffic, the 
government has taken vigorous action to control the growth in the use of cars through various 
traffic restraints such as the Area Licensing Scheme in Singapore, parking controls and high 
taxes on cars. In order to improve traffic flows, a continuing programme of traffic 
management and area traffic control measures is implemented in Hong Kong (Government 
of Hong Kong, 1996). These restraints have fostered the use of public transport by creating 
improved traffic conditions because of reduced congestion. Operators have claimed that they 
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were able to meet schedules better and avoid delays (Richards and Huddrat, 1986; Armstrong- 
Wright, 1993). Encouraged by the success of Singapore's experience, a few other developing 
countries attempted these schemes in the face of increasing levels of motorisation. For 
instance, the use of Area Licensing Scheme was tried in Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur but soon 
abandoned because of political reasons (Orikaye, 1983). In some places restraints have been 
applied by restricting cross city movements by private cars. For example, a reduction in traffic 
flow has been reported in Tunis by dividing the central business district into "cells". Public 
transport and emergency vehicles are allowed to cross the borders between cells, but other 
motorised traffic must use entrances and exits onto routes that bypass the central area (Mitric, 
1990; Armstrong-Wright, 1993). 
"The main criteria for road and traffic [management] schemes.... reflecting the particular 
policy inclinations of the authorities..... Typical of such policies are those which give 
priority.... to public transport vehicles in order to maintain or improve levels of service by 
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the services" (IHT, 1987). The need for traffic 
management to give particular attention to public transport is well admitted and the value of 
priority measures for buses is appreciated by most authorities. As a result, bus priority 
measures have been introduced when increase in traffic made the operation of urban buses 
problematic (Giannopoulos, 1989). Simpson (1994) envisaged that bus priority is likely to be 
the most significant way of improving the reliability and speed of services. He further 
emphasises that without it, the other ways of trying to improve bus services such as vehicle 
developments, integration of services and improved information for passengers, would be 
likely to fail. According to Gardner and Fouracre (1990) bus priority systems were 
implemented in many cities throughout the world during 1970s. At present, there is a growing 
trend to provide more effective measures to improve practical aspects of bus operations 
through the provision of bus priority measures as a part of traffic management schemes. 
Bus priority schemes may be classified into several different types according to the 
procedures applied for required priority (Latchford 1986). The following is the range of 
suggested traffic management measures (IHT, 1987; Giannopoulos, 1989; Simpson, 1994). 
a. Various simple bus priority measures, including traffic regulations giving priority to 
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buses (for example when leaving bus stops), parking restrictions near bus stops, and 
on bus routes generally and traffic management measures specifically applied to bus 
routes to facilitate the passage of buses. 
b. Priority at traffic signals (automatic adjustment of the start and finish of the green 
periods to favour approaching buses, and redesigning of signal programmes in Area 
Traffic Control Schemes to give special weight to bus flows). 
c. With-flow bus lanes (reserved for buses travelling in the same direction to the general 
traffic). 
d. Contra-flow bus lanes (reserved usually, but not always, in one-way street, whereby 
buses are permitted to travel against the general flow of traffic). 
e. Reserved bus lanes on freeways (sometimes reversible for tidal-flow operation), 
priority access to freeways and other facilities. 
f. Bus-only streets (normal streets converted to pedestrian and bus use only). 
g. Busways (segregated roads for buses only). 
The main feature of bus priority schemes is the separation of buses from other road users, 
either at selected locations (like bus stops) or along running sections of road network. A large 
number of bus priority schemes have been introduced throughout the world. The earliest 
schemes were introduced in Europe in the early 1970s. Bus priority measures included with- 
flow and contraflow bus lanes, bus streets and spot improvements. Some schemes were very 
effective and many were ineffective due to enforcement difficulties, poor design and other 
factors (TRRL, 1993). 
Jacobs and Bowker (1994) report that bus priority measures, as a part of traffic management 
schemes, are little in evidence in LDCs; and six cities had actually abandoned bus lane 
schemes because of poor enforcement (see section 6). Success is possible however in LDC 
context. For instance in Bangkok, a `with flow' and `contra flow' bus priority project was 
implemented. Prior to implementation of the project, the speed of buses during peak periods 
in central area was as low as 10 kmph, while cars were able to maintain only a little better 
than 12 kmph. In areas where the most success was achieved, buses' and cars' mean travel 
speeds were increased by 25 to 30 percent. The cars did not suffer as a result of priority given 
to buses. With up to 250 standard buses and 150 private minibuses using a single bus lane 
during the peak hour, in total these vehicles carried about 18,000 passengers per hour 
49 
(Armstrong-Wright, 1993). 
Subsequently, however, police enforcement waned, bus lanes violations increased and the 
benefits of the schemes were badly affected. In their study of the operational difficulties 
confronted by operators and the benefits achieved through traffic management measures in 
Bangkok, Richards and Huddart (1986) state that average speed for surveyed routes was 17 
kmph with wide variations and some routes averaging only 11-12 kmph. A major cause was 
delays at traffic signals, and a few routes experienced delay due to the impedient of other 
vehicles at bus stops. This implies that any traffic management measure cannot obtain its 
anticipated benefits in isolation, without both enforcement of the regulations and a 
comprehensive traffic management scheme. 
Armstrong-wright (1993) reports that with effective enforcement, bus priority schemes have 
provided benefits to all road users. Journey speeds and output of buses can be greatly 
enhanced. Reserved bus lanes can permit bus journey speeds, often of more than 20 kmph 
average, without reducing general traffic speeds. Furthermore, passenger volumes of about 
15,000 and 20,000 passengers per hour per lane have been achieved for standard and large 
buses respectively. 
In cases where enforcement of bus-only lanes is not effective, "physical" separation of the lane 
is suggested by Giannopoulos (1989). In order to improve the bus services and to cope with 
heavy demand along major roads, busways have been introduced. The term "busway" is used 
to indicate a continuous road segregated from the rest of the road network and exclusively 
used by buses. Busways are an extreme form of bus priority measures and have been 
implemented in a large number of LDCs and DCs. The earliest schemes were implemented 
in Europe, for example, the first busway was built in Liege (Belgium) in 1970, and the first 
purpose-built busway roads were commenced in Runcorn New Town in UK in 1971 (TRRL, 
1993). Then in the late 1970s and early 1980s a large number of innovative busways were 
implemented in Brazilian cities, many with the assistance of World Bank (Fouracre and 
Gardner, 1990). Busways can present a highly efficient and cost effective system of mass 
transit under distinctive operational measures. Busways can be physically segregated from 
other traffic by using various types of barrier (medians, high kerbs, fences, and studs). The 
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performance of busways varies substantially from place to place and depends on a large 
number of factors, such as the extent to which overtaking is permitted, the bus stop 
arrangements, and the proportion of boarding and alighting of passengers. 
A TRRL study of busway performance identified about 40 operational schemes throughout 
the world; eight of these, from developing countries, were selected for detailed surveys to 
identify operating performance. Some schemes were very effective and showed worthwhile 
benefits with high economic rates of return, but many were ineffective due to enforcement 
difficulties, poor design and other factors (Gardner and Fouracre, 1990). Some busway 
schemes are operating just at available capacity for reasons such as poor enforcement. 
Gedizlioglu (1992) reports that the busway scheme in Istanbul varies from 8-10 meter in 
width and is 5.2 km long. There are 12 stops in each direction, with an average distance of 
500 meters between bus stops, and stops are about 50 meters in length. Over 80 routes use 
the same busway and all share the same stops. There is no ordering of overtaking. A bus can 
be boarded at any point of a stop and the disorganisation of the routing and scheduling of bus 
lines has resulted in delays at stops. As a consequence the busway is utilized under its 
capacity. However, this problem has been dealt with in Brazilian cities, where buses are 
ordered in convoys and passengers board at pre-determined loading points (Lindau, 1987). 
Gardner et al (1991) report that busways in Brazilian cities have achieved very high bus speed 
and passenger throughput (number of buses and passengers handled per direction per hour). 
Bus speeds ranging from 12 to 24.6 kmph have been found during the morning and evening 
peaks. The highest average bus speeds (nearly 30 kmph) were recorded in Sao Paulo. The 
maximum line-haul passenger throughput recorded was 26,100 passengers per hour per 
direction in Port Allegre during the morning peak. The highest evening peak passenger 
throughput recorded was 20,300 passengers per hour per direction in Sao Paulo. From an 
analysis of each busway it was apparent that the main factors affecting average speed were 
bus stop and intersection spacing. Between stops, busway running sections are separated from 
general traffic lanes by heavy studs. Special operating features such as overtaking bays, bus- 
ordering, and trunk and feeder systems have also been provided (Jacobs and Bowker, 1994). 
Furthermore, extensive traffic management measures have also been implemented. Bus 
services are operated by various private and public companies under a regulated environment 
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(Gardner, 1992). Together these arrangements have resulted in relatively high speeds and 
provided high quality bus services. 
The most famous and best example of a full busway system is found in Curitiba. Routes and 
stops are clearly identifiable, similar to a metro system. The busways serve five structural 
axes, each typically comprising a median busway with kerbed separators, and a service road. 
There are also extensive priority measures to route buses into and through the city centre. 
Busways are integral with the city land use plan. Detailed and sophisticated attention has been 
given to passenger interchanges, bus design and many other aspects (TRRL, 1993; Smith and 
Hensher, 1998). 
A trunk and feeder system operates in which busways are routed through a series of terminals 
where passengers transfer between feeder and trunk buses in an enclosed area, with no further 
payment of fares. Tickets are purchased at the entry to terminal, rather than on the bus. This 
reduces boarding times and provides free transfer for those interchanging inside the closed 
area. As a result, this reduces cost and inconvenience to passengers, and permits high 
boarding efficiency. All four doors of the articulated buses can be used, since no ticket 
validation is necessary. Buses are operated by private companies under a regulated regime. 
They use common colour coding and high quality graphics for passenger information (Gardner 
et al, 1991). The average speed of buses has been recorded at 21 kmph (Fouracre and 
Gardner, 1992). 
The review of literature has confirmed that busway transit is capable of carrying high 
passengers volumes at attractive commercial speeds. It can be argued that busway schemes 
compare very favourably with rail mass transit schemes. Certainly 20,000 passengers per hour 
in each direction is a realistic target, even without particularly elaborate measures for 
overtaking at stops and for boarding and alighting (Simpson, 1994). 
More recently (1996) in UK, guided busways introduced in Leeds and Ipswich have been 
approached on a phased, incremental, basis. Indeed one of the supreme advantages of guided 
bus over other modes is that its fragmental nature allows progress and development as funds 
and opportunities arise. In addition, guided busways offer scope for more radical gains in 
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speed, reliability and ridership growth (see Tebb, 1997; White, 1997). Guided busways are 
also expected to begin work soon in Edinburgh (Transit, 5 March 1998). 
Busways have advantages and disadvantages. Cornwell and Cracknell (1990) identify that 
there are difficulties and weaknesses associated with the implementation of busway systems. 
These include institutional fragmentation, a lack of political visibility, apparent complexity, 
severance impacts on other traffic, and land related impacts. Busways can also be criticized 
for taking road space away from cars (Gardner, 1992). 
The advantages of busway systems as described by Cornwell and Cracknell (1990), and 
Gardner et al (1991) may be summarised as follows. First, since buses can join and leave a 
busway along its length, routes serving many parts of a city can use a busway over part or 
all of its length. Passengers from a wide catchment area can therefore benefit from improved 
services, without having to change vehicles. Second, because busway physically segregates 
buses from general traffic, schemes are virtually self-enforcing and therefore superior to 
traditional bus lane priorities. Third, busways enhance the use of buses, which will continue 
to be the main means of public transport in most cities. Fourth, a busway may be 
implemented relatively quickly since usually no special legislation is necessary and because 
track and vehicles are inherently less complex than those of rail systems. Nevertheless, 
negotiations with existing operators can be politically sensitive. Fifth, busways can be 
implemented incrementally and can be enhanced step by step such as guided busways in the 
UK. Sixth, a busway can be constructed with locally available labour and materials, and it 
offers considerable scope for construction by local contractors. As a result, the foreign 
exchange requirement for hard currency is minimised. One of the main disadvantages of 
busway transit is that their implementation requires the active cooperation of the highway 
authority, the licensing authorities, the police, and bus operators; such cooperation is often 
not easy to achieve in LDCs. 
3.5 Enforcement of Regulation 
Enforcement of regulations by various regulatory authorities is often weak in LDCs, which 
can be seen reflected in the poor quality of vehicles, route shortening by operators, and 
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overcrowding of public transport services. Moreover, ineffective enforcement will also 
undermine the implementation of traffic management measures (see the preceding section). 
In Nigeria, for instance, local governments have had the responsibility for developing, 
controlling and monitoring urban public transport services, but they are not equipped with the 
financial means and regulatory capabilities required for performing these functions effectively 
(Ezeife and Bolade, 1984). Practically, regulations are left to the operators' unions, which 
make agreements amongst members to protect their interests rather than for the improvement 
and coordination of services. The private sector operators, officially assigned to routes by the 
Central Licensing Authority, operate anywhere they wish (Bolade, 1988). As a result, urban 
public transport in Nigeria has many deficiencies. Moreover, the most acute of the traffic 
problems is the notorious congestion. Maunder and Khezwana (1994) described congestion 
as appalling in Lagos, and it is not helped by the supply of large numbers of small capacity 
private sector vehicles operating anywhere in the city. 
Barrett (1988) and Thomson (1983), assert that police departments, although they are often 
managed by highly trained professionals, have often poorly trained, low paid, and 
inexperienced officers. Traffic regulation is one of their duties and has a low priority, and 
laws may be written in ways that are difficult to enforce. Moreover, the police are reluctant 
to put drivers out of business if they are poor and their vehicles are poorly maintained. With 
low paid and undisciplined police forces, bribe taking is a common problem. 
In contrast to this general pattern the literature also reveals that there are instances in some 
LDCs where authorities seemed able to enforce regulations. Khezwana and Maunder (1994) 
reported that the government of Papua New Guinea rigorously enforced regulation over the 
private sector operation in 1987. In consequence, vehicles operated only on specified routes. 
Passengers were forbidden to stand in a minibus and this regulation was strictly enforced. 
Pirate operators were non existent. However, during the off-peak periods service levels 
reduced significantly. No information is available about the present situation. A similar 
instance of effective enforcement can be cited from Cote d'Ivoire in regard to the 
implementing of traffic management measures (see preceding section). It can be argued that 
in LDCs the authorities often have the potential to enforce regulations but generally they lick 
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competent staff and political support. 
3.6 Urban Public Transport Regulation in India 
In India public transport services are provided by both public and private sector operators, and 
services are regulated by the transport authorities. In some cities, the authorities have also 
attempted to improve the performance of public transport services by implementing bus 
priority measures. The purpose of this case study is to review the impact of regulatory 
measures on the provision of public transport in this country. India has been selected as a case 
study due to its similarity of conditions to those in Pakistan, so that the lessons learned from 
this experience have most relevance. The analysis is based on the accessible literature. 
Road based public transport supply in Indian cities is characterised by a multiplicity of 
services with public and private sector operators. These services include double decker buses 
(in a few cities), full size buses, midibuses, minibuses, taxis, autorickshaws (three wheels 
motorcycle powered vehicles), man-drawn cycle-rickshaws and animal drawn vehicles 
(Maunder et al, 1987). According to Umrigar et al (1989) there is no uniformity about the 
institutional arrangements for the provision of services by the public sector. In some cities the 
municipality is responsible for the provision of bus services; in others the State Government 
controls bus transport provision through a State Road Transport Corporation. In Delhi the 
Central Government is responsible for providing bus services through Delhi Transport 
Corporation (Maunder et al, 1987). 
The regulation of urban road transport in Indian cities (other than Delhi) is the responsibility 
of the individual State Governments rather than the Central Government. Fares are regulated 
by State Governments except in Delhi where Central Government controls fare levels. Stage 
carriage services require a route permit besides the registration and vehicle fitness certificates. 
The number of buses to be provided in a city is controlled by State Transport or Road 
Transport Authority by issuing route permits. Private operators are not involved in the 
planning and allocation of routes. They must only operate on the route which is allocated to 
them by the public agency (Umrigar et al, 1988; 1989). Moreover, various restrictions are 
applied on the operation of private operators. For instance, the policy of the Tamil Nadu 
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government relating to the role of the private sector in operating public transport services has 
been to allow only limited competition with public sector services. According to this policy, 
a single private bus operator can run only up to 5 vehicles. However, this ceiling on 
individual bus operators has in no way restricted the competition between the public and 
private sectors (Gunaseelan, 1995). 
Umrigar et al (1988) report that State undertakings have gained preference in the issuance of 
route licences and in the receipt of subsidies from Central and State Governments (Maunder 
et al, 1987). Generally, the public bus companies are in a poor state of affairs. For instance 
in Calcutta, the Calcutta State Corporation had a fleet of some 1,100 single and double buses 
in 1986. Of the total fleet, less than 700 buses were in operation. The corporation had been 
plagued by low productivity and was receiving a monthly subsidy in the region of $1 million. 
The main factors contributing towards this end included: the high staffing ratio per operating 
bus (20.7) and fare evasion estimated at more than 15 percent (Armstrong-Wright, 1993). 
Umrigar et al (1988) argue that as a result of controlled artificially low fares, operators are 
facing very serious problems. For instance in Delhi, the Delhi Transport Corporation, despite 
its better performance compared with many other bus corporations, incurred huge financial 
losses ($90 million in 1984) simply because of low fares. As a result, the corporation was 
unable to raise finance to meet rising demands and the bus fleet became overloaded, standards 
deteriorated and it faced severe public criticism (Armstrong-Wright and Thiriez, 1987). A 
similar episode has been reported for the public bus corporation in Bombay (Buchanan, 1980; 
WS/Atkins, 1994). Maunder et al (1987) reported that in India, fare levels are not sufficient 
to invest in new vehicles. Moreover, fare levels are not reviewed regularly, for instance fares 
were not increased from 1980 to 1985. 
However, in the state of Tamil Nadu, where privately and publicly owned operators coexist, 
the public sector bus undertakings are reported to be more efficient and financially viable 
compared with private sector operators, both in Madras and Coimbatore (Armstrong-Wright 
and Thiriez, 1987). In Coimbatore, Cheran Transit Corporation was mandated by the state to 
provide cheap and efficient bus services while maintaining financial viability. The corporation 
was also authorised a high degree of financial and operational independence. It operated 1,100 
full size buses with a high level of efficiency; with over 95 percent of the total buses in 
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operation on a regular basis. Initially, the staff per operating bus ratio was 7.3 but gradually 
it was reduced to 6.5. Despite very low (government fixed) fares, the corporation was able 
to make a profit, which enabled it to expand its fleet in line with demand. 
Much of the success of the corporation must be attributed to its dynamic and accountable 
management, and its degree of independence. It adopted prudent commercial policies, and 
undertook comprehensive monitoring and costing of services. An important reason for its high 
productivity was the payment of bonuses to staff as a result of higher bus utilization and 
better fares collection. Bus drivers were also awarded annual bonuses for accident-free 
driving. Another reason for high productivity was that the corporation achieved scale 
economies by establishing its own body building operations, with a target of 750 bodies for 
the year 1986/87. More than half of the bodies were sold to other companies (Armstrong- 
Wright and Thiriez, 1987; Armstrong-Wright 1993). Similarly, improved services and 
financially viable operation have been reported for the Pallavan Transport Corporation in 
Madras (Armstrong-Wright and Thiriez, 1987; Spiers, 1987). 
Gunaseelan (1995) stated that in Coimbatore passengers were more satisfied with public than 
with private bus services, particularly in regard to reliability and safety; the exception was 
comfort, regarding which passengers were more satisfied with private services, due to their 
ability to provide more personalised service for short length trips than the public bus sector. 
It appears that the public bus sector had a higher comparative quality of service due to its 
large vehicle fleet and its maintenance and infrastructure facilities. 
"The public sector organisations [in India] though they have done a fair job so far, are in 
many cases too large, complex and bureaucratic to be able to respond to changes in the 
overall travel market with the speed required to maintain a working financial surplus. 
Consequently services get out of time with demands and in particular costs and revenues 
are not adjusted quickly enough to prevent large deficit arising" (WS/Atkins, 1994: 5-7). 
The private sector does not play a large part in operating full size stage carriage bus services 
in most Indian cities. Generally private operators sub-contract full size buses to the public 
sector bus corporation, as in Delhi. However, small capacity vehicles such as minibuses are 
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increasingly used by the private sector (Maunder et al, 1987). As fares are controlled by the 
government at low levels and private operators are not given any subsidy, they maximise their 
revenue by maximising the number of passengers carried at the cost of quality of service. 
There is hardly any monitoring and control by regulatory authorities to check the quality of 
service provided to the users (Umrigar et al, 1989). 
The present picture of urban public transport in India is not desirable one. The services are 
mostly overloaded throughout the day. In many cases the publicly owned organizations have 
attempted to contract out some services to private bus operators under their control and satisfy 
part of the demand. Even with this practice there is unsatisfied demand which is the principal 
cause of rapid growth of intermediate public transport modes such as autorickshaws, pedal- 
rickshaws and small capacity minibuses (Umrigar et al, 1988). Taylor (1988) also reports that 
in India, there is very high demand for road based urban transit, when compared to the 
situation in western cities, but that Indian cities suffer from a large imbalance of supply and 
demand for bus services. Low frequency, high density networks are the norm, and small bus 
fleet size leads to high average load factors throughout the day. Maunder et al (1987) confirm 
that the level of provision of stage carriage bus services in India (at between 0.17 - 0.35 buses 
per 1000 population) is very low compared with international standards. Even in the largest 
Indian cities the provision is less than half that observed in UK cities (0.77 buses per 1000 
population). They further state that this deficiency to some extent is fulfilled by intermediate 
public transport. 
The literature also shows that in Indian cities where bus services are deficient, better quality 
services (taxi-like and quality bus services) are used at higher fare levels by middle income 
groups on a regular basis (Maunder and Fouracre, 1981; Maunder et al, 1987). A recent study 
by WS/Atkins (1993) also reports similar findings. It also observed that performance of 
limited stop bus services introduced in Bombay has been affected by traffic congestion. 
"Serious delays to bus services are caused by major traffic congestion in many parts of 
Bombay. This reduces speeds to between 12 and 14 km/hour, although in some instances 
actual operating speeds are even lower. Consequently, bus services are unreliable and in 
the worst instances journeys have to be cancelled to allow buses to pick up later journeys 
as scheduled" (WS/Atkins, 1994: 2-49). 
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According to the WS/Atkins (1994) a number of reserved bus lanes have been tried in a few 
Indian cities, and abandoned because of the difficulty of enforcement. Buses were often 
unable to use the lane due to parked vehicles, pedestrians, and hawkers. One can expect this 
situation where there is a lack of planning control and where disrespect of law is a way of 
life. An article published in The Guardian presents a scene from Delhi. "Anil Aggarwal 
climbs aboard his four year red scooter and circles the streets of the capital. He pauses now 
and then, amid the lawless snarl of cars, autorickshaws, buses, hand-carts, cycles and 
motorcycles - all fighting as if life itself depended on advancing one inch farther down the 
road than the person beside them - and ascribes down the registrations of traffic offenders. 
It's strange way to spend his mornings and evenings, he admits, braving the smoky and 
cacophonous hell that is Delhi's rush hour" (Goldenberg: The Guardian 5 January 1998). 
Nevertheless, in order to enable bus services to become more reliable, to achieve higher 
operating speeds, and to make better use of resources by improving headway, bus priority 
through physical segregation has been introduced in few places within Bombay city. So far, 
the introduction of a contra flow bus lane has been reported a success and was in operation 
in Bombay until 1994 (WS/Atkins, 1994). No later information is available on the operational 
performance. 
3.7 Deregulation Of Urban Public Transport 
"In the United States, and increasingly throughout the world, public policy relies on the 
competitive market is to establish the price and quality of goods and services. In the market, 
customer preferences drive the prices of competing firms lower, while maintaining or 
improving product quality. At the same time, public policy seeks to avoid monopoly. 
Governments grant private monopolies only where they perceive there to be no alternative. 
But because monopoly raises consumers prices and limits production, governments subject 
private monopolies to regulation to replicate the lower costs and higher quality that would 
be produced by the competitive market.... Thus governments have converted monopolistic 
industries such as long distance telecommunications to competition.... Similarly 
governments around the world have converted regulated oligopolistic industries to 
competition. (Such as airlines, rail transport, and intercity buses)" (Cox et al, 1997: 1). 
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Governments have begun to recognize the drawbacks of government monopoly and are 
adopting service delivery mechanisms that improve public performance through the injection 
of competition such as privatisation, deregulation and competitive tendering (Meyer and 
Gomez-Ibanez, 1993; Cox et al, 1997). The United States has been playing a leading role in 
adopting deregulation policies at national level, most notably with the relaxation of 
government controls over telecommunications, airlines, banking, trucking and railroads (Meyer 
and Gomez-Ibanez, 1990 & 1993). In Europe Britain has been a leader in the deregulation 
of urban bus services (Glaister, 1993). 
Khezwana and Maunder (1994) describe deregulation as a process of introducing competition 
into a previously protected sector of the economy so as to reduce constraints on potential 
entrants into the sector and make the sector more responsive. According to a Royal 
Commission Report, public transport deregulation is based on the theory that competition is 
normally the best way of ensuring that services meet the needs of customers at an 
economically justifiable price and that deregulated companies will improve efficiency and 
seek to innovate in order to meet the needs of their customers (Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution, 1995). 
Tolly and Turton (1995) clarify that previously the state was seeking to protect the public 
interest via planned competition and regulation, but under deregulation the role of the state 
is redefined as one of creating conditions for efficient transport operations and allowing 
maximum competition. A key element of deregulation is the promotion of direct competition 
between rival operators. However, it is wrong to say that in a deregulated environment there 
will be no "quantity and quality" controls in the provision of urban public transport services 
and passenger safety. Quality licensing is required even in a so called deregulated 
environment (Khezwana and Maunder, 1994). 
The proponents of deregulation such as Walters (1979) argue that government regulation of 
services and fares is unnecessary and undesirable. It was argued that competition would 
prompt the provision of new supply capacities and that a variety of new services better suited 
to the diversity of actual and potential demands would appear. Moreover higher frequencies 
as a consequence of increased demand resulting from low fares would be provided. Under the 
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assumptions of perfect competition, there is no need for the government to control fares. The 
only role that the government can play is to ensure that competition is fair. 
The argument generally brought up against deregulation is that operators would concentrate 
on the profitable routes, increasing congestion and leaving the poorest neighbourhoods 
unserviced, and that free entry would also bring in inexperienced operators who may cause 
accidents and add to congestion. A more sophisticated argument against deregulation is that 
it is impossible for the government to create and enforce the necessary conditions for perfect 
competition in the urban transport market at a reasonable economic cost (Khezwana and 
Maunder, 1994). 
To authors such as Walters (1982) and Hibbs (1985) reasonably good services have appeared 
under deregulation in a competitive environment, provided by private operators on a 
commercial basis. On the other hand, a recent review by White (1995) stated that deregulation 
in the UK has produced major savings in operational costs and public expenditure, but 
significant changes in the quality and image of the bus are needed if it is to fulfil its potential 
future role. 
An analysis of regulatory reforms in developed and less developed countries is given in the 
following sections. 
3.7.1 Deregulation in developed countries 
Public road passenger transport was in the past usually provided by protected monopolistic 
public sector operators in Developed countries (DCs). Fares were typically determined by 
local government which provided subsidy, often on a simple deficit finance basis (Gwilliam, 
1997). In the past decade or so some countries have reduced government controls on prices, 
service quality, entry, exit and other aspects of private industry behaviour (Higginson, 1990; 
Meyer and Gomez-Ibanez, 1993). In Europe Britain has been a leader in deregulation of urban 
bus services. No other European countries have adopted policies based on the British model 
excepting Portugal, although more liberal regulation and a shift toward competitive tendering 
can be seen in Scandinavia in particular (White, 1995). 
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In New Zealand, the British model has been followed, as a part the general adoption of 
similar `Thatcherite' economic policies from 1991. However, the approach is not identical, 
with a stronger planning role taken by the regional authorities. About 80 percent of services 
are operated on contract, and only 20 percent services are commercial (Fielding and Johnston, 
1992). Deregulation has affected bus passenger service in a number of ways. In Auckland (the 
largest urban area of New Zealand), the average unit cost of bus service has declined. In some 
areas, service frequency has increased and new services have been provided. Competition has 
emerged but at the expense of service quality (Turley and Talley, 1996). 
Gwilliam and Van de Velde (1990) report that Portugal is, after the UK, the most extensively 
deregulated country in Western Europe. A new law promulgated in 1990 displaced a regime 
which had been in operation since 1945. There is a complete deregulation for bus services in 
the country, subject only to a qualitative licensing system of operators, except in Lisbon and 
Oporto. The state retains a power to constrain maximum fares, and the municipalities have 
the right to supplement the commercial network by contracting for subsidised services. 
However, in Lisbon and Oporto, commissions have been set up with the task of establishing 
and implementing public transport plans and determining procedures for the regulation of the 
system. 
The deregulation of urban bus services has been implemented in Britain and other DCs 
followed the British model. The academic debate on this is extensive as is evident in the 
proceedings of five international conferences in the series on Competition and Ownership in 
Land Passenger Transport and in a series of papers in journals such as Transport Reviews 
(White, 1995 & 1996; Gwilliam and Van de Velde; 1990; ) and Journal of Transport 
Economics and Policy (Dodgson and Katsoulacos, 1988; Gwilliam, 1989; Heseltine and 
Silcock, 1990; Evan, 1990). Deregulation in Britain since 1985 has provided the best setting 
for evaluating the innovations which have been initiated by the market (Gomez-Ibanez and 
Meyer, 1997). The following section reviews in detail the British experience about bus 
deregulation. 
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3.7.2 Deregulation of the bus industry in Britain 
For over fifty years from 1930 urban bus services were strictly regulated. A system of route 
service licensing controlled the network of routes to be operated, frequencies and fares, and 
assigned monopoly franchise rights (Gwilliam, 1989). The industry had been running on 
public service principles and had been largely exempted from the provisions of competition 
and restrictive practice legislation. There were suggestions that this monopoly had led to 
inefficiencies and the stifling of innovation which prompted a critical appraisal of how a 
competition structure might be generated (Savage, 1985). 
Since 1980 the bus operating industry in the UK has undergone the most dramatic revolutions 
(Tolly and Turton, 1995). The 1985 Transport Act re-organised the bus industry in Great 
Britain and provided a new framework for all local bus operations outside London. The Act 
reflected a desire to introduce competition into local public transport and concern with 
increasing subsidies. The most effective ways of addressing these issues were by deregulation, 
the introduction of competitive tendering for unprofitable routes and the transfer of bus 
operations from the public to the private sector (Simpson, 1996). The Act followed previous 
legislation (The 1980 Transport Act) which had deregulated express coaches nationally and 
local bus services in three Shire Counties. 
Passing judgement on that legislation, the government felt that: "The 1980 Act began to 
remove the barriers to competition by making it easier for operators to run new services. 
The last four years have shown that industry has able and energetic managers who are 
ready to take advantage of new opportunities and that there is life in the bus market where 
operators have been prepared to try new ventures. It is now time to go further" (The 
'Buses' White Paper; HMSO, 1984). 
However, rather than seeing this as a natural progression of successful policy, opponents of 
the 1985 Transport Act questioned the diagnosis based on this earlier legislation. To many 
commentators, the 1985 Transport Act was based more on an ideological conviction by the 
government that it would work, than on proven experience. Radical policies generated lively 
debate (for example, UK Department of Transport, 1984; Banister, 1985; Beesele and Glaister, 
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1985; Gwilliam et al, 1985 a& b). 
The proponents of the deregulation such as Beesley and Glaister expected better results 
"Government policy dictates that subsidy to bus industry must fall substantially. If nothing 
else were to change then this would have serious consequences for the public. Fortunately, 
there is scope for substantial cost reduction. But this can only be achieved through 
competition.... deregulation will produce an instant response" (Beesley and Glaister, 1985). 
They claimed, the reforms would create a market environment that was competitive, so that 
any monopoly profits would be eliminated. They argued that the resulting competitive 
pressures would also force the industry to improve productivity, reduce costs and to devise 
improved and attractive services. They also predicted reduced fares and higher ridership 
The opponents of the deregulation such as Gwilliam, Nash and Mackie predicted negative 
effects. 
"The analysis of the White Paper rests on four straightforward propositions: deregulation 
will produce a competitive market, competitive pressures will substantially reduce costs, 
competition will improve resource allocation and will not cause significant side effects. We 
reject all of these propositions" (Gwilliam, Nash and Mackie, 1985). They expected 
competition either not to develop or to be wasteful if it did. They also contended that many 
communities would end up dominated by entrenched local bus monopolies, which being 
unresponsive to users and no longer inhibited by government oversight, would raise fares and 
cut services. If competition did develop, they stated, it would be concentrated on a few 
profitable routes and services would decline on the unprofitable routes. They predicted bus 
ridership would decline and car use and traffic congestion would increase. 
Following enactment of the 1985 Transport Act, the British local bus industry was deregulated 
in 1986. Bus operators are now free to decide what bus services they wish to provide 
commercially and what fares they wish to charge. There is a quality control of operators, 
drivers and vehicles, but no quantity control. The only restriction on entry and exit is that the 
operator must register his service, giving 42 days notice of the route and timetable which are 
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to be offered (Mackie and Preston, 1992). According to Tolly and Turton (1995), route 
competition was introduced on commercial services, public subsidy has been slashed; and city 
streets have seen the decline of the old double-deckers and the appearance of mini and 
midibuses, often in eye-catching liveries and operated by previously unheard-of companies. 
The local authorities may choose to supplement the commercial network by securing 
additional services via competitive tender. 
The effects of deregulation in Britain have been very uneven and have been well debated and 
documented. The following are the major outcomes of the deregulation 
Competition: It is difficult to establish how much competition has occurred, beyond 
conceding that it has so far been less than was optimistically expected (Glaister, 1993). Begg 
and Smith (1997) state that the effects on passengers have been mixed and localised. Some 
areas benefited from competition and some saw no changes at all. Still others experienced all 
the side effects of high level on-the-road competition. According to Tyson, deregulation has 
led to competition in the bus industry on a significant scale. There are few areas of the 
country which are the preserve of a single operator. Bus operators have shown themselves to 
be capable of diversifying to and from other activities and capable of operating well outside 
their traditional areas (Tyson, 1996). On the whole, however, competition has not generally 
been widespread or sustained. Where competition develops, many of its undesirable features 
are reportedly common. White (1995) reports that headrunning is a frequent competition 
strategy, for instance, while price competition is reportedly rare. Similarly travel cards or 
passes are less prevalent outside London than they used to be (Tyson, 1995). In some 
metropolitan areas active competition has been reported. The city of Oxford is the prime and 
possibly only example where competition has led to investment in new buses and very high 
frequencies. As a result of these developments, the number of passengers miles by bus into 
the city centre has markedly increased over the last decade (Jeffery, 1997). Colson (1996) 
claims that a successful growth of the market has also been achieved in Bristol. 
Fares: The obvious effect of deregulation is changes in real fare levels. It was expected that 
with competition costs would be generally reduced which would allow fares to be reduced, 
but fares have increased significantly in real terms. During 1985-89, fares in metropolitan 
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areas rose by an average of 23 percent in real terms but only 10 percent in the country as a 
whole (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer, 1989). Over a period of 10 years (1985-1995), a sharp fares 
increase has been reported by White (1997). He reports an overall fares increase of about 20 
percent ranging from 5.4 percent in Scotland to 50.3 percent in the metropolitan areas. 
Public expenditure: The government has saved a large amount of money in reduced 
subsidies. Gwilliam (1989) reports that subsidies to the bus industry and its passengers have 
been reduced by 50 percent. The overall fall in public expenditure on local buses (excluding 
London) from 1984 to 1988 was about 26 percent (Glaister, 1993). White elucidates that 
revenue support outside London fell by 55 percent. In 1985/86 this included payments to 
operators and controlling bodies such as Passenger Transport Authorities, for maintenance of 
fares and service policies. However, the payments to operators are now confined to those for 
tendered services and have declined more rapidly. These payments comprised some £143 
million compared with the revenue support figure of £237 million in 1992/93 (White, 1995). 
This implies that deregulation tends to achieve its objective of reducing public expenditure. 
"Deregulation has not achieved the main objective as summed up by Nicholas Ridley, 
Secretary of State for Transport when legislation was introduced, `to halt the decline that 
has afflicted the bus industry for more than 20 years'.. It has not resulted in many small 
and medium sized companies competing to provide a more efficient service at lower cost 
to traveller and taxpayers as was envisaged. The Transport Act 1985 has resulted, however 
in lower subsidies" (Simpson, 1996: 217). 
Bus patronage: Fairhurst and Edwards (1996) and Mackie et al (1995) reported a large 
increase in bus-kilometres, of almost 30 percent since 1985/86. The large increase in bus 
kilometres seems to have had very little effect on demand. Whoever, the main effect of the 
deregulation has been a reduction of people using buses, with patronage falling faster after 
deregulation than before, especially in the large cities (Tolly and Turton, 1995; White, 1995; 
Tyson, 1996). In the first six years of deregulation, the number of bus passenger journeys in 
the metropolitan counties fell by 23 percent and in the shire counties by 17 percent 
(Department of Transport, 1994). Moreover, there has also been a decline in travel at 
concessionary fares (Hill and Last, 1994; Paulley and Balcombe, 1996). Recently some 
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reduction in the rate of decline in the ridership have been reported by the Department of 
Transport (1995). This is the great disappointment of the policy (Glaister, 1993). White 
(1990), and Fairhurst and Edwards (1996) estimated that the post-reform ridership losses were 
slightly smaller than expected in London and slightly larger than expected elsewhere. These 
losses were mainly because of irregular running, or vehicle bunching, lack of service 
coordination or confusion among passengers because of frequent changes and lack of 
information. Owing to the above deficiencies, the drop in bus patronage is not therefore 
surprising (The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution's Report, 1995). In addition, 
managers seemed slow to adopt good marketing practices and commercial pricing (Tyson, 
1989; 1990). 
Fleet composition: The overall fleet grew by 10.3% from 67,900 in 1985/86 to 74,900 in 
1993/94. Much of this growth was in minibuses/midibuses (vehicles with 17-35 seats). The 
number of these vehicles rose from 3,100 to 14,600 over the same period. However, the 
number of larger vehicles (over 36 seats) fell from 58,200 to 50,900, notably in the double 
decker category. Rapid ageing in this category is also evident. The percentage of vehicles 12 
years old and above in 1985 was 19 percent and increased to 48 percent by the end of 1993 
(White, 1995). 
Ownership: Presently most of the local bus industry falls within the private sector whereas 
over 90 percent of bus operations were in the public sector in 1986. This largely illustrates 
the gradual sale of previous public sector business to private ownership, although some 
expansion of private sector operations has also occurred through entirely new entrants in the 
local bus market (White, 1995). 
Operational costs: A notable feature of deregulation has been the reductions in unit operating 
costs. Operational cost per kilometre has been reduced by 30 percent (Gwilliam, 1989; 
Heseltine and Silcock, 1990). The overall reduction in average operating cost is higher in 
areas outside London. Taking trends up to 1993/94 inclusive, the reduction in deregulated 
areas as a whole was more (at 41.9%) than in London (at 35.1 %). However between 1993/94 
and 1994/95, London displayed a greater reduction than other areas (White, 1997). Advocates 
of deregulation such as Glaister (1993) claim that the reduction in operational costs is due to 
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reduced labour costs resulting from the new policy. However, White and Turner (1990) added 
that costs also fell due to substantial reduction in fuel prices. 
The minibus effect: One of the most striking innovations has been the substitution of 
minbuses/midibuses for double deckers (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer, 1997). Before 1984, 
minibuses were rarely used on intensive urban services, but urban minibus/midibus operations 
have flourished in the deregulated environment (Watts et al, 1989; Turner and Mbara, 1992). 
The minibus experience in Britain has delivered increased frequencies, greater vehicle 
kilometres and more fuel-efficient vehicles. Increased frequency has been allowed by lower 
capital and operating costs, including drivers' wages and has resulted in increase in ridership, 
compared with full size buses (Simpson, 1994). What minibuses lack in passenger capacity, 
they often make up for in higher speeds and allow greater route coverage with better 
penetration of residential areas (Glaister, 1993; White, 1995). 
Road safety: Safety was a subject of great debate. It was alleged that competition would lead 
to neglect of vehicle maintenance and personnel training (Glaister, 1993). An analysis has 
been made of detailed casualty trends from 1966 to 1992. The evidence indicates that no 
significant change in casualty rates for bus and coach occupants has occurred since local bus 
deregulation (White and Tyler, 1994). A similar conclusion is also supported in other recent 
studies (Astrop et al, 1991; Evans, 1994). The British experience suggests that quantity and 
price deregulation need not result in any worsening in casualty rates for bus and coach 
occupants, provided that strict quality control is retained. This is achieved through the 
operator licensing system (White, 1995). 
Service quality: The effects on quality of services have been varied. Services have changed 
far more frequently than before deregulation. As a result it has been not easy to provide 
information to passengers. Tyson (1990) examined the provisional impact of deregulation on 
service stability, information and integration in metropolitan areas. Later in mid 1990s, Tyson 
reported that the present deregulated market has not provided stability of services, an 
identifiable network which could be easily promoted, with inter-operator and inter-modal 
tickets, regular coordinated timetables on routes, or significant investment in new vehicles. 
Moreover the deregulated market is not able to generate the level and quality of bus service 
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necessary to attract car users to public transport (Tyson, 1995). There is a lack of cooperation 
between operators which has resulted in poor connections between services. Many services 
have been reduced, networks are restructured and have become less stable. The general 
impression is of declining quality of services (Simpson, 1996; White, 1996). Moreover, there 
was also deterioration in the extent of bus-rail integration; markedly so in Tyne and Wear. 
Passengers on main routes with faster, cheaper and more frequent services have benefited, but 
this is offset by the losses suffered by those who wish to travel off-peak, on less used routes, 
or who wish to interchange with other urban transport services. Women and the elderly 
comprise the majority in this category (Tolly and Turton, 1995). Begg and Smith concludes 
that "overall, there has been an erosion of customer confidence by the frequent changes 
to services, confusion of publicity and a perception of a lack of stability in service provision 
due to the competitive environment" (Begg and Smith, 1997: 20). 
3.7.3 Deregulation in Less Developed Countries 
To overcome the problems associated with regulation of public transport (discussed in section 
3.3), various regulatory reforms including complete deregulation have been adopted in a 
number of LDCs (see Darbera, 1993; Fernandez, 1994; Fouracre et al, 1994; Joy, 1995; Kang, 
1995; Roth and Diandas, 1995). The intent of deregulated entry is to find a mechanism which 
will enhance the capacity of the system. There are varied opinions over the outcome of 
deregulation in LDCs. With free access to the market, the capacity of the fleet would be 
enhanced and passengers may avail themselves of different types of services. Deregulated 
fares, coupled with ease of entry to the market, is likely to result in the provision of more 
services that meet the needs of the public at competitive prices. Moreover, the element of 
competition may reduce the chances of excessive profits and encourage efficiency 
(Armstrong-Wright and Thiriez, 1987). The literature shows that deregulation has however 
not improved the functional productivity of public transport vehicles particularly in developing 
countries such as in Chile and Peru (Henry, 1993). 
Fouracre is pessimistic, and claims there is no guarantee that deregulation will encourage 
market entry. In developing countries there is no certainty that market forces will result in 
services at market price to all areas. Very often in practice trade associations or consortia of 
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owners or drivers take on the role of regulation in order to avoid cut-throat competition. Such 
associations tend to protect the interests of their members rather than that of the community. 
Gwilliam (1997) confirms that a common phenomenon in many of developing countries is 
the existence of operators' associations. Such associations typically establish property rights, 
often over terminals, and by force if necessary. 
The implementation of deregulation policies has varied from country to country: from (a) 
complete deregulation except quality controls, (b) fares deregulation retaining strict quantity 
controls (c) fares deregulation with weak quantity controls and (d) free entry retaining fare 
regulation. Little information is published on c and d situations. Two countries, Chile and Sri 
Lanka, have been selected to illustrate the impact of a and b deregulation policies. 
a). Chile is the pioneer country that started deregulation of urban public transport in 1979. 
Complete deregulation has been rejected in the longer term. The analysis of the 
experience shows how the failure of deregulation has led to a form of re-regulation. 
b). In Sri Lanka, fares have been deregulated for private sector services. Yet fares for 
publicly owned services remain fixed by the government and quantity controls 
retained. The analysis in this case study illustrates the extent of the success of these 
reforms in the provision of public transport services. 
1. Chile 
Frenandez and De Cea (1985) reported that the public transport system in Chile had, previous 
to 1979, been subject to strict regulation under which quantity quotas per route and fares were 
fixed by the regulatory authorities. Deregulation of urban public transport in Chile was a 
gradual process, with pauses, performed in three steps, over about ten years. The first step 
was taken in 1979 when most of the entry restrictions were relaxed. New operators still had 
to submit an application stating the route they wanted to operate for approval, but practically 
all permits were granted automatically. In 1983 fares were deregulated with one condition that 
the fares be clearly displayed on the windshield. In 1989 the public transport industry was 
completely deregulated. The only remaining conditions were on running condition of the 
vehicles (safety and pollution) and on the qualification of the drivers (Darbera, 1993). 
The outcomes of deregulation have been discussed by many authors (for instance see 
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Fernandez and De Cea, 1985; Thomson, 1992; Darbera, 1993; Figueroa, 1993, Fernandez, 
1994). As a consequence of deregulation measures in Santiago, the size of fleet grew rapidly, 
but also fares increased rapidly in real terms so that ridership and average vehicle occupancy 
actually declined. Between the year 1979 and about 1989, the number of vehicles doubled in 
the city, from 5,200 to 10,500, with no corresponding increase in the number of passengers. 
The average vehicle age considerably increased between 1980 and 1988, and there has been 
a tendency towards smaller and smaller vehicles. The remarkable growth in minibuses and 
taxibuses added greatly to congestion in the downtown, and to Santiago's already serious air 
pollution problems. Also individual bus owners on a single route raced to get to the corner 
first where passengers are waiting. This practice has caused very serious safety and accident 
problems in the city. As a result, the image of public transport became totally negative. A 
cartel took over the control of fares and operation of the vehicles. There are approximately 
8,000 bus owners who are organized in 50 unions. The fares fixed by the cartel reached levels 
which guaranteed high profits for their members, which in turn stimulated the incorporation 
of new operators, putting additional pressures on fares. In this manner, fares went up 140 
percent in real terms between 1983-89. Brown (1993) argued that as a consequence of fare 
increases some people could no longer afford to ride the bus and had to walk, and average 
ridership per bus dropped from 1,000 passengers per day to less than 500. It meant there were 
empty buses all over the city at all times of the day. As a result, the average cost of operating 
a bus per day per passenger, went up again in Santiago. 
On the positive side, owing to the huge increase in the number of buses and taxi-buses, there 
is a greater choice of where these vehicles go. Individual bus routes became much longer, and 
at the same time,. the connections between them were greatly increased and waiting times 
were decreased. Passengers who used to take two buses to get from home to work now could 
find one bus that would go all the way. Quality of service in these senses increased 
considerably (Glaister, 1993; Thomson, 1992). 
In summary the outcomes of deregulation in Chile include: fares more than doubled in real 
terms; the cartel of operators was strengthened; doubling in the number of buses with no 
corresponding increase in ridership; and external side effects, such as traffic congestion, 
pollution and accidents, strongly increased. On the other hand spatial coverage of the system 
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grew, and waiting times and walking distances were reduced. 
Darbera in evaluating the deregulation policies in Chile concluded: "Policy makers were 
definitely misled when they believed that complete deregulation would lead to perfect 
competition and market equilibrium, with its optimum allocation of resources. Urban 
transport is a market where the free interaction of market forces leads to unstable 
equilibrium with wide over-capacity. It is not clear that the end result of their policy is 
worse than the previous situation where buses were scarce, over-crowded, and the network 
very limited" (Darbera, 1993: 56). 
In 1990, the existing law was amended to establish a new framework. Under the modified 
law access to the public transport market is restricted under terms and conditions specified 
by regulatory authorities (with a re-introduction of some entry restrictions but selectively). 
This modification was made to ameliorate the problems of congestion, pollution and 
accidents. In 1991, collective taxis were banned from certain areas. The Government has been 
promoting a large number of corrective measures to alleviate congestion and pollution levels 
in Santiago. One of the key measures adopted is to invite mass transit operators to bid for 
specific routes (Figueroa, 1993; Fernanadez, 1994). The Government started a route franchised 
system in Santiago in 1991. This system has quantity control on the entry of buses to the 
central area, with licences distributed on the basis of a competitive tender. The criteria were 
based on the fares offered, the size of buses, and their average age (an important issue 
because the newer buses have lower emissions). After the introduction of the competitive 
franchising system fares were stabilised in real terms, congestion was relieved and 
environmental impacts substantially reduced as reported by Fernandez (1994). No information 
is available about more recent performance of this re-regulation in Chile. 
2. Sri Lanka 
Over a 60-year period from 1916, Sri Lanka's bus services went through a cycle of 
unregulated competition, private route monopolies, nationalisation and revived competition. 
This process has been described by Diandas (1989). In 1979, the government of Sri Lanka 
introduced the following measures for the improvement of public transport. First, it terminated 
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the monopoly enjoyed by the public bus company, the Ceylon Transport Board, which had 
been operating at huge loses and could not cope with increasing demand. Second, it let 
private sector operators compete. Third, it relaxed import restrictions on public transport 
vehicles. Fourth, tax incentives were introduced to operators for the purchase of new vehicles 
(Armstrong-Wright and Thireiz, 1987; Diandas, 1989). 
Roth and Diandas (1995) report that these actions of the government evoked a strong response 
from private bus operators, who imported more than 10,000 buses. A majority of those 
responding to the government invitation were individual entrepreneurs who acquired one bus 
each. The availability of reconditioned Japanese 29-seat vehicles encouraged this process. An 
overwhelming majority (95%) of the owners have only one bus. 
Public transport services within the provinces are regulated by provincial transport authorities 
and inter-provincial services by the National Transport Commission. All owners obtain 
individual operating permits for their buses for a specified route. The government fare 
regulation for private public transport services was abolished in 1989. At present, fares are 
theoretically set by the operators, but are largely based on the public sector bus companies 
fares, which are held artificially low. Moreover, fare increases are restrained by threats of 
permit cancellation. These threats, although illegal, have been effective (Roth and Diandas, 
1995). 
In early 1980s, the government also mandated each private operator to join a district operator 
association which was empowered to regulate schedules, despatch vehicles from terminals and 
generally police operator behaviour. These associations soon developed a reputation for 
corruption and favouritism. The National Transport Commission abolished them in 1991 
owing to these irregularities. More recently, transport officials in two provinces have 
attempted to get operators to agree voluntarily to coordinate schedules and despatching. The 
negotiations among the numerous small operators proved so difficult that only 6 of the over 
300 routes in one province are covered by agreements (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer, 1997). 
The overall effects of the deregulation of bus services in Sri Lanka are well illustrated. 
Despite the statistics indicating a steady increase in the number of buses, there is a 
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widespread perception that passengers carried on many routes do not obtain good service. 
This perception is supported by observation of Colombo's crowded buses. On the positive 
side, there has been a substantial increase in capacity, particularly at peak periods, and more 
frequent bus services. Users of the smaller buses on busy routes benefit from reduced waiting 
times due to the higher frequencies associated with the smaller vehicles (Armstrong-Wright 
and Thireiz, 1987). 
On the negative side, the private buses operate only one daily shift, and do not offer service 
outside busy periods nor in remote areas. Another negative consequence is that standing in 
small buses is even less comfortable than standing in full size buses. One of the most 
common complaints is that the buses do not move from their route starting points until they 
are full, and they then have only crowded standing room for passengers at intermediate points. 
There are also numerous complaints relating to speeding and other unsafe operations, and to 
insufficient boarding and alighting time being allowed to passengers (Diandas, 1989; Roth and 
Diandas, 1995). 
Headrunning, racing to bus stops, irregular despatching and other problems associated with 
competition are more commonplace in Sri Lanka than they have been in Britain or Santiago, 
perhaps because one bus operators are the norm (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer, 1997). The end 
result is a dilapidated, inadequate system and substantial growth in two wheelers and the 
chartered van services. These divert a large articulate middle class segment of the travel 
market from buses (Diandas, 1989; Roth and Diandas, 1995). 
3.8 Alternatives Forms of Competition 
Governments have begun to adopt service delivery mechanisms that improve public 
performance through competition. Competition may be intensified by putting smaller packages 
of service out to tender through which a public agency guaranteeing service to the public, 
while reducing costs. As a result, competitive tendering has been implemented by socialist, 
liberal, and conservative governments in response to fiscal challenges (Cox et al, 1997). Van 
de Velde (1997) reports that Dutch government was planning to introduce franchising in local 
public transport which is meant to give to potential operators the possibility to tender for the 
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whole design and operation of bus networks. 
Gwilliam and Scurfield (1996) state that the essential requirement is to secure effective 
competition between alternative sources of supply. This can be achieved in a number of ways, 
which can be categorised into the following forms (1) the system management contract, (2) 
the service supply contract, (3) unbundling and sub-contracting, and (4) mixed systems. 
3.8.1 The- system management contract % 
According to Gwilliam and Scurfield (1996) the extreme form is that whole network is 
franchised to a single operator for a protected period, with a complete specification of service 
structures and fares. This has the advantage of giving security of service. But it is then 
difficult to find credible alternative operators; terminals, vehicles and staff may need to be 
transferred between operators as a consequence of franchising changes. Competition is among 
different management groups, with inter-area emulation and professional reputation being the 
main instruments of competitive pressure. This approach does effectively separate the political 
and professional management elements. Such regulatory schemes are currently common in 
France and Latin American cities (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer, 1997). But it is susceptible to 
capture both by incumbent management groups, who have a great advantage in the periodic 
competition, and by organised labour, which may be under no effective competitive threat. 
The selected management may have incentives to subcontract to small operators if they 
operate more economically (Gwilliam and Scurfield, 1996). 
Monami (1997) reports the regulation of land passenger transport through management 
contracts in Belgium. In 1991, Belgian regulators opted for management contracts to provide 
public transport firms with more managerial autonomy and to increase their commercial 
responsiveness. Since then, management contracts have been increasingly used to determine, 
once in every few years, the financial and potential liabilities of both public transport 
operators and authorities. In the Walloon Region, bus operators were split geographically into 
five relatively independent local operators, placed under the umbrella of a holding company. 
The problems associated with such systems are excessive rigidity in routes and services and 
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excessively stringent controls on fares. This rigidity develops owing to the nature of 
franchises. Fares are often not authorized to increase regularly with inflation. In theory this 
problem might be avoided by legally indexing fares to inflation, but in practice indexing is 
rare. Problems of administrative capacity and integrity are less, however, because the 
administrative tasks are relatively simple and there is a limited discretion (Gomez-Ibanez and 
Meyer, 1997). 
3.8.2 The service supply contract 
There are two major versions of this approach. First, the gross cost version involves bidding 
on the basis of the total costs of provision of the specified service, with all revenues accruing 
to the central authority. This protects the operator from any revenue risk and hence reduces 
his incentives to produce high service quality or to collect farebox revenue. It also increases 
the monitoring requirement for the authority over revenue collection and service delivery. The 
second version involves the net cost bidding on the basis of supplemental revenue or subsidy 
required by the bidder. This puts revenue as well as supply cost risk firmly with the supplier, 
and appears to have greater efficiency incentives (Gwilliam and Scurfield, 1996). Service 
supply contracts have been introduced in both DCs and LDCs. 
In London, the alternative of comprehensive tendering is adopted. London Transport plans the 
entire service network and specifies the service to be provided. The tendered services are 
operated on a gross cost basis with all revenue accruing to the tendering authority (London 
Transport), and the operator is paid for total costs incurred. In general, such tendering on a 
gross cost basis works well and serves as a good model (see section 9.2 for details). 
Cox et al (1997) report that competitive tendering has also been introduced in Scandinavia. 
In Denmark, the Danish parliament has mandated that the Copenhagen public transport bus 
system be converted to competitive tendering. As a result, Copenhagen now contracts 56 
percent of its system on a competitive basis and it will convert the remainder by 2002. More 
than 20 operators provide service under competitive contracts. Copenhagen Transport credits 
competitive tendering with reversing its falling ridership trend. Policy is separated from 
operations. Total operating costs declined by 18.5 percent from 1989 to 1996 while bus 
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services expanded by 5 percent, and bus costs per kilometer have declined by 22.3 percent. 
Similarly, Stockholm competitively contracted about 60 percent of both its bus services and 
rail services as at 1995. Tendered bus services are reported to be 32 percent less costly than 
non-competitive services. Total operating costs have declined by 18.5 percent from 1992 to 
1995, while bus services expanded by 2.8 percent, and bus costs per kilometre have declined 
by 20.3 percent in three years (Cox et al, 1997). 
Goebel (1996) reports the service based commercial contracts have also been introduced in 
Queensland (Australia). The urban bus industry plays an important role in the provision of 
public transport in the city. There are 70 providers with a total fleet of 680 buses in 
Queensland. These contracts are on the basis of service performance above set minimum 
service levels for a franchised area, with all costs covered by internal cross subsidy. Contracts 
are awarded for a period of five years with a mid-point review. The main outcome of the 
contracts is service innovation. 
In LDC context there are problems to deal with competitive tendering due to a limited 
administrative capabilities. The following are examples which show miss-managed tendering 
in LDCs. 
Ackerman (1996) reports that with a view to increase competition, and to reduce the level of 
subsidies to the protected monopolistic public sector services, a competitive tendering system 
was also proposed in the late 1980s in South Africa. However, this system was only 
implemented in areas where bus operators threatened to withdraw their services due to 
financial difficulties, and where the government was not prepared to increase subsidies to 
unacceptably high levels. Other factors limiting the introduction of competitive tendering are 
reported administrative loopholes protecting operators from competition, the concerns of 
unions regarding job security and the complicated nature of documentation used for calling 
tenders. 
Gwilliam reports that in Jamaica, dissatisfaction with the quality of service led the 
government to introduce a new system in 1994. The city of Kingston was divided into five 
areas each for the exclusive operation of a selected franchisee for a period of ten years in the 
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first instance. Each franchisee was required to own or control the operation of all buses 
operating within the franchise. The franchisee had to provide adequate depots, terminals, and 
vehicles, and meet specified quality standards including scheduled operation, a specified 
minimum quantity of service on each route. Because of political unwillingness to increase 
prices, the invitation to tender was amended. The fare table was omitted from the invitation 
to tender and provision was made for payment of a direct subsidy in the event that a 
commercial fare table was not subsequently introduced. In April 1995, the franchises were 
awarded to three applicants. Initially fares were adjusted for inflation and subsidy was paid, 
but the basic inadequacy of the fare level was not addressed and subsidy did not continue to 
be paid. In these circumstances franchisee are unable to provide the required capacity and 
traditional undisciplined practices are commonplace (Gwilliam, 1996 & 1997). 
3.8.3 Unbundling and sub-contract 
Where the supply of bus services is formally a protected monopoly right of a company, there 
are number of ways in which competition and private sector involvement can be secured. Few 
bus companies manufacture their own vehicles, and other activities which may be contracted 
out include vehicle maintenance, particularly for light vehicles for which there is usually a 
large maintenance sector. Where more competitive supply is required, but planning skills are 
concentrated in the incumbent operator, the master operator may be required to subcontract 
part of its operations to the private sector (as in Delhi, Melbourne). This effectively delegates 
the management of city-wide service to the original bus operator, but achieves a competitive 
supply of service. The main problems are those of creating sufficient incentives to sub- 
contract ensuring fair competition between in-house and contracted suppliers, and ensuring 
that the master operator uses its powers to meet the social objectives. 
3.8.4 Mixed systems 
White and Tough (1995) reports a mixed system, used in UK outside London, combines free 
entry into the industry without subsidy, with subsidised services put out to competitive 
tenders. Gwilliam and Scurfield (1996) have identified that the main problems of this type 
of competitive system are ensuring fair competition, and particularly preventing cross-subsidy 
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in bids by parastatals; establishing the relationship between commercial and the subsidised 
sectors to prevent game playing by incumbents; establishing the appropriate administrative 
skills for operating a tendering system; monitoring performance to establish that contract 
conditions have been satisfied; and providing information to customers where a service 
network is divided among multiple operators. 
3.9 Models of Good Regulatory Practice 
3.9.1 Public transport regulation in Hong Kong 
Lee (1993) reports that Hong Kong has a diverse multi-modal public transport system, 
comprising an electrified Kowloon-Canton Railway, a Mass Transit Railway, a Light Rail 
Transit, a tramway, franchised buses, public light buses, various residential coach services, 
taxis and ferry services. The latest innovation is an escalator-traveolator system designed to 
transport residents, students and office workers between mid-level residential areas and busy 
districts of Hong Kong. The intensity and diversity of public transport services in Hong Kong 
are unparalleled in comparable cities of the world. The public transport services are provided 
by private concerns and public corporations without any direct subsidy. 
It is government policy to promote healthy competition whilst maintaining a safe, 
comprehensive and efficient public transport network, offering the public a variety of services 
in terms of modes, operators, fares, comfort and convenience. Some 90 percent of the daily 
trips in Hong Kong are made on public transport. In 1995, the public transport services 
overall carried about 10.5 million passengers per day. Road passenger transport accounted for 
two-thirds of all public transport journeys. More than half of these journeys made were on 
franchised buses (3.51 million passengers daily), and the rest on public and private light 
buses, taxis and non-franchised buses (Government of Hong, Kong, 1995). 
The Transport Department is responsible for the planning, regulation and monitoring of public 
transport services in Hong Kong. The Commissioner for Transport is head of Transport 
Department. He is authorised for administering the Road Traffic Ordinance and legislation 
regulating public transport operations other than railways. His responsibilities include strategic 
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transport planning, road traffic management, government road tunnels, car parks and metered 
parking spaces, and the regulation of internal roads and waterborne public transport. The 
Commissioner is also responsible for the licensing of drivers and the registration, licensing 
and inspection of vehicles. While the police force is the main agency for the enforcement of 
traffic legislation and prosecutions of offenses, prosecutions involving safety defects found 
in buses, breaches of vehicle safety regulations and government tunnel regulations are handled 
by the Prosecutions Unit of the Transport Department (Government of Hong Kong, 1996). 
The public transport services are subject to government regulation in order to ensure the 
availability of efficient services to the public. An operator proposing to operate a public 
transport service may at any time apply to the Commissioner for a licence. The Commissioner 
grants a license if it is considered desirable to introduce a service. A passenger service license 
is issued for a period not exceeding 5 years (Government of Hong Kong, 1990). Appeals 
against decisions made by the Commissioner for Transport are registered with a Transport 
Tribunal set up under the Road Traffic Ordinance. This tribunal comprised of a chairman and 
members all appointed from the public was set up under the Road Traffic Ordinance 
(Government of Hong Kong, 1994). 
Route network and services are determined with the mutual cooperation of bus operators and 
regulatory authorities in Hong Kong. Bus route franchises are granted to bus operators for 
specified routes. The operators are responsible for providing services as agreed with the 
government. The agreement covers fares, schedule of services, vehicle carrying capacity, and 
types of buses (Government of Hong Kong, 1990a). Scurfield and Lee (1988) report that 
initially, the Department of Transport used to prepare a Route Development Programme. In 
preparing the programme, the department had to consider outstanding items such as 
complaints regarding bus services, population changes, availability of other public transport 
services, bus terminals, road conditions, and changes in passenger demand and market. Under 
this system, the entire route planning was done by the government and implementation by the 
operators, which resulted in some negative effects. 
In 1985, it was considered that the operators, not the government, should plan. The need for 
franchised bus operators to make forward planning programmes became a part of the law. 
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Presently, they submit a programme of the operation, before 30 June of each year, for the 
following five years. The present regime contains: a bus route development programme; an 
estimate of the total fleet requirements; a programme bus scrapping and acquisition; a depot 
development programme; and a forecast of the financial implications of the programme. The 
operator and the Commissioner for Transport are required to reach an agreement before 30 
September, and their disagreement is resolved through arbitration. This programme has been 
proved a very useful mechanism both to the government and the companies. The financial 
plan gives a forewarning of implications on fares, so that the government could have an idea 
and timing of prospective fares increase. In order to avoid unacceptable fare increases, a 
balance is sought between the quality and quantity of services on one hand, and reasonable 
fare levels on the other (Scurfield and Lee, 1988; Lee, 1990). 
Minibuses in Hong Kong are licensed to carry a maximum of 16 passengers. There are two 
types of minibuses: public light buses and private light buses. The public light buses are 
authorised to carry passengers paying separate fares whereas the private light buses carry 
group passengers and do not collect separate fares. The public light buses are classified into 
green minibuses and red minibuses. Green minibuses provide services on approved routes, at 
fixed schedules and timetables with fixed fares. Red minibuses operate without a schedule. 
They do not have fixed fares and timetables (Government of Hong Kong, 1996). 
Passengers in Hong Kong benefit from a variety of public transport modes. The government 
also ensures that consumers get a reliable service at reasonable price. The operators are given 
financial incentives to make long term investments for the provision of a proper and efficient 
service to meet anticipated demand. These objectives are achieved without any direct financial 
contribution or subsidy from public funds (Scurfield and Lee, 1988). 
3.9.2 Competitive tendering in London 
Regulatory practices in many DCs are evolving in similar ways, and the principal model is 
London's tendering scheme. This section presents an analysis of the effectiveness of service 
supply contracts in London. 
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Prior to the 1984 London Regional Transport Act, London's bus system was an increasingly 
costly public monopoly. Inflation adjusted costs per bus mile grew 65 percent (or 3.4 percent 
per annum) from 1970 to 1985 (Cox et al, 1995). To maintain performance and ensure public 
safety while reducing costs, the London Regional Transport Act required a competitive 
tendering of bus services until full deregulation of passenger transport at an unspecified future 
time. Tendering managed by the administrative body began in 1985-86 and increased 
gradually until 1994 when the operating subsidiaries were fully privatized. The entire network 
is to be provided through net-cost tenders by the year 2000 (Newton, 1994). 
London Transport Authority plans the entire service network and specifies the services to be 
provided. Traditionally, they had been operated almost entirely by its own subsidiary, London 
Buses Ltd (LBL), until in early 1986, competitive tendering was introduced. Companies 
receive a single contract and each service is tendered separately. The separately tendered 
services are operated on a gross cost basis, that is, all revenue accrues to the tendering 
authority (London Transport), and the operator is paid for total costs incurred. As a result, the 
operator does not incur revenue risk. London Transport has the largest public transport bus 
system in the developed world, with over 5,000 buses and carrying 1.1 billion annual trips 
(Cox et al, 1997). It is the public customer, defining the routes, setting fares, paying operators 
for the service provided and collecting all revenue, and maintaining intermodal tickets 
availability and coordination (Chartered Institute of Transport, 1994). 
Gwilliam (1997) assesses that in general the tendering system in London works well and 
serves as a good model. Over a 10 years period (1985-95) operating costs had fallen by 40 
percent, and subsidy by 75 percent in real terms. Intermodal integration had been strengthened 
and, despite real fare increases of 30 percent, patronage remained approximately constant. 
Over the 11 years period 1985-96, services have been expanded 28.7 percent, ridership 
increased three percent and costs per vehicle km have dropped 45.7 percent. Moveover, 
passenger fares covered 94 percent of operating and capital costs in 1996 and fares covered 
60 percent of the costs before competitive tendering. In contrast, passenger fares hardly cover 
50 percent of operating costs in the largest US public transport systems (Cox et al, 1997). 
The quality of service has been improved substantially on tendered routes, because of the 
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closer attention required for contract enforcement. Competition for tenders has been strong 
and traffic congestion has not been a problem. Revenues increased due to the increase in bus 
miles delivered. Tendering in London can be considered a success. Results have been good, 
the administration has run smoothly, and the sensitive situation created by an in-house 
supplier bidding against outside competitors has generally been handled satisfactorily 
(Glaister, 1993). Kennedy (1995) reviewed the tendering system in London, confirming that 
large savings have been made, but that there is also inflexibility in the system as perceived 
by bus company managers. Mackie et al, concluded that "London's tendering has been 
successful because it avoids wasting resources in competitive battles, offers the opportunity 
to balance fares and service policies efficiently, and avoids the loss of consumer confidence 
associated with instability" (Mackie et al, 1995: 317). 
Experience in London also illustrates some of the practical drawbacks of tendering. The 
negotiated contract with LBL companies functioned on a net subsidy basis. In the absence of 
a sufficiently precise system for revenue apportionment, this produced serious problems both 
for London Transport and the operating companies (Chartered Institute of Transport, 1994). 
In view of the difficulties encountered in net cost tendering, route-by-route tendering was 
resumed on a gross cost basis for the period to 1997 (White and Tough, 1995). Moreover, 
private operators providing contract services in London frequently complain that the route 
planners have little feel for the market and are unresponsive to suggestions, although the 
planners deny that this is the case (Kennedy, 1997). 
3.10 Conclusions 
  The literature shows that regulatory and other government policies in LDCs have 
generally undermined the role of urban public transport services, with as a result 
investments in public transport curtailed, quality of service reduced and expansion of 
services stunted (section 2). 
  There is a direct relationship between the level of fares and the level of service which 
is commercially sustainable. Under low fare controls the operators are not able to 
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invest in new vehicles. As a result, the quantity of services is inadequate and there is 
a poor quality of services (sections, 4.2 and 6). 
  The literature shows that quantity controls rarely achieve the desired benefits and 
results are very often undesirable. Quantitative limits are often set in an arbitrary 
manner and tend to become subject to political manipulation and corruption. Yet 
abolition of entry controls or their poor enforcement has also resulted in inadequate 
services (section 4.1). 
  The literature indicates that operators' associations exist in most of the LDCs. 
Regulation by these associations for the most part has had negative impacts on the 
provision of public transport services, but if the activities of associations are well 
regulated by the government they can perform efficiently (section 4.3). 
  The experience of complete quantity and fares deregulation overall has been a mixed 
blessing. The deregulation in Britain has proved very effective in reducing unit costs, 
with generally a poor outcome in terms of ridership. The deregulation in Chile solved 
capacity problems but resulted in increased fares and negative impacts such as 
environmental degradation and increased road accidents (sections 7.2,7.3). 
  General subsidies given to public sector operators have not achieved the anticipated 
results (see sections 2& 6). Subsidies can be allocated more efficiently between 
operators through competitive tendering. The existence of a rational and consistent 
process for the determination of fares, service and subsidy levels is essential even in 
a competitively tendered franchise regime (see section 8). From an international 
perspective, the experience of tendering in London is seen to work well and serves as 
a useful model (section 9.2). 
  The success in expanding the public transport system in Hong Kong under a highly 
regulated environment, is due to a pragmatic approach to the planning, regulation and 
control of the industry, which has given the operators the necessary operational 
flexibility and investment incentives. It is recognised the Hong Kong regulatory model 
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is not readily applicable in most LDCs, especially those such at much earlier stages 
of development, but it is one which deserves to be carefully considered if a regulated 
public transport environment is to be improved (section 9.1). 
  The literature suggests that there is a demand for a diversity of public transport 
services in LDCs to reflect the willingness to pay for more for better quality services. 
On the other hand, low-income groups would opt for services with low fares at the 
expense of quality of service (section 4.3). 
  The review shows that improved traffic management associated with bus priorities has 
resulted in increased levels of user benefits. However, poorly enforced traffic 
management and bus priority measures do not achieve anticipated benefits (sections 
3.4 and 6). 
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Chapter 4 Urban Public Transport In Pakistan 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter attempts to present the overall government policies, initiatives and regulation of 
urban public transport in Pakistan. The analysis presented in this chapter is based on 
information collected from various departments/agencies, data gathered through secondary 
data sources and in-depth interviews conducted with officials and operators. Section 2 gives 
background information about Pakistan and its provinces. In this section, population growth, 
development of economy and inflation rates and history of urban public transport in the 
country are described briefly. The following section deals with the role of Federal and 
Provincial governments. This section encompasses the role of the Federal Government in 
formulating transport policy and other matters regarding urban public transport throughout the 
country. Sections 4 and 5 describe the current subsidy and taxation policies at both provincial 
and federal levels and their impact on public transport services. Section 6 reviews the 
regulation of urban public transport services in the country. The current regulatory systems 
in practice in various provinces are described. Section 7 describes the overall efforts made 
by the government, including use of overseas aid, for the provision and improvement of 
public transport throughout the country. The final section concludes on the overall public 
transport situation in urban areas of Pakistan by describing the results, problems and effects 
of the policies and regulatory systems as they are administered. 
4.2 General Presentation 
4.2.1 Location 
Pakistan has four provinces, viz, Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province 
(NWFP), with each subdivided into a number of divisions and districts, as well as federally 
administered areas. In the west it is bounded by mountains and desert along the Iranian border 
and Afghanistan. In the north the Hidukush and Karakoram mountains form the border with 
the China, while a control line exists in the north east separating the Pakistan and Indian parts 
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of Kashmir and Jamu. In the east the boundary with India and the Arabian Sea in the south 
(Figure 4.1). The total area of the country is 804,000 square kilometres. Pakistan is densely 
settled at about 150 persons per square kilometre, ranging from 17 in Baluchistan to 315 in 
the Punjab. 
4.2.2 Population 
Pakistan is experiencing rapid population growth. The 1981 census put the population at 84.25 
million (GoP, 1981a) and it was officially estimated' at 131.45 million in 1995-96 (GoP, 
1996). The country's population is believed to be growing at a rate of 2.9 to 3 percent per 
annum. This population growth rate would be easily the highest in South Asia. In comparison, 
India's estimated growth rate was a more moderate 2.1 percent; Sri Lanka's stands at 1.4 
percent and Bangladesh's was recorded at 2.3 percent during 1980-90 (World Bank, 1992). 
The annual population growth in Pakistan presents a real threat to development. The meagre 
slice of budgetary allocation available for development is each year divided among a growing 
number of people. 
The overall literacy rate is 35 percent, a very low figure, with female overall literacy of 21 
percent and about 6 percent in rural areas being one of the lowest in the world. The 
participation rate in primary education remain well below the average for LDCs, at 53 percent 
of the age group in 1985 (World Bank, 1994). 
The estimated urban population of Pakistan in 1991 was 35 million, 30.7 percent of the 
country's total population (T P0 Sullivan and PADCO, 1991). Of the urban total, over 60 
per cent was living in eight large cities with populations exceeding one million. The number 
of such large cities will increase to 12 by the year 2001. This rapid growth in urban 
population is likely to continue and will pose severe problems, especially for the provision 
of efficient urban transport. 
The latest population census in the country was conducted in 1981, and plans to hold 
a further census have been postponed four times following disputes in the four 
provinces. 
87 
Figure 4.1 Map showing Pakistan and its provinces 
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4.2.2 Development of the economy 
Pakistan has developed its economy in accordance with eight consecutive Five Year Plans 
(FYP) since 1955. The annual growth rate of GDP averaged around 6.1 per cent during the 
6th FYP (1983-88) and 7th FYP (1988-93) periods (GoP, 1993). Pakistan's economy suffers 
from three major structural weaknesses: the high growth rate of population; the low rate of 
savings; and the adverse balance of external payments. Pakistan is among the large group of 
countries with grossly unequal distribution of incomes. Nevertheless, in the 1980s the 
economy was growing faster than those of other South Asian countries, as presented in Table 
4.1 (UNICEF, 1993). Similarly during 1980-91, the inflation rate (7%) in Pakistan was low 
when compared with other countries in the region, India (8.2%), Bangladesh (9.3%) and Sri 
Lanka (11.2%) (World Bank, 1994). 
Table 4.1 : Average annual economic growth rates of South Asian countries (1980-87) 
(percent per annum) 
Sector Bangladesh Sri Lanka India Pakistan 
Agriculture 3.8 4.6 4.6 6.6 
Manufacturing 2.4 3.1 4.8 3.4 
Services 2.4 6.2 8.3 8.9 
Source: UNICEF, 1992 
The estimated income per capita ($400) in Pakistan in 1991 was also higher than in India 
($330) and Bangladesh ($210). However, this is not reflected in an improvement in the 
quality of human life. In fact, as far as social development is concerned, Pakistan lags behind 
India, and still more alarmingly, Bangladesh; in adult literacy, school enrolment and 
availability of basic health care (World Bank, 1993). It is also interesting that all the figures 
are estimated because Pakistan could not hold its census which was due in 1991 whereas 
India and Bangladesh held their latest censuses. Other indicators gauging economic 
performance tell a similar story. 
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Significant changes in the economic system have been initiated since the middle of the 7th 
FYP period (1988-93) such as deregulation of centralised control over the economy, a rapid 
privatization process of the government-owned or controlled public entities, the promotion of 
market oriented economy, reformation of tax collection system, changes in custom duties and 
emphasis on attracting foreign investments to develop the comparative advantages of Pakistan. 
The above economic development has resulted in increasing the transportation demand. The 
transport system in Pakistan, however, has not been adequately maintained nor improved to 
cope with changes in demand despite government efforts to improve the situation (GoP, 
1995d). 
4.2.3 Summary history of urban public transport 
Prior to 1945, bus transport was provided by private operators with very poor performance, 
characterized by inadequate numbers of buses, irregular services; and rash and negligent 
driving. The Government of the Punjab decided to establish a transport system under its 
control in 1945. The NWFP and Sind provinces followed suit in 1948 and 1950 respectively. 
However, the private sector also continued public transport operation. 
The Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 was amended in 1951. As a result, Road Transport Boards 
were constituted in all the provinces except Baluchistan where no public sector public 
transport was introduced. The Boards were to serve as a model for the transport sector in the 
respective province. The main objectives of the Boards were to provide an efficient, adequate, 
economical and coordinated system of transport in the provinces. Following the integration 
of the provinces into one unit, these Boards were amalgamated into the West Pakistan Road 
Transport Board in 1957. The new Board continued to function until 1963, when it was felt 
that the arrangements were cumbersome as they unduly inhibited the growth and operations 
of public sector road transport. Consequently, this Board was converted into an autonomous 
corporation in 1965. 
In 1970, the West Pakistan Road Transport Corporation was dismembered and three separate 
corporations were created in Punjab, Sind and NWFP. In late 1970s, Urban Transport 
Corporations were also formed in the provinces of Punjab, Sind and NWFP. These 
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Corporations were controlled and financed by the Federal Government. The Corporations were 
defederalized and Federal Government stopped its funding in 1982 (Hundal, 1987). 
Consequently, the Provincial Governments have been responsible for the control, organisation 
and financing these Corporations since 1983. Moreover, the Provincial Governments were also 
responsible for the regulation of public transport services operated by the private sector. Over 
recent years the operation of publicly-owned bus corporations has been phased out by all the 
Provincial Governments and the public transport market is now totally left to private 
operators. 
4.3 Role of Governments 
The Constitution of Pakistan (1973) and its subsequent amendments establish the 
responsibilities and powers of the Federal and Provincial Governments. Some powers rest 
exclusively with the Federal Government, some are on the concurrent list and may be 
discharged by either the Federal or Provincial Governments, and others are vested in the 
provinces. In theory public transport is on the concurrent list and may, therefore, be a federal 
or provincial responsibility. Presently policy making, planning, development, operation and 
regulation of road based public transport is in practice the responsibility of the relevant 
Provincial Government. The Federal Government provides funds on certain occasions and has 
some inputs to policy making. 
4.3.1 Role of Federal Government 
The Federal Government (FG) is responsible for formulation of overall transport policy and 
policies related to imports, taxation and custom duties on all vehicles. 
Currently there is no clearly stated transport policy available in Pakistan. During the 1980s 
there was recurring criticism by the media and politicians over the non existence of clear-cut 
transport policy. In 1992, a draft policy was produced by the Ministry of Communications 
(GoP, 1992). This policy paper addresses largely national rather than provincial transport 
issues, and the following is a synopsis. 
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The paper calls for innovative approaches to management and finance, developing the 
opportunities of federal, provincial and city governments to work with the private sector. 
Specific possibilities identified include `Build, Operate and Transfer' schemes for urban mass 
transit and the phasing out of unprofitable and inefficient publicly-owned bus services. 
Poor management and revenue leakage were identified as the two major problems in the 
provincial bus companies. In addition the restricted access of private operators to commercial 
bank credit was identified as a handicap to development (see section 4.8), along with 
regulated fares which have lagged behind cost increases. The paper emphasises the need to 
ensure that restraints on the development of the private sector are eliminated, particularly 
controls on bus fares. 
In its policy direction, the paper stresses the shared responsibility between the public and 
private sectors, although it defines only in very broad terms the distinct role that the public 
sector should play. The role of government (at all levels) in relation to transport safety and 
environmental concerns is emphasized; and it is acknowledged that these aspects have been 
ignored in the past. 
The importance of maintenance of the existing infrastructure is stressed and the need to make 
the best use of existing assets rather building expensive capacity expansion to deal with urban 
traffic congestion. Essential new capacity should be provided through carefully planned and 
coordinated transport systems. No major facilities should be built without full consideration 
of existing facilities, alternative options and the capacity enhancements which should be 
possible through improved management and control techniques. 
Although this draft transport policy was not formally approved because of a change of 
government, some actions in keeping with the policy were started both by Federal and 
Provincial governments. Provincial Governments began to reduce loans and subsidies given 
to the publicly-owned bus corporations, and introduced a golden handshake scheme for their 
employees in order to shed surplus staff (PRTC, 1992; KDA, 1989). Various projects related 
to traffic management have also been started in urban areas (TEPA, 1993; GoP, 1995b). 
Similarly at federal level, the implementation of a Light Rail Transit project in Karachi is 
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agreed on Build Operate and Transfer basis (see section 8.2). 
Table 4.2 Summary of the Federal Government responsibilities 
Responsibility 
Aspect 
Policy " Should prepare a transport policy for the entire country 
" Formulation of policies for the import of vehicles 
" Issuance of policy directives to the PGs 
Administration " Administration of the ITA Islamabad 
" Signing agreements related to overseas aid 
" Administration of Mass Transit Projects 
Urban public " Funding of the Circular Railway Karachi 
transport funding 
" Funding of Mass Transit Projects 
" Funding of the NTRC 
" Providing grants to the PGs for specific projects 
Infrastructure " Development and maintenance of national highways and inter-city railways 
development 
" Development and maintenance of road infrastructure in army 
administered cantonments 
Taxation " To levy various taxes on imported vehicles and spare parts 
" To levy taxes on imported petrol, diesel and kerosene oil and 
development 'surcharge on locally produced oils 
Source: Compiled by the researcher from primary and secondary sources 
As far as the regulation of road based public transport is concerned, the FG regulates services 
only in federally administered areas. Also a federal agency, the Islamabad Transport Authority 
(ITA), is responsible for planning and regulation of services in the city of Islamabad. Federal 
civil servants run the ITA. In the past the FG funded and controlled publicly-owned bus 
corporations up until 1982. It has also given grants on certain occasions to various provincial 
institutions for the purchase of buses. The FG deals with all foreign aid funded public 
transport projects and studies. It is also responsible for the construction and maintenance of 
national highways through National Highway Authority (NHA). Pakistan Railways, which run 
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local (in Karachi only) and inter-city services, are the direct responsibility of the FG, as is the 
development of infrastructure in the army controlled Cantonment Board areas which exist in 
most of the major cities. Other initiatives of the FG related to public transport are described 
in the following sub-sections. A summary of the responsibilities of the FG is given in Table 
4.2. 
4.3.2 Role of Provincial Governments 
The transport responsibilities of the Provincial Governments (PGs) are confined to road 
transport. The regulation of public transport is also the responsibility of the PGs. Passenger 
transport services in urban areas are regulated by the provincial and regional transport 
authorities, except in Islamabad. Various PG Departments are concerned with these functions. 
Unlike federal ministries, which are primarily policy making bodies with no field 
responsibilities, all the provincial departments have very extensive field operations. 
In all provinces the Transport Department is chiefly responsible for all matters regarding 
public transport regulation in the entire province but it has somewhat limited field 
involvement due to the presence of Road Transport Corporations and the Provincial Transport 
Authorities. In the past transport was often treated as an additional assignment of the Industry 
Department. However, a separate Transport Ministry was created in Punjab and Sind 
provinces during the 1980s because of the mounting transport problems. In other provinces, 
transport affairs are administered by officials of other departments. In both Punjab and Sind 
provinces, the Transport Department is headed by Secretary to the Government, whereas in 
Baluchistan Senior Member Board of Revenue supervises transport affairs in addition to his 
other duties, and in NWFP the Secretary of the Industry Department is in-charge of the 
Transport Department. 
The other departments include Home, Local Government, and Housing and Physical Planning 
Departments in all provinces. The involvement of the different departments in public transport 
is discussed in section 6.3, but there is a lack of coordination among these departments. Some 
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coordination is exercised by Provincial Planning and Development Departments', but this is 
limited to development projects only. A summary of the responsibilities of the PGs is given 
in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 Summary of the Provincial Government responsibilities 
Aspect Responsibility 
Policy " Should prepare provincial transport policy 
" Issuance of policy directives to the Regional Transport Authorities 
Regulation " Regulation of public transport 
" Controls over fares of public transport. 
" Vehicle fitness 
" Traffic management and on-street regulation 
" Enforcement 
Urban public " Funding of the publicly-owned bus corporations 
transport funding 
" Traffic and transport studies 
" Managing overseas grants for traffic and transport projects 
Infrastructure " Development and maintenance of local and provincial roads 
development 
" Provision of public transport infrastructure 
" Implementing traffic engineering and management schemes 
Taxation " Levy various taxes and charges on operation of public transport vehicles 
Source: Compiled by the researcher from primary and secondary sources 
4.4 Subsidies and grants 
In Pakistan employees of government, semi-government and autonomous bodies and many 
industrial workers receive travel allowances for their journeys to and from work. These 
2. In all provinces the Planning and Development Department deals with approval of new 
projects including studies and coordinates with the Finance Department. 
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allowances are nominal, do not cover the cost of journeys, and are paid on a monthly basis 
alongwith salary. In urban areas, employees on Basic Pay Scale (BPS) 1 to 10 receive Rs 50 
per month and employees on BPS 11 to 16 receive Rs 150 per month, employees on BPS 17 
and above receive Rs 250 and Rs 350 if they own their cars (building in an incentive to car 
ownership! ). Employees provided with a transport service by their employers are not paid this 
allowance. In some cities, government employees have been provided with subsidised 
transport. In Quetta for instance, the employees working in the Civil Secretariat of 
Baluchistan have been provided with government buses. Employees using these subsidised 
services do not receive travel allowance. 
The Federal and Provincial Governments also provide finance for capital investment in 
publicly-owned vehicles and their operation, and the construction and maintenance of 
infrastructure. The FG and PG have invested in new vehicles on various occasions. The 
operators of private services are not paid any subsidy. Government generally grants subsidies 
with the primary objectives of providing the public with adequate services at affordable fares. 
An account of the subsidies/grants given to publicly-owned bus services is given in the 
following sections. 
4.4.1 Federal Government subsidies 
Federal subsidies have been paid to maintain the services of Pakistan Railways and the 
corporations. The Federal Government was responsible for funding and control of publicly- 
owned bus services until 1982. During its regime the FG gave funds for the purchase of new 
vehicles. For instance in Peshawar, the FG gifted 75 buses for Government Transport Service 
(GTS) fleet in late 1970s (GTS, 1981). Similarly, the FG provided Rs 592 million for 
investment in Karachi Transport Corporation during 1977 and 1982 (KTC, 1988). Concerned 
about the financial burden, the FG defederalised the Corporations in 1982 and the PGs were 
obliged to take them over. However, the FG has continued to give some grants to these 
Corporations. For example, FG concern about the public transport situation in Karachi led it 
to make a grant to cover the purchase of 200 new Hino full size buses for KTC in 1987/88 
(KTC, 1989). 
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4.4.2 Provincial Government subsidies 
After 1982, the Provincial Governments were also responsible for paying subsidies to the 
Corporations. The PGs gave grants, loans and subsidies to enable the corporations to cover 
their losses. For example in Karachi, the KTC's operating income was Rs 89 million in 
1986/87 and it also received Rs 51.6 million subsidies from the Sind Government (KTC, 
1988). This specific subsidy was intended to cover losses related to student travel and 
conventional services and additional payments were made on ad-hoc basis when KTC ran out 
of funds. Gray (1990) reports that the KTC had very low productivity and required an 
operating subsidy in the region of $5 million per year. 
The worst case is the PRTC which illustrates how public money is poorly managed. The 
financial review of the PRTC reveals that this corporation had been incurring heavy financial 
losses for many years. The Government of the Punjab was providing loans/grants to meet the 
gap between the resources and expenditures. The financial statement of the PRTC given in 
Table 4.4 presents trends in losses and loans provided by the Provincial Government. The 
loans given to the PRTC were substantially increased over a period of 9 years. The maximum 
loan was provided to the corporation in the year 1992-93 which includes Rs 200 million paid 
for the first phase of a golden handshake offered to surplus employees. An average loan 
provided to the PRTC by the PG was Rs 272.8 million per annum. A study commissioned 
by the PRTC has reported that the corporation was receiving a subsidy about Rs 300 million 
per annum in order to provide social services to the community (BCEOM, 1992). The 
officials of the PRTC considered that the funds provided by the Government are a loan but 
in practice the PRTC has never paid a single instalment towards this loan. However, in view 
of the poor performance of the PRTC services, the PG stopped providing loans and decided 
not to give any further grant/subsidy/loan from the year 1993-94. A detailed analysis of poor 
performance of the public bus corporations is included in chapter five. 
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Table 4.4 : The financial statement of the PRTC 
Period Income Expenditure Loss Loans provided by the 
1985-86 296.8 535.2 238.4 221.4 
1986-87 279.0 571.9 292.8 142.5 
1987-88 221.7 619.6 397.8 182.0 
1988-89 188.5 541.1 352.5 245.0 
1989-90 167.9 507.7 339.7 240.0 
1990-91 170.4 499.4 329.0 266.2 
1991-92 140.3 515.8 375.4 344.1 
1992-93 100.6 718.6 618.0 541.9 
1993-94 46.9 282.8 235.9 
Source: Data collected from the PRTC, 1995 
Experience in Pakistan shows that the contemplated benefits from subsidies are generally 
disappointing and difficult to realise. At the time when these Corporations were abolished the 
subsidy and grants were being largely paid into the pockets of employees only as a social 
welfare payment. One of the major reasons for the failure of such subsidies to achieve 
anticipated results is that the existence of subsidies tends to lead to inefficiency and greater 
deficits (see chapter 3, section 2.2). In Pakistan, the management and employees believed that 
the Government would make up all the losses. Consequently, they exerted little effort to raise 
revenues. 
4.5 Taxation policies 
Vehicles are subject to a variety of charges at all levels of the Government. The details of 
various taxes are presented in the following sections. 
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4.5.1 Federal Government taxes 
The Federal Government levies import duties on all vehicles, parts, tyre, batteries etc. Sales 
tax is charged on both the items imported and those produced in the country. In addition, 
there are surcharges as well. For instance, a flood relief surcharge is imposed on imported 
vehicles and spare parts. 
The FG also levies taxes on petrol, diesel, lubricant oil and kerosene oil. The buses, 
midibuses and minibuses use diesel, whereas the taxis, autorickshaws and suzukis are using 
petrol. Kerosene oil is mostly used for cooking purposes. The development surcharge on 
petrol (Rs 9.28/litre) and diesel (Rs 3.47/litre) is higher, but for kerosene oil it is low (Rs 
3.24/litre). Similarly, the excise duty levied on petrol is Rs 0.88/litre and diesel Rs 0.25/litre, 
whereas no excise duty for kerosene oil. These taxes are not increased frequently but prices 
of petroleum have increased frequently due to downward readjustment of the Rupee. 
In some LDCs buses are free of customs duties and vehicles used as taxis are eligible for a 
reduction on custom duties (see for example Roth and Diandas, 1995). In Pakistan, heavy 
import duties and taxes have been imposed on public transport vehicles and their spare parts. 
The import duties include customs duty, Karachi Port Trust (KPT) import dues and clearance 
charges, and Municipal octroi. The rate of taxes are same for all public transport vehicles 
except for the KPT dues and municipal octroi which varies by vehicle type. The registration 
fee for vehicles is levied by the PGs. Table 4.5 shows the overall picture of import duties, 
taxes and other charges levied on new, imported full size buses (61 seater) before their 
operation on the road. 
Until mid 1993, mostly reconditioned vehicles had been imported from Japan and custom duty 
was charged at 100 percent on both new and reconditioned vehicles. The reconditioned 
vehicles were generally in reasonably good condition. The import value of reconditioned 
buses and minibuses was very low. For instance, a minibus imported from Japan was being 
sold in the market at about a price of Rs 600,000 including custom duty. Later during 1992- 
93, a large number of public transport vehicles were introduced under the Prime Minister 
Public Transport Scheme (see section 7.2). These vehicles were exempted from custom duties 
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and available at very low price. A new minibus was available at a price of about Rs 400,000 
under this scheme. Consequently, there was little problem regarding the supply of buses and 
minibuses in the market. 
In 1994, the FG because of its concern over environmental pollution, particularly in urban 
areas, imposed a ban on the import of all types of reconditioned vehicles including buses and 
minibuses. For new public service vehicles, however, custom duty was reduced from 100 
percent to 60 percent. As a result of this new import policy, only new vehicles are available 
in the market. Since the price of new buses and minibuses is very high, the import of these 
vehicles has remained very expensive even with the reduced 60 percent custom duty. For 
instance, a new minibus was being sold in the market at a price of Rs 1,200,000 in 1996. As 
a consequence, imports have fallen and there is limited investment in new buses and 
minibuses. The data collected by the researcher from the RTAs in the Punjab in 1995 shows 
that none of the operators applied for a route permit for urban operation with a brand new 
vehicle during 1994-95. 
Generally, in case of new buses, midibuses and minibuses overall taxes are over 100 percent. 
As illustrated in Table 4.5. The total price of a new full size bus after paying import expenses 
is estimated at Rs 1,934,831 for the year 1996. Of the total price, 49.6 percent (Rs 960,000) 
has been paid as an import value and 50.4 percent (Rs 974,831) as taxes and import charges 
on the vehicle. 
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Table 4.5 : Taxes on imported buses 
Taxes Rate charged in 1996 Value of a full size 
bus in Rs 
Import value - 960,000 
Custom duty 60% on import value 576,000 
Sales tax 15% on custom duty paid value 230,000 
Income tax* 4% on taxes paid value 70,656 
Flood relief surcharge 1% on import value 9,600 
Municipal dues (octroi) Rs 54383 per bus 54,383 
KPT dues Rs 24167 per bus 24,167 
Registration fee Rs 500/Rs 100,000 of the value 9,625 
Total taxes - 974,831 
Total value of a bus - 1934,831 
Source: Bus value is calculated by the researcher on the basis of tax rates 
of the Central Board of Revenue Islamabad, 1996 
* If the importer is not an income tax payee 
4.5.2 Provincial Government taxes 
The Provincial Government levy a registration fee, an annual token fee, a capital value tax, 
a vehicle transfer fee, a vehicle fitness fee, a route permit fee, all driving licence fees and 
tolls on bridges etc. These taxes and charges vary from province to province. These taxes are 
not increased frequently due to the envisaged threats from the operators. The Punjab 
Government increased all its taxes in 1996 but later some of these increases were withdrawn 
as a result of a transporters' strike. A summary of tax rates realized by the Provincial 
Governments is given in Table 4.6 
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Table 4.6 : Charges on motor vehicles by Provincial Governments 
Description Charges in various provinces (Rs) 
Punjab Sind NWFP Baluchistan 
Permit fee 
Bus/annum 1050 750 800 250 
Wagon/annum 1050 750 710 200 
Suzuki/annum 1050 - 710 150 
Taxi/3 years 620 400 710 100 
Rickshaw/3 years 620 400 710 100 
Fitness fee/6 months 
Bus 300 250 250 50 
Wagon 250 250 250 50 
Suzuki 100 - 100 50 
Taxi 100 75 100 50 
Rickshaw 100 75 100 50 
Driving Licence fee 
Motorcycle 60 90 40 40 
Light 60 110 40 50 
Heavy 50 110 40 100 
Token fee (Road tax) 
L 
225/seat 225/seat 225/seat 225/seat 
Source: Data on charges collected by the researcher in 1995 
The Government of the Punjab Province has recently imposed a tax on private cars in its 
annual budget (1997-98) announced on June 16 1997. This tax is payable by those who own 
cars (above 1000 cc) with a 1990-model or newer. The tax also varies for different types of 
vehicles. The revenue collected from this tax is to be spent on the improvement of public 
transport. This historic initiative (a new tax for the improvement of public transport) has been 
undertaken only by the Punjab Government. The researcher envisages that this initiative will 
bring better results and that other provinces will follow by imposing similar taxes. However, 
this initiative may encourage the use of older and more polluting models of cars. 
4.5.3 Local council charges 
Local councils charge octroi, toll taxes, rent of bus stands, terminal stations and licensing of 
non-motorised vehicles. The rate of taxes/charges vary from one local authority to other and 
also varies from year to year according to the budget proposals. 
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Effect of local and provincial taxes 
No published information on operating costs of private sector public transport vehicles is 
available either from private operators or regulatory agencies. Data on operating costs was 
collected, from the operators in major cities, by the researcher in 1995. The cost of 
maintenance varies from city to city depending upon the type of traffic and condition of 
roads. Similarly, the "contingencies" for instance, the ex-gratia payments to the officials (graft 
etc) also vary from city to city depending upon the local circumstances. The taxes on vehicles 
vary slightly from province to province. 
The overall effect of the provincial and local councils taxes on the operating cost of public 
transport vehicles operating in Lahore is illustrated in Table 4.7. This Table shows that local 
and provincial taxes for full size buses are relatively higher than taxes on smaller public 
transport vehicles (see Appendix-4 for details). This implies that the operation of full size 
buses is discouraged. The operators also believe that some of the contingencies are taxes 
which they give directly to the officers. 
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Table 4.7 : Average annual operating cost of public transport vehicles in Lahore 
Description Expenses in Rs 
Full size bus Minibus Suzuki Taxi 
Fuel 133,800 39 116,400 37 69,600 40 56,000 46 
Maintenance 30,000 9 25,200 8 12,000 7 4,500 4 
Tyre & tubes 20,000 6 30,000 10 10,000 6 5,000 4 
Salaries/wages 96,000 28 86,400 28 60,000 35 48,000 39 
Taxes 19,350 6 11,700 4 3,500 2 1,307 1 
Contingencies 39,920 12 42,040 13 18,260 10 7,060 6 
Total 339,070 311,740 173,360 121,887 
Source: Data collected by the researcher in 1995 
Percentages are shown in bold figures 
4.6 Regulation of urban public transport 
4.6.1 Legal framework 
The legal basis upon which the public transport industry in Pakistan is founded is determined 
by the Motor Vehicle Act of 1939, the West Pakistan Motor Vehicle Rules (1969) and 
Provincial Motor vehicle Ordinance (XIX of 1965) and subsequent ordinances and regulations. 
Later ordinances are largely concerned with amendments to the financial provisions contained 
within the original legislation. The legislation admits two types of passenger carriage services; 
stage carriage and contract carriage services. The services comprised of a range of motor 
vehicles used in urban areas (see chapter 5). 
4.6.2 Objectives of regulation 
According to the MVO 1965, the measures applied to regulation of transport are intended to 
achieve a wide range of objectives: 
o to coordinate road and rail transport; 
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o to ensure the financial viability of public transport; 
0 to prevent uneconomic competition, particularly in road transport; 
o to protect highways, bridges, and other public infrastructure from overloading or 
abuse; and 
o to ensure safety in road transport. 
The regulatory instruments used in support of these multiple ends include restricting transport 
activities to a limited number of operators, structuring the fares system, requiring certain 
services to be provided even though they are not financially viable, and establishing standards 
for safety, examining the roadworthiness of vehicles, noise levels, and exhaust emissions. 
4.6.3 Regulatory agencies 
In each province, Provincial Transport Authority (PTA), having several Regional Transport 
Authorities (RTAs), exercises control over public transport within its jurisdiction. The PTAs 
function through their RTAs. The jurisdiction of each RTA extends to the boundary limits of 
a Revenue Division, usually consisting of more than one district. These authorities consist of 
officials appointed/nominated by the Provincial Government who have no financial interests 
as proprietor, employee or otherwise in any transport undertaking. Traffic engineering 
functions are carried out by the Local Government and Development authorities. Enforcement 
of regulations is the combined responsibility of transport authorities and the Traffic Police. 
1. Provincial Transport Authority: The PTA consists of a chairman (who is ex-officio post 
of the head of the Transport Department), a few members nominated by the Provincial 
Government (the number varies from province to province) and a full time secretary who is 
usually an officer in BPS 17/18. The key role of the PTA is to convey the Provincial 
Government's policy and instructions to the respective Regional Transport Authorities, and 
coordinate and regulate their activities. The PTA deals with all inter provincial transport 
matters and liaison with federal authorities. The PTA also itself determines routes which 
originate and terminate in the jurisdiction of more than one Regional Transport Authority. In 
addition, it administers the vehicles introduced under the PMPTS. 
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2. Regional Transport Authorities: The RTA exercises and discharges powers and functions 
throughout the region/division. For instance, the Punjab province comprised of eight divisions 
viz; Lahore, Gujranwala, Sargodha, Faisalabad, Rawalpindi, Multan, Bahawalpur and D. G 
Khan, and each division has more than one districts (see Figure, 4.2) and eight RTAs are 
functioning in this province. Each RTA is chaired by the Divisional Commissioner. The 
Divisional Commissioner is generally a senior officer of the provincial or federal civil service. 
He is appointed by the Provincial Government. The Commissioner is the administrative head 
of a Division (region) and has wide ranging responsibilities including civil administration, law 
and order and vested judicial powers. In addition, he is ex-officio Chairman of the RTA and 
exercises considerable influence in all aspects of transport. The other staff of the RTA are 
Provincial Government employees reporting through the Commissioner to the Transport 
Department. This staff is headed by a Secretary (BPS 17/18), who is assisted by assistants and 
clerks. The following are the main functions of the RTAs: - to 
" recommend and forward new routes for the approval of PTA; 
" issue and renew route permits and decide on new route applications, in consultation 
with the Traffic Police and the Publicly-owned bus Corporation; 
" grant licences for bus/minibus stands in consultation with local authorities and civil 
administration; 
" nominate a member for the Licensing Authority which issues driving licences; and 
" enforce bus route networks. 
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Figure 4.2 Map showing divisions and districts in Punjab 
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3. Traffic Police: The Traffic Police come under the Provincial Home Department. It deals 
with the testing of drivers, inspection of vehicles and enforcement of traffic rules. In addition 
to these functions, the Traffic Police often attend on very important personals such as 
ministers and chief officials etc. 
Most enforcement is carried out jointly by PTA, RTAs and the Traffic Police. The RTA and 
PTA Secretaries and the Superintendent Police (SP) for Traffic are magistrates and, together 
with the Police, they carry out spot-checks on private buses. The Traffic Police divert the 
vehicles to a place where checks are made on: 
a. overloading, 
b. driver uniforms and badges (sometimes), 
c. driving licences, 
d. vehicle fitness, 
e. registration book 
f. the certificate of fitness, and 
g. route permits. 
But only these Magistrates have the right to fine drivers on the spot for offences. Normal 
enforcement of traffic rules for all vehicles is carried out by Traffic Police. Apart from spot 
fines, the Traffic Police book the vehicles for various offences and fines are imposed by the 
courts. However both normal enforcement and that which is specific to public transport 
vehicles is generally weak in Pakistan. The following are the principal reasons for this 
weakness (KDA, 1989): 
a. low salary and motivation, 
b. bribery/corruption, 
c. under-staffing, 
d. inadequate training and lack of resources, 
e. outdated procedures, and 
f. inadequate punishments and difficulties in obtaining prosecutions, due to lengthy delays in 
the courts. 
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4. Development authorities: These authorities were established in major urban areas under 
the Provincial Department of Housing and Physical Planning (Town Planning Department in 
Sind). They are responsible for the control of land use and the development of housing and 
other facilities, and for traffic engineering. Land use and transport infrastructure development 
have not been given as much importance as they deserve. No adequate land reservations have 
been made for transport infrastructure (terminals and bus stations etc) even in the newly 
developed residential areas. 
In the face of growing traffic and transport problems in larger cities, separate traffic 
engineering bodies were created under the development authorities during 1980s. For instance, 
the Traffic Engineering Bureau (TEB) in Karachi, the Traffic Engineering Management Unit 
(TEMU) in Peshawar and the Traffic Engineering and Transport Planning Agency (TEPA) 
in Lahore. The main roles and functions of these bodies are to study, examine and identify 
the traffic problems; to recommend and to take steps to ensure smooth and safe flow of 
vehicular and pedestrian traffic; the prevention of accidents and road user education. A senior 
official of the development authorities (such as Chief Engineer from the TEPA and Director 
of the TEB) is nominated as one of the members of the relevant RTA. 
The development authorities have conducted studies on various aspects of transportation and 
implemented improvement schemes with the help of foreign consultants. They have 
undertaken surveys of traffic and travel characteristics and improved traffic signalling systems, 
in addition to planning and designing of roads and intersection improvements. Public transport 
studies have been commissioned in rapidly growing cities, such as the Karachi Mass Transit 
Study (KDA, 1989) and the Comprehensive Transportation System Study in Lahore 
(JICA/TEPA, 1991). 
5. Local councils: Municipal committees, municipal corporations or metropolitan 
corporations are the statutory bodies responsible for the provision of most services in urban 
areas. These councils work under the Provincial Local Government Department. The functions 
of these councils among others include the following (LGO, 1979; sections 80-85): 
a. to provide and maintain public streets and other means of communications, to prepare 
and execute a road maintenance and development programme; 
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b. to take measures for the proper street lighting; 
c. to make arrangements for the control of traffic to prevent danger and to ensure safety, 
convenience and comfort of the public; and 
d. to regulate the operation of slow moving non-motorised vehicles and to fix the rate 
of fares for non-motorized public service vehicles. 
The head of a local council is an elected Mayor/Chairman or Government appointed 
Administrator in the absence of an elected council. However, senior officers are Provincial 
Government employees. These councils have not played an important role in the provision 
of transport infrastructure due to their internal inefficiency, corruption and political 
interference. However, they have managed the provision of some improvements to roads and 
bridges and the operation of traffic lights in their areas. In some areas the councils have also 
provided some bus stops and shelters, for example, in Karachi and Quetta. 
4.6.4 Regulatory instruments 
Government has attempted to accomplish its regulatory objectives by applying three types of 
instruments to public transport in Pakistan. These are fare regulation, and quality and quantity 
controls. 
1. Fare regulation 
Public authorities can, and generally do, exercise control through the Motor Vehicle 
Ordinance, 1965 section 45 which states that the government "shall fix maximum and 
minimum fares for stage carriage [services] throughout the province or within any area or 
any route within the province". Currently, distance based fares are determined by the 
government. There exists a disparity among the provinces in that fares are neither uniform 
nor increased simultaneously. For instance, the fares fixed for bus services are Rs 0.20 per 
km in Baluchistan province. Fares set by other provinces are compared in Table 4.8. 
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Table 4.8 : Fares structure in different provinces 
Distance in Fares specified in Rs 
km* 
Punjab Sind NWFP 
Up to 5 2.25 2.00 2.00 
Over 5 to 10 3.25 3.00 2.50 
Over 10 to 15 4.25 3.50 3.00 
Over 15 to 20 5.25 3.50 4.00 
Over 20 6.00 3.50 4.00 
Source: Data collected by the researcher, 1995 
* Stage distance is rounded off to show comparison 
In theory, fares should have been increased on a regular basis in line with escalation in the 
prices of petroleum, spares, etc. In practice, the initiative for fare increases has normally come 
from operators, particularly the associations of private operators and the publicly-owned 
corporations, who submit requests to the Provincial Department of Transport. Usually the 
Transport Department considers this request only as a result of private operators' strikes. 
According to the regulation proposed fare increases should be published in the press and 
public opinion/objections should be invited. This action is practised only in Sind Province. 
Eventually approved fares are notified in the press and fare increases are published in the 
official Gazette. 
In the early 1970s, the Federal Government decided to introduce a concessionary fare for 
students. Under this scheme students are allowed to travel on stage carriage services (in full 
size buses and midibuses only but not in minibuses and suzukis) by paying a nominal fare 
of Rs 0.25 for a distance of up to 30 km, and beyond this distance they pay 50 percent of the 
normal fare. In Punjab and Sind provinces this regulation is implemented in letter and spirit 
but in Baluchistan and NWFP, it is modified and the students everywhere pay 50 percent of 
the actual fare. Moreover on production of identity cards, the blind, disabled and elderly (over 
60 years) also pay 50 percent of the actual fare in NWFP. Private sector operators receive no 
compensation for these concessions except in the cities of Punjab, where a form of 
compensation is given to the operators in the shape of overloading. In this regard the 
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notification issued by the Punjab Government declares: 
"For carrying students at concessional rates, stage carriages, may carry 15 passengers 
beyond the seating capacity, provided that the vehicle is carrying at least 15 students or 
such number of students by which the vehicle is overloaded" (Manual of Motor Vehicles 
Laws, 1992). 
2. Quality control 
The Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965 gives transport authorities the powers and procedures 
by which the standards of vehicles and drivers, and the conduct of drivers and conductors are 
controlled. Of the three forms of control, quality is the only one that is absolutely essential 
as it affects safety, a particular concern in urban areas of Pakistan. 
Quality licensing for private public transport in Pakistan is the joint responsibility of RTA and 
the Traffic Police. These agencies, in accordance with the Motor Vehicle Ordinance, carry out 
driving test and issue driving licences. To obtain licences, drivers are also required to produce 
medical certificates. 
A motor vehicle fitness test is required every six months. The purpose of this test is to ensure 
that the vehicle complies with the provisions of the motor vehicle fitness rules and is 
roadworthy. Conduct of this test is the responsibility of the Motor Vehicle Examiners (MVEs) 
who examine vehicle fitness and issue "Certificate of Vehicle Fitness". 
3. Quantity control 
Quantity controls are applied through the route permit licensing system. Route permits are 
issued in accordance with conditions specified in by the MVO, 1965. Applications for a 
public transport permit are made to the RTA of the region. The RTA grants a permit to an 
individual operator for a specific vehicle, if the application is in order. However, publicly- 
owned corporation services were exempted from getting route permits. For stage carriage 
services, quantity control is applied by the RTAs through a route structure and limits on the 
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number or frequency of vehicles operating on each route. For contract carriage/taxi services, 
RTAs limit the number of permits to be issued in any area (Rules 58 of MVO 1965) and 
refuse to grant a permit if that maximum number has been reached. 
Transport authorities define the entire route network, and the size and the type of vehicles to 
operate on different routes. Usually routes are defined without employing any specific criteria. 
Local circumstances determine policies for defining and controlling route networks which 
vary from city to city. A summary of quantity control regimes employed in major cities of 
Pakistan is presented in Table 4.9. Until recently the RTAs ensured that the route did not 
compete with publicly-owned buses because the MVO, 1965 protected them from competition. 
The ordinance states: 
"Government may cancel generally or in relation to a specified area any permit or class 
of permits granted in respect of transport vehicles in order to enable the Corporation to use 
its transport vehicles on the routes thus rendered vacant. Government may direct the PTA 
or the RTA not to grant or issue any permit or restrict the grant of fresh permits to a 
specified number on any route or routes or part of a route on which the Corporation is 
already operating motor transport or intends to do so" (MVO, 1965). 
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Table 4.9 : Summary of quantity control regimes in Pakistan 
City Quantity control regimes Explanation 
Karachi RTA defines and publishes details of new routes in the newspaper. This In 1986, the Prime Minister announced 
procedure invites objections and potential operators informed. Route that minibuses should be phased out 
network modified although after long intervals. from the city. This measure was taken 
in response to serious concern about 
Routes opened to full size buses and midibuses subject to a no objection high accident rates and congestion 
certificate (NOC) from KTC and the TEB. Until 1985, effectively no caused by the minibuses. 
restrictions on the number of buses and minibuses serving individual 
routes. Smaller size minibuses (13-15 seater) not issued permits after 
1990. Operation dominated by private midibuses and full size buses. 
Lahore RTA defines routes and bus stops for the city. Routes not modified The Punjab Government was concerned 
during the last 10 years. Some new routes have been added. Routes about traffic congestion and imposed 
defined by RTA not fully operated being un-profitable. restrictions for minibuses on entire route 
network in 1992. 
Routes earmarked for specific size of vehicles and permits are issued to 
private operators on production of an NOC from the PRTC. Until 
recently, full size buses allowed to operate on a few sections of the route 
network. Government has specified age and number of minibuses to 
operate on routes. 
Islamabad & Rawalpindi RTA Rawalpindi and ITA Islamabad define route networks for their own Route networks created according to 
areas of jurisdiction. operators maximum profit principles 
with poor or even no service in some 
Routes allocated for specific size of vehicles and no official control over areas of Rawalpindi. 
the number of permits issued. The authorities having 'informal 
arrangements' with the operators associations to increase on each route 
annually by not more than 5% permits. The maximum age of a minibus 
is fixed at 10 years. 
Peshawar PTA defines route network on the recommendation of the RTA. Only 3 Restrictions on private operators 
new urban routes for midibuses added in the past 20 years in addition to imposed to protect public sector omni 
3 existing routes for minibuses. Private operators initiated many illegal buses. 
Full size private buses are old 
routes for suzukis. and their operation restricted 
due to 
environmental grounds. New routes not 
Urban routes restricted for full size private bus operation and the RTA defined 
because of narrow existing road 
also fixed the number of permits for midibusea and minibuses. network. 
Quetta PTA defines route network on the recommendation of the RTA. Eight The policy to phase out full size buses 
new routes for minibuses have been defined during the past five years. was for two reasons; narrow roads and 
more traffic in central area. 
Routes are allocated for specific size of vehicles with no official limits 
Unfortunately the authorities 'regard' 
on the issuance of permits. Private operators, already in the business, do 
full size buses as a main contributor to 
not let new entrants into the market because of their tribal monopolies on traffic congestion. 
specific routes. Recently (since 1994), a change in regulatory policy 
for 
full size buses from free entry to gradual forced exit. 
Faisalabad In theory, the RTA responsible for defining the route network for public FUTS is a social company organised by 
transport in the city. In practice, Faisalabad Urban Transport Society government officials. Private operators, 
(FUTS), a non governmental organization has taken over the members of the Society, operate 
responsibility for planning and regulation of public transport services minibuses (IS seater vehicles) paying a 
under FLITS control. donation and monthly fee to the Society. 
The Society defines the entire route network, terminals, and bus stops for 
its own services. RTA obliged to 'rubber stamp' FUTS decisions. The 
Society specifies the size and type of vehicles. Route permits allocated in 
discussion with operators. No restrictions on the number of vehicles 
operating on individual routes. 
Source: Compiled by the researcher from information collected in 1995 
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In all urban areas, the authorities have restricted entry to market by applying measures such 
as control over the number of route permits. The main reasons for the restrictions to be 
imposed include: protection to state-owned operators and or private operators already in 
business; a lack of awareness of route network implications; to avoid traffic congestion, road 
accidents or environmental degradation; and to achieve safe and efficient movement of cars 
and other traffic. The latter was specifically for Quetta, by the Secretary RTA in his interview 
with the researcher in 1995. These restrictions are reducing the supply of public transport at 
a time when it is recognised that there is a shortage. The resultant encouragement of greater 
use of contract carriage services and private vehicles will contribute to rapid increases in 
congestion because the capacity needed to carry passengers in taxis or private vehicles is 
much greater than that required to carry passengers in the buses. 
4.7 Urban Public Transport Initiatives in Pakistan 
4.7.1 The National Transport Research Centre 
In most developed countries, the universities play a leading role in meeting the research needs 
of the country. In Pakistan however, transport related research has been confined mainly to 
the National Transport Research Centre (NTRC). Even the NTRC is seriously crippled due 
to lack of funds, man-power and other supporting facilities to meet national requirements 
(GoP, 1992). 
The nucleus of the NTRC was established to conduct transport research in June, 1974. 
Initially, it was organised and funded by the Planning Commission. Generally, the NTRC 
conducts research on the pattern of the TRL, UK. It established a Road Research Wing in 
1984, which has commissioned an Urban Transport Wing to develop indigenous expertise in 
preparing comprehensive transportation plans. Also a Railway Research Wing and a Training 
Wing have been added. It has prepared a large number of reports and its major projects cover 
vehicle operating costs and vehicle makes, road construction and maintenance, road safety, 
traffic management, the trucking industry etc. Since 1992 the Centre has functioned under the 
administration of the Federal Ministry of Communication. 
115 
The NTRC started studies related to urban public transport during the late 1980s and is 
attempting to introduce new initiatives. The Centre has successfully demonstrated the viability 
of a number of new ideas during past few years which (it claims) have been highly 
appreciated by all concerned (NTRC, 1993). The significant efforts related to urban transport 
are described below. 
Quality urban bus: In 1987, a pilot urban bus project was undertaken by the NTRC, with 
the object of studying the effects of deregulated fares on patronage and on the quality of 
service offered by the private sector. A route (23 kilometres) between Rawalpindi (Railway 
Station) and Islamabad Secretariat was selected for the operation of 13 Mazda coaches with 
25 seats (see Plate 4.1). Passengers were offered assured seats and information about service 
frequency. Overall regulation, planning and operation of the project remained in the hands of 
the government, but the maximum fare for the route was fixed at Rs 4.00, compared with the 
normal government prescribed fare of Rs 2.5. According to a preliminary evaluation, the 
response from the users was very encouraging and the one year pilot project proved to be a 
successful basis for a policy of better quality services at higher fares (Idris, 1987). 
Urban bus train: In 1986, the NTRC focused its attention on developing an indigenous 
system which could provide transport facilities for the poorest group of the society, at 
minimum cost. One of the avenues explored was to try to recycle old and worn-out buses. 
Three worn-out Bedford buses were acquired from the Karachi Transport Corporation for 
conversion into passive trailer units for the NTRC Bus Train. The Bus Train was essentially 
a long articulated bus which had the potential to provide mass bus transit facility on main 
corridors (see Plate 4.2). The train was first operated in Karachi during 1989-90 and was later 
shifted to Rawalpindi-Islamabad to operate along Murree-Islamabad Highway (not the obvious 
route for mass transit). The Bus Train successfully operated without any serious accidents 
until 1992 (Idris, 1992). However, the service was terminated later owing to the lack of 
interest shown from the NTRC staff in continuously supervising and managing its operation. 
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117 
Plate 4.1 laus used under NI R(; project 
4.7.2 The Prime Minister Public Transport Scheme 
The Prime Minister Public Transport Scheme (PMPTS) was introduced by the FG in the 
middle of 1992. This was neither a part of the FYP nor was there an existing policy to initiate 
such a type of scheme. It was solely the idea of the then and present Prime Minister, Mian 
Nawaz Sharif. The main purpose of this scheme was to partially address the unemployment 
problem, but also to provide a means to improve public transport services throughout the 
country. Custom duty was waved for new public transport vehicles under the scheme. These 
vehicles were provided at a subsidised price to unemployed persons who qualified to get a 
vehicle under the scheme. Only 30 per cent of the cost was to be paid as a down-payment and 
the remaining amount was to be paid in monthly instalments over 3-5 years in specified 
banks. However, the down-payment and the period of payment varied for different type of 
vehicles. The banks were authorised to confiscate vehicles in cases where the owner failed 
to deposit instalments in time. 
According to the data provided by the Ministry of Communication, by the end of December 
1993,900 full size buses, 7,000 coaches (26,29 seater), 11,000 minibuses (15 seater) and 
45,000 yellow cabs were imported from Korea and Japan under the PMPTS. NO details were 
given to the researcher about the total foreign exchange spent on the scheme. Some of these 
vehicles were fitted with air-conditioners and have become popular among passengers. Full 
size buses and coaches with air-conditioners are popular for long journeys. Few air- 
conditioned coaches were inducted in Karachi, and these vehicles have been converted into 
non-airconditioned by the operators due to operational reasons (air-conditioners were 
ineffective due to frequent openings at different bus stops). The coach bodies were built 
locally either on a Mazda Chassis of 3500 c. c with 26 seats or on a Hino Chassis of 4200 c. c 
with 29 seats. 
Yellow cabs vary in size from 600 c. c to 2800 c. c and mostly they are of Korean make. A 
few Mercedes diesel taxis were also imported and these are operating in urban areas. Most 
of the taxis are fitted with air-conditioners. The Provincial Government has fixed relatively 
higher fares for yellow cabs compared with old taxis. As these are relatively new and better 
quality vehicles, they are popular inspite of their comparatively high fares. The majority of 
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these taxis are operating in Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad and Rawalpindi. Initially, the 
Magistrates were deputed to make sure that yellow-cabs were operated only for public service. 
At present, however, these checks are seldom applied, and a large number of owners have 
changed the colour of their vehicles after paying all instalments and they are using them as 
private cars. 
In-spite of large commitments of the scarce foreign exchange resources of the country for the 
improvement of public transport under the PMPTS, only a small number of large buses and 
minibuses have been introduced in urban areas. About 100 large buses were introduced under 
this scheme in Karachi and a special notification was issued by the Provincial Government 
to allow higher fares for these services (Qasim, 1994). No full size bus was introduced in 
Lahore due to regulatory restrictions. The vast majority of full size buses and coaches are 
operating on inter-city routes, and the operation of the new vehicles introduced under the 
PMPTS is reported successful and profitable. This is mainly due to a higher fare structure and 
lower costs of maintenance and repair for the new fleet. 
Under this scheme a large number of new vehicles were introduced in the public transport 
fleet. As vehicles were given to individuals and inexperienced operators, this scheme gave rise 
to fragmented vehicle ownership in addition to the introduction of inexperienced operators and 
drivers. As the PMPTS was suspended by the end of 1993, the import of new buses, 
minibuses and yellow cabs has come to a stop. Unless remedial measures are taken the future 
availability of newer public transport vehicles is bound to decline. 
4.7.3 National Mass Transit Authority 
The National Mass Transit Authority was established by the FG in April 1995. The 
establishment of the authority also was not covered in any existing policy and was not 
included in the FYP. Again it was idea of the then Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, to 
establish this authority alongside the National Highway Authority. The headquarters of the 
Authority is in Islamabad and its regional offices were proposed to be in capital cities of the 
provinces where the national mass transit ways are to be set up. The authority may, in 
concurrence with the concerned Provincial Government, prepare a master plan for the 
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development, construction, operation and maintenance of appropriate mass transit for major 
cities in Pakistan. The purpose of the Authority is to formulate and implement policies and 
to plan, promote, organize and implement programmes for construction, development, 
operation, repairs and maintenance of national mass transitways, whether bus, light rail or 
heavy rail systems, including other allied works specially entrusted to it by the FG or by a 
PG (GoP, 1995c). 
Three months after of its formation, 'the National Mass Transit Authority prepared an 
immediate action plan for the implementation of mass transit. This plan included the 
following initiatives; Development of a Circular Light Rail line along the existing Karachi 
Circular Railway, and development of Light Rail Transitways, either simultaneously or 
consecutively, along the two corridors defined as priority I and II in the Karachi Mass Transit 
Study (Soomro and Shamim, 1996). 
4.7.4 Awami Train project 
A new train service (on the existing rail track) from Rawalpindi (Marir Hassan station) to 
Islamabad (Margalla station) was introduced during the dying days of Benazir Bhutto's 
Government. This "Awami (peoples) Train" project was launched by the FG on August 1996 
as a part of the Rawalpindi Development Package. The idea was to offer an alternative mode 
of transportation for around 400,000 people travelling daily between the twin cities on 
working days. The cost involved was Rs 40 million per km and the FG funded the entire cost. 
The Capital Development Authority (CDA) was a partner in the project as it was assigned to 
transport passengers in its buses (specially arranged for this purpose) to their destinations in 
the central Secretariat and other places in Islamabad. The schedule of the Awami Train was 
designed to coincide with official working hours. 
The train service has proved to be a failure in all respects, and is no longer operating. A 
senior FG official told the researcher in December 1996 that the daily operating cost of the 
Awami Train was well over Rs 26000 per day, but it could hardly collect Rs 2000 in return. 
The principal reasons for its failure were the lack of coordination and monitoring of the 
services. For instance, there was a scheduling between the CDA buses and the train but the 
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train service was not operated reliably to coordinate with bus schedule. The CDA buses would 
not be there to meet the train's arrival. As a result, the Awami Train neither saved time nor 
the hassle which the passengers face while travelling between the twin cities. In addition, the 
Margalla Station in Islamabad is not well located to travel onwards to the Secretariat (see 
Figure 4.3) and has been described by Mushtaq (1997), as a dead end rather than a 
destination. 
It was also planned that this rail-track would be stretched to the Secretariat and Quaid-i-Azam 
University in Islamabad. This idea was, however, simply one of the castles in the air which 
our part-time rulers, the politicians, are in the habit of building whenever they get an 
opportunity to speak at the inaugural ceremony of this kind of a project. Since the Benazir 
Government was dismissed by the President of Pakistan in November 1996, there is a little 
hope of any further extension of the project. 
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Figure 4.3 Schematic picture of the Islamabad/ Rawalpindi road network 
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4.7.5 Overseas aid 
A substantial part of most overseas aid projects involves policy decisions such as the 
formulation of financial and fiscal incentives, concessions or guarantees. These policy 
decisions can only be made by the FG not by the PGs. The FG approves and signs 
agreements between funding agencies and the Government. However, specific projects are 
implemented and dealt with by the concerned PGs through the Provincial Planning and 
Development Departments. The aid projects include; training of staff working for traffic and 
transport, building up and strengthening of institutional capabilities, provision of public 
transport vehicles, funding of transport infrastructure and financing studies related to public 
transport. 
Public transport was not considered as an important priority by the Government until the mid 
1970s. As a result, public transport services were not meeting the travel needs. There was 
continued public dissatisfaction with the services provided during the 1970s by both public 
and private sectors. In 1977 a high level committee, after detailed deliberations, established 
that there was a need to improve public transport in Karachi (KTC, 1988). In view of this 
situation, it was proposed in the fifth FYP that improvement to public transport would be 
undertaken by inducting a large number of buses in major urban areas with the assistance of 
overseas aid (GoP, 1978). In order to overcome the serious lack of a strong cadre of fully 
trained professional manpower to properly plan, design, construct, operate and manage 
transport in the country, the NTRC has organized courses on Transportation Projects Planning. 
Some of the courses were held in collaboration with the World Bank and US-AID (Swati, 
1993). Other main efforts made by the FG related to public transport and studies conducted 
with the assistance of overseas agencies are given below. 
In 1979, Volvo was persuaded to propose a comprehensive five year project to develop public 
transport in Lahore. This project involved training of staff and assistance in planning, 
management and the maximum utilization of public transport resources, and a delivery of 750 
new chassis (Hansen, 1981). New buses were also introduced in Faisalabad and Rawalpindi 
and Islamabad in early 1980s. 
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In 1991, two offers were received by the Government of Pakistan (GoP). The first offer was 
an interest free loan for the purchase of buses from the Chinese Government. The second 
offer was from the Belgian Government. This offer included the purchase of 100 Volvo buses 
on a credit at the rate of 0.6% per annum and rehabilitation of 75-100 Volvo buses of the 
PRTC free of cost. The Transport Department of Punjab prepared two projects both for 
Chinese and Belgian offers. These projects were submitted to the Provincial Planning and 
Development Department for onward transmission to the FG. This department forwarded these 
projects to the Federal Economic Affairs Division. The FG accepted the project containing 
Chinese offer and allocated 60 buses to Punjab and 40 buses to Sind province. The project 
was submitted to the Chinese authorities and finally, it was materialised and more recently, 
the FG has imported 100 buses from China in 1996 (see the following section). 
The GoP requested on various occasions assistance from the UK for a number of traffic and 
transport projects. For instance, a workshop has been set up in the NTRC for providing a 
range of services for in-house maintenance and repair of equipment including the official 
transport fleet (Swati, 1993). Similarly, the UK has assisted in the strengthening of existing 
institutions. Halcrow Fox and Associates were appointed in 1983 to provide technical 
assistance services to the LDA in the field of Transportation in Engineering and Planning. 
Specifically this assistance was requested to support the work of TEPA (the then Traffic 
Engineering and Transportation Planning Unit) in the introduction of modern traffic 
engineering techniques in Lahore. Moreover, a Traffic Manual was produced by these 
consultants in 1984 (Halcrow Fox and Associates, 1984a and 1984b). 
In 1987, the Karachi Mass Transit Study was commissioned under World Bank funding. 
Extensive data collection, planning and analysis were undertaken under this Study which was 
completed in 1990. The Study was conducted for the purpose of defining a Mass Transit 
System appropriate for Karachi and to develop a programme by which needs for improved 
public transport in the city could be met. The plan comprised of a network of 87 km of 
transitways to be built along existing corridors incorporating a rationalized bus route network. 
These transitways were planned to be built as busways convertible to light rail (Qasim, 1996). 
At the early stages of the project formulation, the World Bank expressed its interest in the 
funding of the infrastructure i. e the transitways only. With the change in government in 1994, 
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the GoP decided to take the project under its umbrella. Accordingly, the National Mass 
Transit Authority put forward an immediate action plan as a first phase of mass transit 
implementation. Under this plan, the development of Light Rail Transitways was offered on 
a BOT basis to interested investors and operators bidding for the project. Subsequently, the 
GoP signed an implementation agreement with a Canadian-Turkish-Pakistani consortium to 
build an 18 km long light rail urban transport line (Soomro and Shamim, 1996). 
In 1988, the GoP decided to conduct the Comprehensive Study on Transportation System in 
Lahore (JICA/TEPA, 1991). The GoP requested the Japanese Government for its assistance. 
In response to this request, the Japanese Government entrusted the study to the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The funding for this study was paid by the 
Japanese Government. Similarly in 1994, in response to a request from the GoP, the 
Government of Japan funded a master plan study on the National Transport Plan (GoP, 
1995d). The Punjab Urban Development Project was launched by the Planning and 
Management Unit of the Housing and Physical Planning Department in the early 1990s. This 
project included the preparation of development and infrastructure plans for various cities in 
Punjab. The PRTC was one of the beneficiaries of this project. The project was financed by 
the International Development Agency (IDA). In the case of PRTC, the original intent of the 
project was to carry out a study encompassing operations, vehicle maintenance, financial 
management and management information system and to develop various concepts related to 
the PRTC's operational problems including the review of the existing organization structure, 
and to provide guidance and recommendations to improve technical and financial efficiency 
(BCEOM, 1992). None of the recommendations given in this study was implemented due to 
the reluctance of the Provincial Government to grant funding. 
Facing the growing problem of urban transport in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, the GoP 
requested Sweden to assist in the development of local competence in urban transport 
planning and in the undertaking of an urban transport study of the Islamabad/Rawalpindi area. 
The project was financed by Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA). An 
agreement was signed between Scandiaconsult, a major Swedish consultant firm, and the 
counterpart, the NTRC within the Ministry of Communication of Pakistan. This study was 
completed in 1995 (GoP, 1995b). 
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More recently (in August 1997), the Government of Punjab has decided to operate about 20 
buses for the exclusive use of females in Lahore. The total cost of the project would be $1 
million. The entire funding for the project would be provided by the UNDP. The route 
network would be determined by the representatives of the UNDP, Punjab Government and 
the private sector. However, this pilot project would be operated by the private sector under 
the supervision of the government. If there is a successful experience in Lahore, the project 
is intended to be extended to Karachi, Multan, Faisalabad and Rawalpindi etc (Daily Jang, 
August 22 1997). The proposal of the project had been suspended due to the dismissal of 
Benazir's government in November 1996. 
4.7.6 Recent initiatives 
The following are some of the recent efforts made by the FG and PG to improve public 
transport services in Pakistan. 
Public sector's new buses: The Government of Pakistan imported 100 full size buses from 
China in 1996. The initial aim of importing these buses was to increase the existing fleet of 
publicly-owned services. Forty buses were given to the KTC and remaining 60 buses were 
handed over to the PRTC. The KTC added new buses to its fleet in Karachi and one of the 
new buses was set on fire during a strike by the public in August, 1996. However in the 
Punjab, the Government decided that the new buses should not be inducted into the PRTC's 
fleet. Instead these buses were gifted to various girls' educational institutions in the province. 
The institutions were made responsible for recovery of the operating costs of the buses. These 
services charge higher fares from their students than the buses in other educational 
institutions. 
The Prime Minister's directives: Although the Federal Government has no formal role in 
the provision and regulation of public transport, in 1997, the newly elected Prime Minister 
(Mian Nawaz Sharif) directed the Federal Ministry of Communication to set out short and 
long term plans for a revamping of the public transport systems (national and local both) and 
road network in the country. These plans are to include the construction of flyovers and 
underpasses on roads and provision of better quality public transport services in urban areas. 
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To overcome the problems of traffic jams and congestion, the widening and repairing of roads 
in the cities should also be included in the plans (The News, February 26,1997). In some 
cities progress to this end has been reported. For instance in Lahore, the Traffic Engineering 
and Transport Planning Agency (TEPA) presented a development package for the city in a 
briefing given to the Prime Minister in Lahore. The package includes, along with other 
projects, the construction of a ring road, and flyovers and underpasses on the Mall (Daily 
Jang, July 28 1997). Recently, the FG has also proposed a relaxation in taxes on public 
transport vehicles (see chapter 7, section 2.4). 
4.8 Conclusions 
In Pakistan transport in general and urban public transport in particular is in a very sorry state 
of affairs. The dissatisfaction of the public is manifest in a number of ways. The national 
newspapers are full of complaints against the level of transport service. The following issues 
are at the heart of urban public transport problems: first, a lack of defined government policy; 
second, a lack of political will; third, poor administration; fourth, a lack of financial 
incentives to private operators; and final, undue regulation of public transport services. These 
issues are discussed briefly below to outline the various dimensions involved. 
4.8.1 Lack of articulated transport policy 
Urban public transport policy has been shifting from one extreme position to another. There 
was no clear-cut understanding of the role of the private sector and the responsibility of the 
government in providing urban transport. Not only the question of public and private sector 
roles remained undecided, but the responsibility for publicly-owned services was tossed 
between Federal and Provincial Governments. There were repeated suggestions that public 
sector bus corporations must run on commercial lines but none was implemented. Public 
transport services are fragmented in urban areas, with no scheduling for private sector 
services. 
Most educational institutions and factories have their own buses. Moreover, introduction of 
special buses for ladies is a result of a lack of provincial transport policy and a lack of decent 
127 
public transport services in urban areas. History of overseas aid packages also does not reflect 
any FG policy to improve public transport in the past. However, in the recent past the 
Government has shown its concern to commission studies on public transport with the 
assistance of funding agencies. 
There has been also individual concern from the Chief Ministers and Prime Minister to dictate 
their own decisions. The decisions to eliminate minibuses from the city of Karachi was made 
on the directions of the then Prime Minister in 1986. There were also suggestions from the 
Federal Division of Environment and Urban Affairs in 1996 that autorickshaws should be 
eliminated from cities like Karachi and Lahore by the end of year 2000. No action was taken 
owing to the change of government. For instance, the Prime Minister seems to be acting as 
Mayor of Lahore as he is giving directions to initiate traffic and transport projects for the city. 
Moreover, he is regularly monitoring the progress in this regard. 
4.8.2 Lack of political will 
The experience of Karachi Mass Transit Project also demonstrates inconsistent policy and a 
lack of political will. Under this project busways were proposed in the Karachi 
Mass Transit 
Study (KDA, 1989) and at that time the World Bank was willing to finance the 
infrastructural 
cost. At that time, the project had the support of the government 
but when the Federal 
Government changed in 1990, the support for the project slackened. As a result, the project 
was delayed. Again with the change of government in 1993, the project was re-launched, the 
government decided to implement a Light Rail Transit project based on 
financial and fiscal 
incentives and the project agreement was signed on BOOT basis in 1996. 
The FG could regulate and operate public transport services easily in Islamabad as services 
in the National Capital are regulated by the federal ITA. However, the poor regulation and 
operation of urban transport services in Islamabad shows that the FG is not giving serious 
consideration to urban public transport problems. Lessons from the NTRC pilot project and 
the NTRC bus train project were clear, that there is a need for different types of public 
transport services at different fare level in urban areas. Owing to the absence of transport 
policy, no follow-up was made to this end. Similarly, government officials are aware of the 
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situation that present fares are not sufficient to operate urban public transport successfully but 
due to lack of political will of the government fares are not increased regularly. On the 
positive side, the introduction of FUTS and its successful public transport services is the result 
of political will on the part of the government (see chapter 6 for details). 
4.8.3 Poor administration 
The government has improperly administered public transport services at all levels. The 
bureaucrats involved are not properly trained to regulate public transport. For instance, the 
Awami Train project was launched without studying its feasibility. Moreover, no attempt was 
made at reliable train scheduling. Similarly, the Prime Minister Scheme was initiated without 
adequate administration of its operation. Initially, the operation of yellow-cabs was checked 
but when the owners paid off all instalments of the vehicles, they have been able to use the 
vehicles for private purposes. The public sector bus corporations were so poorly administered 
that they are now no longer operating. Generally corruption and bureaucratic procedures are 
involved at all stages of administration. 
4.8.4 Lack of financial incentives 
One of the biggest hurdles in promoting urban public transport is the lack of financial 
incentives to private sector operators. Although some temporary financial incentives were 
given under the PMPTS, the tax and incentives structure however, works against public 
transport and does not encourage bona-fide private operators to enter in the market. Private 
sector bus operators are obliged to give fare concessions on social grounds but they are not 
given any compensatory subsidy or grant. Taxes on new vehicles are excessive and both 
present taxation structure and the regulation of services discourage the operators from 
investing in new vehicles. A higher fee for issuing fitness certificates for full size buses and 
the token tax charged on the basis of the number of seats both discourage the use of larger 
buses. As a result the supply of vehicles in the public transport market is restricted and 
passengers are constrained to travel in low quality vehicles. It is imperative that operators be 
given some tax rebates and concessions in customs duties. 
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4.8.5 Undue regulation 
The most important issue is the undue regulation of public transport services by the regulatory 
authorities. Under the circumstance, vehicles are overloaded in peak hours, quality of vehicles 
and safety standards are poor, and undisciplined drivers and passengers are contributing 
unnecessarily to road congestion. The underlying reasons are: 
" Control of fares has made investment in new buses unattractive and has meant that 
operators reduce standards of service and safety; 
" Control on quality (safety) is weak because of the fragmented and competitive nature 
of the industry, and enforcement problems; and 
" Controls on quantity are reducing the supply of public transport in all major urban 
areas. 
Current government policies, the institutional framework and regulatory arrangements are 
generally causing reductions in the quality and quantity of privately-provided transit service 
rather than promoting the increases generally desired. Owing to the lack of transport policy, 
import restrictions and heavy taxation, limits on fares, and over regulation of services, public 
transport in urban areas is inadequate, unreliable and uncomfortable. Given the above findings 
it comes as no surprise that a recent study for the Ministry of Communications has 
acknowledged these deficiencies in Islamabad/Rawalpindi (GoP, 1995b). This chapter has 
identified problems which require more detailed exploration in order to search for solutions. 
This is done in chapter 5 for Lahore and chapter 6 for Faisalabad. 
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Chapter 5 Public Transport In Lahore 
5.1 Introduction 
It was concluded in the previous chapter that urban public transport in Pakistan is suffering 
from inappropriate policies and undue regulation. The services provided are generally 
inefficient and are of poor quality. This chapter provides evidence from the city of Lahore 
that poorly administered public transport has resulted in inadequate supply and low quality 
of services. Section 2 describes the overall city characteristics. It also gives an account of the 
variety of public transport services offered. The regulatory arrangements for public transport 
are reviewed in section 3. Sections 4 and 5 provide the details of services offered by public 
and private sectors. The impact of current regulations on both publicly owned and private 
sector services is also evaluated in these sections. The market for various types of public 
transport services is analyzed in section 6 through the analysis of household surveys. A 
summary of the findings of these surveys is also presented. In section 7 the public transport 
problems in the city are discussed, and section 8 concludes. 
5.2 City Characteristics 
5.2.1 General presentation 
Lahore is the provincial capital of the Punjab and the second largest city of Pakistan. The city 
is located on the south-eastern bank of the River Ravi and its centre is within 25 Km of 
Pakistan's border with India to the east (see chapter 4, figure 4.2). The river and Indian 
border are major impediments to the location of urban development and general growth of 
the city. Consequently, modem expansion has been confined predominantly to the southern 
side, producing an increasingly symmetric city (Qadeer, 1983). 
Lahore boasts a long and proud historic significance, portrayed through a glorious 
architectural and urban heritage, and thriving cultural life. Lahore used to be known as the 
city of gardens. The city earned this name through the famous gardens of Mughal legacy, and 
131 
the parks in the cantonment and the civil lines areas created during the British period. At 
present, Lahore is a major national centre for commerce and administration, with diverse 
sources of industrial employment ranging from the large scale to a multitude of traditional 
cottage industries, and numerous recreation, cultural, and higher education establishments 
which contribute significantly to the overall character and activity of the city. 
5.2.2 Population growth and density 
Since independence, the population of Lahore has registered a big increase which has been 
linked to a heavy influx into the city of industrial labour from the rural hinterland. The 
population of Lahore city' grew from 0.85 million in 1951 to 2.95 million in 1981 (GoP, 
1981b) representing a cumulative growth rate of approximately 4.2 percent per annum over 
the 30-years period. The estimated city population in 1990 was 4.17 million and the total 
population has increased about fivefold in a period of four decades. The estimated total 
population of the wider Lahore Metropolitan Area (LMA2) in 1990 was 5.43 million 
(JICA/TEPA, 1991). Recent estimates suggest that the population of metropolitan Lahore 
would grow from 6.1 million in 1994 to 7.9 million by the year 1999 at an annual growth rate 
of 5.62 percent (EPAP/World Bank/ADB, 1993). The overall population density (persons 
above 5 years of age/hactre) of the city in 1990 was estimated as 90 persons per hectare and 
densities of over 200 persons per hectare are found in the Walled City, Shad Bagh and 
Kirshan Nagar areas (JICATTEPA, 1991) (see figure 5.1). This rapid growth of population 
puts great strains on the city's transport systems. 
'. The city consists of the area under the administration of the Metropolitan Corporation 
Lahore (MCL) and the cantonment 
2. Presently LMA covers approximately 2250 sq. km, whereas in 1979 it was about 1650 
sq. km 
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Figure 5.1 Population density by zones in Lahore 
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Source: Adapted from JICA/TEPA, 1991 
Nute: Density based on persons above 5 years of age 
5.2.3 Land use and urban structure 
Lahore's physical development since 1947 exhibits both the scale of demographic and 
economic change and the structural characteristics of the city. Historically, Lahore City has 
developed from the Walled City and expanded southward (see figure 5.2). The development 
of the city reflects wide disparities in income distribution. In the expansion of the city towards 
the south a substantial number of low density upper and middle income housing schemes have 
been developed (Leonard, 1986; Anjum, 1994). Most of these schemes have been developed 
by either public or private land developers in a piecemeal pattern and are not being properly 
linked to main route networks, albeit they have been provided with an adequate road network 
within the schemes. 
Large and continuous areas of unauthorized low-income residential and mixed used 
developments have grown up to the north and east periphery of the city. Moreover, katchi 
abadis (squatter settlements, predominantly with low-income families) are to be found on 
residual land all around the city and numbered 308 in 1990. These illegal settlements 
accommodate about 30 percent of the total population of Lahore (Mueenuddin, 1991). Some 
urban development has also been initiated across the river (on the north side), as result of 
liberal taxation policy for industrial establishments along Shekhupura and Grand Trunk (G. T) 
Roads. Associated residential developments are characterized by poor road layout, access, and 
infrastructural services (Anjum, 1990; Anjum and Hameed, 1994). 
Manufacturing industry is dispersed, apart from some concentrations near the railway yards 
to the east of the city. The total number of employees working in this industrial area, in 1990, 
was about 17,000 (JICA! TEPA, 1991). A large number of steel bar plants are situated north 
of the general bus stand (terminal). Bus body building workshops are mainly located along 
western Bund road. Most large-scale industries are located outside the city along the main 
highways. 
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Figure 5.2 Trend of urbanization in Lahore 
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Lahore does not have a tightly defined central area but its predominant central activities are 
located around the old Walled City. The Mall is the centre for major purchase shopping, 
banking and entertainment, and the Walled City for trading. The more specialized bazaar trade 
is concentrated within and around the Walled City, while less specialized bazaars are to be 
found in all areas. Financial sector, commerce, offices, hotels, the law courts, government 
buildings and prestigious educational institutions are centred along a section of the Mall. 
However, considerable central office functions, shopping plazas and markets, and 
entertainment functions have also been developed in high-income planned residential suburbs 
and in the Cantonment area. In addition, some higher education institutions have also shifted 
from the central area to the south of the city, for instance Punjab University (New Campus), 
and Allama Iqbal Medical College (Figure 5.1). 
Lahore has developed into a framework of land use patterns that require high levels of 
transport movement (Figure 5.3). Residential areas are located far from employment 
opportunities and educational institutions. Particularly for residents in southern part of Lahore, 
trip lengths have increased and opportunities for non-motorised transport such as cycling and 
walking have consequently reduced. The unbalanced shape of the city also adds to difficulties 
in meeting travel demands. It also results in unidirectional flow of traffic during peak hours 
with a concentration of movement in the central area contributing to congestion. 
5.2.4 Road network 
The road network in the city is presented in Figure 5.4. The main road network is more 
extensive within the city. It comprises two main radial roads to the north of the River Ravi, 
and three to the south. The roads to the north connect Lahore with the nearby cities of 
Sheikhupura and Gujranwala, in addition to forming part of the national highway network to 
Rawalpindi, Islamabad and Faisalabad. Multan Road to the south is also part of the national 
network, linking Lahore to the south of the country. The Grand Trunk (G. T) Road to Wagha, 
and Ferozepur Road, serve hinterlands towards border areas. 
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Figure 5.3 Land use pattern in Lahore (1990) 
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A network of secondary distributor roads, apart from the main strategic roads, provides access 
to residential, industrial, commercial areas and other facilities of the city. Many of these roads 
are built to generous proportions in the newly planned expansions to the south but in the 
central area and old built up parts of the city many distributor roads are inadequate in both 
width and alignment. 
The internal road network in old and unauthorized sectors of the city has led to problems of 
accessibility and circulation. The absence of land use control in these areas has further 
exacerbated the problems. Encroachments on to the roads occur throughout the city which 
impede traffic flow and cause congestion, confusion, and danger. Usually pedestrians are 
badly affected as they are unable to use encroached footways. 
The Lahore Development Authority (LDA) is responsible for maintaining only six roads, 
including the Mall, while the National Highway Authority (NHA) has only three - GT Road, 
Bund Road and Multan Road - under its jurisdiction. The Lahore Cantonment Board (a 
residential area administered by the army) is responsible for the maintenance of roads falling 
within its boundary. The Provincial Communication and Works Department is responsible for 
21 roads in Lahore, while the biggest burden lies with the Metropolitan Corporation Lahore 
(MCL) - 972 residential roads inside various localities plus service lanes. 
All the agencies (except for MCL) are working relatively efficiently in the provincial capital. 
As a result, the main road network is generally well developed and, with junction 
improvements and planned extensions in growth areas, can accommodate the existing and near 
future traffic flows. However, existing road capacity is generally poorly utilised due to poor 
road user behaviour and ineffective traffic management. 
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Figure 5.4 Road network in Lahore 
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Source: JICA/TEPA, 1991 
5.2.5 Traffic engineering and management 
The Punjab Government created the Traffic Engineering and Transport Planning Agency 
(TEPA) under the LDA in 1987. The main functions of the agency include the planning, 
design, and implementation of traffic engineering and traffic management programmes (LDA, 
1987). The TEPA has undertaken minor traffic improvement schemes and major engineering 
projects. The officials of the TEPA include major engineering projects as measures for traffic 
management. However, these schemes are discussed separately. 
Under the provisions of the Punjab Urban Development Project the TEPA has embarked on 
a programme of low-cost infrastructure improvements. These are aimed at improving junction 
capacity, junction control and street lighting. By December 1995, TEPA had improved 41 
roads besides major engineering projects in the city. An illustration of typical junction 
improvement measures is presented in Plate 5.1. According to the Chief Engineer of TEPA, 
the agency under the future Lahore Transport Project intends to expand the existing 
programme: to improve public transport through bus terminal improvements, and to carry out 
major road infrastructure provision in the southern part of the city. 
The current physical infrastructure for road based public transport is very limited and is 
confined to terminal provision at Lahore Railway Station and the provision of a bus station 
at Bhati Gate. Attempts have been made in various parts of the city to prohibit or segregate 
different classes of road users. The most notable initiatives are as follows: first, heavy 
vehicles are prohibited from using central parts of the city during day time; second, animal- 
drawn vehicles are prohibited from using the Mall; third, cyclists are segregated onto the 
service roads along the Mall; and fourth, around Circular Road animal-drawn vehicles are 
confined to a specially constructed service road. According to the senior official of the Traffic 
Police, none of the segregation schemes operates well. In all cases they are only successful 
during the periods that they are physically enforced by the Traffic Police. 
The TEPA is also making major improvements in getting to grips with traffic engineering and 
control. The TEPA started working on a series of projects with funding arranged from the 
World Bank in 1991. This financial assistance was to end in 1995, but was extended to 1997. 
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Plate 5.1 A road junction improvement in Lahore 
Plate 5.2 A newly built under pass on Jail Road in Lahore 
It had completed 21 major projects at a cost of over Rs 1314 million by the end of 1996. They 
include for instance, the construction of underpasses at the Mall-canal crossing, Jail Road-canal 
crossing etc. An illustration of these traffic engineering measures is presented in Plate 5.2. 
Another nine projects, joint ventures with the private sector, are also under consideration, 
including the Lahore Ring Road project, construction of parking plazas in the central area and 
along the Mall, and a new bus terminal at Shahdara (see Figure 5.5). No scheme has been 
undertaken specifically to achieve the efficient flow of public transport. 
5.2.6 Road transport 
Road users are generally male, and poorly educated about road USC, both as pedestrians and as 
vehicle drivers. Vehicles are generally poorly maintained and they are noisy and polluting. 
Motorization is still in its infancy in Pakistani cities, but the availability of motor transport has 
increased significantly in recent years. There were 2,017,307 registered motor vehicles in the 
country in 1986 whereas 3,329,888 motor vehicles were registered by the end of' 1993 ((ioP, 
1994). From these figures the average increase in motor vehicles in Pakistan is estimated at 9 
percent per annum. Figure 5.5 illustrates changes in the modal split of* traffic between 1979 and 
1989. By 1989 motorcycles had replaced bicycles as the largest share of the traffic volume 
(29.4%, ), with motor cars the third largest share at 24.6 percent (B('FOM, 1992). It must he 
remembered however that walking, omitted in these figures, remains by far the most common 
mode of travel. 
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Motorcycles have been the fastest growing type of vehicle in Lahore. The number of 
motorcycles increased at a rate of 19 percent per annum during 1974-1978 whereas the 
growth rate of cars was 13 percent (LDA/World Bank/IDA, 1980). The absolute increase that 
has occurred in road transport in Lahore is evident during the past few years. An average of 
25,000 new vehicles are being added each year to Lahore's traffic. According to data provided 
by the registration office, in 1995-96,16872 two-wheelers and 9987 four-wheelers were 
registered in the city. The growth in number of motorcycles and cars is likely to continue in 
future and will pose serious problems of traffic congestion on already clogging roads. At 
December 1994, the total number of registered vehicles was 583,892. Of this total, 468,496 
(80%) were private vehicles and 115,396 (about 20%) were public service vehicles 
(Government of Punjab, 1995). 
5.2.7 Travel patterns 
Over 10 million person trips were made daily by all transport modes in the LMA in 1990. 
Table 5.1 presents the proportion of all the trips undertaken by the major travel modes in 
1990. Motorized traffic is growing rapidly, but walking is still the main means of travel. The 
bicycle is very important because it provides flexible transport for people who cannot afford 
to purchase a motor vehicle or travel by public transport (JICATTEPA, 1991). Many people 
consider that bus services are inefficient, uncomfortable, and unreliable, and prefer to use 
bicycles or private motor transport if it can be afforded (see section 6.3). As in other cities 
of Pakistan, there exists a well-off population which demands quality of service and is in a 
position to pay the full cost (Idris, 1987). 
In 1990, public transport contributed one third of personal motorized trips in Lahore. Of these, 
83 percent of trips were made by bus and 13 percent by taxi services respectively. Only 0.3 
trips/capita/day were made by public transport (0.26 trips/capita/day by buses) out of the 
average 2 trips/person/day (JICATTEPA, 1991). This figure is lower than in many cities in 
other LDCs. For example, 0.37-0.94 public transport trips per capita per day are found in 
African cities (Maunder, 1990). In what should be a rapidly growing market, the low use of 
public transport in Lahore, affirms the inadequacy of services (Table 5.1). 
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Table 5.1 : Modal split of trips in Lahore, 1990 
Transport mode No. of trips per day Percentage 
Walk 5,121,626 52.57 
Bicycles 698,681 7.17 
Public transport* 1,410,237 14.48 
Private vehicles** 2,507,148 25.73 
Other modes 4,654 0.05 
Total 9,742,346 100.00 
Source: Adapted data from JICA/TEPA, 1991 
* Includes tongas 
** Includes motorcycles 
About 15.1 percent of all the trips are made for work and 15.2 percent trips were to 
educational institutions. To home trips represent the largest proportion of all the trips, 
accounting for 46.7 percent. Private trips (include shopping, social, recreational and religious 
trips) account for about 20.7 percent. Business trips comprise only 2.3 percent of all the trips 
(JICA/TEPA, 1991). 
Walking is reported to be the main mode in Lahore, with 52.57 percent of all the trips made 
on foot in 1990 (Table 5.1). Trips made by walking are short with average travel time of 10.8 
minutes. Of trips made by walking, 62 percent are made within 10 minutes (JICA/TEPA, 
1991). In particular, walking is a common mode in low income areas. The household survey 
conducted in Baghban Pura showed that 42 percent of the total trips were made on foot for 
different purposes, including shopping (28%), education (27%) and work places (17%). Thirty 
percent of the total trips were reported by bus services largely for social (62%), recreational 
(14%) and work purposes (13%). Tongas were also used for 15 percent of the total trips, 
mainly for social trips (Table 5.23). 
Conversely, in middle and higher income areas, the majority of the trips are made by 
motorised vehicle. The household survey in Jauhar Town shows that 54 percent of the total 
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trips were made by car and taxi, largely for social (33%), shopping (27%), and recreational 
(25%) purposes. Two-wheelers (mainly motorcycles) were used for a further 22 percent of 
the total trips, mainly for shopping (34%), social (22%) and work (17%) purposes (Table 
5.10). 
5.2.8 Public transport services 
Lahore offers a variety of public passenger transport services. Rail makes an insignificant 
contribution (0.57% of trips) to movement within the LMA. At present public transport in 
Lahore is exclusively provided by private sector operators. The private sector operates 
primarily 15-20 seater minibuses (known locally as wagons). There are a small number of 
privately operated 30 seater midibuses and full size single-deck buses in limited areas. The 
private sector also operates suzukis (10 seater microbuses) on a few routes. In addition, the 
Model Town Society also operates a small number of full size buses which ply to and from 
the central area and the separately administered, middle class, Model Town area (see Figure 
5.2). The buses operated are old and of poor quality, and the society has not been able to 
invest in new vehicles as it is not earning sufficient revenues as a result of regulated fares. 
The publicly-owned Punjab Road Transport Corporation (PRTC) provided full size single- 
deck bus services until June 1997. Regular taxis/yellow-cabs, autorickshaws (3-wheel Vespa 
motorcycle engine powered vehicles), tongas (horse drawn carts) offer contract carriage 
services. Table 5.2 shows an inventory of the road public transport modes and passenger seats 
in the city. 
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Table 5.2 : Road public transport inventory in Lahore (1996) 
Transport mode Number of vehicles Passenger seats (2) 
cu 
Number Percentage 
Bus Services (all) 118,288 67.1 
PRTC Buses 24 1680 0.9 
Private Buses 326 19560 11.2 
Minibuses 4781 86058 48.8 
Midibuses 270 8100 4.6 
Suzukis 289 2890 1.6 
Taxi Services (all) 58008 32.9 
Taxis/yellow-cabs 3021 12084 6.9 
Autorickshaws 10842 21684 12.3 
Tongas 4040 24240 13.7 
Total - 176,296 100 
Source: (1) Data collected from the RTA Lahore, 1996 
(2) Seating capacity x No. of vehicles 
Own-account services: Both private companies and government institutions operate their own 
full size buses, midibuses and minibuses, with the main purpose of providing easy travel for 
their employees/students. The private companies include major industrial and commercial 
establishments, for example Ittefaq Group Limited, and the government institutions include 
universities, colleges, Pakistan Railways, the Water and Power Development Authority, and 
the Telephone and Telegraph Department etc. There is no recently recorded estimate of extent 
of these services for Lahore, but Armstrong-Wright (1993) reports the use of 1000 vehicles 
in Karachi. 
These services are exempted from government regulations, with routes, fares and frequencies 
determined by the institutions themselves. In the case of private companies and government 
departments, the employees using these services are not paid their monthly travel allowance 
(see chapter 4, section 4). However, students are charged nominal fares which vary from one 
educational institution to other. For instance, the bus services of the University of Engineering 
and Technology charge a fare of Rs 0.25 per student per trip whereas the Punjab University 
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buses charge Rs 1.0 per student per trip. 
5.3 Regulatory Framework 
Regulation of road based public transport operations is essentially the responsibility of 
Regional Transport Authority Lahore. The only exceptions to this are tongas which are 
controlled by the MCL. The various regulations applied to private sector public transport 
services and their administration are described in the following sections. 
5.3.1 Administration 
The PTA is empowered to define routes for stage carriage services in the entire province. In 
Lahore however, the PTA has authorised the RTA to define routes lying in its jurisdiction. 
All the routes in Lahore have been defined by the RTA. Under section 254 of the MVO, the 
District Magistrate is empowered to declare bus stops in the urban area, while outside it the 
RTA is competent to pass such orders, in consultation with the District Magistrate. 
All kinds of route permits in respect of buses, wagons, trucks, suzukis, autorickshaws and 
taxis are issued and renewed by the Secretary RTA after realizing the requisite permit fee. 
In theory, the RTA may cancel/suspend a route permit for a such period as it thinks fit on the 
breach of any condition of the permit, for instance in response to a complaint from the 
general public or in the case of an accident. In practice the Chairman RTA cancels permits 
in the case of fatal accidents and the minor accidents and general complaints are disposed of 
by the Secretary RTA, generally by imposing fines on defaulters. The composition of the 
RTA Lahore is: Divisional Commissioner Lahore (Chairman of the RTA), Deputy Inspector 
General Police (member), Superintending Engineer Highways (member), Chief Engineer 
TEPA (member), and Secretary RTA (member). 
The Divisional Commissioner and the Secretary are mainly responsible for all matters 
regarding the regulation of public transport. Both the officers are from the civil service and 
employees of the Provincial Government. Generally, they have no background or training in 
dealing with transport issues and the RTA has no technical staff to assist them. Moreover, 
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they are frequently transferred. Secretaries and Commissioners have been changed 3 times for 
RTA Lahore during 1994-1996. As a result, these officers deal with public transport issues 
on an ad-hoc basis. The Secretary of the RTA is appointed without considering his 
competence to run the affairs of transport. For instance, the Secretary appointed in 1996 
previously worked in the fisheries and finance departments. 
5.3.2 Fare regulations 
Fares for road based public transport are determined by the Provincial Government. Average 
fares for minibuses (Rs 0.33/km) are fixed higher than for full size buses (Rs 0.26/km), with 
the average fare for suzukis fixed at Rs 0.24/km. Concessionary fares are allowed for 
students. Students are allowed to travel on full size buses and midibuses by paying a nominal 
fare of Rs 0.25 within Lahore. Private sector operators receive no compensation for these 
concessions, but they do not apply on smaller size bus services (10-18 seater vehicles). It is 
therefore hardly surprising that few full size buses and midibuses are operated on routes 
which would be much used by students. 
Generally fares are set without employing any realistic criteria and fare levels tend to be kept 
below economic levels. In interviews conducted by the researcher in 1995, both the public 
and the private sector operators were not satisfied with the present structure of fares. The 
operators admitted that the low fares have significant effects on service quality. The service 
offered to the passengers is very basic, with cheap, poorly maintained vehicles forming the 
majority of the bus fleet. The bus operators attempt to maximise revenue by ensuring that 
their vehicles are always full. The consequence of this is that vehicles spend a long time 
stationary at bus stands and, once full, race each other to the next stop to find new 
passengers. 
In addition to low fares, the uneconomic student concessionary fare has significantly affected 
the viability and quality of public transport services. The concessions affected the publicly 
owned corporation more than private operators since a higher proportion (20-30%) of its 
passengers were students (PRTC, 1992). A similar situation is reported for the KTC (KDA, 
1989). The Corporations used to receive a subsidy/loan to offset this concession whilst private 
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operators do not. 
Fares for bus services are relatively low in Pakistan as compared with other LDCs (see World 
Bank, 1986: 47). The price of spare parts, oil etc has increased over 15 fold from 1979 to 
1995, whereas fares have increased only about five fold over the same period. In the face of 
such low regulated fares, it is questionable how the public transport market is feasible for 
private operators. In theory some operators should have to leave the industry but in reality 
the number of public transport vehicles is increasing albeit at slow rate. This is because the 
operators seek to reduce their costs and standards of service in order to continue operating. 
Moreover, there is a limited supply of route permits by the RTA, and operators maximise 
their revenues by overloading. 
5.3.3 Quality controls 
Quality controls are applied in the form of checking standards of public service vehicles 
(PSVs) and licensing the PSV drivers. The city of Lahore has been divided into four zones 
on the basis of the number of PSVs. A Motor Vehicle Examiner (MVE) is responsible for 
conducting fitness test for vehicles in each zone. The MVEs are controlled by the PTA and 
RTA. They examine vehicles and issue "Certificate of Vehicle Fitness" for every six months. 
Chapter VI of the Motor Vehicles Rules (1969) specifies quality control standards and a 
comprehensive procedure for issuing a vehicle fitness certificate. The MVEs are required to 
examine, for example, front and rear lights, direction indicators, steering, brakes, silencers, 
safety glass, mirror, tyres, seating room, reversing, width of doors, driver'seat and even paint 
of vehicles. The MVEs do not always enforce the quality control requirements and vehicles 
are sometimes not inspected. For instance, according to data collected from the PTA, a total 
19,676 vehicles were granted 'fitness certificate' during January to July 1995 by all the MVEs 
in Lahore. This indicates that each MVE took about 13 minutes per vehicle (on average) to 
examine its `complete mechanical fitness'. This calculation is made on the basis that each 
MVE continuously examines vehicles for 8 hours per day! The private operators have no 
complaint against the MVEs except bribes. Operators in interviews conducted by the 
researcher stated that by paying bribes to the MVEs, their vehicles are not thoroughly 
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examined, but if they do not pay bribes, the fitness certificate is issued after a number of 
vehicle examinations conducted over a period of 2-3 weeks. The senior officials of the Traffic 
Police, in their in-depth interviews, also admitted that there are loopholes in the existing 
system and that they were not satisfied with vehicle examination procedures. 
The functioning of public transport vehicles is not satisfactory as the full size buses, 
midibuses and minibuses used are old and in deteriorating condition, generally having been 
passed on to urban areas when retired from inter-city operation. According to the officials of 
the Traffic Police, they frequently find the following mechanical deficiencies in public 
transport vehicles seats torn-up, windows broken, lights missing, engines emitting smoke and 
brakes not properly connected. The services provided using these vehicles are neither reliable 
nor comfortable. One of the reasons is that quality controls are not strictly enforced. 
Drivers in general have a poor training and education in traffic rules and regulations. A 
significant problem is caused by the fact that many public transport drivers are not qualified. 
It is also common practice to stop anywhere to drop and pick up passengers, even in the very 
middle of road intersection. Where bus bays exist drivers tend to stop in the street, 
intentionally blocking their competitors. This behaviour causes both accidents and congestion 
(see sections 7.5-6). 
There is a regulation that each public transport driver must hold a PSV licence. In reality, 
interviews conducted with police officials in 1995 showed that only about 20 percent of 
public transport drivers in Lahore hold PSV licences. In other cities in Pakistan estimates are 
40 percent in Quetta, 30 percent in Peshawar and 15 percent in Islamabad/Rawalpindi (Traffic 
Police verbal estimates in interviews). The private sector operators to a large extent cut costs 
by employing non-qualified drivers who are paid less. According to the police, drivers with 
a PSV licence are involved in fewer traffic accidents. 
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5.3.4 Route network regulations 
The RTA Lahore itself defines the route network for the city and sets limits to the number 
of permits available on each specified route. The RTA used to determine the routes for private 
sector operation in consultation with PRTC. In order to run a stage carriage bus service, 
private operators are required to apply for the grant of a licence for the intended route and 
a permit is issued for each individual vehicle allowed to operate the route. The applicant must 
furnish documents related to vehicle registration, fitness and insurance policy and pay an 
annual licence fee. Vehicle types are also specified by the RTA for various routes. There is 
no monitoring of operator performance by the RTA after a permit is issued. 
Prior to 1985, policies regarding entry were relatively liberal and the number of minibuses 
operated grew rapidly. To address growing congestion problems, which are blamed partly on 
minibuses, the RTA has implemented more restrictive policies over recent years. It has limited 
the issue of route permits for minibuses as follows: 
a. in 1985, only new vehicles (of the current year model) were granted 
licenses to operate, 
b. in 1989, this policy was revised to permit vehicles up to two-years old; 
c. in 1992, the following amendments were made: 
1. on routes for which 250 or more route permits have been issued, 
further permits were banned. 
2. on routes having 100 or more permits, only the latest model vehicles 
would be granted permits. 
3. on routes having above 50 but below 100 permits, vehicles up to two- 
years old would be given permits. 
4. on routes having less than 50 permits, vehicles up to four-years old 
would be allowed. 
Generally, the private operators were not satisfied with the existing quantity controls and the 
bureaucratic procedures of the RTA. In their interviews operators were asked if they had 
faced difficulties in obtaining a route permit. As one replied "money solves all the problems". 
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As a result, they were operating on their own choice of routes. The main reasons for the 
selected route were that it was profitable due to more passengers and roads being in good 
condition. Those operators who did not pay money to the officials were operating on less 
profitable routes with poorer road conditions. 
5.4 Public Sector Services 
5.4.1 General description 
The Punjab Road Transport Corporation (PRTC) was in the past the sole public sector 
organisation directly involved in the provision of public transport services in Lahore. The 
Corporation was established in 1977, and held a monopoly over public passenger services on 
40 routes within LMA (LDA/World Bank/IDA, 1980) as well as serving more distant 
localities. 
Although private services were permitted from 1972, and private full size bus services were 
allowed from 1977 on certain routes in the north and east of the city, there was continued 
public dissatisfaction with the services provided in the 1970s by both public and private 
sectors. In view of this the FG proposed a substantial increase in the number of buses in 
major cities, including Lahore (GoP, 1977); and in 1979, Volvo was persuaded to propose a 
comprehensive five year programme to develop public transport in Lahore. This involved 
assistance in planning, management and technical matters, and the delivery of 750 new 
chassis (Hansen, 1981). Accordingly, 49 routes were designed and implemented in 1981. The 
new services were reported to perform much better initially than the previous services 
(Jenkins, 1982), but gradually the performance of the PRTC as operator declined (PRTC, 
1992). There had been profound changes in its organizational structure since 1983. 
a. Federal subsidies were stopped in 1983 due to defederalization. As a result, the 
Corporation was placed under the control of the PG which continued to grant subsidies 
for its operation. 
b. In 1985, intercity and urban operations were amalgamated. 
c. The PG was not willing to continue to give subsidy/loan to make-up all of its losses. 
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In 1993, Government offered a golden handshake scheme to employees. Out of 6521 
options only 1579 employees were paid their pension/gratuity and additional one 
month salary by the end of 1995. 
d. In June 1997, the government decided to disband the PRTC. 
5.4.2 Regulation of services 
The intended role of PRTC in Lahore was seen to be to provide mass transit services through 
the intensive operation of high capacity buses (see Plate 5.3) along the main corridors. Its 
services were protected from competition through the Motor Vehicles Ordinance which gives 
priority to publicly-owned buses over private operators in the allocation of routes. In addition, 
its services were not subject to formal regulatory controls except for fares. The Motor 
Vehicles Act (1973) states that: 
"The Corporation may operate motor transport on any route it may think fit, and where 
it so operates such transport, the Provincial and Regional Transport Authorities shall.... 
have no jurisdiction in relation to that transport. The Provincial Transport Authority or 
Regional Transport Authorities shall not grant or issue stage carriage permits.... unless an 
offer has first been made to the Corporation to operate its services on such routes" (Motor 
Vehicles Laws, 1992: 47). 
The PRTC was effectively self-regulated, with the RTA and traffic police having no 
jurisdiction over its vehicle inspection and route permits. Despite these advantages the facts 
about the PRTC are simple and brutal. 
5.4.3 Operational performance 
With the induction of new buses during 1981-82 the ratio between operating revenue and 
costs was 0.55 in Lahore. Later in the 1980s, costs per seat-km were estimated at more than 
twice those of private operators (Idris, 1987). The cost of operation was also more than for 
bus operations in a number of other LDCs (World Bank, 1986). Revenue collected was less 
than half of operating costs, although PRTC buses carried a large number of passengers and 
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were grossly overloaded during all times of operation. Private operators with full size buses, 
by contrast, were making profits on the same routes, and with the same fares. 
Over recent years the performance of the PRTC drastically declined. In 1995, it operated only 
24 buses on six routes in Lahore and carried roughly 17,000 passengers daily (RTA, 1995), 
whereas in 1990 some 53,700 passenger seats were available (JICA/TEPA, 1991), and back 
in 1979 some 105,000 passengers were carried daily (LDA/World Bank/IDA, 1980). A 
comparative performance of publicly-owned urban bus corporations in various provinces in 
Pakistan is presented in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 : Operational performance 
of public bus corporations in Pakistan: a comparison 
Operational criteria 1990 1994 
KTC PRTC KTC PRTC GTS 
Total kilometres (in millions) 26.56 20.17 13.76 2.86 4.82 
Total revenue (millions Rs) 111.24 60.59 89.16 
10.40 22.02 
Total expenditure (millions Rs) 216.06 246.35 180.85 
210.39 41.24 
Average income per km (Rs) 4.19 3.00 6.48 3.64 4.57 
Average cost per km (Rs) 8.13 12.22 13.14 73.56 8.56 
Average loss per km (Rs) 3.94 9.22 6.66 69.92 3.99 
Source: Data collected by the researcher in 1995 
The comparison of operational performance shows that the PRTC had the worst performance 
when compared with the Karachi Transport Corporation (KTC) in Karachi and the 
Government Transport Service (GTS) in Peshawar. The average cost incurred per km was 
almost double the average income per km for the KTC and GTS, whereas the PRTC average 
cost per km was four times greater than the average income per km in 1990. The average 
cost/income per km ratio increased to about 19 times in 1994. These high expenditures for 
the PRTC were primarily due to over manning and cuts in service levels (see section 5.4.4). 
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5.4.4 Reasons for terminal decline 
Reasons for this collapse as stated in an RTA working paper are the low fares; increased 
operational costs due to traffic congestion; the student concessionary fare (students constitute 
about 30 percent of passengers on PRTC buses); and rising costs of inputs such as spare parts 
and the capital cost of vehicles (RTA, 1995). Most of these are factors which are faced by 
bus services in many cities in LDCs (see chapter 3, section 2). However, the Corporation 
confronted other more grave problems (PRTC, 1994) which included: 
over staffing - it had no less than 189 "employees" per operating bus! 
(estimated in June, 1995); 
ii. an old and dilapidated fleet - comprised mainly of the large Volvo buses from 
the early 1980s; 
iii. un-healthy union activities - all unions are affiliated with political parties. 
Indiscipline and lawlessness on the part of unions paralysed the Corporation, 
creating a very difficult position for the management at all levels; 
iv. for political reasons, it had not been allowed to manage its operations on an 
ordinary commercial basis; and 
v. extensive pilferage. 
In his interview with the researcher in December 1996, the provincial Minister for Transport 
of Punjab also held the unions responsible for the sorry state of affairs of the PRTC. He 
remarked that "all the government efforts had proved fruitless due to emergence of pressure 
groups from within PRTC workers. He said these groups had destroyed the whole system 
and made the government think about other options" such as privatisation of the corporation 
and the lay off of its staff through a golden handshake scheme. He articulated that an 
immediate decision was required about the fate of the corporation because the government 
had to give an annual grant of Rs 400 million for running a few buses. He further stated that 
the PRTC owed Rs 7 billion to the Punjab Government and Rs 1.7 billion to various banks 
(Interview of the Minister Transport, 16 December 1996). 
155 
Due to the above problems, the corporation's services are now non-existent. Although PRTC 
had ambitions to reactivate its services with outside international help and subsidies/grants, 
the Provincial Government was no longer willing to give additional support. Recently, in June 
1997, the Minister for Transport declared in a session of the Punjab Assembly that the 
government has decided to abolish the PRTC. The Minister emphasised that all the previous 
efforts to overhaul the PRTC had failed to produced the desired results. He repeatedly said 
that the government is fully alive to the people's transport problems, and will replace the 
present system with an appropriate transport system. The Punjab Assembly unanimously 
endorsed the dismantling of PRTC and a golden handshake scheme (redundancy payments) 
for its employees (The Nation, 10 June 1997). In July 1997, the PRTC buses were sold to the 
Transmobile, a Karachi-based transport company, through an open bid (Daily Jang, 27 July 
1997, and also see Appendix-6). 
5.5 Private Sector Services 
5.5.1 Stage carriage services 
1. Full size bus services: The private sector operates some full size buses with a capacity of 
52-60 seats. RTA data indicate that at the end of 1996, a total number of 326 route permits 
were issued to bus owners but there had been no increase in the number of buses during 
1989-95. The RTA has defined 20 routes in the north-east part of Lahore for these buses but 
operators have applied for only nine routes. The functioning of these buses, in particular 
compared with minibuses, has not been satisfactory, as the vehicles used are old and in 
deteriorating condition, having been passed on when retired from inter-city operation. Usually 
passengers are reluctant to travel on them because they are neither reliable nor comfortable. 
They tend to be used by longer-distance passengers who have baggage and enough time, and 
cannot afford higher fares. 
To combat growing problems of congestion and overcrowding, the RTA introduced minor 
modification within the existing regulations in association with the Lahore Urban Transport 
Project (LUTP) which commenced in May 1995 with the collaboration of private operators. 
This pilot project allowed the operation of full size buses on a few additional routes, along 
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major corridors in previously restricted areas. The buses used under this project were in 
relatively good condition (see Plate 5.4). Initially, the RTA provided some temporary 
protection for LUTP services from undue harassment of the traffic police, and temporary route 
permits were issued for 114 buses on specified routes. However in March 1996, the RTA 
granted permanent status to 7 routes for full size buses after examining their operation for 
about 9 months. Fares were the same as for other full size buses except for the student 
concessionary fare which was increased from Rs 0.25 to Rs 1.00. These full size buses were 
in competition with minibuses on the same routes. 
LUTP, operating essentially under the old regulatory regime, has not achieved its objectives. 
Improvements in service provision resulted but they were relatively minor. For instance, 
Khanzada (1996) reports that the LUTP services were efficient and reliable compared with 
full size bus services operating on other routes in Lahore. The following are the principal 
reasons given by operators and RTA officials for a little success of the project. First and 
foremost the RTA has not felt able to raise fares for services under the LUTP, which resulted 
in marginal profitability. Temporary route permits were issued to some inter-city operators 
who found they earned less revenue while operating on LUTP urban routes than they were 
earning previously. As a result, they withdrew buses and restarted operation on their old inter- 
city routes. Secondly, full size buses could not compete with the cowboy-style of driving and 
greater manoeuvrability of minibuses, and could not attract sufficient passengers on routes 
where minibuses were present in large numbers. Finally, the Commissioner who initiated this 
project was transferred from Lahore to another city, and the remaining RTA officials have not 
exerted efforts to improve or sustain it. However, two significant achievements of the project 
must not be overlooked. First, a shift in passengers'opinion has been observed. They are 
generally willing to travel on these full size buses whereas they have been reluctant to use 
full size buses in the past. Second, the improved operation of services under the LUTP has 
provided justification for permanent routes for full size buses in previously restricted areas 
(Russell and Anjum, 1996). More recently, the LUTP services have been reported to join 
gradually the services operated under an NGO control (see chapter 7, section 4.6). 
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Plate 5.3 A Volvo bus under the terminated PRTC operation 
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Plate 5.4 A full size bus under the LUTP operation 
2. Midibus Services: Privately operated midibuses (vehicles with 25-30 seats) were 
introduced in the early 1970s. In 1996,270 midibuses were operating on 11 routes. The 
operation of midibuses has steadily declined over recent years (Table 5.4). Most of the 
vehicles currently operating are again older models, in relatively poor mechanical conditions, 
notwithstanding the six-monthly checks which are supposed to be made by the MVE. 
3. Minibus Services: The public transport market in Lahore is dominated by minibuses 
(normally vehicles with 15-20 seats) and the operation of minibuses has grown steeply. The 
total number of minibuses increased at a rate of 17 percent per annum during 1979-85, before 
the RTA introduced the more restrictive conditions described above from 1985 onwards. 
Consequently the growth rate for minibuses fell to 6.7 per cent per annum during 1985-90. 
In addition to these restrictions, there existed a continuing requirement for a no objection 
certificate from the PRTC before a permit was issued to a private operator. In effect PRTC 
enjoyed a power of veto. PRTC used the power of veto over routes for its own operation, but 
the exercise of this power has now ended as it is no longer existing (see section 5.4). Despite 
the tighter restrictions on permits from 1992, the number of minibuses operating in the city 
has again grown rapidly over the last few years (Table 5.4). 
There are presently 63 RTA defined routes for the operation of minibuses. However, only 45 
have been taken up by the operators with no applications for the remainder. It is said that 
these routes are not profitable and/or not suitable for minibus operation. From an analysis of 
the permits issued, six routes are fully subscribed (250 permits per route), for which no more 
permits are to be issued, while there is an average of 82 permits across the other 39 operated 
routes. 
The fully subscribed routes are on the main arterial roads, such as Multan Road, Ferozepur 
Road, and G. T Road (Figure 5.4), while routes in the high-density areas with a poor road 
network (eg north of Railway Station, and west of the secretariat) and cross-town routes in 
the south are not considered commercial propositions. Private operators were not consulted 
in defining the route network, so that one-third of the routes defined by the RTA are not 
operated, and many areas are not properly served because of the inadequacies of the network. 
The operators, in their in-depth interviews conducted by the researcher in 1996, emphasised 
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that if they had been consulted in formulating the route alignments, no route would have been 
left un-operated. 
4. Suzuki Services: A similar picture applies to suzuki operation. Stage carriage services by 
suzukis were permitted in 1979 on 18 routes, but only nine routes were taken up. These small 
vehicles operate on shorter-distance routes with average route length of eight km. The official 
capacity of these vehicles is 10 seats, and they are suitable for areas with narrow streets or 
where passenger demand is low. In 1996, suzukis were operating on only three routes out of 
19 defined by the RTA. The primary reason for such limited operation is again the fare and 
route structure regulations. 
Table 5.4 illustrates trends in the provision of private stage carriage services. 
Table 5.4 : Private stage carriage provision in Lahore (in vehicles) 
Year Full Size Bus Midibus Minibus Suzuki 
1979 100 - 609* 
25 
1985 179 80 1238 362 
1989 260 568 1621 213 
1990 260 499 1651 225 
1991 260 383 2179 253 
1992 260 369 2731 240 
1993 260 381 2860 243 
1994 260 270 4631 287 
1995 260 270 4813 289 
1996 326 270 4781 289 
Source: Data collected from the RTA Lahore in 1995 & 1996 
* Includes midibuses 
160 
5.5.2 Structure of private bus industry 
A significant feature of the private sector operation in urban areas of Pakistan including 
Lahore is that there is no large scale bus operator. Most of the owners have one or two buses. 
This results in excessive competition to acquire route permits on the busiest routes where 
there are large number of passengers. As a consequence, there is inadequate or practically no 
service on the less profitable routes, and the prime routes are the subject of adverse and ugly 
competition. 
Generally it is considered that most individual buses and minibuses are owned and operated 
by the same person or persons (drivers and conductors) in Pakistani cities. However, evidence 
gathered from Lahore suggests this is true in case of full size buses, but less true in case of 
minibuses because only about 30 percent of minibuses were found to be owned and operated 
by the same persons. About 10-15 percent of minibuses are owned by operators having more 
than one minibus. Some operators or "keepers" purchase vehicles using funds borrowed from 
money lenders. Most "keepers", even with old vehicles, are therefore in debt. Money lenders 
insist that vehicles be registered under names they choose. They normally use bogus names, 
preferring not to use their own names for tax and other reasons. This is essentially a form of 
leasing although there is usually no written agreement between lender and keeper of the 
vehicle. 
It was also reported by the drivers to the researcher that about 40 percent of the minibuses 
operating in Lahore are owned by policemen. The policemen have not registered the vehicles 
against their own names but they have arranged surrogate owners. The Nation has reported 
that 50 percent of the owners of minibuses in Lahore are policemen/or their relatives (The 
Nation 27 June, 1997). 
Under this situation, there may be no legal owner but the money lenders and policemen are 
the de-facto owners. Money lenders repossess vehicles if the keeper falls behind in his 
payments. For obvious reasons, obtaining information about policemen or from money lenders 
is difficult, and therefore definite conclusions cannot be drawn about the true ownership 
structure of the industry. The RTA has no proper record of the formal ownership. 
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This fragmented structure of the private bus industry dictates reckless operating practices. 
Some of the drivers have to pay their monthly instalments to the lenders or daily fixed cash 
to operators, and some drivers know that owners of their vehicles are influential policemen. 
As a result, they are involved in racing to earn more revenue. They fearlessly disobey traffic 
signals and other norms of good road behaviour, as some of them are sure that they will not 
be booked for these traffic offences (The Nation 27 June, 1997). 
5.5.3 Cooperation among operators 
Operators frequently attempt to collaborate to limit entry and maintain fares. Such institutions 
are common in most LDCs. Associations are driven primarily by self interest. Some of the 
ways in which they may pursue that self-interest are in the public interest (Gwilliam and 
Scurfield, 1996). For example, in Buenos Aires, operating franchises are only granted to 
legally constituted cooperatives, who perform the function of planning, scheduling and 
controlling operations on their routes and they maintain a high quality of service (see chapter 
3, section 4.1). In Pakistan, the operators' associations work only for the interest of their 
members not for the public interest. Full size bus, minibus and suzuki operators' cooperation 
exists in the form of owners' unions/associations. The following owners'associations were 
working in Lahore in 1996. 
  Minibus owners'associations: A large number of minibus owners' associations are working 
in Lahore under different names. Each association is comprised of owners on particular 
routes. These associations are: (1) Local Minibus Federation (2) Bismillah Local Minibus 
Owners Federation (3) Cantt Minibus Owners Association (4) Ittefaq Lahore Minibus 
Association (5) Peoples Unity Owners Association (6) Ghausia Cantt Miniibus Federation (7) 
United Minibus Council. 
  There is only one association of full size bus owners; the Local Bus Owners Association. 
  Similarly there is a single association of suzuki owners; the Suzuki Owners Union. 
All these associations are registered under the Societies Act and primarily they look after the 
interests of their members, rather than the needs of the passengers. Their main function is to 
collect specified daily levies from each operator for the right to operate. These levies, which 
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amount to some 10 percent of revenue (TEPA, 1993), are used to provide the drivers and 
operators with a degree of immunity from officialdom and protect them from police action. 
As a consequence, most of the drivers and operators have no insurance, no road tax or driving 
licence. In addition, many of them have little regard for basic traffic laws. Each operator pays 
the association Rs 60/vehicle/day. The following are the specific aims of the associations: 
1. to liaise with Government, 
2. to foster cooperation between members, 
3. to appear in the court on behalf of operators/drivers 
4. to negotiate and lobby for fare increases 
Generally the management of terminals and dispatching of vehicles is not included in the aims 
of these associations and dispatching is organised separately for each bus or minibus route. 
Practices appear to vary, but in all cases timekeepers are present at both terminals of each 
route. These timekeepers are employed by a committee. The committee comprised of well 
reputed operators nominated by consensus of the operators of the specific route. When the 
timekeepers are absent, drivers apparently organise themselves. The timekeepers: 
a) dispatch vehicles in order of their arrival at the beginning of the day but with no 
scheduling; and 
b) are paid Rs 2-3 per each trip per each bus or minibus or suzuki. 
5.5.4 Contract carriage services 
Contract carriage is characterized by the variety of popular services it offers. These consist 
of taxis/yellow-cabs, autorickshaws, and tongas. Provision and use of these services have been 
growing over recent years, with the exception of tongas. Contract carriage services are also 
controlled by the RTA. Fares are officially determined by the Provincial Government. Current 
regulated fares and the growth of these services are presented in Table 5.5. 
1. Autorickshaws: These are the cheapest form of motorized contract carriage service. An 
autorickshaw is 3-wheel vehicle powered by a Vespa Scooter engine, which carries two 
passengers in a semi-open compartment and is fitted with a fare meter. Although officially 
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determined by the Provincial Government fares are generally bargained for with passengers, 
and there is weak control over fares. Both the PTA and RTA are responsible for keeping 
checks on fares in the city. However, the Secretary of the PTA says that the authority is too 
fully occupied with checking wagons in the city. So far as the rickshaw fares are concerned, 
he adds that passengers themselves prefer a negotiated fare, fearing that they would end up 
paying more travelling by a tampered meter. The tampered meter problem has never been 
dealt with effectively. 
Rickshaws are popular for short journeys, particularly when and where bus services are 
inadequate and unreliable. It is unlikely that rickshaws are used much for longer journeys 
because fares rise more steeply with distance than for bus or minibus. The number of 
rickshaws has grown rapidly, doubling in the last 15 years. To operators the rickshaw has 
been a more attractive proposition than conventional taxis, until recently. 
Table 5.5 : Contract carriage services in Lahore 
Type of mode Fare (Rs/km) No. of vehicles 
1979 1996 1979 1990 1996 
Taxi/yellow cab 1.20 5.00 450 483 3021 
Auto-rickshaw 0.80 2.00 5000 7317 10842 
Tonga 0.25 1.00 4300 4040 4040 
Sources: (data collected): Fares from PTA, 1996 
M. vehicles from RTA Lahore, 1996 
Tongas from MCL, 1996 
2. Taxi/yellow cabs: Taxi/yellow cabs provide higher quality service and are popular for 
longer distances because cabs carry four passengers and then become cheaper than rickshaws 
in cost per head. The RTA has no policy to limit the number of taxis and the yellow cabs are 
very frequently used by residents of the more affluent southern areas of Lahore, because of 
their efficiency, comfort, privacy and reliability. Yellow cabs have provided comfortable and 
efficient services primarily because the vehicles are new and some are fitted with air- 
conditioners (with a premium fare of Rs 6/km). Despite comparatively high fares yellow cabs 
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are now posing a serious challenge to auto-rickshaws, as illustrated by the growth in use since 
their introduction in 1992 (Table 5.5). Their introduction was subsidized through a cheap loan 
scheme for new vehicles, which has now been withdrawn, and it has to be seen whether the 
quality of the services will be maintained by the operators. 
3. Tongas (horse-drawn carts): These have traditionally operated up to five km from the 
central walled city and in peripheral areas, offering low fare scheduled or taxi type services 
in areas with poor road conditions that are difficult to serve by other modes. The MCL is 
authorised to issue operating permits and to fix the rate of fares for non-motorized public 
service vehicles (LGO, 1979: Section 85). In practice the MCL usually do not fix fares and 
tonga drivers themselves determine the fares for their own routes. Being a slow moving 
vehicle the tonga contributes to overtaking movements and traffic congestion, particularly on 
main roads. On some important roads their operation has been prohibited, and the 
Government has a policy to limit the number of congas in the central area of the city. 
Consequently, the number has been stagnant at 4040 tongas over the last 10 years. However, 
the overall number of tongas in the entire LMA has grown from 9000 in 1980 (Jenkins, 1982) 
to 15000 in June, 1995 (RTA, 1995). This growth may suggest that public transport (bus) 
services are inadequate in peripheral areas as well. 
5.6 Evidence on Demand from Household surveys 
Household surveys were conducted in two distinct areas with different income groups, 
namely: Jauhar Town and Baghban Pura. In total, about 1400 persons (above 5 years age) 
were interviewed from 220 households. These surveys were carried out in November 1996. 
Jauhar Town: It is located along the Canal Road in the southern part of Lahore where a 
large number of private and public sector planned housing schemes have been developed. 
Most of these schemes are of low density and accommodate middle and high income families. 
Jauhar Town was launched by the LDA in 1980s. The town has been developed into two 
phases. Infrastructural development in phase-I was carried out by the LDA and completed by 
the end of 1980s. In total 8972 residential plots were allocated in Phase-I and about 30 
percent of the houses have been built and occupied. However, house building in Phase-II is 
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at low pace. Jauhar Town phase-I was selected for conducting the household survey. This area 
is typical of the planned housing schemes in the southern area, which are inadequately served 
by public transport services operating along Canal Road. 
Baghban Pura: It is located in the north-east part of Lahore, and falls between G. T Road and 
Bund Road. This area is characterised as high density (114 persons/hectare), poor and 
congested road network, mostly with unplanned and illegal residential land subdivision, and 
accommodating predominantly low income families. A majority of the RTA designated public 
transport routes in this area are not operated. Only areas adjacent to G. T Road are served by 
minibuses and in some parts of the area some suzuki and tonga services are provided. The 
remaining area has no public transport at all. This area is typical of the old and congested 
areas Of the city which accommodate mostly lower income groups. 
The field work was organised in the following manner. A map of Jauhar Town was obtained 
from the Town Planning Wing of LDA (Figure 5.6), and for the Baghban Pura area, the map 
printed by Feroz Sons was used (Figure 5.7). Then a pilot survey was conducted by the 
researcher in both areas to test the applicability of the household questionnaire drafted in 
Edinburgh. The questionnaire was slightly amended in the light of the pilot. The amendments 
included adjustments to household income categories and travel expenditure categories. 
Later, five final year students from the Department of City and Regional Planning were 
requested to assist in conducting household surveys. So a team of six persons headed by the 
researcher was formed to carry out the household survey in Lahore. The research assistants 
were trained about the various aspects of survey. The training included; briefing about the 
questionnaire, translation of questions into Urdu and Punjabi, how to introduce the research 
and the purpose of the survey, and how to start and end the interview. 
Selecting households to be interviewed in Jauhar Town was easy but in Baghban Pura was 
a complicated process. In Jauhar Town, residential plots varying in size (72 square meters to 
420 square meters) are planned in different housing blocks. Generally, the households with 
higher income have constructed houses on larger plots and the households with lower income 
have constructed houses on smaller plots. The plan of Jauhar Town was used and the 
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households were selected randomly with different plot categories from different blocks in 
order to cover all income groups. However in Baghban Pura and its adjacent areas, it was 
impossible to interview pre-selected households since these areas are unplanned. An attempt 
was made to get an appropriate sample by identifying different housing clusters comprising 
various income groups. Then the households were randomly selected for interview, but was 
not possible to be sure how representative the sample is of income groups. However, the 
survey results are in line with the results of the household survey conducted by the 
consultants of JICA in 1990 (JICA/TEPA, 1991). 
Interviews were conducted in afternoons and on week ends in order to interview all members 
of the households. Some information was obtained from the `head' of the household such as 
number of vehicles owned by the household members, household income and travel 
expenditure. Consensus views of the household members were recorded about existing and 
future use of public transport services and the preferences given to various aspects of service 
quality. However, individual views were recorded where there were divergences of views or 
interest in services, for example concerning, work and education trips. 
Although many household members of Jauhar Town were familiar with English they opted 
that the questions should be asked in Urdu. In Baghban Pura, majority of the households 
preferred that interview should be conducted in Punjabi. The interviews were therefore carried 
out in Urdu and Punjabi and even in English (very few) to allow the interviewees to express 
their ideas in the way they found most effective. The research assistants handed over the 
completed survey forms to the researcher. The researcher checked the survey forms and made 
sure that they were filled properly. 
5.6.1 Household survey in Jauhar Town 
1. Composition of households 
The composition of households is presented in Table 5.6. Survey results indicate there were 
691 persons living in the 110 households interviewed, with an average household size of 6.3 
persons. Of the total household members, 55 percent were male and 45 percent female, with 
10 percent less than 5 years old. Thirty one percent members were working including 33 
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helpers who work at home, with an average about 2 persons per household. Fifty nine percent 
of the members were non-working including 188 (27%) students. In total, 404 (65% of the 
potential trip makers) members regularly made trips. 
Table 5.6 : Composition of households 
Number Total Less than 5 5 years & above 
Sex 
years old Working Non- 
working 
Male 378 55 % 36 186 156 
Female 313 45% 34 30 249 
Total 691 100% 70 10 % 216 31 % 405 59 % 
2. Vehicle ownership 
All the households surveyed in the Jauhar Town owned motor vehicles. The distribution of 
vehicles owned is presented in Table 5.7. Car ownership was predominant with 75 percent 
of the households owning cars, with 15 households owning two cars. Sixty percent of the 
households had motorcycles, with 9 households owning 2 motorcycles. There were 26 percent 
of households who owned bicycles in addition to motor vehicles. 
Table 5.7 : Distribution of vehicles owned by the households 
Vehicles owned No of 
households 
Percentage* 
Car 82 75 
Motorcycle 66 60 
Bicycle + motor vehicle 29 26 
Car + motorcycle 31 28 
Miscellaneous 2 2 
rercentage or yl nousenolas 
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3. Household income 
The distribution of the household monthly incomes is presented in Table 5.8. It can be clearly 
seen that most of the households in this area are from middle and high income groups, as 56 
percent of the households had monthly incomes in the range of Rs 5000 to 10,000 with 38 
percent of the households having monthly incomes of more than Rs 10,000. Only 3 percent 
of the households reported monthly incomes up to Rs 5000. The average income of a 
household, in this area is estimated at Rs 10,235 per month, which is high when compared 
with the average income of a household in urban areas in Pakistan i. e Rs 6,114 per month in 
1996. The income figure for 1996 is estimated by the researcher on the basis of an average 
income of a household in urban areas Rs 3,701 per month in 1990-91 (GoP, 1995a), 
considering 3.6 percent an average annual growth in of economy during 1991-96 and by 
adjusting the inflation. 
Table 5.8 : Distribution of household monthly income 
Income (Rs) No of households Percentage 
5000 3 3 
5001-10000 61 56 
10001-15000 28 26 
15001-20000 9 8 
Over 20000 5 4 
No response 4 3 
Total 110 100 
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4. Monthly travel expenditure 
Table 5.9 shows that monthly travel expenditure of the households in this area is very high. 
The average reported monthly travel expenditure of a household is estimated at Rs 1290. 
Forty six percent of the households spend in the range of Rs 500-1000 on travel and 26 
percent of the households have a travel expenditure in the range of Rs 1000-2000 per month. 
Twenty two percent of the households spend over Rs 2000 on travel. 
Table 5.9 : Distribution of monthly travel expenditures 
Expenditure (Rs) No of households Percentage 
500-1000 51 46 
1001-2000 29 26 
2001-3000 13 12 
3001-4000 4 4 
Over 4000 7 6 
No response 6 6 
Total 110 100 
5. Main mode of travel of household members by trip purpose 
Table 5.10 presents the distribution of mode of travel of household members by their purpose. 
Majority of the total trips (54%) were being made by car and taxi largely for social (33%), 
shopping (27%), and recreational (25%) purposes. Two-wheelers were used for 22 percent of 
the total trips, mainly for shopping (34%), social (22%) and work (17%) purposes. Fifteen 
percent of the total trips were made by bus services (including institutional buses) largely for 
education (40%) and shopping (28%) and work purposes (14%). Walking was not a common 
means of transport in this area. Only 9 percent of the trips were made on foot for different 
purposes with no work trips within the area. 
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Table 5.10 : Main mode of travel of household members by trip purpose 
Purpose Main mode of travel 
Walk 2-wheelers Car/taxi Bus 
Work - 68 (17) 79 (8) 36 (14) 
Education 22 (14) 41 (11) 23 (3) 102 (40) 
Shopping 41 (26) 132 (34) 235 (25) 70 (28) 
Social 84 (54) 83 (22) 309 (33) 31 (12) 
Recreation 4 (3) 47 (12) 257 (27) 11 (4) 
Other 5 (3) 15 (4) 33 (4) 6 (2) 
Total 156 (9) 386 (22) 936 (54) 256 (15) 
6. Reasons for not travelling in public transport 
An overwhelming majority of the household members were not using public transport at all. 
Consensus views of the household members were obtained as to why some of them were not 
using public transport. Forty six percent of the households provided multiple reasons as 
illustrated in Table 5.11. Fifty percent of these households did not travel in public transport 
since their members were either using their own vehicles or institutional vehicles, and 7 
percent of the households were travelling by other modes such as contract carriages. About 
one third of the households complained that the public transport is inadequate. Only 11 
percent of the households did not like to travel by minibuses and buses because they could 
afford private vehicles. 
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Table 5.11 : Reasons for not travelling in public transport 
Reasons No of 
responses 
Percentage 
Inadequate public 
transport 
52 32 
Own vehicles 60 37 
Don't like to travel by 
buses/minibuses 
18 11 
Institutional buses 20 12 
Other 11 7 
Total 161 100 
7. Satisfaction with the provision of public transport 
None of the households interviewed was satisfied with the provision of public transport with 
the exception of three who gave no opinion as they had newly moved in this area. Table 5.12. 
presents the reasons for their dissatisfaction. 
Table 5.12: Reasons for not being satisfied with the public transport 
Reasons No of responses Percentage 
Inadequate services 52 38 
Long walking 
distance to bus stop 
47 34 
Buses are not reliable 28 20 
other 11 8 
Total 138 100 
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8. Inadequacy of bus services 
The complaint about inadequacy of bus services was further clarified from the households. 
The households regarded bus services as inadequate on the grounds either of deficient route 
network or of poor quality services. Half of the households stated that bus services did not 
serve their destination and the area they live in. Half of the households cited poor quality 
services such as no timetables, limited number and bad quality of vehicles in use (Table 5.13). 
Table 5.13: Inadequacy of bus services 
Indicator No of households Percentage 
Don't serve destination 33 19 
Don't serve the area of 
residence 
51 30 
No timetable 43 25 
In-frequent 35 20 
Bad vehicle quality 11 6 
Total 173 100 
9. Intention to use public transport 
Table 5.14 shows that 83 percent of the surveyed households stated an intention to use public 
transport if it was adequately provided with 6 percent of households uncertain about using 
public transport. Twelve percent of households would continue to use their own vehicles and 
considered that these are quicker, more convenient and comfortable than any form of public 
transport and sufficient for the travel needs of their family members. 
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Table 5.14 : Intention to use public transport 
Response No of 
households 
Percentage F 
Yes 91 83 
No 13 12 
Don't now 6 6 
Total 110 100 
10. Intended use of public transport 
The purpose of households intended to use public transport is shown in Table 5.15. A 
majority of the households, 79 percent, reported they would use public transport for shopping 
purposes and 73 percent of households for work trips. Sixty five percent of the households 
would consent for their children to use public transport to and from their educational 
institutions. 
Table 5.15: Intended use of public transport 
Purpose No of 
households 
Percentage* 
Shopping 72 79 
Work 66 73 
Education 59 65 
Social 23 25 
Other 6 6 
* Percentage of 91 households 
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11. Intention to use better quality services at higher fares 
An overwhelming majority (92 per cent) of the households intending to use public transport 
were also prepared to pay higher fares for better quality services (Table 5.16). 
Table 5.16 : Intention to use better quality services at higher fares 
Response No of 
households 
Percentage 
Yes 84 92 
No 5 6 
Don't now 2 2 
Total 91 100 
12. Choice to use various types of bus services 
In 1996, fares for full size buses and minibuses from Jauhar Town to Anarkali were Rs 4 and 
Rs 5 respectively. A question was asked from respondents about the use of various type of 
better quality bus services at higher fares, i. e for full size buses (Rs 6) and minibuses (Rs 8) 
from Jauhar Town to Anarkali. No suzuki service was operating in that area, but willingness 
to use better quality suzuki as a feeder service, with fares Rs 2 from Jauhar Town to Niazbeg, 
was inquired. The responses are presented in Table 5.17. Ninety five percent of the 
households supported the use of minibuses at the given fares but 5 percent of households 
questioned why fares are more for minibuses than full size buses. Eighty eight percent of the 
households also showed their willingness to use full size buses at higher fares but 12 percent 
did not like to travel in these buses as they considered them slower than minibuses. Fifty 
seven percent of the households favoured the use of suzuki as a feeder service whereas 43 
percent disliked to travel in suzukis because they are very slow, their seating arrangement is 
not convenient, and the vehicles are not impressive (see chapter 6, Plate 6.3). 
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5.17 : Choice to use various types of better quality bus services 
Service Responses (percentage) 
Yes No 
Full size bus 88 12 
Minibus 95 5 
Suzuki 57 43 
Total no 
respondents 
84 
13. Importance of various aspects of a transport service 
The importance given to various aspects of a transport service by the potential users is 
presented in Table 5.18. The majority of the households regarded a guaranteed seat and a 
timetable as the most and second most important aspect of a service. Hours of operation, 
service frequency and fares were of less concern to the respondents. The lowest ranking of 
fares again reflects willingness and ability to pay. 
Table 5.18 : Rank order of importance of various aspects of a transport service 
Service Importance 
711 
aspect 
I II III IV V Total 
Guaranteed 
seat 
76 8 - - - 84 
Timetable 6 54 11 9 4 84 
Hours of 
operation 
- 10 39 28 7 84 
Service 
frequency 
2 12 32 30 8 84 
Fares - - 2 17 65 84 
Total 84 84 84 84 84 - 
Note: I to V indicates rank order of importance given by the households 
176 
5.6.2 Household survey in Baghban Pura 
1. Composition of households 
The composition of households from the survey sample of Baghban Pura is presented in Table 
5.19. There were 911 persons living in 110 households. Of the total household members, 56 
percent were male and 44 percent were female, with 15 percent are less than 5 years old. 
Twenty six percent members were working with an average of over 2 persons per household. 
Fifty nine percent members were non-working including 212 (23%) students and school 
children. In total, 336 (about 44% of the potential trip makers) members regularly made trips. 
Table 5.19 : Composition of households 
Number Total Less than 5 5 years & above 
Sex 
years old Working Non-working 
Male 51156% 72 221 218 
Female 40044% 71 3 326 
Total 911 100% 1 1 143 15% 224 26 % 544 59 % ýjl 
2. Vehicle ownership 
Most of the households did not own motor vehicles. Table 5.20 presents that one in four 
households had no vehicle at all and the majority of the households (77 percent) owned 
bicycles. Nine percent of the households had other vehicles such as a suzuki or a tonga. None 
of the surveyed households owned a car in this area. 
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Table 5.20 : Vehicle ownership by the households 
Vehicle owned No of 
households 
Percentage 
None 27 25 
Motorcycles 32 30 
Bicycles 85 77 
Miscellaneous 10 9 
Total 110 
3. Household income 
The distribution of the household monthly incomes is presented in Table 5.21. It can be seen 
that most of the households (61%) in this area were from lower income groups with monthly 
incomes of up to Rs 5000. Thirty six percent of the households had monthly incomes of more 
than Rs 5000. The average income of a household in this area was estimated at Rs 4480 per 
month, which is low when compared with the estimated average income of a household in 
urban areas in Pakistan i. e Rs 6,114 per month. 
Table 5.21 : Distribution of household monthly incomes 
Income (Rs) No of households Percentage 
Up to 3000 39 36 
3001-5000 28 25 
5001-7000 17 15 
Over 7000 23 21 
No response 3 3 
Total 110 100 
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4. Monthly travel expenditure 
As the respondents in this area were from low and middle income groups so their monthly 
travel expenditure was low compared with the southern area. The average reported travel 
expenditure of a household was estimated at Rs 367 per month. Thirty nine percent of the 
households spend less than Rs 300 on travel and 31 percent of the households spent over Rs 
500 on travel (Table 5.22). 
Table 5.22: Distribution of household monthly travel expenditures 
Expenditure (Rs) No of households Percentage 
Up to 300 43 39 
301-400 18 16 
401-500 15 14 
501-600 12 11 
Over 600 22 20 
Total 110 100 
5. Main mode of travel of household members by trip purpose 
Table 5.23 shows the distribution of mode of travel of household members by their trip 
purpose. Walking was a common mode in this area. Forty two percent of the total trips were 
made on foot for different purposes including largely for shopping (28%), education (27%) 
and work places (17%). Thirty percent of the total trips were reported by bus services largely 
for social (62%), recreational (14%) and work purposes (13%). Tongas were also used for 15 
percent of the total trips, mainly for social trips (60%). Two-wheelers were used for 9 percent, 
largely for work (38%) and social purposes (33%), and taxi trips (only 4 percent) were made 
on certain occasions largely for social and recreational purposes. 
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Table 5.23 : Main mode of travel of household members by trip purpose 
Purpose Main mode of travel 
Walk 2-Wheelers Car/taxi Bus Tonga 
Work 143 (17) 68 (38) 2 (2) 77 (13) 16 (6) 
Education 217 (27) 20 (11) - 12 (2) - 
Shopping 222 (28) 15 (9) 2 (2) 51 (9) 47 (16) 
Social 182 (22) 58 (33) 55 (68) 358 (62) 174 (60) 
Recreation 51 (6) 16 (9) 23 (28) 81 (14) 53 (18) 
Total 815 (42) 177 (9) 82 (4) 579 (30) 290 (15) 
Note: percentages of column total are from the total trips made by all members 
6. Reasons for not travelling in public transport 
An overwhelming majority of the household members were not using public transport at all. 
Consensus views of the household members were obtained as to why some of them were not 
travelling in public transport. Thirty four percent of the households gave multiple reasons as 
illustrated in Table 5.24. Fifty nine percent of the household members did not travel in public 
transport since their area was not linked with route network. Fifteen percent of the households 
did not feel the need to use any transport as most of their activities were closely located. Six 
percent of the households complained that the available public transport (suzuki service) was 
always overloaded. None of the households quoted as a reason that they could not afford to 
use public transport. 
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Table 5.24: Reasons for not travelling in public transport 
Reason No of 
households 
Percentage 
Area not linked with route network 96 59 
Own vehicles 26 16 
Institutional bus 2 1 
Suzukis overloaded 10 6 
Living close to their activities 25 15 
Other 4 3 
Total 163 100 
7. Intention to use public transport 
Table 5.25 shows that 89 percent of the surveyed households intended to use public transport 
if it was adequately provided, while 11 percent of households did not intend to use it because 
they were living close to relatives and their activities. 
Table 5.25 : Intention to use public transport 
Response No of 
households 
Percentage 
Yes 98 89 
No 12 11 
Total 110 100 
8. Intended use of public transport 
The various purposes of households intending to use public transport are shown in Table 5.26. 
An overwhelming majority of the households intended to use public transport for social and 
work purposes. Seventy four percent of households indicated they would allow their children 
to use public transport to and from their educational institutions, and 52 percent of the 
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households intended to use public transport for shopping. Nine percent of households would 
use public transport for other purposes such as to attend government offices. 
Table 5.26 : Intended use of public transport 
Purpose No of 
households 
Percentage 
Work 87 89 
shopping 51 52 
Education 72 74 
Social 88 90 
Other 9 9 
Total 98 
9. Willingness to pay increased fares for better quality services 
An overwhelming majority (94%) of the households intending to use public transport were 
also prepared to pay increased fares for better quality services (Table 5.27). 
Table 5.27 : Willingness to pay higher fares for better quality services 
Response No of 
households 
Percentage 
Yes 92 94 
No 6 6 
Total 98 100 
10. Choice to use different bus services at increased fares 
No public transport service was directly operating in this area in 1996. However, government 
fixed fares for full size buses, minibuses and suzukis from Baghban Pura to Railway Station 
were Rs 2, Rs 2.5 and Rs 1.5 respectively. A question was asked from the respondents about 
their choice to use various types of bus services at increased fares, i. e for full size buses (Rs 
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3), minibuses (Rs 3.5) and suzukis (Rs 2.5) from Baghban Pura to Railway Station. The 
choices of the households are presented in Table 5.28. A majority of the households (61%) 
reported their choice to use suzukis owing to their proposed lower fares, quicker loading 
because of their lower seating capacity and the vehicles being suitable for the area, whereas 
39 percent of households disliked to use suzukis because they are not suitable for ladies. 
Twenty one percent of the households showed their willingness to use minibuses as these are 
quicker than other modes, but 79 percent of the households did not like to use minibuses at 
increased fares. Only 12 percent of the households reported their choice to use full size buses 
and 88 percent considered that roads were not favourable for full size bus operation. There 
were also 19 percent of the households who were willing to use any of these services at 
higher fares. 
Table 5.28 : Choice to use different services at higher fares 
Service Response (percentage) 
Yes No 
Full size bus 12 88 
Minibus 21 79 
Suzuki 61 39 
Any 19 - 
Total no of 
households 
92 
Note: Some respondents selected multiple services 
12. Importance of various aspects of a transport service 
The importance given to various aspects of a transport service from the potential users is 
presented in Table 5.29. The majority of the households were concerned about the provision 
of public transport rather than the quality of service. However, they considered the given 
aspects of a service in the following order of preference: service frequency, hours of 
operation, guaranteed seat, fares and a timetable. It is clear that rank order of preference for 
fares is low even in the low income area. 
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Table 5.29: Rank order of importance of various aspects of a transport service 
Service Importance 
aspect 
I II III IV V 
Guaranteed 
seat 
16 26 9 33 8 
Timetable - - 14 19 59 
Hours of 
operation 
28 22 31 - II 
Service 
frequency 
40 26 12 14 - 
Fares 8 18 26 26 14 
Total 92 92 92 92 92 
Note: I to V indicates rank order of importance given by the households 
5.6.3 Summary of survey findings 
Following is a summary of findings of household surveys conducted from two selected areas 
in Lahore. 
  An overwhelming majority of the potential users in both rich and poor areas were 
prepared to use better public transport services at higher fares. However, in Jauhar 
Town they were not willing to use better quality suzuki services as a feeder service. 
In Baghban Pura, a majority of the households were willing to pay higher fares for 
suzuki services and considered them suitable to operate in that area. 
 A majority of the households in Jauhar Town regarded a guaranteed seat and a 
timetable as the most important and understandably second most important aspects of 
a service. Respondents in Baghban Pura area were more concerned about the provision 
of public transport in the first place. Even in lower income Baghban Pura only about 
9 percent of households regarded fares as the most important aspect of a service. 
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  The survey shows that an overwhelming majority of the households in both areas 
intended to use public transport if adequate services were provided. In Jauhar Town 
use would be largely for shopping, work and education trips, whereas in the Baghban 
Pura area would largely be for social, work and education trips. 
  None of the households in either area was satisfied with the provision of public 
transport; complaining about the inadequacy of number of buses, deficient route 
network and poor quality of services in Jauhar Town, and the lack of any or 
inadequate provision of services in Baghban Pura area. 
  The average household size (8.3 persons) was larger in Baghban Pura compared with 
6.3 persons in Jauhar Town. However, the average number of working persons was 
almost same in both areas i. e 2 persons per household. 
  The survey shows that all the households interviewed in Jauhar Town own motor 
vehicles, and 75 percent of households had cars; whereas the vast majority of 
households did not own motor vehicles in Baghban Pura, but 77% had bicycles. 
 A majority of the household members in Jauhar Town used their own vehicles for 
work, shopping, social and recreational trips. Bus services were used by only about 
15 percent of the members. In Baghban Pura, most of the household members made 
trips on foot and used two-wheelers but about 30 percent used bus services, albeit they 
often have to walk for long distances to take the services. 
  Forty two percent of the household members in Baghban Pura area go on foot for 
various trips including 17 percent for their work, whereas in Jauhar Town only 9 
percent members go on foot for various trips and no one walks to their work place. 
This reflects the fact that Jauhar Town is far from work opportunities and other 
facilities. By contrast, these facilities are relatively at close or within the Baghban 
Pura area. 
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5.7 Resulting Public Transport Problems 
5.7.1 Inadequacy of services 
The quantity of public transport services is undoubtedly poor in Lahore and statistics confirm 
it to be so (Table 5.2). The 1996 survey shows that none of the households was satisfied with 
the provision of public transport; either in Jauhar Town or in the Baghban Pura area (section 
5.6.3 above). Ahmad (1996) also affirms quantity problems of public transport in the city. He 
attributes the lack of services to inadequate private or state owned fleets, the limited number 
of buses, a route network not based on origin and destination surveys, inadequate incentives 
to private sector operators, high import duties and provincial taxes on public transport 
vehicles. 
Private full size bus and midibus operations have not grown in line with the demand for 
public transport. The chief reasons are the regulatory restrictions imposed. Private full size 
bus routes have been restricted to only one part of the city until very recently. Midibuses have 
similarly been restricted to only a few routes. The low fare structure determined by the 
Provincial Government has led to marginal profitability. Uneconomic concessionary student 
fares are imposed and no compensating incentives or subsidies are provided. Since 
profitability is very low, the operators are not able to invest sufficiently in new vehicles, 
which has contributed to the very poor quality of operation. Vehicles are not replaced except 
when it is unavoidable and the mechanical condition of buses and midibuses is very poor and 
deteriorating. Moreover, owing to the unreliability and discomfort most passengers are 
reluctant to travel on these services, except for those who are captive users forced to trade 
off service quality against their transport costs (Asghar, 1994). 
Minibuses are most commonly used by passengers because they operate on the majority of 
the routes in Lahore. They also operate at very high speeds with high frequencies at some 
routes. Travel on minibuses is usually considered dangerous but passengers travel in these 
services as they have no alternative cheap public transport. The number of minibuses was 
significantly increased during 1991-94. The main reasons for this increase were the inadequate 
number of publicly owned services and the availability of large number of subsidised 
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minibuses under PMPTS (see chapter 4, section 7.2). Otherwise, most of the operators 
purchase second hand low quality vehicles from the market at low price. However, this 
tendency is declining due to the RTA's more restrictive route permit policies (see section 5.3). 
Moreover, operators have not been able to invest in new vehicles particularly due to low fares 
structure. As a result, the growth of minibuses have slowed down from 1995. If the present 
trend continues there is a likelihood that the declining number of minibuses would further 
aggravate capacity problems. 
There should be more successfully operated suzuki routes, because these vehicles are able to 
penetrate areas with a poor road network and their operation is also potentially suitable for 
low demand/low density areas of expansion. In theory the demand for this vehicle should 
have been greater in the large northern and western areas of Lahore, which are densely 
populated with a relatively poor road network, and there are many peripheral low-density 
areas which could also benefit from small capacity services. In practice the number of suzukis 
grew to 362 in 1985, then gradually decreased with a partial recovery over the last few years. 
The main reason for their limited operation is the fare and route structure regulations. In 
addition, suzukis are not a preferred mode of travel because of the tight seating arrangement, 
which is seen as particularly unsuitable for females. 
5.7.2 Poor quality of services 
Quality of service is undoubtedly poor in Lahore. Service frequency and reliability is very low 
for those who do not live near the route termini because buses do not generally leave until 
they are full. Drivers often do not complete the specified route, and tend to disappear in bad 
weather. Waiting times are often long away from the route terminal, and severe overloading 
is commonplace. Part of the problem however is that the existing buses are poorly utilised. 
There is usually no scheduling, and the buses spend a large proportion of the time stationary 
(wanting to fill up) in long queues at the terminals, providing no service to passengers. 
Passengers are not sure about the hours of operation. 
The extreme conditions of discomfort are obvious. Ahmad (1996) states that the main 
problems of public transport in Lahore are: services of poor standards, uncomfortable, 
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irregular and unreliable. In common with most developing cities, overcrowded services is the 
norm in the Pakistani cities. Officially no standing passengers are allowed by regulation, but 
gross overloading is in fact common practice, with no effective enforcement (Plate 5.7). 
Routinely passengers are crammed into the buses, or they hang onto the outside, and then 
encounter an erratic journey in a road environment which is heavily polluted. Only young fit 
males are likely to travel on the bus services under these conditions. 
Generally the elderly and women are constrained to use expensive modes (if they can afford 
to) due to the shortcomings of public transport. Women travelling in available public transport 
are vulnerable. Waleed (1996) states that the passengers, especially women, are facing 
innumerable difficulties on their way to educational institutions, shopping, offices and other 
work places. UNDP (1996) also reports that the number of females in the labour force has 
increased, but safe means of transportation to facilitate their mobility has been neither 
increased nor improved in Lahore. The travel problem of females is also realised in other 
cities in Pakistan. For instance in Rawalpindi-Islamabad, the authorities started a separate 
women transport service on one route in 1997 (see Appendix-6). 
The PRTC services no longer exist and there is a limited growth in large bus services, but 
minibus services continue to grow rapidly (see Table 5.4). Overall journey speeds are faster 
than for larger buses, and occupancy is high throughout the day. There are arguments against 
minibuses in that they contribute to congestion in situations where demand would support 
large buses. In addition, other aspects of the quality of service provided by minibuses are not 
satisfactory, because there are no timetables to which drivers must adhere, and there is no 
control over the regularity of service. Drivers frequently operate irregularly and hold back 
their vehicles in order to get a bigger load. Route frequency is organized by the operators 
without regard to standards of service. As a result, passengers face the problems of undefined 
first and last departure times, with very poor services during off peak hours and at night, and 
overcrowded services in peak periods. 
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Plate 5.7a Travel in minibuses in Lahore 
Plate 5.7b No luggage space in minibuses in Lahore 
The quality issue of the public transport is repeatedly highlighted in the local and national 
newspapers (Daily Jang, June 23,1996; Nawa-e-waqat, August 21,1995; Waqiat, August 9, 
1995). A passenger survey was conducted by the team of a daily newspaper at six bus 
terminal stations in September 1996. The survey reports that 55 percent of the passengers 
considered travel in bus services was uncomfortable and 45 percent complained about other 
aspects of service such as route shortening, delays at bus stops and overcharging etc (Nawa-e- 
waqat, September 20,1996). 
5.7.3 Spatial and social inequalities 
In Lahore, generally routes do not penetrate in many areas - notably low-income areas where 
roadways are often narrow/poorly maintained; routes are predominantly radial and there is no 
good provision for other journeys. Many lower-income groups live in less accessible or 
outlying areas in north-east Lahore and in general their employment sources are located in 
the business and industrial areas along main roads, in the Walled City, and in Government 
and other offices in the central area. As a result, the urban poor have to travel long journeys 
to work or to search for work. 
Conversely, most of the high and middle-income developments are relatively well served by 
the existing route network. At present, a large number of private minibus routes serve these 
areas and in the past the PRTC bus route network was also concentrated on these areas. 
Moreover, in rich localities like Iqbal Town/New Campus and Main Gulberg/Model Town, 
over 50% of the households have their own cars (JICA/TEPA, 1991). 
It is of the utmost importance that residential developments in an urban area should be within 
reasonable walking distance of public transport services providing access to other parts of the 
city. In the LDC context, the reasonable walking distance in dense and low-density urban 
areas has been recommended as 300-500 metres and 500-1000 metres respectively 
(Armstrong-Wright and Thiriez, 1987). The available public transport services are unevenly 
allocated across the city, both socially and geographically. Figure 5.8 highlights those parts 
of the built-up areas lying more than 500 metres in a straight line from the nearest route, and 
shows the new planned and unplanned urban developments located at the fringe. 
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Figure 5.8 Location of selected areas in Lahore 
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Area, inadequately served 
by the existing routes 
A summary of problems in areas inadequately served by the bus services is presented in Table 
5.30. It can be seen from this that some of the most densely inhabited areas are not 
adequately covered by bus routes. In addition, peripheral locations are not well networked 
with services. As a result of poor public transport provision, people choose alternative modes 
of transport. Table 5.31 shows, for instance, that Kirshan Nagar and Baghban Pura 
accommodate relatively low income groups3, yet they have a much larger share of bicycle 
and motorcycle trips (around 50%) compared with bus trips (around 15%) (JICA/TEPA, 
1991). The 1996 survey shows that an overwhelming majority of the household members in 
Baghban Pura were not using public transport at all. Fifty nine percent of the household 
members did not travel in public transport since their area was not linked with the route 
network (Table 5.24). The inadequacy of public transport services linking these areas means 
that the urban poor, even those able to afford public transport, are constrained to walk or 
cycle for long distances. The situation is even worse in Rawalpindi where 2/3 of the 
passengers have longer walking times than the maximum considered to be a reasonable level 
of service (GoP, 1995b). 
3. Shahdra and Niaz Beg are peripheral areas with low income groups but their location along 
major roads provides the residents an opportunity to also use intercity bus services. Densities 
are shown low because Niaz Beg has rural character and Shahdra includes flood plains. 
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Table 5.30 : Summary of problems in selected areas 
(see Figure 5.8 for location map) 
Name of areas Characteristics Nature of services Remarks 
Baghban Pura and High density, poor and congested Only G. T Road and its Suzukis can penetrate 
Shadbagh to the north road network, areas with 45% of the adjacent areas are served in these areas. Need to 
within the confines of total as Katchi abadis, mostly illegal by buses. Inadequate encourage suzuki 
protective bund land subdivisions, and dominated by services are provided by operation. 
low-income groups. Over 50% trips suzukis and tongas in 
are made by 2-wheel vehicles. some parts. Remaining 
Majority of the RTA designated areas have no public 
routes are not operated in these areas, transport. 
Krishan Nagar, Sanda High density areas relatively close to In the past the PRTC Needs restructuring of 
Kalan and its contiguous central area. Mostly accommodate buses used to operate in routes and introduction 
areas along with the low-income groups. About 60% trips the area but presently of traffic management 
western Bund Road are made by 2-wheel vehicles and suzukis operate along one measures. Private 
only 16% by bus services. Except for major road only. Taxi operators need financial 
a few wide roads, the overall road services and tongas are incentives through 
network is congested. used as substitute modes. increased fares. 
Minibus operators are not 
willing to operate owing to 
traffic congestion. 
North of cantonment on Medium density, unplanned newly Minibus services are Needs improvements to 
either sides of UBD canal developed settlements, not properly inadequate and distributer road network 
linked with approach roads. Generally overcrowded because of and allocation of suzuki 
accommodate low-income limited supply. Suitable routes in these areas. 
households. About 45% of vehicular areas for suzuki operation Also needs increase in 
trips are made by motorcycles and but routes are not defined fares. 
bicycles. for suzukis. 
Sabza Zar and its adjacent Low density, newly developed The inhabitants use bus For the time being the 
areas along Multan Road planned housing schemes, a large services along Multan suzukis could serve as 
number of unplanned colonies and Road, have to walk for feeders to Multan Road 
'trapped' villages. Fairly well long distances. The RTA bus services, subject to 
networked with wide roads. About defined route for minibus increases in fares. With 
35% trips are made by 2-wheel operation is not yet increased demand, 
vehicles and around 36% trips by bus operated because of low however, buses could 
services. demand and low fares. easily be introduced. 
Expansion areas: include Newly developed planned housing Areas are served with Needs forward route 
M. A Jauhar Town, schemes with low density. Mainly minibuses and a few planning and better 
Defence Housing Scheme, accommodate middle and high LUTP buses on through quality services with 
and a large number of income families, except for low- routes along main roads. premium fares. Small 
private housing income families in 'trapped' villages. capacity vehicles are 
developments Fairly well-planned road network, potentially profitable to 
About 60% of schemes are fully operate in these low 
serviced with infrastructure but density areas. 
limited house building partly 
influenced by non availability of 
public transport. 
Source: Russell and Anjum (1997a) 
193 
Table 5.31 : Density, income, and modal component in selected areas 
Density Household Percentage modal component of trips (walking omitted) 
Name of area 
(persons/ 
hectare) 
income 
(Rs/month) Bus Car Tonga/Taxi 2-wheel 
Walled City 266 3 412 40 25 5 30 
Shad Bagh 250 3 554 14 8 20 58 
Krishan Nagar 238 3 143 16 14 10 60 
Niaz Beg 51 3 514 36 18 11 35 
Baghbanpura 114 3 131 23 9 16 52 
Shahdra 32 3 039 45 4 6 45 
Township 75 4 832 20 30 3 47 
Cantonment-North 62 3 047 25 20 10 45 
Source: Data adapted from JICA/TEPA, 1991 
(Density is given for the population of 5 years old and above) 
Reasons for this spatial inequality in the provision of public transport in Lahore are non- 
operation of routes, fare regulation, inappropriate and deficient route definition and coverage, 
poor and congested road networks in some areas, the inability-to-pay of low-income groups, 
and the lack of suitable financial incentives for private sector operators. The relative 
importance and combination of these factors vary from area to area. A detailed analysis has 
been made in two distinct areas to identify their incidence and relative importance more 
closely (see section 5.6). 
5.7.4 Environmental degradation 
Apart from the general aspects of pollution which cause concern in every city of the world 
is traffic noise and vehicle emissions. Similarly in Pakistani cities, air pollution is principally 
caused by motor vehicle emissions. For instance a study conducted on air pollution in Lahore 
in 1983 reports that motor vehicles are major sources of hydrocarbons (89%), carbon 
monoxide (92.7%) and nitrogen oxides (63%). Fifty percent of total sulphur oxides emissions 
also come from motor vehicles (Tariq et al, 1983). The last decade has seen unprecedented 
growth in the number of motor vehicles in Lahore (see section 5.2.5). Traffic densities are 
high and vehicle speeds low, leading to a high level of emissions per unit distance travelled. 
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Due to environmental pollution (air, noise, water and solid waste), Lahore (once known as 
the city of gardens) has now become the city of problems. A high air pollution level (495 
micrograms per metre cube) is found in Lahore compared with other LDC cities; Dehli (448), 
Jakarta (230), Bangkok (153), Kuala Lumpur (151) and Tehran (130) (World Bank, 1992). 
Air pollution problems have been increasing over the past few years and are set to prevail in 
years to come. Lahore and other cities of Pakistan have three particular causes of increased 
pollution. These are the high usage of modified motorcycles and autorickshaws; the use of 
adulterated fuel; and poorly maintained vehicles. The motor vehicle fleet in Pakistan is much 
older than those in developed countries and less well maintained. As a result, the pollution 
caused by emissions is greater. According to the National Conservation Strategy estimate, an 
average Pakistani vehicle emits 20 times the hydrocarbons, 25 times the carbon monoxide and 
3.6 times the nitrous oxides (in grams per km) compared with the average vehicle in the 
U. S. A (GoP, 1991). 
Gwilliam (1997) indicated that public transport vehicles have been among the most polluting 
contributors in many of the developing countries. The vehicles produce large amounts of 
annoying diesel fumes because of poor maintenance, poor quality fuel and aggressive driving. 
The situation is similar in Pakistani cities where a large reliance is placed on buses, and to 
a lesser extent autorickshaws for urban transport, and emissions from both are heavily 
polluting due to the fuels used and the age, overloading and poor maintenance of vehicles 
(EPA/World Bank/ADB, 1993). There is a commonly felt concern that private sector operators 
are less concerned with environmental issues than the public sector. In Lahore, Traffic Police 
officials, in in-depth interviews with the researcher, stated that the engines of 95 percent of 
autorickshaws and 75 percent of wagons are not in order. Vehicle engines are not properly 
tuned and are rarely regularly serviced. An owner will wait until something goes seriously 
wrong with his vehicle before taking it into a workshop. One of the results is a high carbon 
monoxide and unburnt hydrocarbon content in the exhaust. On the other hand, the public 
transport operators, in their interviews with the researcher, alleged that substandard oil is the 
main cause of air pollution in the city. They further added that many oil filling stations sell 
substandard fuel. Regular petrol and diesel may have kerosene oil added to them as it is 
cheaper than petrol and diesel, and premium petrol may be blended with regular. 
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MVEs, in interviews conducted by the researcher, claimed that all public service vehicles are 
issued fitness certificates after a complete vehicle examination. However, they admitted that 
on recommendations from above (senior officials), some quality control conditions were 
relaxed when issuing fitness certificates to the LUTP buses. 
It was explained to the researcher by one of the MVEs in Lahore that the rickshaws are 
powered by two stoke engines which are badly maintained and which use an inferior quality 
of oil. The engines emit a lot of smoke and fumes and unburnt oil clogs the silencer. The 
silencer is, therefore, often modified or removed, leading to an increased noise output. He 
described that the present rickshaw engines are assembled by local manufacturers such as 
Rocket and Super Star rickshaw in Hyderabad, Pak Hero and Vicky Master rickshaw in 
Lahore. The quality of these locally assembled rickshaws is not good compared with imports. 
For instance, the 1979 model imported rickshaws emit less smoke than the brand new locals. 
The MVE further added that rickshaw drivers mix mobil oil in petrol to increase its viscosity 
(which helps to increase the power of engine) and then overload their rickshaws. As a result 
of more combustion, more smoke is emitted. 
There are three agencies responsible for keeping checks on smoke emitting vehicles operating 
in Lahore; namely the Traffic Police, the MVEs and the EPA. But there is an inherent 
unwillingness of government officials to take action against polluters. All the authorities seem 
too preoccupied with their other assignments. Traffic Police data show that 22.5 percent of 
vehicle bookings were made on pollution grounds out of a total 341,044 bookings made in 
1994. The latter figure is estimated at 0.58 booking per motor vehicle per annum which is 
very low in the wake of worsening air pollution in Lahore. The percentage of bookings on 
pollution grounds seems reasonable but the booking level for overall offences seems very low. 
5.7.5 Traffic congestion 
The rapid growth in motor vehicles in Lahore combined with ineffective and inefficient traffic 
management and weak enforcement have resulted in growing traffic congestion. Because of 
insufficient resources, and different priorities among law enforcers, the degree of enforcement 
has been minimal. Reasons for the scale of congestion problems include mix of motorised and 
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non-motorised traffic; encroachment onto the carriageway by traders; unruly behaviour of 
drivers; inadequate space assigned for bus stops; poor signing, road marking, dilapidated roads 
and the absence of traffic management measures; and the general lack of provisions for 
pedestrians (Plate 5.5 and 5.8). 
Illegal encroachments on all major roads, are a source of great distress to other road users. 
These are in the form of temporary shops on walkways forcing pedestrians onto carriageways, 
exhibition of goods within the carriageways, illegal road side parking and repair of vehicles 
on the roads. The existence of encroachments is a result of weak development control by the 
controlling agencies. The daily newspapers report that encroachers, hawkers, and even beggars 
in the city have to pay a certain percentage of their earnings to officials to stay in the 
business. A similar situation prevails in other cities of Pakistan. For instance, a study 
conducted by an NGO estimates that each month about 110 million rupees are extracted in 
bribes by various government officials from encroachers in the city of Karachi (Jillani, 1997). 
These encroachments have substantially reduced the road space and increased the congestion 
in the city of Lahore. 
There is a requirement that all new commercial/office buildings should have parking space. 
The builders are required to have one car parking space per 1000 sqft gross floor space of the 
buildings located in the city, and 500 sqft gross floor space of the buildings located in the 
outskirts. They are also required to give provision for one parking space for motorbike/scooter 
per 250 sqft and one bicycle parking space per 300 sqft gross floor space of their buildings 
(LDA, 1986). Generally builders have not been required to strictly observe these conditions. 
For instance, some builders along the Egerton Road and Jail Road have only provided half 
of the requisite parking space. The result is even more chaos on these roads mainly due to 
illegal on-street parking. 
Although TEPA has undertaken many road improvement schemes in Lahore but no traffic 
management scheme has been undertaken for an efficient operation of public transport (see 
section 5.2.4). As a result, the bus services are suffering from congestion and delays due to 
a lack of priority measures for buses. Most delays occur at bus stops and junctions rather than 
along running sections of roads. To deal with this problem, there is a dire need for the 
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introduction and enforcement of effective traffic management measures which give priority 
to public transport where appropriate. 
In Lahore the congestion problem is intensified by the uncontrolled behaviour of drivers and 
the laxity of licence holder requirements. Inappropriate activities by unruly drivers such as 
speeding, queue jumping, red light offences, and improper stopping and parking have 
aggravated traffic congestion problems. They also undermine the implementation of traffic 
management measures and increase transport problems in general. 
The minibuses themselves also contribute to the chaotic situation. This adds to the reasons 
why public transport services are generally not considered a reliable mode. The actions of 
minibus drivers are well described by a group of planning students in a project report in 1992: 
"Drivers of minibuses and wagons have been found to be engaged in racing and chasing and 
other undesirable practices. The majority showed a complete lack of consideration for other 
road users, particularly for pedestrians and cyclists, and a remarkable lack of awareness of 
the danger of their actions to their passengers.... Their practice is to rush for passengers right 
at the junction corner, and... without making a queue, the vehicles block the road for other 
modes and result in chaotic and hazardous conditions at junctions. Moreover their habit to 
stop where they please or when their passengers demand, increases chances of conflict with 
pedestrians who are forced to walk on roads.... They overtake other vehicles on the nearside 
and tend to make no signals at all... They have been found to change sides of the road just 
before they arrive at a junction at which they wish to turn, and edge to the front by 
overtaking the stationary vehicles at the junction" (Hameed et al, 1992). 
A similar situation exists in other cities of Pakistan as well. In Multan for instance: "The 
small public service vehicles are today causing serious disturbances to traffic at their favourite 
stopping points in and near junctions, where competition for passengers can be observed. " 
(IDA/World Bank/MDA, 1990). 
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Plate 5.5a A lack of organisation for bus stops in Lahore 
Plate 5.5b A lack of organisation for bus stops in Lahore 
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Plate 5.6a A disorganised bus terminal in Lahore 
Plate ß. 61) A disorganised bus terminal in Lahore 
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Plate 5.8a Illegal parking in Lahore 
Plate 5.8b Illegal parking and turning in Lahore 
The following are the main problems that can be identified from the above situation: first, a 
lack of understanding on the part of most drivers of basic traffic rules; second, a general lack 
of planning control, that leads to encroachments of walkways and carriageway, and the 
construction of new developments without adequate provision of parking; third, the absence 
of, or sub-standard nature of traffic signals; fourth, a general lack of maintenance of the 
existing road infrastructure; fifth, inadequate provision of bus stops; sixth, the weak 
enforcement of on-street traffic regulation. 
5.7.6 Road safety 
Generally there is an insufficient and inadequate driver education and training in Pakistani 
cities including Lahore. Public transport drivers told the researcher that they learned driver 
training either from professional drivers or their relatives/friends. They got their first driving 
licence at the age of 19-25 years after appearing in the driving test. There were drivers who 
got a licence without appearing in the test, by paying bribes or by applying political influence. 
Generally, the public transport drivers do not have PSV licence (see section 5.3.3). 
A senior official of the Traffic Police stated to the researcher that a PSV licence is granted 
to drivers on the recommendations of a committee comprising senior officials of the PRTC, 
the RTA and the Traffic Police. He admitted that sometimes the procedure is violated, and 
licences are issued on the recommendations of transport associations or influential political 
leaders. He further stated that road safety in Lahore is poor but the Traffic Police is not alone 
responsible for this. Other agencies responsible for the enforcement of safety regulations are 
the RTA, the TEPA and the MVEs. 
Most of the road accidents in Pakistani cities, as elsewhere, occur due to the negligence of 
the road users. The NTRC analyzed reported accidents occurring (during 1986-87) in the 
provinces of Punjab, NWFP and Azad Jammu Kashmir. Out of total 344 accidents, 71 percent 
occurred due to speeding, 18 percent due to overtaking, 6 percent due to wrong turning and 
3 percent due to failing to stop vehicle at a stop sign/signal. Only 2 percent accidents 
occurred due to other reasons such as bad road surface condition (Khan, 1990). A high 
proportion of the accidents occurred in rural areas and on inter-city highways, where drivers 
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do not bother to obey speed limits. 
A study of road accidents in Islamabad in 1990, revealed that a primary cause was the 
negligence by the drivers in wrong turning and overtaking (Swati and Khan, 1990). The 
negligence of public transport drivers is partly attributable to excessively long working hours. 
Generally the drivers work long hours in a demanding street environment, for low wages; 
typically Rs 120-150 for a 14-hours shift. Usually they start their service operation at 6.0 am 
and finish at about 10 pm. 
The overloading of minibuses, which are sardine-packed with passengers during peak periods, 
adds to the dangers of travelling in these vehicles. The waiting passengers always try to board 
the bus arriving first. This is partly due to passengers' inability to predict the arrival of the 
next bus because timetables are not available. Minibus drivers seldom use the bay (where 
provided) for boarding and alighting passengers. Their vehicles then not only impede the flow 
of traffic, but also create difficulties and impose danger to passengers boarding and alighting 
(see Plate 5.5). 
The rate of deaths in road accidents in Lahore rose by 13.4 percent per annum between 
January 1992 and June 1996. During this period, 926 fatal and 1452 non-fatal accidents took 
place in Lahore and as many as 993 persons were killed and 2265 injured 
(Traffic Police, 
1996). Public service (passenger and goods service) vehicles are often involved in accidents. 
The Traffic Police data confirm that the accident rate for these vehicles is very high. In 1994, 
714 road accidents were recorded in Lahore. Of this total, 190 were fatal and 332 were non- 
fatal accidents, and in 192 accidents property was damaged. 191 persons were killed and 515 
were injured in these accidents. A breakdown of the type of vehicles involved in road 
accidents in Lahore is given in Table 5.32. The number of public service vehicles was only 
20 percent of the total motor vehicles (see section 5.2.6), but they were involved in 44 percent 
of the total accidents. Of these public service vehicles involved in accidents, the great 
majority were minibuses (72%). 
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Table 5.32 : Vehicles involved in road accidents in Lahore in 1994 
Vehicle involved 
in accidents* 
No of 
accidents 
Percentage 
Minibuses 228 32 
Other public 
service vehicles 
89 12 
Private vehicles 397 56 
Total 714 100 
Source: Data collected by the researcher from Traffic Police Lahore in 1995 
* Includes motorcycles but not bicycles 
Public service vehicles were involved in 85 percent of the total deaths in road accidents. Of 
these, minibuses were involved in 54 percent of the total deaths. Private vehicles in the same 
year, although 80 percent of the total motor vehicles, were involved in only 15 percent of the 
total fatalities in road accidents (Table 5.33). 
Table 5.33 : Types of vehicle involved and persons killed in Lahore in 1994 
Vehicle involved 
in accident 
No of persons 
killed in 
accidents 
Percentage 
Minibuses 86 40 
Other public 
service vehicles 
76 45 
Private vehicles 29 15 
Total 191 100 
Source: Data collected by the researcher from Traffic Police Lahore in 1995 
The analysis of the road accidents, discussions with Traffic Police, and personal observations 
results in the following conclusions related to the poor road safety record in Lahore. These 
are: insufficient and inadequate driver education and training, long working hours (12-16 
hours per day), bad driver/road user behaviour, and very selfish attitudes by all types of road 
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users, poor traffic management, and poor traffic supervision and control. 
5.8 Conclusions 
The current situation of public transport in Lahore demonstrates that the bus services are of 
low-quality, unsafe, unreliable, inefficient and inadequate to accommodate growing demand. 
The main reasons include the inappropriate regulatory control and planning of public 
transport. The RTA Lahore seems to address other problems at the expense of providing 
services. For instance, to ameliorate congestion, the RTA in the city simply imposed limits 
on the number of minibuses allowed to operate on certain routes, resulting in under provision 
and overcrowding. Meanwhile congestion problems require better traffic management, 
including bus priorities and the enforcement of traffic rules. 
Traffic congestion and poor road safety in Lahore are results of poor driver education and 
training, bad traffic behaviour of all road users, insufficient education and training of traffic 
and transport planners, inadequate traffic management and weak enforcement of quality 
controls and traffic regulations. 
Analysis of the existing situation in Lahore reveals that many allocated routes are not taken 
up by the operators because they are not considered profitable. As a result, many areas are 
either not served at all or are deficient in public transport services. Fare controls have been 
implemented without regard to the effects on operators' ability to provide services or to invest 
in and maintain vehicles. 
Investment in new public transport vehicles in Lahore is in consequence generally low. 
Private bus operation is financially unattractive, with an industry structure dominated by very 
small operators. The private sector is in no position to purchase new, and especially new full 
size, buses for urban operation. In the past the public sector was able on occasion to introduce 
new full size buses through foreign aid and purchase by Federal grants, but publicly owned 
services no longer operate. 
The household survey conducted in Lahore demonstrates the inadequacies of public transport 
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services, and household members dissatisfied with present service levels and their quality. The 
survey also indicates that there is a demand for better quality services at higher fares, from 
both wealthy and average household income areas. 
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Chapter 6 Public Transport In Faisalabad 
6.1 Introduction 
In the city of Faisalabad the government has channelled the regulation of public transport 
through the Faisalabad Urban Transport Society, a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) 
formed for this purpose. The Society started stage carriage services, with the active 
participation of local private operators, in 1994. It has assumed delegated responsibilities for 
the quantity, quality and fares regulation of services under its control. This chapter evaluates 
the overall public transport situation in this city with particular reference to the services 
offered and their effectiveness under the new form of regulation and control. The analysis is 
based primarily on the results (a) detailed discussions with officials of the Society (b) 
personal observations of the researcher (c) in-depth interviews conducted with government 
officials associated with public transport regulation, operators and passengers (d) public 
transport users surveys. In addition, secondary data sources have also been utilized. 
In section 2 background information and the current situation of public transport in the city 
of Faisalabad are presented. Section 3 provides an account of the formation, organisational 
structure, objectives, and operational characteristics of the Society. The regulatory regimes 
and their enforcement by the Society have been analyzed in section 4. Section 5 describes the 
vehicle ownership pattern, with categories of vehicle owners operating under the Society's 
control. The details and views of operators in each vehicle owner category are further 
illustrated with selected case studies in this section. In section 6 the analysis of the public 
transport user surveys is reported. This section compares user views about the stage carriage 
passenger services currently offered under two different regulatory regimes. The impact of 
regulation and enforcement on the performance and quality of services offered by the Society 
is evaluated in section 7. The final section presents the overall conclusions of the analysis. 
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6.2 The City of Faisalabad 
6.2.1 General presentation 
Faisalabad, previously known as Lyallpur, is one of the cities which was founded in the 
colonial period. It was built in a square form with eight bazaars radiating from the central 
clock tower. The city is located on the fertile plains of the Punjab (see chapter 4, figure 4.2) 
and well connected with the rest of the country by a network of air routes, railways and 
highways. It is now one of the fastest growing cities in Pakistan and is a large industrial 
centre. It plays a considerable role in the national economy. In terms of value added 
agriculture, Faisalabad district ranks third in the country (GoP, 1987). 
6.2.2 Socioeconomic characteristics 
Socioeconomic characteristics influence the number of trips generated in a city. A travel study 
of three Indian cities found that a 10 percent increase in household size was associated with 
a6 percent increase in household trip making (Fouracre and Maunder, 1987). In his travel 
study of Kumasi, Takyi (1991) has also suggested that increasing family size is associated 
with a greater likelihood of using public transport, though this is probably because most larger 
families have lower per capita incomes. 
The population of Faisalabad is increasing rapidly. This city set a record in the demographic 
history of Pakistan by registering a population increase of 508 percent during the period 1941- 
61. This increase was mainly due to influx of refugees from India and from the 
industrialization boom of the 1950s (GoP, 1981c). The population growth rate has been 
reported at 4.6 per cent per annum during 1972-85 (FDA, 1986). The estimated population 
of the city was 1.63 million in 1994. It is expected that the city's population will reach 2.5 
million by the end of the year 2000 (EPAP/World Bank/ADB, 1993). 
As in many developing countries, households consisting of extended families are common in 
Pakistan. A recent study reports an average household size of 7.5 persons for Faisalabad in 
1996 (FDA, 1997) which is quite large compared with average household size of around 5-6 
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persons for cities in developing countries reported by Fouracre and Turner (1992). No up to 
date figures are available about the employment pattern, but an FDA study showed that about 
23 percent of the total population was employed in the city of Faisalabad in 1985 (FDA, 
1986). 
Household income is clearly a major determinant of modal choice. It sets the limits on how 
much of a particular mode they can afford in order to achieve their desired level of travel. 
Table 6.1 presents the monthly income of the households in Faisalabad. One third of the 
households are from low income groups with monthly incomes of up to Rs 3000. Forty seven 
percent of the households are from middle income groups who have monthly incomes in the 
range of Rs 3001-7000. Twenty percent households are from high income groups with their 
monthly incomes over Rs 7000. The average income of a household in low-income areas 
involved in the Faisalabad Area Upgradation Project (DflD funded project for the upgradation 
of low income areas) in 1996 is reported at Rs 4460 per month (FAUP, 1996). The average 
monthly income of a household in the city as a whole is estimated at Rs 4930 in 1996 (FDA, 
1997), is lower than the estimated average income of a household in all urban areas of 
Pakistan i. e Rs 6,114 per month in 1995 (see chapter 5, section 6). 
Table 6.1 : Household monthly income in Faisalabad 
Monthly income (Rs) No of households Percentage 
UP TO 2000 317 10.4 
2001-3000 694 22.7 
3001-5000 980 32.1 
5001-7000 453 14.8 
7001-10000 353 11.6 
10001 & Above 255 8.4 
Total 3052 100 
Source: Data adapted from FDA, 1997 
208 
6.2.3 Land use and control 
Faisalabad has a clearly defined central area which is the old part of the city. It was planned 
in 1895 on a parcel of land measuring 110 acres. Most of the commercial activities are 
located in eight bazaars. Some of these bazaars are well known due to specialised and 
wholesale business, such as rail bazaar which has predominantly cloth business. The financial 
sector, commerce, goods forwarding agencies, offices, the law courts, administrative buildings 
and inter-city halt points (places where passengers board in buses and minibuses) are situated 
around Circular Road. However, considerable central office functions, shopping plazas, 
markets and entertainment functions have also been developed along all primary roads. Higher 
education institutions such as Punjab Medical College and Agriculture University are located 
along Sargodha Road close to the central and Civil Lines area (Figure 6.1). 
Textile based small industries are scattered in all parts of the city, except for some 
concentration in the factory area in the south of the central area. A large number of small 
scale industries are located in the residential areas of Abdullah Pur, Ghulam Muhammad abad 
and Satiana Road etc (Figure 6.1). Large scale manufacturing industry is mainly located along 
major roads. The dispersed industrial location is a result of non-existence of any development 
plan, and a lack of land use control in the city prior to the inception of Faisalabad 
Development Authority (FDA) in the mid 70s. 
Residential areas exist within mixed use developments particularly in the old part of the city. 
Katchi abadies (squatter settlements) and other unauthorised colonies are to be found all over 
the city. Planned residential neighbourhoods also exist, which have been developed either by 
the public sector or by the private sector. By 1993, the FDA had been able to complete 7 site 
and services schemes and the private sector had developed 29 site and services schemes 
(Siddique, 1994). 
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Figure 6.1 The city of Faisalabad 
Source: Faisalabad Development Authority, 
19146 
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FDA and FMC are responsible for exercising development control in Faisalabad. Both the 
agencies have a specified area of jurisdiction but usually conflict over the boundaries. The 
development of unapproved housing schemes is the result of a lack of coordination between 
these agencies. FDA has exercised relatively strict land use control in planned areas and the 
remaining area under its domain. As a result, one can hardly find any encroachment in the 
FDA controlled area. On the other hand, FMC has a lax land use control in the older parts 
of the city and along major roads. Most of the unauthorised development and encroachments 
can be seen in the FMC controlled area. Industrial units and mechanical workshops are to be 
found along major roads, which are a source of hazard to traffic; for instance workshops 
along Shekhupura Road. This weak control can be attributed to political interference, 
ignorance and corruption. 
The haphazard city growth and piecemeal development has resulted in an inadequate road 
network. The streets are narrow and labyrinthine, and there is generally inadequate provision 
for the disposal of solid and liquid wastes. Although this type of city growth has its 
detrimental effects such as environmental pollution and poor access for large size vehicles in 
many areas, on the other hand, it is suited to the movement of pedestrians and cyclists, and 
to a lesser extent small vehicles. 
6.2.4 Road network and traffic situation 
The primary road network in Faisalabad comprises 10 main roads, which converge on the 
central area (see Figure 6.1). All these roads link Faisalabad with other large and small towns. 
In addition to linking with the national network, these roads also connect various parts of the 
city. A considerable amount of commercial and industrial activities are located along these 
main roads. A network of secondary distributor roads provides access to residential, industrial, 
central area and other facilities in the city. Many of these roads have a sufficient right of way, 
but the road network in the old city including the eight bazaars is of inadequate width for the 
operation of large vehicles. Similarly, the internal roads in the Katchi abadies and 
unauthorised residential areas have problems of access for minibuses and full size buses, 
although suzukis can penetrate these areas. 
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Faisalabad presents a bleak traffic situation. Traffic signals are installed at major road 
intersections but none of them was functioning in December 1996. Most roads were also 
damaged due to poor maintenance and a miserable drainage system. Generally there are no 
road markings and inadequate signs to regulate pedestrian and vehicular traffic (Plate 6.1). 
The volume of traffic on the road network has increased rapidly due to both inter-city and 
intra-city traffic, as the inter-city roads crossing the central area add traffic to already busy 
roads and create interference between local and through traffic. 
Slow moving vehicles (animal driven carts, man driven cart and tractor trolley) are usually 
used for transporting industrial products and other goods in the city. The mixing of motorised 
and non-motorised traffic causes additional problems, which reduce road capacity and safety. 
The disorganised movement of animal driven carts and tractor trolleys on the roads results 
in frequent collision with fast moving motor vehicles (Plate 6.2). 
Violations of traffic regulations are common in the city of Faisalabad. Some vehicles are 
driven without lights at night and goods are projected beyond the vehicle length without 
reflectors at the tail of the loaded material; no courtesy is extended to pedestrians crossing 
the roads; one way traffic rules are frequently disobeyed. Under such a traffic situation, only 
well trained drivers can operate safely. 
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Plate 6.1b A minibus negotiating dilapidated road conditions in Faisalabad 
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Plate 6.1a Dilapidated road conditions in Faisalabad 
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Plate 6.2a A mix of traffic in Faisalabad 
Plate 6.2b A mix of traffic in Faisalabad 
6.2.5 Travel patterns 
A study was commissioned by the FDA in 1996. This study included various traffic studies 
and household surveys in the city of Faisalabad. Under this study, a total 3,052 households 
were interviewed. The FDA study reveals that car ownership in Faisalabad is extremely low. 
Of the total households interviewed, only 9 percent owned cars, 43 percent motorcycles, 41 
percent bicycles and about 5 percent had no vehicle at all (FDA, 1997). Vehicle ownership 
has markedly influenced their travel patterns. Private transport is fully utilized by household 
members but those members who have less access to their households' vehicles are obliged 
to use public transport. Table 6.2 presents the mode of transport used by the household 
members on a selected day. 
Table 6.2 : Reported use of modes in Faisalabad in 1996 
Mode of travel Trips by household members 
Number Percentage 
Car 399 5.2 
Motorcycle 1677 21.8 
Bicycle 2617 34.0 
Bus 627 8.2 
Wagon (minibus, suzuki) 1673 21.8 
Autorickshaw 315 4.1 
Tonga 373 4.9 
Total 7681 100 
Source: Data adapted from FDA, 1997 
Note: The study did not count walking trips 
It is quite clear that, other than walking, the bicycle is the most common means of transport 
in Faisalabad, and is used for over one third of the household members. A 1985 study showed 
a similar modal share of 36 percent (FDA, 1986). In other LDC cities, bicycle trips typically 
ranges from 10 to 30 percent (Maunder and Fouracre, 1989). The modal share of motorcycle 
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has been increasing in Faisalabad, the number of household members using motorcycles 
having increased from about 7 percent in 1985 to 22 percent in 1996. Similarly, the 
proportion using public transport including autorickshaws and tongas has also increased from 
35 percent in 1985 to 39 percent in 1996. This increase in the modal share of public transport 
can be attributed at least in part to improved services. 
About 48 percent of the trip makers have a trip distance of less than 3 km and about 40 
percent fall within the range of 4-7 km. About 9 percent have a distance in the range of 8-15 
km, with only 3 percent trip makers having trip lengths of over 15 km. The average trip 
length in Faisalabad (excluding walk trips) is estimated at 4.8 km (FDA, 1997). 
6.2.6 Public transport services 
About 100 publicly-owned buses were introduced on seven routes in Faisalabad in the early 
1980s but they are non-existent today. Presently public transport services are only provided 
by private sector operators. As in other cities, some institutions (such as the Agriculture 
University, Punjab Medical College, a few schools, and private factories) also have their own 
full size buses, minibuses or suzukis for their staff/students. Stage carriage bus services are 
chiefly offered by suzuki operators and by the Faisalabad Urban Transport Society. 
Autorickshaws and tongas are used as contract carriage passenger services. Table 6.3 shows 
an inventory of the public road transport modes and seating capacities in the city. 
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Table 6.3 : Road public transport inventory in Faisalabad in 1996 
Mode Number of Passenger seats 
_7 
hi ve cles 
Number Percentage 
Bus services (all) - 12,750 48.3 
. FUTS Minibuses 650 9750 36.94 
. Suzukis 300 3000 11.36 
Taxi services (all) - 13,650 51.7 
. Autorickshaws 2325 4650 17.61 
. Tongas 1500 9000 34.09 
Total -[ 26,400 100 
Source: Data collected by the researcher in December 1996 
* Seating capacity x No. of vehicles 
Suzuki Services: Stage carriage by suzukis was introduced in the late 1970s in Faisalabad. 
These small vehicles have been operating on short-distance routes with an average route 
length of seven km. A total number of 807 suzukis on 12 different routes was reported in 
1985 (FDA, 1986) when the fleet of publicly-owned full size bus services was also operating 
on seven routes. But there remained an acute shortage of public transport until early 1994, 
owing to the failure of public sector bus services and the regulatory controls imposed on 
private operators. Passengers were forced to rely upon the small, unpopular suzuki (10-seats 
vehicle) services (Plate 6.3) or to resort to alternative modes such as expensive autorickshaws, 
tongas or cycling or walking (Master Plan, 1994). With the introduction of the PUTS services 
the number of suzuki services has fallen. Suzuki operators reported to the researcher that 
approximately 300 suzukis were operating on 8 routes in the city in 1996. However, the data 
collected from the RTA shows that only 65 permits had been renewed for the year 1996/97 
for suzukis by December 1996 and the remaining suzukis were operating without permits. 
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Plate 6.3a A suzuki operating in Faisalabad 
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Plate 6.3b Seating arrangement in a suzuki 
These suzukis are concentrated particularly on routes linking the city centre with areas having 
narrow streets. Service operation of suzukis is controlled through the mutual cooperation of 
individual operators. Government fixed fares are charged on suzukis. 
Autorickshaws: These are an expensive form of contract carriage service when compared 
with tongas. In theory, the provincial government fix fares (Rs 2/km in 1996) but in reality 
fares are generally bargained for with passengers (a minimum of Rs 5 was being charged for 
a single trip in 1996), and there is weak control. Autorickshaws are still popular for short 
journeys, particularly when and where better quality bus services are inadequate and/or 
unreliable. Moreover, autorickshaws also offer pick up and drop facilities for school children. 
The number of autorickshaws has declined rapidly with the introduction of better quality bus 
services. RTA data show that about 1000 rickshaws have been withdrawn from the city over 
the past three years, with 2325 autorickshaws still operating in December, 1996. 
Tongas (6 seat horse drawn carts): These are operating on certain routes where other public 
transport services are inadequate and in areas with poor road conditions that are difficult to 
serve by other modes. The route length for tongas falls in the range of 3-5 km. They offer 
contract carriage services with a minimum fare of Rs 3 per passenger. These are particularly 
used by ladies, and by passengers having luggage. Tongas also offer pick up and drop service 
for school children on a monthly contract basis. The number of tongas is controlled by the 
FMC through operating permits. The FMC fixed a maximum limit of 1500 tongar to operate 
in the city since 1985 but in practice many more tongas had been operating illegally. Being 
a slow moving vehicle the tonga contributes to overtaking movements and traffic congestion, 
particularly in the central area of the city and on main roads. 
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6.3 The Faisalabad Urban Transport Society 
6.3.1 Introduction 
When Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visited Faisalabad in November 1993, there were public 
demands for intervention to improve the city. One of the major improvements requested 
included the provision of better public transport. She directed the Divisional Commissioner 
Faisalabad to prepare a comprehensive plan for the upgrading of the city, and the 
improvement of public transport became a top priority. 
The Commissioner was very much aware that the public sector has neither the financial 
resources nor the capabilities directly to combat the problems of urban transport. The private 
sector also was unable a to provide reliable services under the existing circumstances. 
Contemplating the strengths and weaknesses of both the public and private sectors he 
concluded that the public has more faith in a product which is administered by the public 
sector, but experience of actual practice showed that the public sector had generally failed to 
deliver, owing to problems such as illegitimate union activities, excessive political interference 
and pilferage of revenue (RTA, 1995). Moreover, public transport services were not being 
properly regulated by the public authorities. He considered that the private sector could 
address the needs of passengers if given the opportunity and if properly regulated. 
Seeking to overcome the limitations of both public and private sectors, the Commissioner 
initiated a public-private partnership for the provision of public transport. He convinced 
various government officials to create an NGO which could run the business of public 
transport in collaboration with the local operators. As a result, the Faisalabad Urban Transport 
Society (FUTS) was founded on January 19,1994. 
The Society has the legal status of an NGO and is registered with the Social Welfare 
Department of the Punjab Government, under the Voluntary Society Welfare Agencies 
(Registration and Control) Ordinance, 1961. The nature and functions of the society, including 
audit requirements, are those of an NGO, although it has been organised by government 
officials in Faisalabad. It is regulated by the laws of a social company, with a constitution 
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approved by the Social Welfare Department. Anyone over 18 who agrees to the constitution, 
and pays the membership fee may, with the approval of the president or Governing Body, 
become a member of the Society. In practice membership is dominated by private minibus 
operators. 
6.3.2 Administration 
The society is administered by a Governing Body (GB) mainly comprised of chief 
government officials. Out of a full complement of 24 members, 12 are senior government 
officials, drawn from the divisional and district administrations, police, local government and 
the development agency. They are permanent members of the GB by virtue of their offices, 
through which most are concerned with the planning, regulation, and operational control of 
public transport in Faisalabad. Another six members can be appointed by the president of the 
FUTS from the general membership of the society. Any member can be nominated whether 
operator, professional, business man, or other representative of local interests in public 
transport. The remaining six members should be appointed by election at the annual general 
meeting. 
As of June 1997, the GB consisted of only the 12 permanent members because no nominees 
had been appointed or members elected. Nonetheless, although private operators have not 
been elected to the GB, they register their opinions, complaints etc., with the administrator, 
which are then considered in meetings of the GB. This mechanism has proved effective in 
resolving conflicts between the society and the operators. The 1996 survey results indicate 
that operators do not wish to exercise their right to elect members to the GB at present (see 
section 6.5). 
The FUTS also provides a potentially valuable forum for representatives of passengers, who 
may become involved in decision making by obtaining membership of the society. This has 
yet to happen but was envisaged by the Commissioner in establishing the FUTS. 
The following are the office bearers of the management committee of the Society, for which 
there are no elections. All are provincial government officials. 
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Commissioner Faisalabad Division, the President of the Society 
District Magistrate of Faisalabad, the Vice President 
Secretary Regional Transport Authority (RTA), the General Secretary 
Additional Commissioner (Coordination), the Treasurer 
Regional Deputy Director, Social Welfare Department, the Publicity Secretary 
A note-worthy feature is the direct involvement of such senior officials as the Commissioner, 
the District Magistrate and the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority (RTA), the 
provincial agency which is formally responsible for the allocation of route permits, and for 
defining the entire route network. 
6.3.3 Objects 
The objects of the society as stated in the constitution are as follows (FUTS, 1994): 
i. To provide, maintain and supervise transport facilities for passengers in Faisalabad; 
ii. To provide a model transport system and encourage other transporters to follow the 
same; 
iii. To replace old and obsolete vehicles with new and better vehicles in order to control 
environment pollution caused by smoke; 
iv. To establish a system for imparting proper training and knowledge regarding traffic 
laws and ethics of the profession; 
v. To take all necessary measures which could help in the improvement of controlling 
and preventing road accidents; 
vi. To work for adult education aimed at developing a sense of civic responsibility; and 
vi. To do all such acts as are incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above 
objectives. 
It can be seen that the Society's objectives are not narrowly based on the provision of public 
transport services but cover a wide range of subjects encompassing urban transport, traffic 
management, road safety, the environment and adult education. As an NGO the society is 
obliged to have broader social objectives, because of its registered status. 
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6.3.4 Support staff 
Support staff for the society are employed on a contractual basis, and responsible for route 
allocation, supervising operations for the entire fleet, enforcement of regulations and other 
administrative duties. The administrator who is head of the support staff is a retired 
Magistrate. He manages the society's affairs, assigns duties to various officials, enters into 
agreements with operators on behalf of the society, and is empowered to fine operators for 
violations. As at December 1996, the total staff numbers only 94 employees, 74 of whom 
were security guards. These guards are posted at terminals/check posts to keep record of 
arrivals and departures, issue duty slips, and otherwise assist officials of the society (Plate 
6.7). Eight staff are working as mobile supervisors, provided with motorcycles, who check 
and supervise service operation on the various routes. The guards and mobile supervisors are 
retired from the army and, unlike the traffic police, the entire staff is generally efficient. One 
of the main reasons for their efficiency is the relatively higher salary compared with the 
traffic police. 
6.3.5 Sources of income 
The society generates funds through monthly service charges and a welfare fund deposited 
by the operators, in addition to fines collected for violations. It has constructed six shops 
(selling spare parts, cigarette, and drinks, etc largely to drivers and operators) which have 
been rented out to shop-keepers, and it earns revenue from its own filling station. Its total 
monthly income was running at about 1.2 million rupee against an operating expenditure of 
about Rs 0.25 million per month by the end of 1996. Thus the financial position of the 
society is very sound. Although it was conceived that in the initial stages the society would 
need to approach the government for financial assistance, no such need has arisen. The 
Society has invested its first three years surplus in an office building (Plate 6.4) and 
construction of the main terminal (Plate 6.5), as well as the shops and filling station. In 
addition, it has made donations to charities and to the traffic police for the purchase of 
equipment. 
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Plate 6. -0 Newts built FUTS office building 
Plate 6.5 Well organised N'U75 terminal 
6.3.6 Operation 
After its formation, the management of FUTS sought the cooperation of the private sector 
suzuki operators and invited them to become members of the society. Operators started to join 
only after repeated requests because initially they were doubtful about the sustained future of 
the society. Once confidence was established however, membership grew rapidly, and by 
March 1998 the society had over 650 members, of which 90% are private minibus operators. 
A condition for their operation under the FUTS flag is that the operators must enter into an 
agreement under which they make vehicles available to the society. An individual operator 
cannot make more than one agreement at the same time. This agreement is valid for a period 
of one year and is extendable for further terms with the mutual consent of both the parties. 
All the relevant documents regarding the vehicles under agreement are forwarded to the 
Department of Excise and Taxation along with certificates issued by the society, under which 
the specific vehicles documented are pledged to the society. A pledged vehicle cannot be sold 
during the term of the agreement and bears a FUTS prescribed insignia. It is insured, by the 
operator, with an insurance company approved by the society, to cover third party claims in 
respect of death or injury to a passenger. 
Thus an agreement is linked to a specific vehicle. It is renewable for up to a specified 
maximum vehicle age (originally 3 years) after which the vehicle is excluded from the fleet 
of the society. However, in cases where the operator intends to replace the vehicle before the 
3 years has elapsed, a new agreement is executed between the parties. 
Vehicles under FUTS operational control are otherwise the responsibility of drivers/owners 
overnight. Crew staff are provided by the operator who is responsible for their pay and other 
emoluments. The driver and conductor should wear a uniform approved by the society, behave 
courteously to passengers, not charge more than the fixed fare, and not allow smoking or 
music playing in the vehicle. The owner also undertakes that the vehicle will not be 
overloaded, or parked at prohibited or un-scheduled places, and that it will be kept clean and 
in good condition. In addition, the vehicle shall not be booked for commercial/personal 
purposes except with prior written permission from the society. 
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If there is violation of the terms and conditions, the agreement can be terminated or a fine 
is levied by the society. Initially some operators did not obey the instructions of the society 
and they were thrown out. The defaulters then lodged writ petitions in the court but the 
society successfully argued that no discriminatory action had been taken against them. In 
consequence, the tendency to resort to litigation (common in Pakistan) was discouraged. 
The total FUTS fleet as at March, 1998 consisted of 655 vehicles compared to only 28 at the 
inception in March, 1994. It is comprised entirely of 15-seater minibuses. It is worth noting 
that unlike minibuses used in other cities of Pakistan, the majority of these vehicles have the 
advantage of a roof-top carrier for baggage. Passengers are happy to keep their baggage on 
the carrier rather than on their knees. Moreover, the vehicles under FLITS control are 
relatively new (Plate 6.6). In many other cities vehicles are much older. 
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Plate 6.6 A minibus under FUTS operation 
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Plate 6.7 FUTS support staff on duty 
6.4 Regulatory Regimes 
6.4.1 Issuance of route permits 
The issuance of route permits for road based public transport operation in the city is formally 
the responsibility of the RTA Faisalabad. The only exception are tongar (six-seats horse 
drawn carts), which are controlled by the Faisalabad Municipal Corporation. In theory, the 
RTA is authorised to define the routes for private sector operation, indicate the type and size 
of vehicle, and determine the number of permits on specified routes. 
In practice, FUTS has taken over the responsibility for the planning, operation and control of 
public transport services under the `FUTS flag'. The society specifies the size and type of 
vehicles. Route permits are allocated in discussion with operators whereby intending operators 
consult with the society about potential routes, assess passenger demand, and then apply for 
a `permit' to the FUTS. The society allows vehicle owners (who must be members of the 
FUTS) to operate on specified routes under the agreement described above. No maximum 
number of vehicles per route is specified and routes are allocated to operators on a `first come 
first served' basis. Although there is no formal maximum number of permits per route, in 
practice FUTS has attempted to steer new entrants to routes where there are 
less minibuses 
operating. 
The operators deposit with the society a sum of Rs 5,000 as security, which is refundable on 
expiry of the agreement. In addition there are monthly payments of Rs 200 to the welfare 
fund and Rs 1,500 to the Society as a service charge, and a payment of Rs 1,050 per annum 
to the RTA for the grant of the official route permit. The society has the right to increase any 
of these charges without prior notice to the operators. 
6.4.2 Fares structure 
Legally fares for road based public transport are determined by the Provincial Government 
(see chapter 4, section 6.4). However the FUTS has been allowed to fix fares for its own 
services, and although prior approval for fares revisions from the Punjab Government is still 
228 
required this is in practice a formality. In effect the FUTS has been treated as private 
institution which can run bus services and set fares for its own purposes; thus creating a 
mechanism for circumventing the government fares controls. The maximum government set 
fare for stage carriage bus services in urban areas was Rs 6.25 in March 1997, whereas the 
full route fare determined for the services operating under FUTS control was set almost 
double at Rs 12. Moreover students have not been given a concessionary fare on FUTS 
services, unlike other stage carriage services. The minimum fare fixed at Rs 3 for trips 
between two stages is also double the minimum set for bus services elsewhere in the 
province. The fares are based on stages, and there are conductors for the entire fleet. The 
higher fares are the chief attraction to operators to join the Society. 
6.4.3 Route network 
FUTS has defined the entire route network, terminals, and bus stops for its own services. The 
RTA has been obliged to rubber stamp FUTS decisions. From an initial seven routes FLITS 
services were operating on 11 routes in 1996, with four new routes started as a result of the 
popularity of the services. Routes form a network of radials running across the city centre 
(Figure 6.2). The RTA previously issued a list of stops for each route, but in practice there 
were no signs even to indicate the existence of bus stops. FUTS has specified the location of 
all bus stops and installed sign boards with the courtesy of various commercial firms. No 
shelters are provided as yet but recently the Society has commissioned the design of a bus 
stop shelter. It has also built the new central terminal, on land leased rent free from the 
government. 
An important feature of the network is that each route converges on the main terminal located 
in the central area, providing maximum interchange for passengers between services, but at 
the risk of some excessive concentration of services on the central main terminal. A further 
terminal near the railway station was under consideration to relieve these pressures. 
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ti Figure 6.2 Route network served by FLITS services 
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6.4.4 Safety regulations 
A motor fitness certificate must be obtained for all public transport vehicles from the Motor 
Vehicle Examiner (MVE), which is subsidiary agency of the RTA, after every six months (see 
chapter 4, section 6.4). Generally this appears to be a paper based formality rather than 
meaning actual examination. The vehicles operating under the control of FUTS, by contrast, 
are examined daily by the FUTS supervisors. Defects are identified and the need to do repairs 
(eg to indicators, lights, seats, windows etc) is pointed out, and is subject to enforcement. 
6.4.5 Enforcement 
The traffic police have an overall responsibility for most aspects of on street enforcement, 
including traffic regulation, motor vehicle inspection, overloading of vehicles and the 
checking of documents such as licences. Other operational controls over hours of operation 
and route coverage are conditions of the route permit from the RTA (see chapter 4, section 
6.4). 
Generally enforcement systems in Pakistan are weak and they are seen to be a source of graft 
both for the traffic police and other officials. Ineffective controls by the regulatory authorities 
over urban bus operations lead to numerous abuses by drivers. These include route deviation, 
route shortening, irregular operation, waiting for full loads and unsafe driving practices (GoP, 
1995), and overloading. In theory no standees are allowed on stage carriage services, but in 
practice there is no effective enforcement and operators maximise their revenues by gross 
overloading (see chapter 5, section 7). 
By contrast, in Faisalabad, FUTS has established its own much more effective system, under 
which drivers are fined for committing regulatory violations, backed up by the ultimate and 
real sanction of exclusion from the society. FUTS staff supervise, police and manage the 
operation of services and ensure that there are no violations of the terms and conditions 
specified in the FUTS agreement. The traffic police allow this delegation and are compelled 
to cooperate in the smooth functioning of enforcement by FUTS because of the authoritative 
composition of the governing body of the society. The traffic police only intervene when 
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drivers are involved in gross violations. 
When vehicle defects are identified by the FUTS supervisors, the operator is required to take 
the vehicle to any local workshop of his own choice and has to obtain a duty slip from the 
society. The operator must make the vehicle available for operation again on the date 
specified on the slip. He is to inform the society in the event of any delay caused in repairs, 
failing which the society has the right to confiscate the whole or part of the operator's 
security deposit. 
The mobile supervisors also police and supervise service operation. They check that there is 
no overloading, that drivers stop their vehicles at specified stopping points and that there is 
no route deviation. Drivers are booked for committing violations and are fined by the 
administrator of the society. In the initial stages of operation, the average violation rate was 
two bookings per vehicle per day. This has fallen to a rate of only 0.15 bookings per vehicle 
per day at present, and usually violations are by drivers who are not adequately supervised 
by the vehicle owners. The reduction in the rate of bookings is evidently the result of strict 
enforcement by the FLITS support staff. 
A common problem with public transport services in Pakistan is that private operators do not 
operate the full route during off-peak hours. FUTS has addressed this problem of route 
shortening by establishing three check points on each route, located at the main terminal and 
at both ends of the route. Drivers are required to register their attendance at the start/end of 
operation and arrival/departure for each trip with a security guard posted at each check point. 
Those failing to do this are liable to heavy fines. The security guards submit the `arrival- 
departure diary' every day for verification of the record by other employees in the society 
office. 
Important features of the FUTS enforcement regime include the following. Firstly, the 
supervisory staff/vehicle ratio is vastly superior, at 1: 6 for FUTS compared with 1: 100 for the 
RTA and 1: 40 for the Traffic Police. Secondly, given adequate fares drivers are not tempted 
to be involved in many violations. Thirdly, the absence of `union' activity is important in this 
context, given the corruption and political interference associated with such activity in other 
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public transport organizations in Pakistan. Finally and most importantly, there is little reported 
evidence of corruption in the entire operation of the FUTS, and the instances which have 
arisen have been dealt with firmly by dismissing the staff concerned. 
6.5 Pattern of Ownership 
Single vehicle ownership is predominant under FUTS control. Approximately 50 percent of 
owners obtained vehicles directly through the Prime Minister Public Transport Scheme 
(PMPTS) at subsidised prices during 1992-93 and their vehicles were operating on intercity 
routes before joining the FUTS. About 40 percent of the present owners also acquired PMPTS 
vehicles either from the original owners or from brokers at a higher price. They paid a deposit 
at the time of purchase and were required to pay the remaining amount in instalments to the 
specified banks. Only 10 percent of owners purchased second hand vehicles other than 
PMPTS from the market. All these owners managed to finance the purchase of vehicles from 
their own sources such as by selling their suzukis, using their savings, or by taking out loans 
from their relatives or friends. Table 6.4 shows the pattern of ownership of vehicles under 
FUTS control. 
Table 6.4 : Occupation of vehicle owners under FUTS control 
Occupation No of owners Percentage 
Transport operators 192 40 
Employees 120 25 
Shopkeepers 96 20 
Drivers 48 10 
Others 24 5 
Total 480 100 
Source: Data collected by the researcher in December 1996 
Note: Some operators own more than one minibus 
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6.5.1 Categories of vehicle owners 
1. Transport operators: there are only 40 percent of owners who had previous experience 
of running public transport, such as operating buses/minibuses on intercity routes or suzukis 
in Faisalabad. Although there were few transport operators at the earlier stages of FUTS 
operation, gradually their number has increased. These operators are strongly motivated to 
care for their vehicles and to control cash flows. They have employed crews (drivers and 
conductors) and themselves check their performance regularly. Every day at the end of 
operation, the crews report to them about defects of the vehicle and the owners arrange 
repairs if required without fail. As a result, their vehicles are well-maintained and some of 
them, who joined FUTS at the early stage, have been able to purchase and operate more than 
on second-hand vehicle. 
2. Shopkeepers: Twenty percent of owners are either shopkeepers or concerned with business 
activities and joined FUTS on the expectation that they would earn more profit on this 
investment. The proportion of shopkeeper-owners reported (by the FUTS staff) was higher 
but with the passage of time has declined to 20 percent. They also employed crews for their 
vehicles. They were inexperienced operators, who started initially to pay crews a fixed daily 
wage, and crews were required to pass on all earnings to owners. But, as in any other 
ticketless system around the world, this practice led to crews supplementing their own 
incomes by diverting fares. As a result, the owners were forced to hire their vehicle to crews 
on a fixed daily basis. Under this agreement, crews are supposed to keep the surplus over an 
agreed amount. The following are the negative aspects of this practice. First, drivers are 
involved in more violations. Second, a single driver is driving the vehicle for more than 16 
hours daily which results in minor accidents and the vehicle often requires a lot of repair 
work. Third, the driver is obliged to park the vehicle at the owner's residence after the end 
of operation. Usually, the driver does not report to the owner about required repairs. This 
negligence results in frequent breakdowns of vehicles and requires large amounts for 
maintenance and overhauling. Some of these operators however, have learned lessons from 
this practice and have started to look after the operation of their vehicles themselves. 
3. Employees: 25 percent of owners are employees of government or private sector. Most of 
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them acquired vehicles directly from the PMPTS to supplement their income. They also 
joined FUTS by withdrawing their vehicles from intercity routes owing to the attractive 
returns under FUTS operation. As most of them were unable to supervise the crews during 
their working hours the same happened with them as with shopkeeper-owners. Some of them 
were unable even to pay their monthly instalments to the banks. Since they were defaulters 
the banks started to hold their vehicles, and they were forced to sell their vehicles by the end 
of 1996 to pay the outstanding amount. There are however some employees who have 
managed to check crews after their working hours and on holidays who are still surviving in 
this business. 
4. Drivers: There are 10 percent of owner/drivers under FUTS control. Most of them 
purchased vehicles on instalments by arranging loans from relatives or friends. They have 
employed conductors who are their own relatives or persons of their confidence. Since they 
drive themselves there is no question of revenue leakage and undue wear and tear to vehicles. 
Like experienced operators they also maintain their vehicles well. 
5. Others: These owners include farmers, retired persons and some ladies. They obtained 
vehicles either from the PMPTS or from the market. They manage the operation of their 
vehicles themselves or through their relatives. They have no other business, hence most of 
their time is spent on looking after their vehicles. 
6.5.2 Vehicle owner profiles 
The above categories of vehicle-owners are illustrated with selected case study profiles given 
below. 
Case 1 (transport operator): Muhammad Shehzad, 32, is an operator by profession, worked 
as a motor mechanic for about four years. He joined his father in 1985, who was operating 
6 buses on Faisalabad-Rawalpindi route. He also established a showroom for (Toyota Hiace) 
minibuses in 1990. In 1994, he joined FUTS with a second hand minibus which cost Rs 
250,000. He was allocated Route No 5 of his own choice. He employed a driver and a 
conductor at the rates of Rs 170 and Rs 120 per day respectively, in addition to Rs 50 for 
their meals. Mr Shehzad is responsible for all repairs, fuel costs, taxes and most fines imposed 
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by the traffic police. In the case of a fine as a result of overloading this is paid by the crew. 
The crew complete 4 to 5 round trips during their daily agreed working hours (6 am to 7 pm) 
and earn an average of Rs 300 per round trip. He applies random checks during the hours of 
operation. The crew report to the owner about any repair work required to his vehicle at the 
end of their operation. He completes two round trips during the remaining period or by 
working beyond specified hours of operation and earns in the range of Rs 500-Rs 600. He 
takes his vehicle to a workshop for required repairs at the end of operation and then parks it 
at his residence. As a result, he has never been directed by the FUTS staff for any repair. He 
also reports the replacement of his vehicle if it is not functioning properly. He added another 
3-year old vehicle in September 1996, and paid Rs 150,000 as a lumpsum and the remaining 
Rs 205,000 in instalments at the rate of Rs 6200 per month. This vehicle is also operating on 
Route No 5 and is driven by his younger brother after 7 pm. 
On a question of operators representatives on the GB of the Society, he states "it will be the 
decline of the Society if they elect operators representatives", on the grounds that generally 
elected representatives would take benefits for themselves and not work for their members. 
He further added, "operation under the Society is profitable at present but demands full time 
supervision". 
Case 2 (shopkeeper): Zafar Iqbal, 40, was a autorickshaw driver in 1980s. He was running 
a bakery during 1990-95. After having information from other operators that FUTS business 
is profitable, he along with another partner, purchased a minibus and joined FUTS in 
September 1995. They paid the previous owner of the minibus Rs 220,000 initially and the 
remaining amount was agreed to be paid over two years at the rate of Rs 6500 per month. He 
applied to FUTS for the allocation of Route No 2 and is operating on this route. He hired the 
vehicle to the crew at the rate of Rs 1000 per day. The crew were made responsible for fines 
and oil costs while the owner responsible for maintenance and other expenses. He reports that 
he received an amount of Rs 250,000 from the crew whereas he spent Rs 150,000 only on 
repairs and maintenance of vehicle during the first 10 months of operation. Since he has to 
spend so much time on vehicle repairs he was forced to close his bakery. His initial partner 
in the minibus has withdrawn from the partnership as a result of the very low return on his 
investment. 
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In October 1996, he sold his house to pay back the amount to the second partner. Presently, 
he is sole owner of the vehicle and is living in a rented house for which he pays a monthly 
rent of Rs 1200. He has started a close supervision of the operation of his vehicle, employed 
new a driver and conductor and pays them Rs 180 and Rs 150 per day respectively. He is 
responsible for all expenses required for his vehicle operation. He also drives the vehicle from 
time to time. The crew start and terminate their operation at Ghulam Muhammad abad, one 
end of Route No 2, where they and he himself live. They complete 6-7 round trips daily and 
collect fares amounting Rs 300-350 per round trip. 
Mr Zafar stated that during November-December 1996, there was a lot of improvement in the 
operating surplus and he is hoping for further improvements. He was trying to get a PSV 
driving licence and by obtaining this license he would be able to save the salary of a driver 
by driving the vehicle himself. He complained that cost of wear and tear in Faisalabad is 
high, due mainly to damaged roads and mixed traffic. He quoted a recent incident when his 
vehicle had a collision with a camel-driven cart, and the door of the vehicle was totally 
damaged. As a result of this, he spent Rs 900 for its repair plus the vehicle was off road for 
one day. He showed no concern on the issue of operators to being represented at the GB of 
the Society. 
Case 3 (driver): Riaz Ahmed, 29, is a driver by profession. He was previously driving a 
suzuki with a light traffic vehicle (LTV) licence during 1987-94. He applied for a PSV 
licence and was failed 3 times before obtaining the licence. Eventually, he was able to obtain 
the PSV licence but he spent about Rs 600 for which he did not explain details. He joined 
FUTS in August 1994, with a second hand minibus purchased from a showroom. He paid Rs 
550,000 as the cost of the vehicle. He managed the payment with the help of his younger 
brother who loaned him Rs 200,000. Initially his vehicle was allocated Route No 7 but he 
applied to the Society for a change in route owing to damaged roads. At present his vehicle 
is plying on Route No 3. 
He drives himself and his younger brother is serving as conductor. They start their daily 
operation from the main terminal at 6.0 am and terminate at about 10.0 pm at either of the 
ends. They complete 5-6 round trips daily and collect fares amounting Rs 350-400 per round 
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trip. When one of the brothers is off from operation, a driver is arranged on a daily charge 
basis, and he is paid Rs 200 including refreshment allowance. When his younger brother 
(conductor) is absent then Mr Riaz acts as a conductor and the driver drives the vehicle. By 
so doing there is no revenue leakage at all. 
Mr Riaz proudly says that during their two and half year of operation he has never been fined 
by the FUTS staff and his vehicle has not had a single minor collision. Consequently, he has 
to pay only for routine maintenance which costs on average Rs 8000 per month. He further 
added that in the city of Fiasalabad, every driver is trying to hit others' vehicles and one has 
to be alert to save his vehicle. In response to the question on how would he disburse his 
savings, he replied that the saving is distributed between two the brothers (driver : conductor 
3: 2). Mr Riaz is thinking of purchasing a five marla residential plot but the younger brother 
is saving money for his marriage. Mr Riaz is happy with present functioning of the FUTS and 
does not feel operators' representation is needed in FUTS administration. 
Case 4 (other): Rehmat Ali, 39, retired from the army in 1994. He joined FUTS in April 
1995, with a minibus purchased from a broker. He paid the broker Rs 197,000 initially and 
the remaining amount was agreed to be paid in two years at the rate of Rs 6700 per month. 
He managed the initial payment of the vehicle from a gratuity received at the time of 
retirement. Initially his vehicle was allocated Route No 8 on which 40 vehicles were already 
operating. Although the route was lucrative, he applied to the Society for a change in the 
route owing to damaged roads. At present his vehicle is plying on Route No 2 on which 80 
vehicles are in operation. He has employed a driver and conductor for the entire daily 
operation and pays them daily Rs 200 and Rs 150 respectively, and they are also allowed to 
have a meal allowance up to Rs 60. He is responsible for all expenses required for vehicle 
operation. Crews complete six round trips daily and collect fares amounting Rs 350-380 per 
round trip. He also drives the vehicle from time to time and offers rests to his driver. By 
doing so he can have an idea about the amount collected for a trip. 
Mr Rehmat says that he has no other job and therefore he remains at Main Terminal or 
arranges spares and time for repairs for the vehicle if required. He further states that to avoid 
breakdown, the oil filter is changed and general maintenance for the vehicle is done after 
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every four days. For this purpose the vehicle is generally taken to a workshop after the end 
of operation. 
He regularly pays the monthly instalment for his vehicle and makes Rs 400 per day. He states 
that "public transport is a business through which one can earn a net cash but can have spares 
form shops and get vehicle repaired from workshops, and even can own vehicles on 
instalments. " He added, "FUTS is a God's gift for operators working under it. " He does not 
feel the need for operators to be represented at the GB for the time being, but representation 
can be made if any problem emerges. He spends Rs 5000 per month on his living expenses. 
In response to the question how would he disburse his savings, he replied that he is thinking 
of buying an additional vehicle. 
6.6 Public Transport User Surveys 
To seek users' views about the services and their opinions as to how improvements could be 
made to public transport services, passenger surveys were conducted in Faisalabad in 
December, 1996. In order to get deeper understanding about travel pattern of the users in 
Faisalabad, household case studies were also undertaken. 
Two types of stage carriage passenger services are operating in this city; Suzuki services 
which are regulated by the Government and FUTS services which are regulated by the NGO. 
Comprehensive survey forms were developed in order to obtain several sets of information 
on both types of public transport services operating in Faisalabad (Appendix-3). A pilot 
survey was conducted to test the workability of the survey forms and the forms were modified 
in the light of the pilot test. In total, 280 passengers were interviewed: 140 passengers on 
suzuki services and the same number using FUTS service. Of the total, 50 percent of 
passengers were interviewed during peaks (8 am-10 am &3 pm-5 pm) and 50 percent during 
off-peaks (11 am-12 am &7 pm-8 pm). The surveys were conducted during working days 
excluding weekends. 
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Figure 6.3 Passenger survey points in Faisalabad in 1996 
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There are route sections and complete routes, where suzukis and FUTS minibuses compete 
with each other. On some routes suzukis have totally been eliminated, and on some routes 
only suzukis operate. In order to get a representative picture, passengers from different 
sections of each of these route types were randomly selected and interviewed (see Figure 6.3). 
Table 6.5 shows the stratified sample used to ensure coverage of overlapping and non- 
overlapping sections of the route network operated by both services. An attempt was also 
made to cover female passengers and the passengers from different age groups. Of the total 
passengers interviewed, 20 percent were female. It would have been possible to employ in 
principle quota sampling for this survey but this would have meant an impractically large 
number of interviews. 
Table 6.5 : Passengers interviewed in Faisalabad 
Survey section No. of passengers 
Total Male Female 
FUTS service 
FUTS central terminal 60 48 12 
Routes where only FUTS operates 40 32 8 
Routes where both services operate 40 32 8 
Suzuki service 
Routes where only suzukis operates 40 32 8 
Non overlapping sections of route 40 32 8 
Overlapping sections of route 40 32 8 
Fully overlapped routes 20 16 4 
6.7.1. Passenger survey (suzuki) 
1. Reported use of suzuki service 
The use of suzuki service is presented in Table 6.6. Of the 140 passengers interviewed, more 
tended to use suzukis occasionally rather than on a regular basis. To get to work, 19 percent 
of the passengers regularly travelled in suzukis whereas 30 percent used them occasionally. 
Similarly, for shopping, 17 percent of the passengers regularly travelled to the shops 
compared to 31 percent who were travelling occasionally. Eleven percent and 17 percent of 
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the passengers used this service for social activities on regular and occasional bases 
respectively. Twelve percent of the passengers responded that they were regularly benefitted 
from the use of suzuki service for other purposes such as hospitals visits or to attend 
government offices. The use of suzukis for education was reported as much less, only 6 
percent. 
Table 6.6 : Reported use of suzuki service 
Activity No of respondents 
Regularly Percentage Occasionally Percentage 
Work 27 19 42 30 
Education 8 6 9 6 
Shopping 24 17 44 31 
Social 15 11 24 17 
Other 16 11 17 12 
2. Reported use of suzuki for specific trip 
Table 6.7 presents reported use of suzuki by the passengers for their specific trip. One in 
three passengers reported that travelling in a suzuki either to go home after finishing work 
or going to work. Of these, 50 percent passengers were travelling during morning peak, 40 
percent during evening peak and 10 percent during off-peak periods. Twenty seven percent 
of the passengers reported that they were using the suzuki for shopping. Fifteen percent of 
the passengers responded their use of the suzuki was for social activity. All shopping and 
social trips were reported by the passengers during off peak period. Only 13 percent of the 
passengers (60% during morning peak and 40 percent during evening peak) stated their 
purpose for that specific trip was education. Twelve percent reported other purposes such as 
to visit a hospital or to attend court. 
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Table 6.7 : Reported use of suzuki for specific trip 
Trip purpose No of respondents Percentage 
Work 47 33 
Education 18 13 
Shopping 37 27 
Social 22 15 
other 16 12 
Total 140 100 
3. Reasons for travelling in suzukis 
The principal reasons for travelling in suzukis as reported by the passengers are presented in 
Table 6.8. It is quite evident that most of their reasons are related to the levels of FLITS 
services. Of the passengers, 32 percent reported that a seat was not available to them in FUTS 
service as the number of its minibuses was inadequate. There were 30 percent of passengers 
who reported to use suzukis as their fares were low. Six percent of the passengers reported 
other reasons, for example, that their own vehicle was not available to them for that specific 
trip or they were from outside of Faisalabad. 
Table 6.8 : Reasons for travelling in suzukis 
Reasons No of passengers Percentage 
Low fare 42 30 
Limited number of 
F iTS vehicles 
45 32 
No FU TS service 22 15 
O/D not linked with 
. FUTS service 
23 17 
Other 8 6 
Total 140 100 
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4. Monthly income 
The reported monthly income of suzuki passengers is given in Table 6.9. Forty one percent 
of the passengers interviewed had a monthly income in the range of Rs 3,001-6,000. 
Seventeen percent of the passengers had a monthly income over Rs 6,000. Twenty percent 
of the total passengers had a monthly income of up to Rs 3,000. The average monthly income 
of the suzuki passengers is estimated at Rs 4,300 which is below than the average monthly 
income of FLITS passengers (see section 6.6.2). Twenty two percent passengers did not report 
their monthly income (some females/unemployed persons) as they did not know their 
household's income. 
Table 6.9 : Monthly income of suzuki passengers 
Income (Rs) No of passengers Percentage 
Up to 2000 6 4 
2001-3000 22 16 
3001-4000 27 19 
4001-5000 19 14 
5001-6000 11 8 
6001-7000 13 9 
Over 7000 11 8 
No response 31 22 
Total 140 100 
5. Intention to travel in FUTS service 
Seventy five percent of the suzuki passengers interviewed, intended to travel in FUTS 
services. Of these 45 percent (47 passengers) stated that they would travel in FUTS minibuses 
provided a seat was available, and these passengers were from those areas where both services 
operate. The remaining 55 percent of those intending to travel in FUTS services were from 
areas where only suzukis operate. Twenty percent of the passengers responded that they were 
not prepared to travel in FLITS services due to the higher fares, or because they had access to 
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their own vehicles. The other 5 percent stated that they do not know. 
6. Willingness to pay higher fare for suzukis 
Seventy percent of the passengers intending to use FUTS services were also willing to travel 
in better quality suzuki services at higher fares if their service operation was organised on the 
lines of the FUTS pattern. Thirty percent of the passengers stated that they were not prepared 
to use suzukis at higher fares because of the narrow seating arrangement of the vehicles. 
7. Reported complaints about existing public transport services 
The complaints of suzuki passengers about existing public transport are presented in Table 
6.10. Most of the complaints (75%) were related to quality aspects of service offered. Of 
these complaints, 41 percent were regarding comfort aspects such as frequent overloading, 
uncomfortable vehicles, unsuitable access for the elderly and ladies or unsuitable and narrow 
seating arrangements. Thirty four percent of the complaints were about the aspects of 
unreliability of suzuki services; for instance, wastage of time, no schedules, route shortening 
and the crews' practice of deceiving passengers. Sixty percent of these complaints about 
unreliability were from the passengers where both services operate and 
40 percent from the 
areas where only suzukis operate. Nine percent of the total complaints were about safety 
aspects such as old vehicles and reckless driving. Passengers also complained about 
insufficient public transport services and 16 percent of the complaints were about the 
infrequency or absence of FUTS services on some routes. Of the complaints about insufficient 
services, 80 percent were from the areas where only suzukis operate and 20 percent from the 
areas where both services operate. 
245 
Table 6.10 : Reported complaints about existing public transport 
Service aspect Complaints by passengers 
Frequency Percentage 
Reliability 145 34 
. Time wastage 74 17 
. No schedule 27 7 
. Route shortening 26 6 
. Deceiving passengers 18 4 
Comfort 175 41 
. Overloading 78 18 
. No comfort 51 12 
. Difficult ride 23 5 
. Narrow seating 12 3 
. No seats for ladies 11 3 
Safety 39 9 
. Old vehicles 21 5 
. Reckless driving 18 4 
Quantity 70 16 
. Vehicles inadequate in number 70 16 
Total 429 10 0 
8. Suggestions for improvement to public transport 
Improvements suggested to public transport in Faisalabad are illustrated in Table 6.11. Most 
of the passengers (60 percent) furnished their suggestions about the reliability and comfort 
aspects of services, and 20 percent of the passengers suggested improvements in quantity such 
as more FLITS vehicles, replacement of suzukis with FUTS on remaining routes, and 
introduction of large capacity vehicles on busy routes. Eight percent of the passengers wanted 
safety benefits from better driver behaviour or better quality vehicles. Cleanliness was not 
recorded as a complaint, but 5 percent of the passengers did suggest improvements to 
cleanliness. Similarly, although passengers did not complain about the behaviour of crews, 
7 percent of them registered suggestions that there should be no smoking or playing of music 
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by the crews in the vehicles, or that they should behave courteously to passengers. 
Table 6.11 : Suggestions for improvement to public transport 
Service aspect Suggestions by passengers 
Frequency Percentage 
Reliability 140 34 
. No request stops 39 10 
. Hours of operation 34 8 
. Service schedule 31 7 
. Route shortening 20 5 
. Service check 16 4 
Comfort 105 26 
. Overloading 82 
20 
. Ladies seats 12 
3 
. Luggage space 
11 3 
Safety 33 8 
. Good condition vehicles 
24 6 
. No reckless driving 
9 2 
Cleanliness 20 5 
Courteous staff 29 7 
. Crews behaviour 
20 5 
. No smoking 
5 1 
. No music 
4 1 
Quantity aspects 82 20 
. More vehicles 
61 15 
. Replace suzukis with 
FUTS 12 3 
. Large capacity vehicles 
9 2 
Total 409 100 
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6.7.2 Passenger survey (FUTS) 
1. Use of FUTS services 
The use of FUTS services is presented in Table 6.12. Of the 140 passengers interviewed, fifty 
six percent regularly used FUTS services for their travel to work whereas 14 percent were 
occasional users. For shopping, 32 percent of the passengers regularly travelled to the shops 
by FUTS services whereas 24 percent were travelling occasionally. Thirty five percent of the 
users travelled regularly for social activities while 24 percent reported occasional use. 
Eighteen per cent of the passengers regularly benefitted from the use of FUTS services for 
other purposes; such as visit hospitals, attend government offices and travelling in bad 
weather. The use of FUTS services for education was found to be much less common: 14 
percent regular users and II percent occasional users. 
Table 6.12 : Reported use of FUTS services 
Activity No of Respondents 
Regularly Percentage Occasionally Percentage 
Work 78 56 20 14 
Education 20 14 16 11 
Shopping 45 32 34 24 
Social 49 35 27 19 
Other 25 18 20 14 
2. Reported use of FUTS service for specific trip 
Table 6.13 presents reported use of FUTS service by the passengers for their specific trip. 
Thirty eight percent of the passengers (of which 62% during morning peak and 38 percent 
during evening peak) reported that travelling in a FUTS service either to go home after 
finishing work or going to work. Twenty nine percent of the passengers reported that they 
were using FUTS service for shopping. Of these, 55 percent were during off peak and 45 
percent during peak periods. Fifteen percent of the passengers (of which 62% during morning 
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peak and 38 percent during evening peak) stated their purpose for that specific trip was 
education. Eleven percent of the passengers (of which 61% during off peak and 39 percent 
during peak) responded their use of the FUTS service was for social activity. Nine percent 
of passengers reported other trip purposes during off peak hours. 
Table 6.13 : Reported use of FUTS service for specific trip 
Trip purpose No of respondents Percentage 
Work 53 38 
Shopping 40 29 
Education 21 15 
Social 16 11 
other 10 7 
Total 140 100 
3. Monthly income 
The reported monthly income of FUTS passengers is given in Table 6.14. Thirty seven 
percent of the passengers interviewed had a monthly income in the range of Rs 3,001-6,000. 
Twenty three percent of the passengers had a monthly income over Rs 6,000. Only 12 percent 
of the total passengers had a monthly income of up to Rs 3,000. The average monthly income 
of the FUTS passengers is estimated at Rs 4955 which is identical to the estimated average 
monthly income (Rs 4930) of a household in Faisalabad (see section 6.2.2). Twenty eight 
percent of passengers did not report their monthly income. 
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Table 6.14 : Monthly income of FUTS passengers 
Income (Rs) No of passengers Percentage 
Up to 2000 4 3 
2001-3000 12 9 
3001-4000 10 7 
4001-5000 31 21 
5001-6000 12 9 
6001-7000 14 10 
Over 7000 18 13 
No response 39 28 
Total 140 100 
4. Choice of FUTS service for specific trip 
Table 6.15 presents the reasons why the passengers made a choice of FUTS service for their 
specific trip. A majority of the passengers (79 percent) selected FUTS service for their 
specific trip due to a guaranteed seat and service reliability. Six percent of the passengers 
travelling in FLITS service reported other reasons such as an emergency or that the FUTS 
service was available at that time. Nine percent of the passengers chose the FUTS service 
because of the non-availability of an alternative mode. Only six percent of the passengers 
were travelling by FUTS service because there was no cheaper public transport service 
available to them, and these passengers were from the areas where suzukis were no longer 
operating. 
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Table 6.15 : Choice of FUTS service for specific trip 
Principal reasons No of passengers Percentage 
Guaranteed seat 71 51 
Reliability of service 39 28 
Non-availability of cheaper 
public transport 
9 6 
No alternative mode 13 9 
other 8 6 
Total 140 100 
5. Mode of transport used prior to FUTS service 
Table 6.16 shows that the FUTS has attracted the ridership of both the private and the public 
transport modes as well as casual passengers. Sixty four percent of the passengers reported 
that they previously made this journey by other public transport modes; namely either suzukis, 
tongas and autorickshaws. Twelve percent stated that they previously used their cars, 
motorcycles and bicycles. Eight percent of the FUTS passengers used to walk for that trip and 
three percent reported using other modes such as suburban buses or lifts from others. Four 
percent of the passengers had not made the trip before in Faisalabad. 
251 
Table 6.16 : Mode of transport used prior to FUTS service 
Mode Passengers responses 
Frequency Percentage 
Walk 21 8 
Suzuki 96 37 
Autorickshaw 32 12 
Tonga 62 24 
Motorcycle 3 1 
Car 4 2 
Bicycle 24 9 
Trip not made 9 4 
Other 7 3 
Total 258 10 
6. Satisfaction with FUTS service 
Most of the passengers (73 percent) were satisfied but 18 percent stated their dissatisfaction 
with FUTS service, and 9 percent gave no opinion. The reasons for dissatisfaction with the 
service are explained in the more detailed analysis which follows. 
7. Do passengers wait for FUTS service? 
Fifty one percent of the passengers reported that they waited specifically for the FUTS service 
and 45 percent stated that they prefer FUTS service but take the first which to arrive. Only 
4 percent of the passengers did not wait for the FUTS service but travelled on the first 
available transport service. 
8. Reported waiting times 
Of the passengers who waited for a FLITS service, 58 percent reported a waiting time of up 
to 10 minutes, 26 percent reported a waiting time of between 11 to 20 minutes and 16 percent 
reported a waiting time in the range of 21 to 30 minutes. The average reported waiting time 
was estimated at 10.3 minutes. Reported waiting times must be treated with some caution 
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however, since it was observed by the researcher that some passengers exaggerated their 
reported times during peak hours. For instance, if three full-minibuses passed the bus stop in 
15 minutes, passengers typically reported their waiting time in the range of 25-30 minutes. 
9. Stoppage at designated bus stops by FUTS drivers 
Forty nine percent of the passengers reported that FUTS drivers always stop vehicles at the 
designated bus stops and 30 percent said that they frequently regard designated stops. 
However, 18 percent of the passengers complained that FUTS drivers sometimes allowed 
passengers to board from non-specified bus stops. 
10. Route deviation by FUTS drivers 
There was a question about route shortening in the original questionnaire but after conducting 
a pilot survey it was found that the routes were not shortened by the FUTS drivers although 
there was some route deviation. Forty one percent of the passengers reported a route deviation 
occurred sometimes; 22 percent reported that route deviations were rare and 7 percent 
reported frequent short cuts in the specified route. The FLITS drivers gave reasons to the 
researcher for the route deviations, such as damaged section of roads and road blockages due 
to social, religious or political gatherings. 
11. Reported overcharging during hours of operation 
Seventy eight percent of the passengers reported that they were never overcharged. However, 
10 percent reported overcharging after ten o'clock by FUTS crews, and further 8 percent 
indicated rare incidence of overcharging during their journey during the hours of FLITS 
operation. This latter reported overcharging was on two routes where fares were increased in 
April 1996 due to the extension of the routes and the passengers were not aware of the 
increased fares. 
12. Reported overloading on the FUTS service 
Seventy two percent of the passengers reported that they had never seen overloading on the 
FLITS services. However, 11 and 14 percent of the passengers reported overloading on FUTS 
services during peak and off peak hours respectively (Table 6.17). The drivers admitted that 
this overloading was due to some `black sheep' who were repeatedly fined for their violations. 
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The drivers also pointed out that sometimes they were helpless when passengers forcefully 
boarded the vehicles during morning peak hours. They also mentioned difficulties when both 
a female a accompanying male passenger were not able to be accommodated and therefore 
would have to be separated for their journey. This then caused problems when the male 
insisted on travelling with the female. 
Table 6.17 : Reported overloading on the FUTS service 
Rate No of passengers Percentage 
Never 101 72 
Peak 16 11 
Off peak 19 14 
Peak & off peak - - 
Don't know 4 3 
Total 140 100 
13. Reported walking times to the bus stops 
Sixty five percent of the passengers reported their walking time to the nearest bus stops was 
up to 10 minutes. Thirty five percent of the passengers reported walking times of over 10 
minutes. In terms of distance, a recent study reported that 74 percent of households in 
Faisalabad had a walking distance of up to 500 and 26 percent over 500 meters to the nearest 
bus stop (FDA, 1997). 
14. Satisfaction with the mechanical condition of vehicles 
Fifty nine percent of the respondents were satisfied with the mechanical conditions of FUTS 
vehicles but 22 percent showed concern about mechanical condition. Nineteen percent gave 
no opinion. Table 6.18 presents the nature of the complaints of the passengers related to 
mechanical condition of FUTS vehicles. Forty three percent were about broken windows, 37 
percent were about seats not being comfortable and 19 percent were about the vehicles 
emitting smoke. There were no complaints about breakdown of FUTS vehicles during 
operation, which is a common complaint about public transport vehicles used in other cities 
in Pakistan. Although vehicle defects are regularly identified by the FUTS staff, sometimes 
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operators could fully justify a delay in vehicle repairs. For instance in the case of one repair, 
window-sheet was not available in the market for about a period of one month (December, 
1996). 
Table 6.18 : Complaints with mechanical condition of FUTS vehicles 
Aspects Complaints by passengers 
Frequency Percentage 
Windows broken 21 43 
Seats not comfortable 18 38 
Emit smoke 9 19 
Total 48 100 
Note: Some passengers reported more than one complaint 
15. Satisfaction with the cleanliness 
Forty seven percent of the passengers were satisfied and thirty one percent dissatisfied with 
the cleanliness of FUTS vehicles. Twenty two percent of the passengers did not comment on 
this aspect. The majority of the passengers acknowledged that vehicles were clean in the 
morning time. It was observed that passengers eat dry and fresh fruit and throw their rubbish 
under the seats as there was no arrangement for rubbish collection in the vehicles. Generally, 
most of the crews do not clean their vehicles after making a trip because there is no 
punishment/fine about this aspect. 
16. Passengers' views about fare levels 
Table 6.19 indicates remarkably little dissatisfaction of passengers over fares. Fifty four 
percent of the passengers interviewed were satisfied with the fares, while only 11 percent 
were concerned that fares were too high and indicated that they use the FUTS service because 
an alternative mode was not available on their routes. About 31 percent of passengers were 
of the opinion that fares were slightly high for longer distance trips and the remaining 4 
percent gave no opinion because this was their first trip on a FLITS service. 
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Table 6.19 : Passengers' views about fare levels 
Level of fares No of passengers Percentage 
Slightly high 43 31 
Too high 16 11 
Realistic 75 54 
No opinion 6 4 
Total 140 100 
17. Satisfaction with safety aspects 
Sixty two percent of the interviewed passengers were satisfied with safety aspects of the 
FUTS service but 31 percent of passengers were dissatisfied. The remaining 7 percent of 
passengers gave no opinion. Table 6.20 indicates passengers complaints about safety aspects. 
Of the complaining passengers, 44 percent commented that drivers were irresponsible, 20 
percent said that crews were in a hurry and 36 percent considered there was a risk of 
accidents. Problems also occur at bus stops. It was noted that in cases when there were more 
passengers at a bus stop than the seats available in FUTS vehicles, the conductors only let in 
the required number of passengers and gave the `go ahead signal' to the drivers. As there was 
no queuing system some passengers attempting to board the vehicles were pushed back by 
the conductors. There were cases when some passengers were injured. For instance, 
passengers told the researcher that an arm of a student from the Punjab Medical College was 
broken in March 1996, as a result of this behaviour. 
Table 6.20 : Passengers' views about safety aspects 
Aspects Complaints by passengers 
Number Percentage 
Irresponsible drivers 43 44 
Crews always in hurry 20 20 
Probability of accidents 35 36 
Total 98 100 
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18. Popularity of FUTS service 
In general, FUTS service is popular among the passengers. Table 6.21 shows the reported 
popularity of the service. Fifty seven percent of the passengers stated the popularity of FUTS 
service was gradually increasing, while 26 percent of the passengers reported no change in 
popularity, and 4 percent of passengers reported popularity was decreasing due to service 
inadequacy. Fourteen per cent of passengers gave no response. 
Table 6.21 : Reported popularity of FUTS service 
Rate No of passengers Percentage 
I -ý 
Increasing 78 56 
Unchanged 37 26 
Decreasing 6 4 
Don't know 19 14 
Total 140 100 
19. Complaints about FUTS service 
The summary of complaints about FUTS service is presented in Table 20. Thirty two percent 
of complaints were that the number of FUTS vehicles was not sufficient and 15 percent were 
about the quality aspects of service such as the crews smoking in the vehicles and being 
discourteous to passengers. Eight percent of complaints (largely by ladies) were that ladies 
were not given their allocated seats. The crews stated that the ladies were usually offered their 
seats, but it was difficult for them to keep ladies' seats vacant when they had male passengers 
available. Moreover, the FUTS' own staff did not enforce the ladies reserved seat regulation. 
Forty five 45 percent of complaints were about safety aspects (see Table 6.20). 
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Table 6.22: Other complaints about FUTS service 
Service aspect Complaints by passengers 
Frequency Percentage 
Quality 38 15 
. Discourteous crews 25 65 
. Smoking 13 35 
Comfort 19 8 
. Seats for ladies 19 8 
Safety 113 45 
. Old vehicles 15 13 
. Irresponsible drivers 43 38 
. Crews always in hurry 20 18 
. Probability of accidents 35 31 
Quantity 79 32 
. Not enough vehicles 79 32 
Total 249 100 
20. Suggestions about improvement of FUTS service 
The suggestions given by the passengers about the improvement of FUTS service are 
presented in Table 6.23. Thirty one percent of the suggestions were that FLITS service 
capacity should be augmented by adding more or larger capacity vehicles and 12 percent 
suggestions were that vehicle quality should be improved. Eleven percent of passengers' 
suggestions were about the extension in the FUTS route network, and 5 percent of passengers 
suggested the construction of bus stop shelters which were non-existent at the time of survey. 
Twelve percent of the suggestions highlighted the need for training for ill-mannered 
conductors and reckless drivers. Five percent suggested that crews should deter smoking and 
playing music inside the vehicles. Ten percent of the suggestions emphasised that the vehicles 
should be kept tidy during the service operation. Nine percent of the suggestions (largely from 
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ladies) were that the regulation of reserved seats for ladies should be strictly enforced. About 
5 percent suggested other improvements including a ban on the operation of smoke emitting 
vehicles, tougher enforcement of regulation by the FLITS staff, and the efficient processing 
of passenger complaints registered with the FUTS administrator. Generally the administrator 
issues a warning to the specific crew but no fine is imposed. 
Table 6.23 : Suggestions about improvement of FUTS service 
Suggestions Frequency Percentage 
More vehicles 73 31 
Vehicle quality 30 12 
Route network extension 26 11 
Bus stop shelters 12 5 
Crews training 30 12 
No smoking/music 12 5 
Cleanliness 25 10 
Ladies seats 22 9 
other 11 5 
Total 241 100 
6.7.3 Household case studies 
The travel pattern of the users in Faisalabad is illustrated below with selected case studies of 
households. These studies of households were undertaken in order to gain deeper 
understanding about their socioeconomic conditions, attitudes, and perceptions about the use 
of various transport modes for different purposes. An attempt was made to cover different 
categories of households, by income and socioeconomic groups, from six different areas 
chosen to reflect socioeconomic variations in Faisalabad (see Figure 6.4). The following were 
the bases for the selection. First, the household is typical of that area. Second, the researcher 
has contacts with the household. 
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Figure 6.4 Location of case study households in Faisalabad 
D ^ýýlS 
Y 
T 
G 
Q 
R0 
Ba 
260 
a 
Case 1. Shafqat Mahmood, 48, lives with his family in a planned housing scheme, Medina 
Town. He is a government employee, with a monthly salary of Rs 5000 and works as a 
superintendent in BPS-16 in the Bureau of Imports and Exports. His wife is also working, as 
a senior teacher at the Comprehensive High School at Medina Town and earns Rs 5500 per 
month. Other household members include; his father (70), two sons (11,3), and three 
daughters (13,9,7). 
Mr Shafqat owns a car which he uses for all his travelling including social trips for his 
family. His wife, son and daughters travel in a tonga to and from their schools located in the 
same area and pay Rs 600 per month. His father visits farms situated outside Faisalabad once 
a month. He regularly travels by FUTS services to and from the railway station and pays Rs 
3 for a single trip except in bad weather when he travels in a rickshaw for which he pays Rs 
15. His wife usually goes for the shopping with other ladies. The nearest bus stop, about 600 
meters away, has only one FLITS service. However, they travel in tonga to the main bus stops 
at Jaranwala Road, where they have a choice of alternative modes at different fares to the city 
centre; suzuki (Rs 3), tonga (Rs 4) and FUTS services (Rs 4). They prefer to use the FUTS 
service for shopping in the city centre. His wife used to ride on tongas prior to the 
introduction of FUTS. Total monthly travel expenditure of his household is Rs 1000. 
Case 2. Abdul Hameed, 52, is a resident of Peoples Colony No II. He was retired from the 
air force and presently works as a sales-man, with a total monthly income of Rs 6000. His 
household comprises 6 members; wife (40), two sons (17,3), and two daughter (11,1). 
He owns a motorcycle which is used exclusively by him. His son, a student of Islamia 
College Sargodha Road, mostly uses suburban buses, paying a student concessionary fare. 
However, when he is late from the college and during exam days he travels in FUTS services 
and pays Rs 5 for a single trip. His daughter goes on foot to her school located within the 
local area. His wife either travels in a suzuki or FUTS service for shopping and social 
purposes. The fare to the city centre is Rs 5 and Rs 3.5 for FUTS and suzuki services 
respectively. If a seat is available to her in both services she prefers to travel in FUTS 
services despite the extra expense, as she feels comfort is more important than the money. 
Members of the household who use FUTS services on certain occasions used to travel in 
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suzukis for these trips. Total monthly travel expenditure for his household is Rs 500. 
Case 3. Muhammad Din, 60, lives in Gulberg Colony with his two sons (30,22), a daughter 
(20), and a daughter in law (18). He and his younger son are running a shop adjacent to their 
house and earn about Rs 6000 per month. His elder son works as a sales-man in the city 
centre, with a monthly income of Rs 1800. His daughter also works for a private nursery 
school and earns about Rs 1000 per month, and his daughter in law is a housewife. 
Usually, his younger son travels in FUTS services and pays Rs 2.5 to go to the city centre 
to buy commodities. He then travels on an animal-driven cart hired to transport commodities 
to their shop. Usually in the morning while going to work his elder son prefers to ride on a 
tonga, costing Rs 3, due to non-availability of seats in FUTS services . In the evening, he 
regularly travels by FUTS service and pays Rs 2 from his work place to home. The ladies 
frequently travel in FUTS services for social and shopping activities. His elder son's family 
occasionally use rickshaws to visit their relatives. Most of the household members were using 
tongas prior to the introduction of FUTS services. Total travel expenditure for their household 
members is Rs 800 per month. 
Case 4. Nusrat, 50, lives in a rented house in Saman Abad, with his wife and three sons. He 
owns a small factory installed in his owned house. All male members of their household work 
in the factory and their reported monthly income is about Rs 10,000. 
Nusrat has a motorcycle and uses it for all trips except when he goes outside Faisalabad and 
travels in FUTS to and from railway station or coach stand and pays Rs 5 for a single trip. 
His wife, 50, is a status conscious lady and uses rickshaw for most of her trips, but sometimes 
she attends religious functions with her husband and uses motorcycle. All three sons use 
bicycles to and from their factory. They use their father's motorcycle, if available, or FUTS 
services for their longer-distance trips. They were using suzukis prior to FUTS service. Their 
local travel expenditure is Rs 1000 per month. 
Case 5. Muhammad Ayub, 55, lives adjacent to Islam Nagar area with his wife, three sons, 
and two daughters. He works as a medical representative and earns about 5000 per month. 
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His two elder sons were students of the researcher and graduated in town planning and civil 
engineering in 1993 and 1994 respectively. The elder son (town planner) at the time of survey 
was unemployed and was preparing himself for civil services examination. The civil engineer 
is employed with a private firm outside Faisalabad and is earning Rs 6000 per month. The 
younger son and daughters are college students. 
Mr Ayub is a regular user and his daughters also travel in FUTS service to attend college and 
for social activities. The town planner and his younger brother use bicycles for various 
purpose trips but they travel by FUTS services when accompanied with their ladies. All 
household members go shopping on foot as the city centre is located close to their residence. 
The engineer son uses a rickshaw whenever he visits home about every month. Previously, 
they were using suzukis and tongas. Mr Ayub states that as his daughters have grown up he 
had planned to purchase a second hand car in 1994 but with the introduction of FUTS, he has 
postponed his plans for the time being. All members are very satisfied with this service but 
demand improvement in crews' behaviour. Their total monthly travel expenditure is about Rs 
800. 
Case 6. Fazal Din, 55, lives in his own house in Ghulam Mohammad abad, with his wife 
(45), a daughter (22) and three sons (18,14,10). He is a carpenter and works within his area. 
His wife and daughter are not working. All his sons are studying. Fazal reported his monthly 
income as Rs 3,000 which seemed unrealistic. 
Fazal has a motorcycle and uses it for all trips. His wife and daughter sometimes use FUTS 
service or tonga for shopping in central area. They use their own motorcycle for social and 
recreational purposes. They were asked that why they do not use FUTS service regularly? 
They replied, it was expensive for them. His two sons studying in the central area use 
bicycles to and from their educational institutions. The third son goes on foot to his school 
located within the local area. The total household monthly travel expenditure is Rs 300 which 
largely consists of petrol and repairs for the motorcycle and mending punctures for bicycles. 
Implications of household interviews: Although the above household case studies cannot 
give a comprehensive picture of households in the entire city, some implications can be drawn 
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from these cases. They reveal that households having their own vehicles fully utilize them for 
various trip purposes and that household members having no access to their own vehicles use 
public transport. The case studies illustrate that the FUTS service is being used by households 
with a monthly income of between Rs 5000 to 10,500. These households are from middle and 
higher income groups (see Table 6.1). This reflects the passenger survey results and it appears 
most households from low income groups cannot generally afford the use of FUTS service. 
The FUTS service is also being used by all age and sex groups. The case studies also show 
that where household members have a choice, they prefer to travel by FUTS service rather 
than suzukis, regardless of higher fares. The households have also shown their concern over 
the limited number of FLITS vehicles. 
6.7.4 Summary of survey findings 
The following is a summary of findings from the passenger surveys and household case 
studies in Faisalabad. 
  The majority of the FUTS passengers travel in FUTS services due to a guaranteed seat 
and service reliability, whereas the majority of the suzuki passengers travel in suzukis 
mainly owing to inadequacy of FUTS service, and complain about comfort and 
reliability aspects of the suzuki service. 
  Unlike suzukis, the FUTS service is popular among passengers and the majority of 
them are satisfied with service operation. 
 A majority of the users are satisfied with the FUTS fares and they prefer to use FUTS 
service over suzukis despite the latter's low fares. 
  Surveys show that a majority of passengers are prepared to pay higher fares for better 
quality services. 
  Surveys show that a majority of the passengers regularly use FLITS services rather 
than suzuki services. 
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  The majority of suzuki passengers are willing to use FUTS services, where adequately 
provided. 
  Route deviations, overcharging, and overloading in FUTS service have been reported 
but at a very low level. 
  FUTS service has attracted the ridership of suzuki (37 percent), tonga (24 percent), 
autorickshaw (12 percent) and remaining from private transport and walking persons. 
  Surveys show that users are concerned about the inadequate number of FUTS vehicles. 
FUTS passengers have also shown concern over safety aspects and the behaviour of 
crews. 
  Surveys reveal that the ridership of the FUTS service is predominantly from the 
middle income groups with an average monthly income of Rs 4955 whereas suzuki 
ridership is more from lower income groups with passengers having an average 
monthly income of Rs 4300 . 
  Surveys indicate that there is still a market for suzuki service. This can be seen by the 
fact that 30 percent of the suzuki passengers are using suzukis rather than FUTS 
services due to low fares. Similarly, 9 percent of the FUTS passengers indicated they 
travel by FUTS services because no cheaper public transport is available to them on 
certain routes. The higher fares appear to be a barrier to the use of FUTS services by 
lower income groups. 
6.7 Performance of the Faisalabad Urban Transport Society's Services 
6.7.1 Operational performance 
The FLITS fleet has largely replaced the suzukis in the city. This can be seen by the fact that 
there are 22 RTA defined routes for suzuki operation and, until 1993, all these defined routes 
were operated. Now only 8 routes are operated, and in areas not adequately networked with 
FUTS services. This rapid transformation has occurred because of the quality of service 
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provided by the FUTS, which suzuki operators are unable to match because their fares are 
capped. There are other suzuki services operating illegally, however, in areas of the city not 
covered by FLITS services. 
1. Passenger volumes: A significant indicator of productivity is the number of passengers 
carried in relation to the capacity of the system. A minibus plying in Faisalabad carries an 
average of 315 passengers each day, whereas in Indian cities an overloaded minibus of the 
same capacity carries 450-480 passengers per day (Fouracre and Maunder, 1981). This 
comparison suggests that there is no overloading on FUTS services. In total over 200,000 
passengers are carried daily by the entire fleet. 
2. Fleet utilization: The proportion of a vehicle fleet that can be put into service each day 
has a direct bearing on the productivity of the system. According to information provided by 
the society 95% of the FUTS minibuses are available for service from 6.00 am to 10.00 pm 
throughout the day. This indicates the effectiveness of vehicle maintenance and overall 
management of the system. A similarly high utilization figure (95%) has been reported to be 
achieved by the Cheran Transport Corporation in India (see chapter 3, section 6), but this is 
very exceptional in the LDC context. 
3. Staff employed: The number of staff employed to put buses into regular service provides 
a clear indication of the labour productivity of the service. An average of only 2.6 persons 
are employed per FUTS operating vehicle. For comparison in Quetta, where mostly public 
transport services are provided by the private sector, the staff employed per operating vehicle 
is 4.3 and for the Cheran Transport Corporation in India 6.5 (see chapter 3, section 6). 
4. Operating cost/surplus: The total operating cost per FUTS vehicle per day is around Rs 
600-700, which includes labour cost, taxes, fines, service charges, spares, tyres, oil and 
maintenance, and is identical compared with the operating cost of a minibus in Lahore (see 
Appendix 4). In Faisalabad, maintenance costs are high due to damaged roads whereas in 
Lahore contingencies are high such as for graft. Private operators under FLITS control are 
generating an operating surplus around Rs 900-1200 per vehicle per day (see section 6.5.2). 
This is a high level compared to the surplus of operators with the same type of vehicles in 
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Lahore (Rs 500-600) and Rawalpindi-Islamabad (Rs 600-700). This is a result of realistic 
fares and efficient operation under the management of FUTS. 
6.7.2 Quality of service 
Quality expectations and acceptable levels of service vary from country to country. 
International comparisons are difficult to make and there are no universally applicable criteria 
against which to assess the quality of bus services in a city. More restricted comparisons can 
give useful insights nevertheless, and there are a number of attributes that can be measured 
in examining level of service. They include frequency/waiting time, walking distance to bus 
stops, bus occupancy, number of transfers, journey time, fares, reliability, service information, 
and the capacity of a system. In the Pakistani context, system capacity, waiting time, in- 
vehicle travelling time, access to bus services, fares, safety aspects and bus occupancy are 
selected for discussion below, as they apply to the FUTS services. 
1. System capacity: Passenger seats per capita give a general indication of the level of 
service provided in a city. In Faisalabad FUTS has only 655 minibuses for a city of 
population approaching 2 million. The current ratio of 0.40 buses per 1000 population 
(excluding the suzukis) is almost equal to the average of 0.39 observed by Jacob et al (1986) 
for a large number of cities in LDCs. The FUTS scheme provides about 9,750 passenger seats 
per day. Alongside are the suzuki services, providing 3,000 seats, with autorickshaws 
providing 4,650 and tongas 9,000 seats (Table 6.3). 
2. Service frequency/waiting time: Service frequency is a major factor in the overall quality 
of a service, and for urban services this is indicated by the time passengers have to wait at 
bus stops. In Faisalabad, the frequency of service is very high on the busiest FLITS routes (5 
out of the 11 routes, on which more than 70 minibuses operate) with average waiting times 
of only 8 and 5 minutes during the peak and off peak periods respectively. Waiting times are 
higher in the peak hours because FUTS minibuses are full and overloading is not allowed. 
3. Journey times: The journey time depends on the overall average speed, taking into account 
running speeds, delays in traffic, and en-route stopping to enable passengers to 
board and 
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alight. Minibuses in Faisalabad, as elsewhere in Pakistan, operate at high speeds when 
possible, but encounter poor quality road surfaces and are caught up in congestion and mixed 
traffic where their speeds decrease to 10-12 km per hour in the peak hours (see Plate). The 
average journey speed for the entire fleet controlled by FUTS has been recorded as 17 km 
per hour. This compares poorly with the figure reported for minibuses in Delhi of 22.4 km 
per hour (Fouracre and Maunder, 1981), although this figure is now dated. 
4. Bus occupancy: Bus occupancy is defined as the number of passengers per vehicle under 
operation for a given period of time and for a specific part of the route network. A 
remarkable feature of the FUTS operation is that no overloading is allowed. The vehicles are 
restricted to the seating capacity of 15 passengers throughout the day. Initially frequent cases 
of overloading were found, but fines (of Rs 50/extra passenger) were imposed and 
consequently violations have been largely eliminated. The survey in 1996 found that 72 
percent of the passenger interviewed have never seen overloading on the FUTS services, with 
11 and 14 percent reporting that they have seen overloading during peak and off-peak periods 
respectively (see Table 6.17). 
5. Route density: As indicated earlier, FUTS is adding more routes to its network with the 
increase in number of its vehicles. Routes have an average length of 19.5 km. The entire route 
network comprises of only 215 km with a route density of 0.07 km per 1000 population. This 
indicator suggests a major improvement is required in the total route network for the city of 
Faisalabad, although suzuki services have been excluded from the calculation. 
6. Reliability: There are no predetermined timetables by which the reliability of FUTS 
services can be judged. However, 73 percent of the passengers who are regular users of the 
service indicated satisfaction because they know the headway of their specific route. 
Moreover, an important feature affecting reliability is that drivers do not wait for full 
passenger load at the terminal or wait for additional passengers for varying times at different 
bus stops, which is a common practice for suzuki drivers in Faisalabad and on public 
transport services operated in other cities of Pakistan. Also, route shortening or deviation has 
been largely eliminated (see section 6.6). 
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7. Hours of operation: The period of operation of the service has serious consequences for 
the operating costs of the operator and for the service offered to the public. FUTS has 
determined hours of operation as 6.00 am to 10.00 pm. The same level of services operates 
throughout this period, and some operators continue their operation until mid night on the 
routes where passengers are available to them. Unlike public transport service in other cities 
in Pakistan and suzuki service in Faisalabad, passengers are confident about the hours of 
operation of FUTS services and the 1996 survey affirms that passengers have no complaints 
about this aspect (see section 6.6). 
8. Safety aspects: Although the accident rate provides some indication of driving and 
maintenance performance, it is also influenced by the traffic conditions and the volume of 
pedestrians. Over the past 3 years, minibuses under FUTS control have been involved in only 
one fatal accident. However, it appears that many vehicles have been involved in minor 
accidents resulting in damage to the vehicle body. For this type of accident no record is 
readily available. Drivers reported that these minor accidents occurred in conflict with slow 
moving carts where only property was damaged, but minor injuries also often go unreported. 
Survey results indicated that 62 percent of the passengers interviewed were satisfied with 
safety aspects of FUTS services, but 31 percent passengers were dissatisfied, complaining that 
crews are always in a hurry or drivers irresponsible, risking accidents (see Table 6.20). 
6.8 Conclusions 
The new form of regulation in Faisalabad, utilizing NGO status, has proved far more effective 
and promoted major improvements in services. Government agencies have failed to achieve 
regulatory objectives owing to the inefficiency and corruption of the government's own 
bureaucratic procedures. Yet the same chief government officials have been able to improve 
the quality of public transport by regulation through the NGO. 
The FUTS experience demonstrates that private operators in Pakistan are willing to operate 
in an effectively regulated environment. This is one in which they are an integral part of the 
process and are consulted at each stage of planning and decision making, within a fair system 
with no discrimination between operators, and one which allows them to generate a 
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reasonable return on their investments. 
The factors responsible for this success are reasonable fares and the strict enforcement of 
rules by the support staff of the FLITS. The underlying key to this success has been the ability 
of senior officials to establish a forum free of the corruption of the existing agencies. FLITS 
provides a forum for open decision making in discussion with operators and other interested 
parties, with top officials freed from the constraints of their own government systems. The 
forum has promoted more flexible decision making and a learning process. 
Real improvements in the quality of services have been achieved in conditions which are 
financially attractive to operators. The number of FUTS vehicles has grown rapidly, and the 
society is offering greater capacity and a better quality service to passengers, at realistic fares. 
Every passenger is assured a seat, stoppages are at designated stops, and there is generally 
strict adherence to specified routes, although services still lack the support of effective traffic 
management measures. 
User surveys conducted in Faisalabad reveal that a majority of the passengers is satisfied with 
current fares charged by the FLITS services, which clearly demonstrates that there is a demand 
for better quality services at higher fares in Pakistan. 
It is acknowledged that only a limited number of passenger interviews were conducted in 
Faisalabad under this study. It was therefore not possible to explore views of users on the 
basis of income or other socioeconomic variables. As 33 percent of the households in 
Faisalabad belong to a lower income category (up to Rs 3000 per month) (see section 2.2), 
it appears that FLITS fares level may be a barrier to use by low income groups. 
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Chapter 7 Synthesis Of Analysis And Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter synthesises the analyses presented in the previous chapters, and the analysis is 
further supplemented by a discussion of results from in-depth interviews focusing on wider 
regulatory issues. The findings are discussed in terms of the implications for practice in 
reforming the present regulatory regimes for public transport in Pakistan. Section 2 analyses 
the government policies associated with the provision of public transport in urban areas. The 
analysis of various regulations governing urban public transport is the subject of section 3. 
Section 4 provides a summary of the analysis of the effectiveness of NGO based regulation 
by comparing its performance with government regulation in providing urban public transport 
services. The final section presents the concluding remarks. 
7.2 Urban Public Transport Policies 
7.2.1 Transport policy 
The analysis undertaken in chapter four shows that urban public transport 
in Pakistan had not 
been one of the top priorities of the government. This can be seen in the fact that no urban 
articulated transport policy has been formulated so far. As a result, there 
has been no clear 
understanding of the role of the private sector in the provision of urban transport. The main 
responsibility assumed by government has been (until recently) to provide some services 
through publicly owned buses in major urban areas. Even this responsibility for services was 
tossed between FG and PGs. Government grants and subsidies given to public sector services 
have been misdirected due to excessive political involvement, corruption, and the 
incompetence of admin staff. Regulation has been similarly misdirected and ineffectual. From 
time to time there have been individual initiatives stemming from the concern of Chief 
Ministers and/or the Federal Prime Minister to dictate their own decisions. Yet, there was a 
lack of political will in implementing urban public transport initiatives such as the Karachi 
Mass Transit Project and the NTRC pilot projects (see chapter 4, section 8). 
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Nevertheless, in the past the government has commissioned studies on public transport with 
the assistance of overseas funding agencies (see chapter 4 section 7.5). More recently it has 
shown more concern for the improvement of public transport in urban areas, but the policies 
about the role of private and public sector are still ambiguous. In order to promote urban 
public transport, the formulation of a comprehensive policy is desperately needed in Pakistan. 
7.2.2 Ownership policy 
The performance of public sector bus services in LDCs has not been satisfactory. There is 
now a growing tendency for governments to either privatise or terminate the operation of 
public sector bus services (see chapter 3, section 2.1 & section 6). In Pakistan, publicly 
owned services were protected from competition, they received grants for the purchase of new 
vehicles and establishment of depots, and regular subsidies to make-up their operating losses. 
However, the performance of the services drastically declined. The following factors were 
principally responsible for this decline: mis-management (inefficiency and dishonesty of staff); 
low fares; and government interventions such as in the hiring and firing of staff which 
resulted in high overmanning ratios (PRTC 1: 189; KTC 1: 34). As a result of the collapse of 
services, the provincial governments abandoned the publicly owned bus corporations. The 
Punjab Government played a leading role in this regard. 
However the PRTC in Lahore had introduced new full size buses through foreign aid and 
purchase by government grants, and its buses, when operating, served some longer and non 
profitable routes shunned by the private operators. These publicly provided services also 
offered some greater confidence in that passengers were assured of their hours of operation, 
without abuses such as route shortening or bargaining for fares surcharges. A similar situation 
for public sector buses has been reported in Colombo in Sri Lanka (Armstrong-Wright and 
Thiriez, 1987), and in Coimbatore in India (see chapter 3, section 6). 
The termination of public sector bus services raises a question as to the future role of the 
public sector in public transport provision in urban areas of Pakistan. Based on interviews 
with government officials conducted by the researcher, there is no likelihood of reactivating 
the public sector bus corporations. It was intended by the government officials that the 
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government should maintain some involvement in providing public transport services in urban 
areas, such as through the contracting of some services to local or international bus operators. 
The officials were unclear about any future government commitments. 
The Secretary Transport of the Punjab province acknowledged in interview in 1996 that the 
government had little hope in improvement of the PRTC and that the private sector will have 
to play an enhanced role in the provision of public transport services in the province. He 
added that the Punjab Government was working out ways to encourage the participation of 
local and international public transport operators. The past performance of the private 
operators was not regarded as encouraging, and therefore the government would not like to 
rely solely on the private sector. The government was seeking to invite international public 
transport operators to compete with local operators. 
Recently, the Punjab Government has asked private operators for suggestions over public 
private partnerships for operating public transport services in Lahore (Daily Jang 24 
December 1997). Negotiations of the Punjab Government with a UK based bus company have 
also been reported (The News International, 13 March 1998; also see Appendix-6). 
Correspondence reports that a UK based company with the collaboration of the Punjab 
Government is undertaking a pilot project in Lahore froom April 1998. Under this project five 
refurbished full size are operating on one route along Multan Road (Plate 7.1). Corespondence 
also reports that the conditions of this collaboration are still unclear. In this connection the 
Chief Minister of the Punjab province met the general manager of Liverpool based MTL 
Trust Holdings in London on 22 April 1998 (Daily Jang, 23 April 1998). These developments 
indicate that the government has intentions to improve public transport, but it is still not clear 
what would be the involvement of the government in the provision of services. It can be 
envisaged that the government may involve itself in providing urban public transport services 
under mixed ownership. 
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Plate 7.1a A bus used under pilot project in Lahore 
Plate 7.1b On-street pilot bus operation in Lahore 
As far as mixed ownership is concerned, based on the literature review, it can be argued that 
bus operations under mixed ownership could be successful subject to competent autonomous 
and commercially oriented management, and well designed systems for providing information 
and controlling costs. Notable examples of successful operation of buses under mixed 
ownership are the Zimbabwe Passenger United Company in Harare and SOTRAC in Dakkar 
(see chapter 3, section 2.2). In the Pakistani context, any such company needs to operate on 
a commercial basis, with adequate compensation for any non-commercial services or fares. 
The government needs to establish control through the setting of targets, against which the 
company's performance can be monitored. However, there is currently no likelihood that all 
the above conditions can be fulfilled given the poor law and order situation and political 
uncertainty. 
It may appear questionable to try again any approach to bus operation with direct 
government involvement, which could well mean the repetition of old mistakes and 
inefficiency of services. This is mainly because of the scale and extent of corruption involved 
at various levels. The new government is committed to reforms, and the Prime Minister has 
vowed to enact tougher laws to punish corruption, quoted as saying that the majority of 
Pakistan's bureaucrats were corrupt, and that the country suffers estimated losses worth Rs 
two billion (50 million US$) a day due to corruption, mismanagement, and incompetence (The 
News International, 28 March 1997). The Prime Minister himself stated that there was 
corruption from top to bottom in the administrative machinery. Quoting examples, he said Rs 
one billion were misappropriated in just one sale of palm oil, and that the Water and Power 
Development Athourity (WAPDA) was losing Rs 22 billion, Steel Mills Rs 7 billion and 
Pakistan Railways Rs 10 billion a year through corruption (The News International, 28 March 
1997). Correspondence reports that the government has enacted an ordinance "Eradication of 
Corrupt Business Ordinance, 1998". 
These reforms, even if enentually successful, are bound to take time. Meanwhile any 
government involvement in the ownership of the urban public transport operations is seen as 
undesireable. It can be argued that the provision of public transport services under any form 
of ownership could be successful provided there is an arms length approach with no 
intereference with the management to the company. The government also needs to have a 
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clear understanding of the role to be played by the private sector. The worst policy would be 
to start something and make an investment without a clear view of future commitments. 
7.2.3 Subsidy and grants policy 
In Pakistan, the main strategy of the FG/PGs previously revolved around the provision of 
public transport services through the public sector bus corporations. However, the grants and 
subsidies given to these corporations did not result in sustained improvements of public 
transport. The private sector, on the other hand, although substantially more important in 
terms of passenger kms transported, seldom received equal treatment (see chapter 3, sections 
2.3). 
At present no specific subsidies and grants are being given for the provision of public 
transport services, although subsidies could be seen as justifiable for the following major 
reasons. First, to provide essential services to poor people at affordable fares. Second, to 
maintain services on non profitable routes seen as socially or environmentally necessary. 
Third, to compensate for any concessionary fares. Based on the literature review and keeping 
in view the past experience of mismanagement it is not advisable to grant blanket subsidies. 
Moreover, in the Pakistani context, operating subsidies are absolutely undesirable. However, 
targeted subsidies that meet appropriate and specific social and economic objectives could be 
justified. In order to achieve these policy objectives clear targets need to be defined and 
effective mechanisms are needed to implement the administration of the subsidies. 
7.2.4 Taxation policy 
In most LDCs a large share of public transport services is provided by private sector 
operators. The services are operated with a bewildering variety of vehicles and the enterprises 
tend to be small scale, undercapitalised, and very often operating at marginal profitability. The 
development of a private sector bus industry has been hampered mainly due to non-supportive 
government policies such a lack of financial incentives and a heavy taxation structure. The 
supply of new vehicles in the public transport market is restricted and passengers are 
constrained to travel in low quality vehicles. 
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The literature shows that in some LDCs governments have addressed public transport capacity 
problems by arranging bank loans or by relaxing taxes. For instance in Sri Lanka, the 
government relaxed import restrictions and gave tax incentives to operators for the purchase 
of new vehicles in 1979. These actions evoked a strong response from private bus operators, 
who imported more than 6,000 buses during 1979-81 (see chapter 3, section 7.3). In Buenos 
Aires (Argentina), full size bus purchases were encouraged by bank loans (Salvucci, 1997). 
In Pakistan, although some temporary financial incentives were given under the PMPTS, the 
tax and incentives structure has generally worked against public transport and did not 
encourage bona-fide private operators to enter the market (see chapter 4, section 7.2). 
Presently, private sector operators receive no financial incentives. On the contrary, there are 
excessive taxes (over 50% of the price of vehicle) on the import of new vehicles, on top of 
which operators have to pay bribes to officials for smooth operation of service! (see chapter 
4, section 5). In his interview with the researcher in 1996, the Secretary Transport of the 
Punjab province acknowledged that the major hurdles in promoting the public transport 
industry were that the banks do not give loans to the private sector operators for the purchase 
of vehicles, and that the FG levies huge taxes on the import of vehicles which have crippled 
the growth of the private sector bus industry. 
Under present circumstances, when there is an acute shortage of public transport in urban 
areas, it has become imperative that private operators be given some tax rebates and 
concessions in customs duties similar to those in Sri Lanka. Recently however, the 
government has decided to reduce some taxes on public transport vehicles, the details of 
which will be announced in the upcoming budget 1998-99 (Daily Jang, 4 April 1998). 
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7.3 Urban Public Transport Regulation 
7.3.1 Fare regulations 
The review of literature shows that in most LDCs fares are controlled by governments and 
they are not revised regularly in response to rising costs of operation. Fare increases are 
hardly on the basis of financial or economic analysis. Under this situation attempts have to 
be made by the operators to maintain profits by cutting costs. In particular, they have 
achieved this by lowering vehicle standards, (employing old vehicles rather than new, smaller 
vehicles rather than larger) by spending less on maintenance, and by reducing labour costs 
(exploiting the labour force). There is also temptation to increase revenues by overcharging 
passengers. This situation implies that the fare regulations by governments have adversely 
influenced levels of profitability for operators and levels of service for users. On the other 
hand fares control on a realistic basis has ensured profitability for operators and resulted in 
improved services to users, such as in Hong Kong (see chapter 3, section 9.1). 
The literature also reveals that there are better off groups who are willing to pay more for 
better quality services. On the other hand, low-income groups opt for services with low fares 
at the expense of quality of service. However, at low level regulated fares the quality of 
service offered by the operators is inevitably constrained. 
The problems of regulated fares have been well recognized and in a number of countries it 
has led to the abolition of fares control. In some countries governments have also abolished 
public grants as well as removed entry restrictions. However, the deregulation of fares has not 
achieved the desired results. The analysis made in chapter three shows that 
operators'associations have often taken control in the absence of government fares regulation. 
These associations function in the interest of their members rather than passengers (see 
chapter 3, section 4). 
In Pakistan, fares are held low as a policy on welfare grounds, and they are not reviewed on 
a regular basis. In Karachi for instance, there were no increases in bus fares during 1983-1989 
(Gray, 1990; Qasim, 1994). Similarly, data collected by the researcher show that fares were 
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not increased in NWFP from January 1991 to August 1995. Government officials in Pakistan 
are aware that regulated fares are not sufficient to operate urban public transport successfully, 
but due to a lack of political will, the fares are not increased on regular basis. When an 
increase in fares has been authorised it has generally been as a result of operators'strikes. 
Moreover, fare increases have been given on assertions rather than on any realistic criteria. 
The analysis of the existing situation in Lahore reveals that the low fare structure determined 
by the Provincial Government has led to marginal profitability. Uneconomic concessionary 
student fares are imposed and no compensating incentives or subsidies are provided. The main 
consequence of the present fare regulation is that it has led to inadequate supply (both 
quantity and quality) of public transport. The low profitability has made investment in new 
vehicles (buses, midibuses and minibuses) unattractive, and has meant that operators reduce 
standards of service and safety (chapter 5, section 7.6). Hundal (1987) reported that in seven 
major urban areas of Pakistan, most public transport vehicles had an age falling within 9-14 
years and only 20 percent vehicles had an age of less than four years. 
Another negative aspect of current regulated fares is that operators are constrained from 
offering better quality services, even to those who can afford them. The regulations prevent 
the emergence of services with more space, no standing, more comfortable seats, or express 
services and air conditioning. The 1996 surveys showed that an overwhelming majority of the 
potential users was prepared to use better quality minibuses and full size buses at higher fares 
in Lahore. 
The interviews conducted by the researcher with the representatives of operators'associations, 
individual operators and government officials, showed that none of them favoured the 
deregulation of fares. Officials emphasised that some measures of government control over 
urban transport operations are necessary to protect the public interest. Operators envisaged 
that deregulated fares would reduce ridership and result in passenger-operator conflicts. 
Therefore, operators favoured controlled fares but they highlighted the need for the 
introduction of better quality services, reasonable fares, and compensation for concessionary 
travel by student passengers. The above situation implies that in Pakistani context, fares are 
likely to remain regulated. Assuming this is so the following issues related to fares regulation 
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need to be addressed by policy makers: 
1. Fare setting procedures are needed that allow (a) a reasonable return on investment 
(b) periodic adjustments to fares that reflect cost increases and (c) services at different 
fare levels. 
2. A mechanism is required for the compensation of concessionary fares, if they are to 
continue to be offered. 
As far as the fares setting procedure is concerned, ideally, what is required is a mechanism 
for establishing fares which is transparent and intelligible to all concerned. The mechanism 
needs to be simple to operate and beneficial to both the operators and the users. Briggs (1992) 
suggested the decisions for determining the fares should be based the following fundamental 
principles: 
" To provide revenues sufficient to remunerate the operators, giving an agreed return on 
resources employed in providing the services. 
" To provide as good a level of service to the users as possible at a given fare level, 
considering that for a given pattern and size of demand the cost of providing that level 
of service has to be recouped from fare revenue unless the services are to be 
subsidised. 
In order to employ the above principles, it is obviously essential to know what operating costs 
are, and what revenues are expected to be earned for a given fare level. This itself will 
require a continuous monitoring of both supply and demand by the regulatory agency. 
Industry costs need to be periodically checked and carefully evaluated. 
As far as concessionary fares are concerned, mainly a concession is given to students. This 
concession has affected the performance of private sector operators as they are not 
compensated, and it had a particularly adverse effect on the publicly owned services. In 
Pakistan it seems extremely difficult for the government to withdraw this concession due to 
envisaged threats from the students. Government chief officials in their interviews conducted 
by the researcher intended to compensate operators for this concession in order to improve 
public transport. Under the present circumstances, the following problems can be envisaged 
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with the formulation of this policy. First, it was observed by the researcher that the bus crews 
did not issue tickets to students or other passengers, which means there are no records of 
student travelling. Second, if passengers are issued with tickets there are chances of fraud. 
Third, there is the possibility of misuse of student ride cards. 
In view of the above problems, administering accounting for public financial support for the 
student concession in a transparent manner would require a sophisticated strategy. The first 
step towards this end could be to negotiate with educational institutions and obtain the 
number of registered students. Then weekly student travel vouchers could be issued to the 
institution not directly to the student. Although this would involve additional efforts for the 
educational institutions it would potentially resolve day-to-day student-operator disputes. This 
mechanism would also need some basis on which to pay operators such as the production of 
vouchers issued to students as an evidence for payment claims to the operators. 
7.3.2 Quantity controls 
The analysis of public transport services shows that in urban areas in Pakistan the structure 
of the industry is dominated by very small operators with one or two vehicles. Quantity limits 
to both ownership and route access are set in an arbitrary manner; and they tend to become 
a subject of corruption and political manipulation. The use of such quantity controls rarely 
achieves the desired effect, and the results are very often undesirable. In all cities fixed route 
bus services are not meeting the passenger demand, and the gap is partially filled by 
autorickshaws, taxis and other modes. As a result the problems of traffic congestion and 
environmental pollution are exacerbated. 
The analysis of the services made in chapters 4-6 shows that the quantity of public transport 
services is undoubtedly poor in Pakistani cities. It is not uncommon to observe passengers 
travelling on the roof-top of full size buses, hanging behind suzukis and standing in `angular 
shape' in minibuses. Survey results confirm this to be so. The 1996 survey showed that none 
of the households in Lahore was satisfied with the provision of public transport; complaining 
about the inadequacy of number of buses, deficient route network, poor quality of services, 
and the lack of any services in some areas (see chapter 5, section 6.3). This lack of adequate 
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of services is in part the direct result of arbitrary controls such as the limits on the number 
of minibuses (see chapter 5, section 3.4). 
The Secretary RTA and the Secretary PTA indicated in their interviews with the researcher 
that the Punjab Government is reviewing its quantity control policies in order to address 
public transport problems in Lahore. The intention is to adopt the following measures: 
promotion of private full size bus operation and imposition of restrictions on minibuses. These 
measures apparently are intended to change the structure of the industry from small to large 
capacity vehicles. The government hopes that this action will (a) reduce congestion, since full 
size buses are thought to use less passenger road space than minibuses in relationship to their 
passenger carrying capacity, and full size bus drivers are more disciplined than minibus 
drivers; (b) reduce accidents, since minibuses have higher accident rates; and (c) ensure an 
adequate supply of transport capacity. 
These measures are in response to serious concern about high accident rates and congestion 
caused by the way minibuses are being operated. However, the share of minibuses was about 
49 percent (passenger seats per day) of the total public transport services and about 75 percent 
share of the total bus services in Lahore in 1996 (see chapter 5, Table 5.2). To 
impose further 
quantity restrictions on minibus operation is likely to aggravate capacity problems. 
Until 
effective mechanisms can be found to promote the full size bus 
industry, discouraging 
minibuses would lead to: (a) a reduced supply of public transport leading to even greater 
overcrowding on buses, (b) reduced service frequency on route networks, (c) a further switch 
in to paratransit, especially autorickshaws, which are noisy and emit more fumes, and (d) 
encouragement to purchase and use more private vehicles. Furthermore, the researcher's 
experience shows that the authorities in Pakistan have been prompt in employing a `stick' 
approach, and lax in offering a `carrot' approach. In order to improve public transport in 
urban areas the carrot approach needs more emphasis. 
It can be argued that regulatory restrictions on various sizes and types of vehicles are not the 
solution to ameliorate the congestion problems but that this requires better traffic 
management, including bus priorities and the enforcement of traffic rules (see section 3.4). 
It is acknowledged that there is a case for introducing more full size buses and reducing the 
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number of minibuses on sections of routes with high passenger volumes. It is therefore argued 
that entry controls on minibuses need to be more selective and should only apply on specific 
sections where there are traffic problems, not on entire route networks. Moreover it is 
essential to make sure that there will be no capacity problem created by employing 
restrictions on minibuses. In short, a package of complementary measures is required. 
7.3.3 Quality controls 
1. Service standards 
Service quality standards exist in many countries but they are not necessarily properly 
enforced. Enforcement of regulations by various regulatory authorities is often weak in LDCs. 
As a result of weak enforcement, operators do not observe the standards (see chapter 3, 
section 5). 
However, the literature shows some cases where quality regulations have been strictly 
enforced. In Buenos Aires (Argentina), the licensing authority monitors performance of 
services and sometimes withdraws licences (Gwilliam and Scurfield, 1996). In Papua New 
Guinea, the quality of service was improved as a result of rigorously enforced regulation 
(Khezwana and Maunder, 1994). 
In Pakistan quality controls are grossly inadequate. Outmoded and worn-out vehicles, and 
unreliable services, have created severe difficulties for passengers. Regulatory authorities issue 
route permits but do not monitor service standards, except in Faisalabad. 
Operators'associations generally control service operation and do not regulate in the interest 
of passengers. Public transport quality issues are repeatedly highlighted in the local and 
national newspapers (see chapter 5, section 7.2). The household survey in Lahore and 
passenger survey for suzuki services in Faisalabad confirm the dissatisfaction with both 
service levels and their quality (see chapter 5, section 6& chapter 6, section 9.1). 
Ineffective enforcement is a main cause, but other factors are also responsible for quality of 
service problems. The inadequate level of services creates pressures for overloading, as 
described in section 3.1, and part of the problem is that the existing buses are poorly utilised. 
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There is usually no scheduling, and the buses spend a large proportion of the time in long 
queues at the terminals, providing no service to passengers. 
Another problem related to service standards is that governments have not allowed variations 
in bus services with different service standards at different levels of fare. Controlled fares 
have undermined the role of public transport services. For instance, those passengers willing 
to make trade-offs between comfort and fares level have no choice. As a result, those who 
can afford to opt for alternative modes such as private car, autorickshaw, taxi etc (see chapter 
5, section 6.3). 
Under the existing regulatory arrangements it is very difficult to improve service standards 
because of factors such as the limited extent of enforcement, the inefficiency of regulatory 
officials, and corruption, in addition to the effects of controlled fares on bus services. To 
improve service standards, reforms in the current regulatory and enforcement regimes are 
essential. The FUTS experience demonstrates that improvements in quality of service can be 
achieved through effective enforcement of service standards (see chapter 6, section 5). 
2. Route networks 
The review of literature shows that in most LDCs route networks are 
defined by transport 
authorities without applying any specific criteria or consulting operators. Generally, networks 
are neither reviewed nor extended in the face of growing populations or city limits and 
changes in the associated demands for public transport services. As a result route networks 
are defficient, and services are inadequate in many cities (see chapter 3, section 4.3). The 
procedures in Hong Kong, whereby operators are consulted in the process of formulating 
route networks provide a marked contrast. 
In Pakistan, the route networks defined by the authorities are deficient in major urban areas. 
Cities are growing rapidly but route networks are not being effectively modified in response 
to demand (except in Faisalabad), although a limited number of routes have been added in 
some cities. For instance in Lahore, the route network was not revised over the 10 years from 
1985 to 1995, and only 10 new routes were added during that period (see chapter 4, Table 
4.8). 
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Analysis of the existing situation in Lahore reveals that routes do not penetrate in many areas, 
particularly where roadways are often narrow and poorly maintained. Most of these areas are 
densely inhabited (generally by lower-income groups). In these areas, the RTA has defined 
routes for the operation of buses only along major roads. Moreover, more peripheral locations 
of new development are not well networked either (see chapter 5, sections 7.1; 7.3). The RTA 
has not defined routes by applying any sensible criteria and, as a result, passengers have poor 
access to public transport services (see chapter 5, sections 6.1; 6.2). In addition, many routes 
defined by the RTA are not taken up by the operators because they are not considered 
profitable, as explained in chapter 5, section 3.4. 
The following are the principal reasons for the inadequate and inappropriate route networks 
in Pakistani cities. First, in order to define a well organised route network, there is a need for 
information on passenger demand and the operational environment, and a high skill level 
among staff. Unfortunately, in Pakistan the regulatory authorities (RTAs and PTAs) 
responsible for route definition have neither the qualified staff nor the information required. 
Second, routes are not modified on the basis of a regular monitoring process. Third, operators 
are not involved at any stage of route network definition (except in Faisalabad). 
3. Vehicle quality/safety standards 
Vehicle quality and safety controls exist throughout the world but the literature shows that 
they are not implemented properly in many LDCs (see chapter 3, section 4.3). As a result, 
public transport vehicles in use are of poor quality and reckless driving practices are common 
(Armstrong-Wright and Thireiz, 1987; Armstrong-Wright, 1993; Gwilliam, 1997). Reckless 
drivers cause accidents, and poor quality vehicles are a major source of air pollution. For 
instance, Fernandez (1994) stated that rash and irritational drivers caused accidents and low 
quality vehicles caused unacceptable levels of pollution in Santiago, and claimed that 71 
percent of the pollution from traffic was from public transport vehicles. This was mainly due 
to the lack of maintenance in the absence of enforcement of emission standards. 
In Pakistan, safety standards for public service vehicles exist theoretically in the form of the 
licensing of drivers and testing of vehicles before issuing vehicle fitness certificates. Neither 
of these regulations are effective mainly due to corruption and an unwillingness of 
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government officials to enforce these regulations (see chapter 5, section 3.3). Public transport 
vehicles are among the most polluting vehicles in Pakistani cities. Vehicle engines are not 
properly tuned and are rarely regularly serviced and use substandard oil. Consequently, the 
pollution caused by emissions from these vehicles is greater than private vehicles (see chapter 
5, section 7.4). Recently, the Prime Minister himself has directed the provincial governments 
to ensure that vehicle fitness certificates are issued only for mechanically fit vehicles. In 
cases, anywhere unfit vehicles are found operating on road, action may be taken against the 
MVE issuing the fitness certificate in ddition to the vehicle owner (Daily Jang, 16 March 
1998). 
Generally there is insufficient and inadequate driver education and training in Pakistan. Public 
transport drivers receive driver training either from professional drivers or their 
relatives/friends. They obtain their driving licences by paying bribes to the Traffic Police even 
without appearing in the test. They have only a limited knowledge of traffic regulations. 
Moreover, they work long hours in a demanding street environment, typically for a 14-hours 
shift. The end result is poor road safety and traffic congestion caused by their negligence. 
Analysis in in Lahore has confirmed for instance, that public service vehicles were involved 
in 85 percent of the total deaths in road accidents! Of these, minibuses were involved in 40 
percent of the total deaths registered from road accidents which occurred in Lahore (see 
chapter 5, section 7.6). 
There is no realistic alternative to regulation for purposes of safety, health, and protection of 
the environment. The present regulations regarding quality and safety do not require 
modification as much as their implementation and stem enforcement. It is clear that with 
rigorous enforcement of inspection rules and regulations, vehicles standards, and driving 
competence tests, the situation can be improved in Pakistan. 
7.3.4 Traffic congestion/management 
Traffic congestion is common in all Pakistani cities though at differing scales. Apart from the 
general increase in the number of motor vehicles, there are other factors which contribute to 
traffic congestion problems. The following is a summary of the main factors contributing to 
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congestion in Lahore and Faisalabad. 
"A lack of understanding of basic traffic rules and very selfish attitudes by all road 
users 
" Inappropriate activities by unruly drivers such as speeding, queue jumping, red light 
offenses, and improper stopping and parking 
0 The mix of motorised and non-motorised traffic 
"A general lack of planning control, that leads to encroachments of walkways and 
carriageway, the construction of new developments without adequate provision of 
parking 
" Inadequate traffic management measures; poor signing, road marking, the sub-standard 
nature of traffic signals (where provided), and the general lack of provisions for 
pedestrians 
" Lack of maintenance of the existing road infrastructure 
0 Inadequate provision of bus stops 
" Poorly trained, low paid, and inexperienced traffic police. Traffic regulation is one of 
their duties and has a low priority 
As in other LDC cities (for instance see chapter 3, the case study from Sri Lanka), the 
minibuses in Lahore themselves contribute to the chaotic situation. Headrunning, racing to bus 
stops, irregular despatching and other problems associated with on-street competition is the 
norm. This adds to the reasons why public transport services are generally not considered a 
reliable mode. Most delays occur at bus stops and junctions rather than along running sections 
of roads. Full size buses in particular, suffer from delays resulting from traffic congestion, for 
instance, the bus operation under the pilot project even has no protection fromother road users 
(see Plate 7.1b). 
In Lahore, in addition to transport and traffic studies, the TEPA has undertaken both minor 
traffic improvement schemes and major engineering projects. These are aimed at improving 
the junction capacity, junction control and street lighting. The current measures for road based 
public transport are very limited and confined to terminal provision. No scheme has been 
undertaken specifically to achieve the efficient flow of public transport. The TEPA intends 
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to launch further traffic engineering/management projects. The proposed programme only 
includes one project related to public transport which involves terminal improvements (see 
chapter 5, section 2.5). 
The review of literature shows that buses are one of the most space-efficient and cost- 
effective means of transporting large number of people. Where traffic flows are well below 
the capacity of the road network, buses can share road space with other traffic and, in general, 
there is little need for special priorities for buses. However, where road traffic volumes are 
high in relation to road capacity, buses suffer from the congestion and delays caused by other 
road users, and priorities are needed to release buses from traffic congestion. There are three 
main ways in which this can be achieved, which are: spot priorities, bus lanes and bus ways. 
In many countries bus lanes have been provided to give buses priority over long sections of 
the network. They have achieved better results where they have been respected by all road 
users, but have failed in countries where poorly enforced, such as in Bangkok and Indian 
cities. However, to overcome enforcement problems and to further improve bus performance 
busways are employed. Busways have been reported to have improved markedly the 
efficiency of bus transit (see chapter 3, section 4.4). 
In the Pakistani environment where road user discipline is very poor and enforcement by 
government officials is considered a low priority, bus lanes tend to be ineffective over large 
sections of a road network. Gray in evaluating public transport planning in Karachi criticized 
that "in Karachi, bus lanes have in the past been designated but not enforced, and have 
been most popular as a right-of-way for the slow or slower moving vehicles, including 
animal drawn wagons. Their adopted function would seem to have been to keep buses out 
of lanes used by faster moving traffic, rather than to protect and enhance the movement 
of bus traffic" (Gray, 1990: 180). Even when buses are physically segregated from other 
traffic by means of studs, kerbs or fences there are likely to be problems. However, physically 
segregated bus lanes approaching junctions and lanes at various spots giving priority to buses 
can be effective during the periods that they are physically enforced by the Traffic Police. 
Under the present circumstances, the introduction of busways along major corridors needs 
detailed investigation. 
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The current situation in Lahore suggests that most bus delays occur at bus stops and junctions, 
and along some busiest sections of the road network. Therefore, junction-related delays can 
be dealt with by realistic spot priorities, examples of which are turn-ban exemptions and bus 
gates. Turn-ban exemptions permit buses to turn out of a particular road, where this 
movement is banned to other traffic. Bus gates permit buses to turn into a particular road, 
where this movement is banned to other traffic. While spot priorities are a useful traffic 
management measure, they cannot by themselves improve bus performance over whole routes. 
Short bus lane sections at junction approaches can allow buses to queue jump. Short busway 
sections with policing are seen as realistic for cities in Pakistan. 
Another important problem related to on-street regulation for public transport services is the 
inadequate provision of bus stops in Lahore. The locations of bus stops are not generally 
marked, and there are no signs indicating to drivers where they should stop vehicles for 
boarding and alighting purposes. Generally, either a bus stop is considered to be that point 
where passengers are waiting for buses, or the point where the Traffic Police let drivers to 
stop for boarding and alighting. Moreover, minibus drivers seldom use the bay (where 
provided) but stop in the carriageway in whatever position seems of most advantage to 
themselves. Consequently, their stopped vehicles not only impede the flow of traffic, but also 
create difficulties and impose danger to passengers boarding and alighting (see chapter 5, 
section 7.5). In order to improve the image of public transport services and to improve overall 
traffic conditions, the provision and management of bus stops need urgent attention. 
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7.4 NGO Based Urban Public Transport Regulation 
The new form of regulation in Faisalabad, utilizing NGO status, has proved far more effective 
and promoted major improvements in services. The analysis shows that the achievements of 
the NGO approach have been remarkable when compared with the government regulatory 
approach. The following sections summarize the performance and outcomes under this new 
regulatory regime. 
7.4.1 Improvements in the regulatory regime 
Attempts have been made in the past to improve the quality of public transport services but, 
in Pakistan as in many other LDC cities, these have failed due to their operation under the 
same old regulatory regime with its same old faults. Darbera (1993) for example reports the 
failure of efforts to improve the quality of services in Ecuador and India. 
Instances in Pakistan include the following examples. In Lahore in the early 1980s, new 
Volvo buses were introduced in order to improve the service quality of public transport. 
Initially the new services were reported to perform much better than the previous services. 
After only a few years, however, the performance rapidly declined (see chapter 
5, section 4). 
In 1996 in Lahore, the Lahore Urban Transport Project (LUTP) was started with a little 
modification in the existing regulations. Improvements resulted in service provision but they 
were relatively minor (see chapter 5, section 5.1). Some attempts were also made in order to 
improve public transport services in Islamabad; for instance the quality urban bus project, the 
urban bus train and the awami train project (see chapter 4, section 7). 
None of these initiatives have succeeded on a sustainable basis. All have operated essentially 
within the existing regulatory framework, with minor or temporary modifications. 
A distinctive feature of the FUTS is that it is operating outside the clutches of the official 
regulatory system. In the FUTS context the chief officials wear two hats. Normally they 
would be required to apply the prescribed bureaucratic procedures, wearing their `regulatory 
hats' as members of the government bureaucracy. In FUTS, wearing their second 
hats as 
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members of the Governing Body of an NGO, they have greater freedom to directly influence 
the planning and management of public transport services, in a process which also directly 
involves operators in the decision making. This has enabled them to make improvements in 
. services while by-passing procedures associated with inefficiency and corruption. Officials 
have been freed from entrapment in their own government systems. 
A most important feature associated with the FUTS is its self enforcement of the regulations 
in operation. FUTS has established its own effective enforcement system, under which drivers 
are fined for committing regulatory violations, backed up by the ultimate and real sanction 
of exclusion from the FUTS. This is in sharp contrast to the lack of enforcement in other 
cities. A summary comparative analysis of the two regulatory approaches is presented in 
Table 7.1. 
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Table 7.1 : Comparison of regulatory approaches 
Elements Government bureaucratic regulation NGO based regulation (FUTS) 
" RTA specifies the size, type and " In theory RTA, but in practice FUTS 
Quantity control number of vehicles specifies size and type of vehicles for its own 
services 
" Routes allocated to operators on 
discretionary basis " Routes allocated on first come first served 
basis in discussion with operators 
" Frequent delays in issuing route 
permits 
" No specified maximum number of vehicles 
per route 
Fares control " Government fixed fares charged " Fares determined by the Society 
" Maximum full route fare Rs 6.25 " Full route fare fixed Rs 12.0 
" Students given concessionary fare " No student concessionary fares 
" Fares increased as a result of " Fares increased in consultation with the 
operators strikes operators 
Route network " RTA defines the route network " FUTS defines the route network 
" No consultation with operators " RTA has to rubber stamp FUTS decisions 
" No specific criteria " FUTS specifies the location of all bus stops 
and installs clear signs 
" Lack of bus stops signs 
" Routes amended in response to passenger and 
operator opinion 
Safety regulation " Vehicle fitness certificate obtained " Fitness certificate from the MVE plus 
from the MVEs every six months vehicles examined daily by FUTS supervisors 
" Defects must be repaired within a specified 
time 
Enforcement " Weak and muddled system " Strict enforcement by FLITS staff 
" Provides opportunities for corruption " Enhances the roletimage of public transport 
Monitoring " No monitoring of services " Regular monitoring and consultation with 
operators 
" Lack of qualified staff and 
procedures " Frequent improvemets to procedures 
Corruption " At all stages of regulation " Very little evidence of corruption 
" Linked to red tape and bureaucratic " The only one incidence so far detected was 
procedures firmly dealt with 
Source: Based on findings by the researcher in field survey visits (1995/96) 
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7.4.2 Fares control 
Fares control has been the most crucial factor influencing the level of service provision. Fares 
were fixed by the FLITS without any formal approval from the Provincial Government during 
March 1994 - May 1997, whereas in the case of the Islamabad quality urban bus project, 
described in chapter four, a formal approval for the premium fares was granted by the 
government. FUTS has retained the freedom to increase its fares although the prior approval 
of the provincial government is still apparently required and the ambiguity of the FUTS 
situation is reflected in the letter of approval for increased fares from the Punjab Government 
(see Appendix 5). It seems that the aim of the government is to leave the fare setting to the 
NGO but retain the right to intervene. 
The FUTS has provided a mechanism to set fares at levels which have allowed operators to 
make profits and to increase service provision and service standards, bypassing the usual 
government controls. Decisions to change FUTS fares at present involve an informal process 
of mutual consultation between officials and operators. It can be seen by the fact that the 
operators applied to the FUTS management for a generalised increase in fares in December, 
1996 due to inflation and a relative increase in the price of fuel. The opinion of various 
operators were sought by the administrator about the extent of the increase. Fares for FUTS 
services were increased by 20 percent in February, 1997 whereas the inflation rate was 17 
percent and the price of petroleum had increased by 25 percent during 1995-96. Thus a 
substantial increase was amicably agreed, by contrast with the situation in other cities, where 
only after the disruption of 3-day operators strikes fares were increased (also by 20 per cent) 
in August, 1996. 
The latest FUTS increase kept fares at approximately double the government controlled level, 
but this was still inadequate to cover inflation over the previous 3 years, and represents a 
substantial decrease in real terms from the 1994 level. With high inflation it is essential the 
fares are reviewed and raised annually, but FLITS has as yet no procedures in place for such 
regular reviews. This issue needs to be addressed promptly, if the benefits of FLITS in 
escaping from government fares controls are not to be rapidly eroded. 
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7.4.3 Improvements in service 
The FUTS fleet has largely replaced the suzukis in the city. Until 1993, all the 22 defined 
routes for suzuki operation were operated. Now only 8 routes are operated, and these are in 
areas not adequately networked with FUTS services. This rapid transformation has occurred 
because of the FUTS quality of service provided which suzuki operators are unable to match 
due to controlled fares. The FUTS service has attracted most of its ridership from suzukis 
(37%), tongas (24%), autorickshaws (12%) (see chapter 6, section 7.2). 
The number of FUTS vehicles has grown rapidly, and the Society is offering greater capacity 
and a better quality service to passengers, at realistic fares. Passengers are assured a seat, 
stoppages are at designated stops, and there is strict adherence to specified routes, although 
services still lack the support of effective traffic management measures. 
FUTS has been successful in providing more efficient and reliable public transport services 
in Faisalabad. There is no doubt that the FUTS services are of better quality than those 
previously operated, which have rapidly been transformed. In particular, the reliability of 
FUFS services is a radical improvement. It is noteworthy that FUTS services ran as usual, 
and despite some harassment by other operators, during the 3-day strike in July 1996. 
The quantity of services is still not adequate to meet passenger demand in peak periods on 
some routes, despite the high frequency and ability to meet the off-peak demand very well. 
Since overloading is not allowed on FUTS minibuses, and no additional buses operate, 
passengers either wait for longer time periods in the peak or travel by alternative modes. 
Surveys show that users are concerned about the inadequate number of FLITS vehicles. It can 
be argued that this capacity problem for peak periods arises in part because the Society does 
not operate larger capacity vehicles. The number of its minibuses has been growing rapidly 
and it is likely that this trend will continue. FUTS is in the process of extending its network 
and intends to add more routes. If the peak period capacity problem is addressed with more 
small size minibuses, however, this will increase existing traffic congestion problems on 
sections of roads where the minibuses are already delayed. 
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Area coverage of the present FUTS network is good in the central area but some areas 
elsewhere in the city are inadequately served. There are several reasons for this. In some areas 
the road conditions are unsuitable for the operation of minibuses. In addition the Society lacks 
sufficient expertise to design a route network for the city on the basis of well defined criteria, 
and it would benefit from appropriate staff training and more involvement of operators. 
The service improvements have been acknowledged and deficiencies have been indicated by 
users. A comparison of service provision under both regulatory regimes is given in Table 7.2. 
The majority of the suzuki passengers surveyed indicated that they travel in suzukis mainly 
owing to inadequacy of FUTS service, and complained about the comfort and reliability 
aspects of the service. On the other hand, the majority of the FUTS passengers stated that 
they travel in FUTS services due to a guaranteed seat and service reliability. Also, a majority 
of suzuki passengers stated willingness to use FUTS services, where adequately provided. The 
ridership of the FUTS service is generally from the middle and relatively higher income 
passengers with an average monthly income of Rs 4955 whereas suzukis are being used 
largely by relatively lower and middle income passengers with an average monthly income 
of Rs 4300 (see chapter 6, section 6). 
A majority of the users in Faisalabad are satisfied with the FUTS fares and they prefer to use 
FUTS service over suzukis despite their lower fares. However there is still a market for lower 
fare suzuki services (see chapter 6, section 6). 
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Table 7.2 : Service comparison under two regulatory regimes 
Indicators NGO based regulation (FLITS) Government bureaucratic regulation 
" Passengers assured guaranteed seat " Legally no overloading allowed but in 
Bus occupancy practice gross overloading 
" Overloading largely eliminated by 
imposing fines 
Reliability " Drivers don't wait for additional " Drivers always wait for additional 
passengers at enroute bus stops passengers at enroute bus stops 
" Route shortening eliminated by " Frequent route shortening 
establishing three check posts on each 
route " No check on service 
" 73% of the passengers satisfied with " None of the users satisfied with service 
service reliability reliability 
Hours of operation " Fixed by the FLITS (6.0 am to 10.0 pm) " At the mercy of drivers 
" Same level of service operate " Drivers withdraw service during off-peak 
throughout this period periods 
" No complaints from passengers " Many complaints and passengers not sure 
about first and last departure 
Waiting time " No predetermined timetable " No predetermined timetable 
" Average waiting time reduced " Reduced waiting time on routes with a 
large number of vehicles 
Safety " One fatal accident over 3 years " In Lahore, minibuses involved in 40% of 
the total (191) deaths in one year* 
" No record of minor accidents 
" Frequent complaints from minibus users 
" 62% of the passengers satisfied with 
safety aspects 
" 31% of the passengers complained 
drivers irresponsible and risk accidents 
Fares " Higher fare (Rs 12 for full route) " Lower fare (Rs 6.25) for full route 
" Overcharging largely eliminated " Frequent overcharging 
* Minibus data only for Lahore for ease of comparison 
Source: Data collected in field survey visits (1995/96) 
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7.4.4 Gradual development of regulatory measures 
Initially a maximum (3 years) age limit was specified for vehicles under FUTS operation. 
This limit proved too ambitious a condition for operators and they were unable to replace 
them as the market price for new minibuses was very high. As a result, a relaxation to allow 
4-year old vehicles was agreed in January 1996. In addition, operators of brand new vehicles 
were granted exemption from a Rs 15,000 donation to charity then required from operators, 
as a financial incentive to encourage investment. 
Under these circumstances it was still difficult for operators to invest in brand new vehicles, 
and they requested more appropriate quality control conditions, rather than strict adherence 
to an age condition. In February 1997 the Society accepted this and amended its regulation, 
and now vehicles up to a maximum age of 10-years are allowed for operation subject to the 
approval of a 3-person committee appointed by the Society. This committee is authorised to 
examine thoroughly the condition of all vehicles at the time of entering and renewing 
agreements with operators. In addition, the operator is still obliged to get vehicle fitness 
certificate from the MVE. 
To be seen to fulfil its broader social objects FUTS used to collect charitable contributions 
from its operators. Each minibus operator, except for a brand new vehicle, was obliged to 
donate a sum of Rs 15,000 per annum to specified charities (charitable schools in Faisalabad). 
At the request of operators, this requirement was withdrawn by the Society in February 1997. 
As these examples indicate, the regulatory framework is still evolving, with the forum 
provided by FUTS promoting greater flexibility in decision making, and a learning process 
for both operators and officials. 
7.4.5 Information system 
In contrast to RTAs, the Society has been able to develop a well-maintained filing and 
computerized documentation system. Records and data about agreements, incomes, 
expenditures, bookings and associated fines, and duty slips, provide a detailed information on 
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various operational and financial aspects of the Society. This documentation is very useful 
for the FUTS management itself for three purposes. First, it can be used to verify each 
vehicle's operational record (number of breakdowns, bookings etc) at the time of renewal of 
an agreement. Second, the information can also be used for the regular monitoring and 
improvement of services. Third, the data are useful for the dissemination of information to 
various government and other agencies, and for research. Moreover, unlike within government 
departments, access to this information is easy, particularly for the operators. They also 
benefit from the properly maintained records; for example through knowing about 
infringements of rules, and fines paid, by their drivers. 
7.4.6 Improvements in traffic management 
As in many other cities in Pakistan the operational environment on street for full size buses 
and minibuses in Faisalabad is not favourable; owing to the mix of slow and fast moving 
traffic, physically poor road conditions, a lack of awareness of traffic rules, and a lack of 
traffic management. The flagrant violation of basic traffic rules by road users, and illegal 
road-side parking, worsen traffic congestion. As a consequence of these chaotic conditions 
and the resulting congestion, public transport travel times increase during peak periods in the 
central area and elsewhere on the route network. Safer and more efficient operation of 
services could be achieved by implementing effective traffic management measures. 
FUTS is not in a position to directly initiate any programme for the improvement of traffic 
flow in the city albeit this is one of its stated objectives (FLITS, 1993). However, the Society 
has provided funds to the traffic police for the purchase of motorcycles and radio 
communication. As a result the traffic police are somewhat better equipped to regulate overall 
traffic in Faisalabad. Other improvements to traffic flow are a consequence of FUTS, in that 
on-street regulation of public transport is often a root-cause of traffic jams at and around road 
intersections and bus stops. The relatively well-organized and supervised operation of FLITS 
services has resulted in a better flow of traffic. 
The very attractiveness of FUTS services has also resulted in other indirect improvements. 
The FUTS services have attracted the ridership from other modes. As a result, in particular, 
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the use of autorickshaws and suzukis has declined as reported in chapter 6, section 9. The 
RTA officials reported that about 1000 autorickshaws and 735 suzukis have been withdrawn 
from the city. 
With this decline in the number of autorickshaws and suzukis, alongside extensively 
supervised FUTS service operation and better equipped traffic police, overall traffic conditions 
in the city have somewhat improved. Discussions of the researcher with shopkeepers, 
pedestrians, drivers and traffic police all confirmed improvements. 
7.4.7 Sustainability 
The `snapshot' of the current situation under NGO based regulation is quite positive and the 
success of the FUTS is now so well established that it seems unlikely that the gains made can 
be reversed through any clawing back into the control of the government bureaucracy. A close 
examination of the situation shows that there are some grey areas which could influence the 
sustainability and future development of this regulatory regime (see chapter 8, section 3). 
7.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has synthesised the analysis on urban public transport regulation in Pakistani 
context with some relevance to the wider literature review. A summary of the overall 
conclusions drawn from the research with recommendations for current practice and policy 
is presented in the next and final chapter. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusions And Recommendations 
8.1 Introduction 
The general aims of this research were (a) to understand the problems of regulating urban public 
transport in Pakistan, and (b) to provide the basis for a more rational framework that can assist 
with the formulation of regulations and policies in Pakistan. In particular, the research explored 
the following specific objectives. 
1. To review government regulations and policies regarding quantity controls, fares, safety 
and other quality controls, subsidies and grants, together with their associated 
institutional arrangements, and to assess their influence on quality of service; 
2. To examine the market for services at different fare levels, for different income and 
population groups, and specifically to study the potential for better quality services; 
3. To analyse recent regulatory and traffic management interventions and their effects on 
quality of service; and 
4. To identify and make recommendations for public transport planning/regulatory 
improvements which would be attractive and potentially feasible to implement in the 
Pakistani context. 
Although the aims and objectives are centred on Pakistan, similar problems are encountered in 
other LDCs and the research findings accordingly can be expected to have relevance for other 
countries. 
Section 2 presents the general conclusions drawn from this research. The recommendations for 
the regulatory improvements and further research on urban public transport planning are 
presented in section 3. The final section summarises the significance and the contribution of this 
research. 
300 
8.2 General Conclusions 
The general conclusions from the research can be drawn on the following aspects. 
* Nature of the urban public transport problem 
Most cities in the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) have grown at an unprecedented rate in 
recent years. The obvious implications of the expansion in city size and population are the 
massive increases in the intensity of land use and the demand for transport facilities and 
services. Walking or cycling has become more difficult as cities have grown and new residential 
areas are beyond walking/cycling distances to first order service facilities and employment 
centres. Moreover, many LDC cities are characterised by low car ownership, and personal 
motorised transport is still beyond the reach of the large majority. Therefore, public transport is 
theoretically seen as the most efficient way of providing good access for longer distance trips 
interlinking the various parts of the cities, now and in the future. Yet urban public transport 
provision in many LDCs is grossly inadequate both in terms of quantity and quality. The 
research has identified that this situation has arisen largely because of the following factors. 
Firstly, the expansion in the size of the cities with longer distances involved to reach major 
destinations (such as places of employment, health services, education and other amenities) has 
particularly a marked effect on the lower income groups unable to afford car or motorbikes. The 
problem has become further aggravated since the public transport services have been more 
market oriented as the urban poor are less able to afford higher fares. 
Secondly, in most cities, there are many areas where no buses can go. These include historic 
city centres where roads and lanes are too narrow for bus operation, and most illegal or informal 
residential land subdivisions with irregular lay-outs which are usually on sites often flooded or 
waterlogged or on steep slopes with no motorable roads. These illegal/informal settlements are 
often the only viable source of housing especially for the poor. The provision of cost-effective 
public transport is difficult in these areas. 
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Thirdly, it has been found that most transport operators tend to concentrate their resources on 
serving general patterns of movement along major corridors, rather than try to cater for all 
possible origin-destination choices. Also the inefficient operation of the available means of 
public transport has adversely affected its capacity utilisation and hence contributed greatly to 
its inadequacy. As a consequence, unreliability, the overloading of public transport vehicles, 
complex journeys involving frequent interchanges, lengthy walking times to bus stops, long 
passenger queues and lengthy waiting times (particularly during peak periods) have all become 
characteristics of the public transport in the LDC cities. 
Other common problems of urban public transport in most LDCs include: high import costs of 
public transport vehicles; old and poor quality vehicles; and reckless driving practices. Reckless 
drivers cause traffic congestion and road accidents, and old poorly maintained vehicles provide 
uncomfortable and unreliable service, and are a major source of air pollution. 
Finally, public transport planning and management is constrained by a lack of data, and the 
inadequate planning and managerial capabilities of the authorities. Public transport authorities 
responsible for regulation/planning of public transport lack efficient and suitably qualified 
personnel and the existing officials are unable to collect, analyse and disseminate data on 
various aspects of service provision. 
The factors listed above are related to those directly stemming from over and inappropriate 
regulation, in particular, regulated fares. 
* Regulation of urban public transport 
The general aims behind policies of state provision and regulation of urban public transport 
have been seen as ways (a) to facilitate travel, especially to work, for those unable to afford 
private transport (b) to ensure that all parts of the city are accessible to all groups (c) to create 
order out of chaos and (d) to ensure safety of operation. In order to accomplish these aims the 
various regulatory measures have been applied. The measures include restricting transport 
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activities to a limited number of operators, structuring the fares system and establishing 
standards for safety. 
The literature shows that government policies and regulation in most LDCs have generally 
undermined the role of urban public transport services, with investments in public transport 
curtailed, quality of service reduced and expansion of services stunted. The study of public 
transport regulation from Pakistan supports these findings. 
In Pakistan publicly owned bus corporations were introduced in the hope that they would 
facilitate travel and ensure accessibility and affordability, particularly of those low income 
groups. The government also granted subsidies and other incentives for this purposes. The 
experience shows that the services, when operating, served longer and non-profitable routes 
shunned by the private operators and offered relatively reliable services. However, the 
performance of the corporations drastically declined as a result of mis-management 
(inefficiency and dishonesty of staff), low fares and a lack of autonomy to manage the business. 
As a result of the collapse of services, the publicly owned corporations no longer exist in 
Pakistan. The desired effects of public ownership and subsidy policies could not be achieved in 
this way. The other policies related to the provision of public transport, as discussed in Chapter 
4&7, were similarly misdirected. 
The policy of maintaining cheap fares for all users has a detrimental effect on the quality of 
service in Pakistan. Operators are improvished by low fare structures and the fact that operators 
are not compensated for fare levels set below the market rate. Therefore, they are forced to 
sacrifice the quality, for instance using the least expensive vehicles possible to ensure some 
return. Another negative effect of controlled fares is that operators are constrained from offering 
better quality services, even to those who can afford them. 
It is not surprising that route networks have been defined without applying any specific criteria 
in Pakistani cities, as the authorities lack qualified staff and the relevant data. The definition of 
such networks has not achieved the desired results, as evidenced in Lahore where some areas 
are inadequately served and in others no service is provided at all (see Chapter 5, section 7.3). 
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Similarly, in order to ameliorate traffic congestion and air pollution problems in the central 
areas, the authorities have attempted to limit the age and number of minibuses over the entire 
network. This causes capacity problems, as is again evidenced in the case of Lahore (see 
Chapter 5, section 7.1). 
The conclusion drawn is that the aims of the policy have not been realised in practice in 
Pakistan. The bureaucratic regulation of urban public transport as currently implemented has 
suppressed the growth and improvement in services. 
* Deregulation of urban public transport 
The research shows that in order to overcome the regulatory problems of urban public transport 
various deregulation policies have been implemented both in Developed and Less Developed 
Countries. International experience shows that overall quantity and fares deregulation has been 
a mixed blessing. The major benefit of the deregulation has been that the governments have 
saved a large amount of money in reduced subsidies. Riders have benefited from reduced 
walking times as a result of increased spatial coverage of the system, and reduced waiting times 
as a consequence of substantial increase in capacity, particularly at peak periods with more 
frequent bus services. Although in Britain, for example, deregulation has proved effective in 
reducing unit costs, there has generally been a poor outcome in terms of ridership (see Chapter 
3, section 7.2). 
On the other hand, one of the main negative effects of the deregulation has been a significant 
increase in public transport fares. The increase in fares has a brutal impact on low-income 
earners no longer able to afford to ride in public transport, particularly in LDCs. The other 
negative impacts have arisen from the increase in small capacity vehicles that have seriously 
affected on-street traffic operation. In particular in the LDCs, the increase in less maintained 
vehicles has resulted in increased traffic congestion and environmental pollution. Moreover, 
headrunning, racing to bus stops, irregular despatching and other problems associatcd with on- 
street competition have resulted in more road accidents. While the British bus deregulation 
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experience suggests that the safety problems can be addressed through strict quality control, the 
problems of implementing such controls in LDCs should not be underestimated. 
The World Bank and other international agencies have been emphasising the deregulation 
approach in order to get rid of inefficient and ineffectual bureaucracies, and to deliver public 
transport services more effectively and efficiently. The research for this thesis has identified a 
new approach to improving urban public transport regulation in Pakistan through a non- 
governmental organisation (NGO). Public transport services under the control of the Faisalabad 
Transport Society (FUTS) have been extensively regulated but operators have a freedom to 
change the specified route and replace their vehicle with the prior permission of the FLITS. Fare 
levels are determined with the mutual consent of the operators and the FLITS. Services under 
this form of regulation are a measurable success, providing substantial improvements and 
commanding wide acceptance both by passengers and by private operators. The improvements 
under NGO regulation are largely attributable to the following factors: fares are set at a 
reasonable commercial level although affordable for middle and higher income groups; highly 
supervised service operation; and the strict enforcement of rules by the NGO staff. 
The conclusion drawn is that complete deregulation of fares and quantity is not the solution in 
any country trying to address urban public transport problems. Tough quality regulation is 
required for safety aspects through effective controls over vehicle fitness, driver licensing and 
behaviour, and service operations, as in the case of Britain. Quantity regulations over services 
and fares regulation should be limited and there is a need to avoid monopolies and to ensure that 
competition is maintained. Any regulatory system will reflect the limitations in awareness, 
understanding and thinking of the officials who administer it, and, in the context of Pakistan 
today, where these limitations are severe, a minimalist approach is likely to be the most 
effective. The FUTS experience demonstrates that operators are willing to operate in an 
effectively regulated system which allows them to generate a reasonable return on their 
investments. 
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* Market for different services at different fare levels 
The literature suggests that in principle there is a demand for a diversity of public transport 
services in LDCs, to reflect the willingness to pay more for better quality services. On the other 
hand, low-income groups would opt for services with low fares at the expense of quality of 
service. Armstrong-Wright, for instance, states that "the very large number of taxis in some 
cities is often an indication, on the one hand, that bus services are inadequate, and on the 
other hand, that many passengers are prepared to pay more for more convenient or reliable 
transport and would pay more for better bus services" (Armstrong-Wright, 1993: 30). The 
analysis undertaken in the research confirms that these findings stand valid in Pakistan. The 
Faisalabad experience has clearly demonstrated that in practice there is a market for better 
quality services at higher fares in Pakistan. Care should be taken to avoid too sweeping 
interpretation of this finding in that it reflects the views of riders who by definition can afford to 
pay and the ridership of FUTS services is drawn from relatively higher income groups 
compared with the ridership of suzukis. It certainly does not mean that lower income groups can 
afford to use FUTS services on a regular basis and the lowest income groups cannot afford the 
public transport at all. More research is needed to clarify these issues (see section 8.3). 
*A new role of NGOs 
For some problems which the private sector is not able to address and which government fails 
to deal with by conventional planning and management procedures, the work of NGOs 
emerges as an alternative. Most of the NGOs have development-centred activities in areas like, 
housing, health care, education, agricultural extension and environmental conservation. In 
Pakistan, NGOs have been assigned a new role which is the regulation of urban public 
transport. NGO based regulation has proved far more effective compared with government 
bureaucratic regulation in Faisalabad. Officials who failed to achieve regulatory objectives 
under government bureaucratic regulation seem able to achieve more effective regulation 
through the NGO. 
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The reasons for the effectiveness of the new form of regulation include: the NGO has greater 
freedom of decision making for the planning and management of services under its control; it 
has introduced measures to eradicate corruption and ensure greater transparency, efficiency, 
accountability, responsiveness and operators' participation in the management; and it has 
established its own effective enforcement system. This is in sharp contrast to the lack of 
enforcement under government regulation. The Faisalabad experience has also acted as a 
learning process, raising awareness and understanding about public transport issues, a process 
of vital importance given the absence of expertise. The NGO is closer to the ground and directly 
involved day to day with operators and passengers, by contrast to the remoteness of government 
regulatory offices with their culture of concealing administrative procedures, lack of 
responsiveness to problems and providing favours rather than services. 
The NGO has provided an effective 'arms length' mechanism for decision making, which, as in 
other areas of policy, has circumvented problems associated with government bureaucracies. 
This mechanism offers the best prospects for further improvements to public transport services 
in Pakistan in the medium term, and has similar potential in other LDCs. The prominent place 
of NGOs in the Habitat II agenda reflects a growing international recognition of their capacity 
and potential contribution in the delivery of services and the improvement of good governance. 
* Development of methodology 
Finally, what has been learned about how to research urban transport policy implementation in 
LDCs?. The research approach was designed on the basis of personal knowledge and a wide 
literature review. Two case study cities from Pakistan with differing forms of regulation were 
selected. The methodologies employed under this research included the literature review; 
collection and collation of secondary data sources and in-depth interviews conducted with 
regulators; public transport operators; household surveys; and passenger surveys. The approach 
taken for this research has both strengths and weaknesses, some reflection on which is useful in 
developing methodologies for further research. 
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The research has identified a number of ways that further research might be undertaken and 
methodologies be developed in order to advance understanding of how to improve the 
regulation of urban public transport in LDCs. 
In order to gain deeper understanding of the public transport problem and to analyse the market 
for better quality services at higher fares, systematic household surveys were conducted in two 
areas of Lahore. The findings of the surveys were helpful in drawing conclusions about public 
transport provision in the selected areas but it was time consuming to collect and analyse the 
data. As an alternative it would also have been possible to collect similar information through 
the use of more qualitative approach such as group discussions with residents and/or detailed 
case studies of a limited number of households. Such methods would yield better qualitative 
information, for example, on attitudes and perceptions about public transport. 
Passenger views about the public transport services were obtained by using a survey form in 
Faisalabad. Although the sample size was limited it provided a clear picture of the issues raised 
in the methodology. In order to have more conclusive findings on service quality a large number 
of interviews would be required, employing quota sampling and a stratified sample frame. This 
would have been beyond the resources available to the researcher, however, it is questionable 
whether these more elaborate surveys would have provided good value for the additional 
information collected. 
In the case of Faisalabad, an evaluation of the effectiveness of the NGO based regulation was 
made, covering the performance and quality of services offered under both new and old 
regulatory regimes. The research illustrates the potential value of using and developing further 
methods involving before and after or similar comparisons in respect of any regulatory changes, 
in order to evaluate their effectiveness. All too few such studies have been undertaken in LDC 
context, and the researcher is aware of the results reported by Darbera (1994) and Franandez 
(1995). 
The research also illustrates that there is a great scope for the development of methodologies for 
systematic comparison of regulated and deregulated provision between different cities. 
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Researchers can expect to face problems in conducting such comparative research in LDCs 
where scarcities are common in the availability of comparable data related to the provision of 
public transport. This was evidenced in the Lahore/Faisalabad comparison. In both cities the 
collection of data on regulatory issues was managed though only after a difficult exercise. Data 
on performance indicators was difficult to collect, particularly in Faiasalabad. In this city, no 
relevant data was available where a large number of passengers use inter-city buses passing 
through the city centre and suzukis illegally operated. In such circumstances, the research 
exercise should be approached with the recognition of the limits to what will be possible in 
terms of data procurement. 
The researcher cautions that access to data is likely to be problematic even where it is collected 
and theoretically available. Difficult access to available data has been the second major and 
traditional barrier in conducting research in most LDCs. The research also shows that a major 
difficulty in conducting research in Pakistan has been the lack of a standard and reliable map of 
the area. Similarly, access to chief officials for interviews and for their support in overcoming 
access difficulties is another major difficulty. In order to overcome such problems networking 
(e. g. developing and using personal contacts etc. ) is an important means of gaining access to 
primary and secondary data. Certainly without access provided by key contacts in highly placed 
positions within government bureaucracies in Pakistan, the researcher would have been forced 
to rely upon inadequate information. 
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8.3 Current Policy and Practice in Lahore and Faisalabad: Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
The following are the main conclusions and recommendations for current practice and policy 
for urban public transport planning and regulation in the case study cities. 
* Sustainability of the NGO model 
The following are some areas which could influence the sustainability and future development 
of this regulatory regime. 
" Legality: There are three areas which contravene the prevailing law dealing with public 
transport services. First, the Regional Transport Authority is responsible for planning, 
regulation and control of all services within its jurisdiction (MVO, 1965; and also see chapter 
4). In practice in Faisalabad and Lahore, the NGOs regulate their own services and the Secretary 
Regional Transport Authority has to rubber stamp NGO decisions. Pressures still remain 
however from the ambivalent position of the Regional Transport Authority and its Secretary. 
Second, the government has treated the Faisalabad Urban Transport Society and the Lahore 
Transport System on an exceptional basis by authorising them to increase fares, whereas other 
social companies operating public transport services, such as the Model Town Society in 
Lahore, have not been treated in the same way (see chapter 5 section 2.8). Third, no concession 
is given to students using the Faisalabad Urban Transport Society's services. This is also 
contradictory to the law. A clarification to resolve these issues would help to ensure 
sustainability. 
" Fares review process: The sustainability of the Faisalabad Urban Transport Society' success 
depends not just on retaining its independent ability to set fare levels, but on its use of this 
ability to ensure that fares are maintained at realistic levels through a regular review process. 
Only then will further investment and associated quality improvements be possible. 
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" Corruption free system: The Faisalabad Urban Transport Society (FUTS) success derives 
also from its clean administration, and it is arguable that this is still too dependent on a few 
officials in key positions, such as that of the administrator. A degree of protection against the 
emergence of corrupt practices within FUTS is provided by the openness of the governing body 
as a decision making forum. For instance, operators can directly report their complaints (if any) 
to the Governing Body. This acts as a restraint on the actions of individuals in senior positions, 
and makes it more difficult for corruption to become re-established. 
" Representation: Although operators are not represented on the General Body of the FUTS at 
present they are consulted as required and so far this mechanism has worked well. For the 
future development and further transparency of the system it would be appropriate for 
operators to take up the representation they are entitled to on the Governing Body. In this 
regard passengers representation would also be helpful but greater difficulties are likely to occur 
in seeking genuine consumer participation. Nevertheless, representation of passenger interests 
is important in connection with the monitoring of service performance in the longer run. 
" Training: The Orangi Pilot Project NGO in Pakistan is one of the leading NGOs in the LDCs 
working in the areas of housing and sanitation (OPP, 1995). It has served as a demonstration of 
the success which NGOs can achieve for other interests within and outside Pakistan. One of the 
major factors in the success of this NGO is its training arrangements for its own staff as well as 
for other interests. Similarly, the FLITS model is being used as a an example to other interests 
such as government officials associated with public transport regulation in other cities, 
politicians and researchers, but it has neither qualified staff nor training facilities. For FUTS to 
build on its success effectively the needs for staff training will have to be addressed. 
* Replicability of NGO model 
The Faisalabad Urban Transport Society has not widely publicized the success and popularity of 
its scheme, but the need for wider dissemination was suggested by the researcher in the course 
of this research while interviewing government officials and operators working in major cities 
of Pakistan. Moreover, the former Divisional Commissioner, who initiated the FUTS, showed 
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continuing interest and concern about the replicability of the scheme in other cities. At his 
prompting the Deputy Commissioners of Lahore, Gujranwala, Multan, and Rawalpindi districts 
visited Faisalabad, in August 1996, to study and understand the entire FUTS regulatory regime. 
The Federal Government also directed the National Transport Research Centre to evaluate the 
performance of the services operating under FUTS control, and its preliminary report has been 
produced (Idris, 1996). 
As a result awareness and interest elsewhere is growing. The Sind provincial government 
appointed a task force to prepare a feasibility report for the operation of public transport services 
in Karachi under an NGO (April 1997) but no further information is available about 
developments in Karachi. FUTS also received a request for details about the establishment and 
functioning of the scheme from the Transport Department of the NWFP, and the NWFP 
government subsequently indicated its intention to introduce this system in major urban areas of 
the province. The dismissal of the provincial governments following the national elections in 
February 1997, and the consequent reshuffling of official postings, has delayed action. 
However, there is a continuing interest at the highest levels, and the FUTS regulatory model is 
in the process of replication in other Pakistani cities. Within the Punjab province itself the Chief 
Minister directed the Divisional Commissioner for Lahore to organise an NGO on the pattern of 
FUTS. Recently, in June 1997, public transport services commenced under the control of a 
newly formed NGO named the Lahore Transport System (LTS) (see Appendix 7 for details). 
Given the will, the FUTS model can readily be replicated in other cities faced with a 
comparable situation to that in Faisalabad. In other LDCS, with similar regulatory problems 
and similarly deficient bureaucracies, it should also be possible to emulate the FUTS success. 
Success, however, is likely to depend on key officials, as in Faisalabad, and the impetus for 
reform must be maintained and politically supported throughout the process of implementation. 
Also in order to promote the FUTS model and more effectively transfer its success to other 
areas better training arrangements are seen as essential and there needs to be explicit support 
from the Federal Government. 
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* Subsidies 
It has been concluded in the preceding chapter that blanket subsidies for public transport 
services in Pakistan are, in no way, desirable, although the targeted subsidies that meet specific 
social and economic objectives could be justified. This raises a question about the 
administration of the implementation of subsidies. The literature shows that subsidies can be 
allocated more efficiently between operators through competitive tendering. In this regard the 
experience of tendering in London is seen to work well and serves as a useful model (see 
chapter 4, section 10). In the present Pakistani context, this approach is not suitable due to the 
following factors. First, the authorities lack skills to administer the allocation of subsidies 
through competitive tendering. Second, the scale and extent of corruption which is involved at 
various levels. Third, the pattern of ownership (predominantly single vehicle operators) is not 
helpful. The NGO forum seems appropriate to administer targeted subsidies from amongst the 
operators under its control for the medium term. In order to achieve real benefits, monitoring 
and reappraisal from time to time is essential to ensure that the original justification for 
subsidy remains valid. Also, any new proposals for subsidies must be carefully appraised and 
their true effects understood. 
* Quality controls 
The implementation of safety standards for public service vehicles and drivers is a source of 
graft for the law enforcers in Pakistan. As a result, most passengers consider travel in public 
transport (particularly in minibuses) as dangerous. In this regard, stronger action is required to 
ensure that a fitness certificate is issued after a complete vehicle examination and that a licence 
is issued to a public transport driver only after passing a required driving test. The essential step 
to implementing and enforcing these regulations appears to be to eliminate the corruption 
involved. This would be a dcult exercise but not impossible. In order to effectively eliminate 
corruption the salaries of the traffic police need to be increased. 
Another step to improve road safety is that a comprehensive vehicle and driver insurance 
system should be introduced, which is non-existant in Pakistan today. Under this system 
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responsibility might be more appropriately placed with the insurance companies that 
comprehensively insure the relevant vehicles and drivers. These companies, which would have 
to meet legal claims for compensation, would have strong commercial incentives to establish 
reliable testing procedures. Competition among insurance companies would be necessary to 
prevent abuse by them. 
* Traffic management 
The on-street operational environment for bus services is very poor in all urban areas in 
Pakistan. The current situation in urban areas suggests that most bus delays occur at bus stops 
and junctions, and along some busiest sections of the road network. Safer and more efficient 
operation of services could be achieved by implementing effective traffic management 
measures and by enforcing traffic rules. The following traffic management measures are seen as 
appropriate for urban areas in Pakistan. First, short busway sections with policing need to be 
implemented along the route network where there is severe traffic congestion. Second, the 
authorities need to clearly speck the location of bus stops and install proper signs such as is 
FUTS practice in Faisalabad. Third, the scheduling of public transport services can also 
ameliorate the problems. Moreover, there is a need to introduce better enforcement of 
behaviour by drivers targeted on bus stops. In this connection, the lessons learned from the 
good practice of on-street regulation and traffic management models (such as Curitiba, Abidjan) 
can also be utilised. Again training needs are vital, and better training for the traffic police is 
essential to effective enforcement. 
* Federal Government support 
As discussed in chapters 4&7, the development of the public transport industry in Pakistan has 
been hampered mainly due to non-supportive government policies such a lack of financial 
incentives and a heavy taxation structure. Under the present circumstances, the operators are in 
no position to purchase new buses for urban operation. Even under the FUTS operation with 
relatively high fares for bus services within Pakistan, the operators are not able to invest in 
brand new vehicles (see chapter 6, section 5). In order to promote the urban public transport 
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industry, stronger support of the Federal Government will be required mainly to facilitate the 
supply of new vehicles through the relaxations in tax regime (as in the case of Sri Lanka, see 
chapter 3, section 7.3) on a continuing basis. Such a measure to overcome the bus supply 
restrictions for LTS in Lahore is now proposed (see Appendix 7). 
* Further Research Issues 
The following two main areas have been identified under this study which require further 
research. 
  It was possible to conduct only a limited number of passenger interviews in Faisalabad under 
this study. It was not possible to explore views of users on the basis of income due to time and 
financial constraints. However, the analysis of the 1996 user survey indicates that FUTS 
services (with higher fares) are largely being used by higher and middle income groups, and the 
suzukis (with government fixed fares) are being used by a higher proportion of lower middle 
income groups to which one third of the population of Faisalabad belongs. Presently there is no 
mechanism to effectively provide services to lower income groups at affordable fares either 
under government regulation or the NGO based regulation. The question arises as to how public 
transport services can be made accessible to those below the lower middle income groups who 
cannot afford present (the government/NGO fixed) fares. It is also unclear what access needs of 
low income groups are and to what extent cheaper public transport services could help to meet 
them. Further research with a wider sample coverage is needed to address these issues and 
assess the transport needs of low and lower middle income groups. 
  In Lahore, following the successful NGO experience in Faisalabad, public transport services 
have also been introduced under NGO control. The Faisalabad NGO offers public transport 
services throughout the city with only minibuses (15-seat vehicles) under its operation, whereas 
the Lahore NGO to date operates full size buses on only a few routes. The regulatory regimes, 
nevertheless, have a similarity. Further monitoring and analysis of the progress of the 2 NGOs, 
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and of the services they provide would be helpful for the future development and sustainability 
of public transport under NGO based regulation. 
8.4 Significance and Contribution of the Research 
The research findings are seen significant in a number of ways both for policy makers in LDCs 
in general, and also for those researching urban public transport in LDCs. 
* The research contributes in the field of transport planning and policy making by 
providing a better understanding of urban public transport problems in LDCs. The 
literature has been reviewed and the nature of urban public transport regulatory 
problems has been identified in LDCs and the evidence of the problems is specifically 
verified in Pakistani context. 
* The research has also reviewed literature on the regulatory reforms adopted both in DCs 
and LDCs in particular the literature on bus deregulation in Britain. It has also identified 
the good public transport regulatory practices. In the light of this experience, the lessons 
learned need to be applied elsewhere in other cities. 
* The research highlights a new form of public transport regulation through NGOs and it 
presents a new relationship between civil society (operators and users of public 
transport) and state. The new role of NGOs, as public transport regulator, opens a new 
debate for the policy makers, researchers, the World Bank and other international 
agencies. The findings of this research provide basis for further investigation for its 
replicability and sustainability in Pakistan and other LDCs in general. 
* The research has a significance on its methodological grounds. It has employed both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches which indicate that there is a clearly scope for 
wider application and further development of the methodology on the basis of research 
findings. In particular, the findings illustrate the value of before and after comparisons in 
order to evaluate the effectiveness of regulator changes and new policies. Moreover, 
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there is a potential scope for systematic comparison of regulated and deregulated 
provision of urban public transport. 
* The research utilises original data to analyse interrelationships between regulations and 
service improvements in Lahore and Faisalabad. The results of this analysis has helped 
to provide a basis for improvements to the regulatory framework and for researchers to 
provided opportunities for further research related to policy development. In this way, 
the research is not only useful and relevant to Lahore/Faisalabad, and other cities of 
Pakistan, but has relevance for other LDCs faced with similar public transport 
regulatory problems. 
* Two articles have already been published in a refereed Journal (Russell and Anjum, 
1997a; Anjum and Russell, 1997), and several papers presented in international 
conferences. 
* Only limited literature is available on regulatory frameworks of urban public transport in 
the LDC context. The research comprehensively encompasses the main aspects of urban 
public transport regulation and policies in Pakistan. Therefore, it is a valuable addition 
to the knowledge of regulatory frameworks in LDCs. 
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STUDY OF REGULATORY AND TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
FOR URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORT 
School of Planning and Housing 
Edinburgh College of Art 
Heriot-Watt University Edinburgh UK 
(Interview Schedule for Provincial Government Officials) 
Interview conducted with ...................................................... 
Designation .................................................................... 
Address ........................................................................ 
Q. In your opinion, what are the major issues of public transport in urban areas 
Q. What are the main objectives of the Provincial Government for the provision of public 
transport 
Q. What are the Provincial Government policies specifically related to urban public 
transport in urban areas 
Q. Have you implemented your policies related to public transport? 
a. if so, in what regards 
b. if not, why not? 
Q. Do the existing public transport services satisfy the needs of present population in urban 
areas? 
if not, what are the deficiencies 
Q. How would you accomplish your objectives related to provision of urban public 
transport in the face of the declining role of publicly-owned buses 
Q. Are the quality and a provision of services adversely affected by governmental 
regulations? 
if so, in what regard 
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Q. What are the objectives of current regulatory system 
Q. Has the present regulatory structure achieved its objectives? 
if so, in what regards 
Q. Are you satisfied with the performance of the RTA? 
if so, in what regards 
if no, which aspects need improvement 
Q. What are your views about the current regulatory systems of 
. fares (fare structure, student concessionary fare) 
. entry (route licensing) 
. quality (service scheduling, comfort of passengers, vehicles and route network density) 
. safety (licensing procedure, vehicle 
fitness and accidents etc) 
. traffic management/on-street regulation 
Q. Are you supporting publicly-owned bus corporation by giving subsidies/grants? 
a. if yes, what are the reasons for support 
b. if supportive policies, why not such subsidies for private sector operators on same 
fares scale? 
Q. To what extent should the public sector be involved in the provision of public transport 
services, given that its services are often less cost-efficient than the private operator 
Q. What do you consider the most effective ways of meeting present public transport needs 
in urban areas 
Q. Do you envisage dangers from deregulated fares of public transport services? 
if so, what 
Q. Do you envisage dangers from free entry of transport operators? 
if so, what 
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Q. Are you interested in investing in LRT projects in urban areas? 
if so, how would you arrange the capital 
Q. Do you consider it desirable to introduce busways in urban areas? 
if so, 1. how would you arrange the capital 
2. who would operate buses on busways 
Q. Do you consider desirable the participation of private large bus operators in urban areas? 
(a) if so, why? 
(b) would government seek to promote large operators in any way? 
if so, how? 
Q. What are the possibilities of granting loans to private transport operators to assist in 
introducing large buses in urban areas 
Q. Is there any need for better quality services with a premium fare? 
a. if so, how far could the services be initiated 
b. if no, how far should the present services be made attractive for car and taxi etc users 
Q. What are your plans to address the growing problems of traffic congestion and pollution 
in urban areas 
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STUDY OF REGULATORY AND TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
FOR URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORT 
School of Planning and Housing 
Edinburgh College of Art 
Heriot-Watt University Edinburgh UK 
(Interview Schedule for Regional Transport Authority) 
Interview conducted with ...................................... 
Designation .................................... 
Address ....................................................................... 
Q. What are the current functions of RTA 
Q. What are the main objectives of present regulatory structure 
Entry Regulations 
Q. What are the specific objectives of the current entry regulations 
Q. What are the current policies for granting route permits to private operators 
Q. Are all the routes open to all private buses (bus, minibus, wagon, suzuki etc)? 
if not, what are the reasons for specifying routes for certain types of vehicles 
Q. Are existing services sufficient to satisfy the present needs of passengers on each route? 
if no, what are the causes of deficiency 
if yes, what are the reasons of the present overcrowding of buses and minibuses etc 
Q. Have the present entry control policies achieved their objectives? 
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if no, in what regards 
Q. Are you satisfied with the performance of small operators (driver-owned vehicles, 
operators with few vehicles) 
if no, what are the disadvantages of their operation 
if yes, in what regards 
Q. Why are operator funs/companies not interested in urban large bus operation in urban 
area 
Q. In what ways could the large operators participate in the bus industry in urban areas 
Q. Are you in favour of entry control? 
if no, why 
if yes, to what extent should entry be regulated 
Q. Are you in favour of controlled entry along major corridors and in central area routes 
if no, specify the routes 
Q. Are you in favour of the operation of large buses along major corridors of the city? 
if no, why 
Q. Give your comments on a proposal to issue route licences to private large buses along all 
major corridors of the city 
if in favour, have you issued any route permit 
if disagree, why 
Q. What is the role of the Corporation (publicly-owned bus company) in the procedure of 
issuing route permits to the private operators 
Q. What are your suggestions for the improvements in entry regulations 
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Safety Regulations 
Q. Are you satisfied with safety standards? 
if no, what are the deficiencies 
Q. Are you satisfied with the performance of Motor Vehicle Examiner/workshops? 
if no, please give reasons 
Q. Is driver licensing procedure for public passengers transport okayed? 
if not, what are the weaknesses 
Q. Are public transport vehicles frequently involved in road accidents? 
if yes, which vehicle is most frequently involved 
Q. What are the root causes of accidents relate to public transport 
Q. Are you satisfied with the enforcement of safety regulations? 
if no, what are the flaws 
Q. What are the effects of deficient and inadequately enforced safety regulations 
Q. What improvements in safety regulations do you suggest 
Quality Regulations 
Q. What are the specific objectives of quality regulations 
Q. Are standards of service applied for establishing the route network for specific area? 
if so, what is the present criteria 
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Q. Do you assess the need for bus services on each route? 
if yes, from where you get the statistics on passenger trip pattern 
Q. Have you received any complaint from operators against the present route 
network/classification? 
if yes, what are those complaints 
Q. Are all the classified routes (by the RTA) taken up by the operators? 
if no, what are the reasons for some routes being not taken up by the operators 
Q. Do you consider necessary the involvement of private operators in establishing route 
network? 
if not, what are the reasons 
if yes, have they been consulted 
Q. Do you have ever received complaints from public against the route network (location of 
bus stops, route location etc) 
if so, what is your opinion about the involvement of public in establishing route network 
Q. Has the present Board been able (in Lahore) to accomplished the set out objectives for 
route distribution and allocation? 
if so, in what regards? 
Q. Do you have control over the service scheduling (time-tabling and route frequencies) of 
private services? 
if no, what are the consequences 
Q. Are you satisfied with the association's regulated service scheduling? 
if no, give your comments about the functioning of associations of private operators 
Q. What do you consider the effects of quality regulations on service provision 
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Q. To what extent are you in favour of governmental quality regulations 
Q. What are your suggestions regarding the improvement of. 
route network 
. bus stops 
. service scheduling 
Q. Are you satisfied with the seating arrangement of private vehicles? 
if no, what are your suggestions for improvement 
Q. What are the various enforcement powers which RTA enjoys under the present 
ordinance 
Q. What if any enforcement powers does RTA wish to have in the ordinance 
Q. Do the additional powers require amendments in the present ordinance? 
If so, who initiates the case for the amendments in the regulations for public transport 
Q. What are your suggestion for the improvement of performance of RTA 
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STUDY OF REGULATORY AND TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
FOR URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORT 
School of Planning and Housing 
Edinburgh College of Art 
Heriot-Watt University Edinburgh UK 
(PUBLICLY-OWNED BUS CORPORATION) 
Interview conducted with .................................... 
Designation ................................................... 
Address ....................................................... 
Q. Do the Corporation's bus services satisfy the needs of present population? 
if no, why 
Q. What are the various causes of declining role of the Corporation 
Q. Are the current fares sufficient for efficient and effective operation of buses? 
if no, what are the problems with current fares structure 
Q. What are your comments on the student concessionary fare 
Q. Are you in favour of deregulated fares? 
if no, what are dangers with deregulated fares? 
Q. Are you in favour of free entry of private transport operators? 
if no, which dangers do you envisage from free entry 
Q. Are you in favour of contracting out routes to various operators at pre-determined fares 
and services? 
if no, (a) what are dangers 
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(b) what do you envisage as the probable difficulties in contracting procedures 
Q. In your opinion, what are the causes of overcrowding of buses and minibuses (wagons) 
Q. Are you satisfied with overall route network (coverage and bus stops etc) in the city? 
if not, (a) why not 
(b) what do you suggest for its improvement 
Q. What is the specific role of the Corporation for the issuance of route permits to private 
operators 
Q. What do you consider the effective ways of meeting public transport needs in the city 
Q. Should the public sector be involved in the provision of public transport services, given 
that its services are often less cost-efficient than the private operator? 
if yes, in what regards 
Q. What are your future plans for the operation of buses 
Q. On which sections of roads (in the city) do buses face most frequent traffic congestion 
Q. What do you consider are the ways to enhance bus speed in central area and on major 
corridors of the city 
Q. What are your suggestions to improve the performance of buses 
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STUDY OF REGULATORY AND TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
FOR URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORT 
School of Planning and Housing 
Edinburgh College of Art 
Heriot-Watt University Edinburgh UK 
(Interview Schedule for Private Operators) 
Name of respondent ............................................ 
Address ..................................................................................................................... 
No of Vehicles owned...... 
How many routes do you operate........ Route nos ............. 
Entry Regulations 
Q. Did you face some difficulties in obtaining route permit(s)? 
if so, what 
Q. Are (is) the routes you operate of your own choice? 
if no, why 
if yes, why did you choose the route(s) 
Q. Has the number of passenger service vehicles grown on your route(s)? 
if no, why 
Q. Are existing bus services sufficient to satisfy the present needs of passengers on your 
route(s)? 
if no, on which route ......... what are the causes of deficiency 
if yes, what are the reasons for the present overcrowding of vehicles 
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Q. Are you in favour of controlled entry on your route(s)? 
if no, why 
if yes, why 
Q. What are your suggestions for the improvements in entry regulations 
Safety Regulations 
Q. Do you have complaints against the Motor Vehicle Examiner/workshops? 
if so, what type of complaints 
Q. Do you show vehicle(s) for examination? 
if so, how long does the MVE/workshops takes for vehicle examination 
Q. Have your vehicle(s) involved in road accidents during last two years? 
if so, give details 
Q. In your opinion what are the root causes of road accidents involving public transport 
Q. Do you have complaints against the enforcement of safety regulations? 
if so, what 
Q. What are the effects of deficient and inadequately enforced safety regulations 
Q. What improvements in safety regulations do you suggest 
Quality Regulations 
Q. Are you satisfied with the present route network/classification criteria? 
if no, what are the deficiencies 
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Q. Are you satisfied with the provision of bus stops along your route? 
if no, what are the problems 
Q. What are the effects of present inadequate route network 
Q. Are there any problems related to service scheduling (time-tabling and route frequencies 
on your route(s))? 
if so, what 
Q. Have you changed the seating arrangement of your vehicle(s)? 
if so, what are the reasons 
Q. What are the reasons for these being bad mechanical conditions of vehicles operating in 
the city 
Q. Are you in favour of governmental quality regulations? 
if so, what should be the governmental intervention 
if no, who will be ensuring quality 
Q. What are your suggestions for the improvement in establishing the: 
. route network 
. bus stops 
service scheduling 
Q. Are (is) your vehicle(S) usually caught in traffic congestion? 
if so, what are the causes of congestion 
Q. On which sections of roads (in the city) do you face frequent traffic congestion 
Q. What are the key effects of congestion over the operation of buses 
Q. What are your suggestions to enhance bus speed in congested areas 
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Fare Regulations 
Q. Are you satisfied with the present fare structure? 
if no, what are defects 
Q. Do you envisage any specific dangers with deregulated fares of public transport 
services? 
if so, what 
Q. Is there any demand for better quality services (on your route(s)) with premium fares? 
if so, how could the services be initiated? 
if no, could the present services be made attractive for car and taxi etc users? 
if yes, how 
if no, why not 
Q. What are you suggestions regarding the improvement in fare structure 
General 
Q. Are you in favour of large bus operation on your route(s)? 
if no, what are the reasons 
if yes why 
Q. Why are private operators not (interested in) investing in large buses in urban areas 
Q. In what ways could the large operator participate in the bus industry in urban areas 
Q. How long have you been working in public transport service 
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Q. Did you purchase new or second hand vehicle(s) 
give reasons for purchasing second hand vehicle 
Q. How have you managed to finance the purchase of vehicle(s) 
Q. Are you satisfied with the functioning of your association 
if no, what are complaints 
if yes, in what regards 
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STUDY OF REGULATORY AND TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
FOR URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORT 
School of Planning and Housing 
Edinburgh College of Art 
Heriot-Watt University Edinburgh UK 
(Interview Schedule for Traffic Police) 
Interview conducted with .................................................. 
Designation ............................................................... 
Address ........................................................................ 
Safety Regulations 
Q. Are you satisfied with safety standards? 
if no, what are the deficiencies 
Q. Are you satisfied with the vehicle examination by motor vehicle examiner/workshops? 
if no, in what regards 
Q. Generally, what type of mechanical deficiencies you find in public transport vehicles 
Q. Are you satisfied with the requirements of driver licensing for public passengers 
transport ? 
if no, what are the weaknesses 
Q. Are you satisfied with the enforcement of safety regulations? 
if no, what are the flaws 
Q. What are the negative effects of deficient and inadequately enforced safety regulations 
Q. Are public transport vehicles frequently involved in road accidents? 
if yes, (a) which type of vehicle(s) 
(b) what are the causes of involving public transport 
Q. What improvements in safety regulations do you suggest 
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Traffic Management/Regulation 
Q. Which mode of transport most frequently violates traffic regulations? 
Q. What is the impact of violations on the operation of public transport 
Q. What do you think are the ways to enhance bus speed in central area and on major 
corridors 
Q. Are you satisfied with present route network coverage? 
if no, what are the weaknesses 
Q. What are your views about the provision of bus stops 
Q. What are the reasons for overcrowded wagons 
Q. Do you have any views about the type of measures which should be taken for the 
improvement of traffic management/regulation 
if so, what 
Q. In your opinion which aspects of enforcement need improvement 
Q. Are your staff well trained to enforce traffic management measures? 
if no, what sort of special training is needed 
Q. Do present ordinance/regulations give adequate powers to Traffic Police to effectively 
achieve traffic management objectives? 
if no, (a) which additional powers are needed 
(b)would these require amendments in the ordinance? 
Q. What are your suggestions for improving the performance of Traffic Police 
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STUDY OF REGULATORY AND TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
FOR URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORT 
School of Planning and Housing 
Edinburgh College of Art 
Heriot-Watt University Edinburgh UK 
(Interview Schedule for Traffic Engineering Agency) 
Interview conducted with .................................................. 
Designation 
............................................................... 
Address ........................................................................ 
General 
Q. What important issues do you confront in traffic management 
Q. In your opinion what are the causes of traffic congestion in the city 
Q. What efforts have you made to ameliorate the problem of traffic congestion 
Q. How many improvement schemes have you implemented in last two years (please give 
details about nature and, expenditure etc) 
Q. What type of additional measures should be taken to achieve improved flow of traffic 
Q. What are your plans for overall management of future growth of traffic 
Q. Are you satisfied with safety regulations? 
if no, in what regards 
Q. What improvements in safety regulations do you suggest 
Public Transport and Traffic Management 
Q. Are there any traffic management issues (do you face) related specifically to public 
transport 
if yes, what 
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Q. Do you consider that improved public transport operation is necessary in seeking to 
alleviate traffic congestion? 
if so, in what ways 
Q. Are you in favour of introducing priority measures for public transport in the city? 
in no, why 
Q. How many traffic management schemes have been implemented and are under 
consideration to assist public transport operation (please give details) 
Q. Do you consider are busways desirable in the city? 
if so, who will finance 
Q. How does the RTA coordinate with your organization and what is your specific role in 
the route allocation process 
Q. Are you satisfied with traffic regulations? 
if no, why 
Q. What improvements in traffic regulations do you suggest 
Q. In your opinion which aspects of enforcement need improvement 
Future Issues 
Q. Which other agencies would be involved in implementing priority schemes 
Q. To what extent do you envisage any institutional barriers for the implementation of 
priority schemes 
Q. Who would finance priority schemes 
Q. What sort of support would you have from the police in implementing the priority 
measures 
Q. Are your engineers well trained to prepare and implement priority measures 
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APPENDIX 2 
School of Planning and Housing 
Edinburgh College of Art 
Heriot-Watt University Edinburgh UK 
(Household Survey in Jauhar Town in Lahore) 
Name of respondent .............................................. 
House No ................ Housing Scheme................................. 
Q. 1 How many members reside in your household 
Number Total Less than 5 
years old 
S years & above Helpers* 
Sex Working Non -working 
Male 
Female 
Total 
" include servant(s) and driver(s) with same residence 
Q. 2 How many vehicles are owned by household members 
Vehicle Nwnber 
Bicycle 
Motorcycletscooter 
Car/Jeep 
Pickup/suzuki 
Rickshaw 
Taxi 
Other (specify) 
Q. 3 What is the total monthly household income 
Up to 5000 [] 
Rs 5001-10000 [] 
Rs 10001-15000 [] 
Rs 15001-20000 [] 
Over Rs 20000 [] 
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Q. 4 What is the total monthly household expenditure on travel 
Rs 500-1000 [] 
Rs 1000-2000 [] 
Rs 2001-3000 [] 
Rs 3001-4000 [] 
Over 4000 [] 
Q. 5 Which mode of transport is generally used by household members above 5 years old 
Purpose Mode used for different purposes* 
Members Work School Shopping Social Recreation Other 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
7. 
8. 
10. 
* write following serial numbers in the table for stated mode 
1. walk 2. Bicycle 3. Motorcycle/Scooter 
4. Taxi 5. Rickshaw 6. Car/Jeep 
7. Bus 8. Van/Suzuki 9. Mini/Midibus 
I O. Institutional Bus 
11. Other 
Q. 6 Why don't you use public transport (for household members not using) 
[] 
. inadequate public transport 
. own vehicles 
[] 
. don't like to travel 
by buses/minibuses 
. institutional 
buses [] 
other (specify) [] 
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Q. 7 Are you generally satisfied with the provision of public transport 
yes 
no 
don't know 
if not, 
inadequate services 
long walking distance to bus stop 
buses are not reliable 
other 
if bus services are inadequate, how are they inadequate 
don't serve destination 
don't serve the area they live 
no timetable 
in-frequent 
bad vehicle quality 
Q. 8 Would you use public transport if adequate services were available 
Yes [] 
no [] 
don't know [] 
if not, why not 
if yes, for what purposes 
work [] 
shopping [] 
education [] 
social [] 
other [] 
if yes, would you use better quality public transport at higher 
fares 
yes [] 
no [] 
don't know [] 
if yes, choice for various service: 
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a. would you willing to pay a premium fare of Rs 8.00 to and from Jauhar Town to 
Anarkali to have better quality minibus services with a greater reliability and guaranteed 
seat) 
yes [] 
no [] 
if no, why not 
b. would you willing to pay a premium fare of Rs 6.00 to and from Jauhar Town to 
Anarkali to have better quality full size bus services with a greater reliability and 
guaranteed seat) 
Yes [] 
no [] 
if not, why not 
Q. would you use suzukis as a feeder service to and fro Jauhar Town to Niazbeg at a fare of 
Rs 2.00 with a guaranteed seat 
yes [] 
no [] 
if not, why not 
  Please indicate the importance of the following service aspects in order of your 
preference 
. guaranteed seat [] 
. hours of operation [] 
. service frequency [] 
. timetable 
[] 
. fares [] 
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School of Planning and Housing 
Edinburgh College of Art 
Heriot-Watt University Edinburgh UK 
(Household Survey in Baghban Pura in Lahore) 
Name of Respondent ................................. 
House No.......... Street ........... Area/Mohallah ....................................... 
Q. 1 How many members reside in your household 
Number Total Less than 5 
years old 
5 years & above 
Sex Working Non-working 
Male 
Female 
Total 
" include servant(s) and driver(s) with same residence 
Q. 2 How many vehicles are owned by household members 
Vehicle Number 
Bicycle 
Motorcycle/scooter 
Car/Jeep 
Pickup/suzuki 
Rickshaw 
Taxi 
Nono 
Other (specify) 
Q3 What is the total monthly household income 
Up to Rs 3000 [] 
Rs 3001-5000 [] 
Rs 5001-7000 [] 
Over Rs 7000 [] 
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Q. 4 What is the total monthly household expenditure on travel 
Up toRs300 [] 
Rs 301-400 [] 
Rs 401-500 [] 
Rs 501-600 [] 
Over Rs 600 [] 
Q. 5 Which mode of transport is generally used by household members above 5 years old 
Purpose Mode used for different purposes* 
Members Work School Shopping Social Recreation Other 
1 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
* write following serial numbers in the table for stated mode 
1. walk2. Bicycle 3. Motorcycle/Scooter 
4. Taxi 5. Rickshaw 6. Car/Jeep 
7. Bus 8. Van/Suzuki 9. Mini/Midibus 
10. Tonga 11. Institutional Bus 
12. Other 
Q. 7 Why you don't use public transport (if household members not using) 
. area not linked with route network 
. own vehicles 
. institutional buses 
. can't afford to use public transport 
. suzukis are overloaded 
. living close to their activities 
. other (specify) 363 
Q. 8 Would you use public transport if your area was connected 
yes / no / don't know 
if not, why not 
if yes, for what purposes 
work / shopping / education / social / other 
if yes, would you use better quality public transport at higher fares 
yes / no / don't know 
if yes, would you use the following modes of public transport to and from the Railway 
station with a guaranteed seat: 
. suzuki at a fare of Rs 2.50 yes / no 
. minibus at a fare of Rs 3.50 yes / no full size bus at a fare of Rs 3.00 yes / no 
  Please indicate the importance of the following service aspects in order of your 
preference 
. guaranteed seat [] 
. hours of operation [] 
. service frequency [] 
. timetable [] 
. fares [] 
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APPENDIX 3 
School of Planning and Housing 
Edinburgh College of Art 
Heriot-Watt University Edinburgh UK 
(Survey of Suzuki Passengers in Faisalabad) 
Day ................ Location ................................... Route No................. 
Date ............... Sex............ Age....... years 
Occupation .............................. Monthly income (Rs).................... 
Monthly travel expenditure (Rs) ...................................... 
Q. 1 For what trip purposes do you use suzukis? 
education Regularly / Occasionally 
work Regularly / Occasionally 
shopping Regularly / Occasionally 
social Regularly / Occasionally 
other (specify) Regularly / Occasionally 
Q. 2 What is the purpose of this specific trip? 
work / education / shopping / social / other 
Q. 3 What are the reasons for travelling you in suzukis? 
low fare 
limited number of FUTS vehicles 
no FUTS service 
origin/destination is not linked with FUTS service 
other (specify) 
Q. 4 If your area was linked, would you travel by FUTS service? yes / no / don't know 
if not, why not? 
high fares 
other (specify) 
Q. 5 If a suzuki service in connecting your area is organized by the FUTS, would you be 
prepared to pay 50% in addition to the present fare? yes / no / don't know 
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Q. 6 What are your complaints about existing public transport services? 
Q. 7 What are your suggestions to improving public transport service in your area? 
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School of Planning and Housing 
Edinburgh College of Art 
Ilcriot-Watt University Edinburgh UK 
(Survey of FUTS Passengers in Faisalabad) 
Day ............... Location ............................. Route No................. 
Date ............... Sex............ Age....... years 
Occupation .................. Monthly income (Rs).................... 
Monthly travel expenditure (Rs) ................. 
Q. 1 How offen do you use FLITS service? 
education regularly / occasionally 
work regularly / occasionally 
shopping regularly / occasionally 
social regularly / occasionally 
other (specify) regularly / occasionally 
Q. 2 What is the purpose of this specific trip? 
work / education / shopping / social / other 
Q3 Why did you choose to travel in FUTS service for this specific trip? 
guaranteed seat 
reliability of service 
non-availability of cheeper public transport 
no alternative mode 
other (specify) 
Q. 4 Which mode of transport was being used by you prior to FUTS service? 
walk / suzuki / rickshaw / car / motorcycle / tongs / bicycle / other (specify) 
Q. 5 Are you generally satisfied with FUTS services? 
yes / no / don't know 
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Q. 6 Do you wait for FUTS minibuses i. e. rather than take an alternative mode? 
yes / no / sometimes 
Q. 7 How long do you wait on average for your minibus ............. minutes 
Q. 8 Do the FUTS drivers stop minibuses at designated stops? 
never / rarely / sometimes / frequently / always 
Q. 9 Do the FUTS drivers shorten specified route? 
never / rarely / sometimes / frequently 
Q. 10 Do the FUTS services overcharge during their hours of operation? 
never / rarely / sometimes / frequently 
Q. 1 I Do you find overloading on the FUTS services? 
peak / off-peak / peak & off-peak / never 
Q. 12 How long is your walk to the bus stop............ minutes 
Q. 13 Are you satisfied with the mechanical condition of FUTS minibuses? 
yes / no / no opinion 
if no, what complaints 
windows broken 
seats not comfortable 
emit smoke 
other (specify) 
Q. 14 Are you satisfied with the cleanliness FUTS vehicles? 
yes / no / no opinion 
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Q. 15 What are your views about present fares level? 
slightly high 
too high 
realistic 
Q. 16 Are you generally satisfied with the safety aspects of FUTS service? 
yes / no / no opinion 
if not, what complaints 
irresponsible drivers 
crew always in hurry 
probability of accidents 
other (specify) 
Q. 17 Do you feel the popularity of FUTS services is: 
increasing 
decreasing 
unchanged 
don't know 
Q. 18 What complaints do you have about FUTS services? 
Q. 19 What improvements would you like to suggest for FLITS service? 
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APPENDIX 4 
APPENDIX 4A 
Annual operating cost of a full size bus in Lahore 
Fuel costs Rs 133,800 
Diesel Rs 428/day (26 days/month) Rs 105,000 
Engine oil+filter changed after 2000 km Rs 19,200 
Brake, gear oil+grease @ Rs 800/month Rs 9,600 
Maintenance Rs 30,000 
Labour Rs 500/month Rs 6,000 
Parts Rs 2000/month Rs 24,000 
Tyre and tubes Rs 20,000 
2 sets @ Rs 10000/set second hand Rs 20,000 
Salaries/wages Rs 96,000 
Driver and conductors Rs 8000/month Rs 96,000 
Taxes Rs 19,350 
Token tax Rs 11,700 
Permit fee Rs 1,050 
Fitness fee @ Rs 300/6 months Rs 600 
Octroi Rs 20/day (25 operating days) Rs 6,000 
Contingencies Rs 39,920 
Fines average Rs 800/month Rs 9,600 
Bus stand fee (adda fee) Rs 1200/month Rs 14,400 
Gratification to Police, RTA, PTA & MVE Rs 2,000 
Union fee Rs 20/month Rs 120 
Timekeeper Rs 100/month Rs 1,200 
Unforeseen expenses (accidents etc) Rs 15,000 
Source: Costs are based on information given by the operators during field visits in 1996 
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APPENDIX 4B 
Annual operating cost of a minibus in Lahore 
Fuel costs Rs 116400 
Diesel Rs 300/day (25 days/month) Rs 90000 
Engine oil+filter changed after 2000 km Rs 19200 
Brake, gear oil+grease @ Rs 600/month Rs 7200 
Maintenance Rs 25200 
Labour Rs 600/month Rs 7200 
Parts Rs 1500/month Rs 18000 
Tyre and tubes Rs 30000 
2 sets @ Rs 15000/set Rs 30000 
Salaries/wages Rs 86400 
Driver and conductors Rs 7200/month Rs 86400 
Taxes Rs 11700 
Token tax Rs 4050 
Permit fee Rs 1050 
Fitness fee @ Rs 300/6 months Rs 600 
Octroi Rs 20/day (25 operating days) Rs 6000 
Contingencies Rs 42040 
Fines average Rs 800/month Rs 9600 
Bus stand fee (adda fee) Rs 1500/month Rs 18000 
Gratification to Police, RTA, PTA & MVE Rs 3000 
Union fee Rs 20/month Rs 240 
Timekeeper Rs 100/month Rs 1200 
Unforeseen expenses (accidents etc) Rs 10000 
Source: Costs are based on information given by the operators during field visits in 1996 
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APPENDIX 4C 
Annual operating cost of a suzuki in Lahore 
Fuel costs Rs 69,600 
Diesel Rs 200/day (25 days/month) Rs 60,000 
Engine oil+filter changed after 3000 km Rs 6,000 
Brake, gear oil+grease @ Rs 300/month Rs 3,600 
Maintenance Rs 12,000 
Labour Rs 250/month Rs 3,000 
Parts Rs 7500/month Rs 9,000 
Tyre and tubes Rs 10,000 
2 sets @ Rs 5000/set Rs 10,000 
Salaries/wages Rs 60,000 
Driver and conductors Rs 5000/month Rs 60,000 
Taxes Rs 3,500 
Token tax Rs 2,250 
Permit fee Rs 1050 
Fitness fee @ Rs 100/6 months Rs 200 
Contingencies Its 18,260 
Fines average Rs 500/month Rs 6,000 
Bus stand fee (adda fee) Rs 300/month Rs 3,600 
Gratification to Police, RTA, PTA & MVE Rs 3,000 
Union fee Rs 20/month Rs 60 
Timekeeper Rs 100/month Rs 600 
Unforeseen expenses (accidents etc) Rs 5,000 
Source: Costs are based on information given by the operators during field visits in 1996 
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APPENDIX 4D 
Annual operating cost of a taxi in Lahore 
Fuel costs Rs 56,400 
Diesel Rs 150/day (28 days/month) Rs 50,400 
Engine oil+filter changed after 3000 km Rs 6,000 
Maintenance Rs 4,500 
Labour Rs 166/month Rs 2,000 
Parts Rs 208/month Rs 2,500 
Tyre and tubes Rs 5,000 
1 set of Rs 5000 Rs 5,000 
Salaries Rs 48,000 
Driver salary Rs 4000/month Rs 48,000 
Taxes Rs 1,307 
Token tax Rs 900 
Permit fee Rs 207 
Fitness fee @ Rs 100/6 months Rs 200 
Contingencies Rs 7,060 
Fines average Rs 250/month Rs 3,000 
Bus stand fee (adda fee) Rs 125/month Rs 1,500 
Gratification to Police, RTA, PTA & MVE Rs 500 
Union fee Rs 20/month Rs 600 
Unforeseen expenses (accidents etc) Rs 2,000 
Source: Costs are based on information given by the operators during field visits in 1996 
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APPENDIX 5 
From 
The -Commissioner/Chairman, 'R; T. A/Faisalabad Urban Transj: ort Society, 
"'Faisalabad: - 
:. 
The Secretaryq 
., "y'" .,. Government of the 
Pun jab, "' iý';:.; Triinsport. "Departmentp 
. '. ;. rr; +ý ý4.., " Lahore. ... 
t" No. '/RTA-FD/97: Dated: -. 
5 ý{ - 1997" 
SUýý r--DEREGULATION-OF RATES OF FARES. ON 
URBAN ROUTES 
s- :"". "ý: f" '" hý 
. 
"'ý: COVERED BY TE FAISALABAD URBAN', TRANSPORT SOCIE'1. F(ISALABAD(N". G. O. 
'Astelephonically- coifunicated by you ' the memo 
ssued'vide tpis office endorsement'No. 148/RTA-FD/97, dated 
02-4-97 to your address, is hereby withdräwn. 
2. As you arp aware, the Faisalabad ' Urban' Transport 
Society came into being. as hn'N. G. Oo in )March 1994"with av 
"toýPaoilitating the general public 
in travelling in and'acr 
the city at competitive fares. The fare table was initially 
enforced"kt0 the approval. df'the governing body of FLITS 
keeping in"view various relevant factors including-the pric 
of, diesel' which was at that. time , 
selling @ Rs. 6.18 'per litr 
3< it ... . 
' -: Some of the salient features of the FUTS transpo 
system'are enumerated below: - 
' a) Every. vehicle will-not allow more 
" 
than 15 passerigets at a time. 
b) Specific seats have been allocated 
for women. 
c) Music, emoking"and. the use of pressure 
horns is disalloweds 
d) The service provided by the FUTS vehicles 
ij bett'er than rickshaw service/non-FUTS 
vehicles. . ". 
e) FUTS has its own'security/traffic checking 
' 'system -besides the traffic. police' agency. 
4. In view of týe upward trend in the prices of 
. diesel and allied products(dies4l being now sold 
( Rs. 9.81 
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Under the. 'airoumstances, a new fore; "table is"required to be 
promulgatgd , The governing. 'bodY-'bf'tbeSociety has already. ' 
approved; "M 
sale for' revised-1yfar**,, *in" a recent meeting held 
under' tbe`ý chfii'manship; ot; ", the 
under gned. r 
44 
" #s " thereforep, request that"deregülation of 
notificäti , o,. SOTR. Ip- ,, 
96ý-Odak , ý0-1-1996 issued by the 
s Aý Gobernment"of . 
the, Punýabý"Transppýt Department, Lahore may kindly 
be allowed .. `respect, of the PUTS 'an N. G"Oo with a View to 
enabling it to, revise the,,! rates 'of', fares " of wagons on urban 
routes with4 'its . area of. operatian-47i'accordance with the 
preväilin cümptanbes'. in., pubLttö terest. ' 
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MAY 
`; eýiäö iviX'A ý". ýeý O=C, e ý1rt , ': ýý", 1997, 
The Commissioner/ 
Chairman, '"FUTS, ' "' 
Faisalabad ; Division.,, FaicalabG4. 
:: 7EJECT: DEREGULATION OF RATES OF, FARES ON: URBAN ROUTES' 
COVERED BY THE FAISALABAD URBAN TRANSPORT ScCIiTY, 
FAISALABAD (N. G. 0. ) - 
- Please refer. to y. our.. "letter No. ", 163/RTA-I'D/97" 
dated 5. ". 1997 on the subject noted: xb'öve. ' '"-: ", "" ' 
STONER '.. ; o° J 
ALAßAD. . 
.. ) 
2. " The Government 
ö. f theý'i'ýuiijb' in; es'rgnsporýf 
oo. Department has been'pleased'`to`, a11öw 
oý", Yaisal'abad 'Urban Transport Syatein, 'rürx': by. ; r"; 
Lhý hairmanship of the Divisional"'"Cömmissiöi 6r: "; ;. 9o%4ever- 
, exclusive1 rä"n 
i"ýý. icalý4 '}, ý3 <thi 
ýt/S J ''"ý permission will- be . 3; _. ir, '" 
ý 
ý'' 
CC. ". 
%,, ytij 
" +$t"Miýf-ý{ýyýý'i7T 
subject to 'the , 
general control of "thrTran3 01. 'Departrne- `4.4 
The, proppsal for increase in i'nr , 
na1 alsbeE z 'a' roved: '' -°l y, << 
However, whenever, the FLITS wants, to revise. the. "fares, ' 
tc 
'' 
r, 
will get prior approval `from tY GoTrsr Grient Of the P"anje. 3q 
Transport Department. 
:; jy _-. 
'" ' <: 
\ 
C1 T4mt 1'1I DDJQ AS 
%eP 
N0. & DATE EVEN ,""A, 
' . Mý ;.,.::. . {ip 
A copy iý forwar;. .1 for. information. , neCcssa; -y,; ', 
B Siý11 to: - 
, ý. 1. The 
Seeretax! y, Funýab r; ovincial' Tr. nspört'`. s, ", r 
1% Authority,. 
Lahore. 
2. The - Secretary, 
RP"; ^nal' Tra. t, sport ` Authc: ity, 
Faisalabad. 
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LAHORE: Refurbished Volvos on roads by May 
By Our Staff Reporter 
LAHORE, Oct 14: Three foreign firms are likely to cater for the transport needs of the 
people of Lahore by operating refurbished Volvo buses as part of the Lahore Transport 
System. 
The first batch of these buses may be pressed into service by April or May next year, 
Punjab Governor Shahid Hamid told Dawn on Tuesday. 
ma <ýI, nk Talks with a London-based firm MTH have already been concluded while similar 
M, Pkw negotiations with operators from America and Singapore are in progress. 
These firms are supposed to procure about 650 Volvo buses from the Transmubile, a 
Karachi-based transport company, which purchased in an open bid about 650 Volvo 
buses about three months ago. 
The buses, declared as off-road vehicles after the winding up of the Punjab Road 
Transport Corporation, were sold to the Karachi transport company on the condition 
that they would he refurbished and plied in Lahore. Transmobile has now decided to 
sell all these buses for other parties to operate. 
DAEWOO: Meanwhile, the South Kureau tirm, Daewoo. has become the first 
company to he allowed to ply luxury buses on motorway between Lahore and 
::;. 
Rawalpindi. 
An agreement in this connection has been struck between the Punjab government and 
the South Korean firm which was made public on 'T'uesday. 
According to an official handout, the buses will he loaded with facilities like television, 
VCR, toilet and kitchen and drinks and eatables would he served on hoard. Each of the 
buses would also he equipped with first-aid kits. 
3A 
six member South Korean delegation called on Punjab Minister for'I ransport LYCOS 
Arshad Khan I odhi and discussed with him matters relating to providing terminals for 
the buses at Lahore and Rawalpindi. The minister assured the delegation of all possible 
t'"ýriliri, ýc 
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RAWALPINDI: Transport service for women being finalized 
By Our Correspondent 
RAWALPINDI, October 2: The district administration has decided to utilize 10 
microbuses and 20 pick-ups to launch the first ever Women Transport Service (WTS) 
in Rawalpindi, the assistant commissioner traffic, Ali Mumtaz Zaidi said. 
Talking to Dawn on Wednesday, the newly appointed assistant commissioner traffic 
said he was holding a meeting with transporters on Thursday in which the plan of 
launching the service would be finalized. He said it was a difficult task from the district 
administration to launch a transport service for female passengers and yet all necessary 
work had been completed. 
Though the assistant commissioner claimed that it would be the "country's first 
transport service exclusively for female commuters, " our readers may recall that just a 
few years ago a bus service meant only for women was launched with much fanfare in 
Karachi also. But the scheme, despite the noble intentions behind it, had died without a 
whimper due to reasons best known to the people who started it but could not run it 
after spending quite a sum on it. 
The assistant commissioner traffic said the microbuses would be plied on the main 
route from Octroi No 22 to Secretariat, Islamabad, while the pick-ups would be 
employed in congested internal areas of the city. 
He said the transport service for women commuters was being introduced to provide 
better travelling facilities to the female passengers as well as to save them from the 
hardships which they face while travelling with male commuters. 
The official said in the beginning, the bus service would be plied only during the rush 
hours, but the timings of the service could be extended, if demanded by the passengers. 
Giving the details about the routes and stops of the transport service, he said the 
service would begin from Octroi No-22 and stop at GPO, Liaquat Bagh, 
6th Road and 
Faizabad and Secretariat (Islamabad). He said if the service proves successful, 
it would 
be extended to other areas. 
378 
"Due to traffic congestion in the city, the transporters are not to use new vehicles for 
this service. Only old vehicles would be used for this purpose, " he explained. 
Sft by 
XIBERCOM He said that the district administration was acquiring assistance of some NGOs for the 
publicity of the new service. 
The RTA will also install banners at different spots of the city to create awareness 
about the service and advertise in national dailies. 
At least one woman police constable would be deployed at every bus stop to keep male 
passengers from boarding the women's exclusive transport vehicles. 
Earlier, the district administration had decided to ask the transporters for a different 
paintwork on the vehicles of WTS. But if the transporters did not agree, stickers 
inscribed with "Women Transport Service" would be displayed on the vehicles. 
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Country Report on 
KARACHI: KU, NED to get 18 buses today 
By Our Staff Reporter 
KAKA('I11, April 24: The Sindh government will hand over I8 buses to Karachi 
University and NEU University of Fnginccring and 't'echnology on Saturday. 
These 18 buses belong to the fleet of the defunct Karachi `Iranspurt Corporation. 
I he Karachi I Iniversitv will get 16 buses and two will go to NI: D university. 
I he keys oºf these buses will he handed over to the vice chancellors of the two 
universities at a ceremony at the KI I campus. 'Ehe Sindh government is expected 
to he represented, among others, by provincial ministers I)r 1 arooy Sattar and 
13ashir I aruoyui. 
, Jhftkf According to the Karachi University, the varsity ýtiill be handed over 16 buses 
from thL fleet of'defunct Karachi "Transport Corporation. 
'I he university said the buses given to the university needed massive repairs and 
the government had announced an amount of Rs 4million to bring these buses 
into running condition. 
A three-member committee headed by transport adviser Khalil hin W-'aleed and 
comprising transport secretary 'fakir Soomro and a university representative have 
been planning the work relating to the overhauling of'these buses. 
he induction 01' 16 buses wiII bring the total stren-, th of Karachi l 1niversity fleet 
to 42. At present, university has 26 buses. which have been running; as shuttle 
service on difl rent routes such as NIPA, Saddar and (ihulshun ('ho mºngi. 
The university has plans tu introduce sonic more shuttle points from other areas. 
N\hich include Shtihra iI ais il. 
he students 01' Karachi 11niversity have been Lacing serious hrohlenr, 
in the 
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RAWALPINDI: RTA opens special route 
By Our Correspondent 
RAWALPINDI, May 19: The Regional Transport Authority (RTA) has 
Mazdak started a special public transport route (No-24) between the twin cities of 
Rawalpindi and Islamabad to provide better transport facilities to the 
Mdydliiic., citizens, an official of RTA said. 
Talking to Dawn on Monday, the official said the route had been started 
but the response was not good so far. 
NINE till He said the administration had imposed ban since 1994 on the issuance 
of new route permits. However, the new route was allowed in view of the 
convenience of the people. 
He said so far the RTA had issued 37 route permits and many others were 
` '' expected to be issued if the new route got better public response. 
He said the new route did not pass through the city , 
but from areas 
outside the city. He said that only wagons were allowed to ply on the route. 
"The transporters demanded new route which touched the Murree Road, 
but we could not issue any new route which passed through the city 
specially on Murree Road as it would create further complications for the 
police as well as the general public, " he added. 
The official said they had received 37 applications from different 
transporters for the issuance of route permits for the special route and all 
of them had received route permits. 
Giving details about the new route, he said the route would start from 
Lalkurti and after touching the areas of CMH, R. A Bazar, Qasim Market, 
Transit Camp, Bakery Chowk, Pir Vedhai, sector I-11,1-10, H-8, T&T 
Colony, G-9, G-7 and G-6 sectors it would conclude at Secretariat in 
381 
nWN-I . Mill, _, Apni, 1-1-16 imp U I%N II. wIu. uauýr ý 7ynuyý . nucaý , 
absence of point service buses. 
At present, around 14 Karachi University buses shuttle between NIPA 
roundabout and the university campus, resulting in hardship for students in 
attending their morning classes. 
Besides, a good number of students have to change upto three buses to reach 
university, causing a financial burden on them as they have to pay normal fare 
while travelling in coaches, besides mental and physical fatigue and waste of 
time. 
The contract service introduced as a stop-gap arrangement by the Sindh 
ove --- ° rjlovkg the of a ach' IIi sity nt V 
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The girl student was run over by a contract bus while alighting from it. tier death 
led to protests. As a sequel of those protests, a contract bus was set ablaze the 
following day by the students. 
Prior to the withdrawal of point service by private contractors, the Karachi 
University had decided not to enter into any agreement with the government 
unless it was provided with at least 40 wide-bodied buses. 
The university authorities were of the view that the buses provided by the 
contractors had smaller capacity than what they had quoted earlier, resulting in 
overloading with students even sitting on top of the buses. 
Besides, the university found that the number of buses provided by contractors 
varied daily, and the fleet had to be supplemented by the university buses. 
The university students have been protesting against the lack of adequate 
transport arrangements after the closure of the Karachi 'Iransport Corporation, 
which had been catering to - though not fully - the transport needs of university 
students, majority of' them girl students. 
Subsequent governments have been assuring the university that the students 
would he provided with adequate transport arrangement. 
A transport plan enunciating a new arrangement fier the Karachi I niversity' 
students which was expected to he introduced by the last year end under the 
Karachi Public Transport tiocicty has also hit bureaucratic snags. 
I'hat plan proposed the partnership of the govvernment, university and the 
students in this system to make the transport scheme a financially viahle 
proposition. 
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APPENDIX 7 
The Lahore Transport System 
The newly elected Government of the Punjab province has been introducing various measures for 
the improvement of public transport in major urban areas. One of the initiatives includes the 
introduction of better quality services under the NGO control. The Chief Minister of the Punjab 
directed the Divisional Commissioner for Lahore to organise an NGO on the pattern of FUTS 
(Daily Jang, March 31 1997). The Divisional Commissioner formed a committee to prepare 
recommendations for the establishment of an NGO. The committee comprised of the following 
government officials. (1) Tasneem M. Noorani (who introduced the FUTS), the provincial 
Secretary of the Education Department (the chairman of the committee). (2) The Divisional 
Commissioner for Lahore Division (member). (3) The Director Local Government for Lahore 
(member). (4) The Deputy Inspector General Traffic (5) The Secretary of the RTA Lahore. 
The committee presented the following recommendations to the Chief Minister for his approval. 
First, the formation of an NGO comprising operators, passengers and government officials; second, 
the introduction a better quality bus services from initially from three points (Gulberg, Railway 
Station and Civil Secretariat); third, the governing body (GB) of the proposed NGO to be 
comprised of 50 percent government officials and the remaining members from the operators and 
the passengers; fourth, the proposed NGO to function on the FUTS pattern. Moreover, the 
committee also proposed some incentives (such as import of duty free buses) for operators working 
under the NGO. The Chief Minister approved all these recommendations and eventually a new 
NGO named the Lahore Transport System (LTS) was formed in Lahore on 25 June 1997 (The 
Nation 26 June 1997). 
The newly formed NGO initiated its operation in the last week of June, 1997. The functioning of 
the LTS is similar to FUTS except for the following aspects. First, a phased approach being adopted 
383 
in the city with full size buses being introduced along major roads in the first phase (see the 
enclosed plate in this appendix). Second, the full route fare is fixed at a different level (Rs 9 instead 
of government fixed fare at Rs 6). Similarly, the student concessionary fare has been raised from Rs 
0.25 to Rs 1.0 for a single trip. Third, the president of the Local Bus Owner Association (see 
chapter 5 section 5.3) is placed on the GB. Fourth, two members of the provincial assembly 
(supposedly representing passengers! ) have been nominated by the provincial government to the 
GB. 
The LTS started with one route with 12 buses and by March, 1998 over 60 buses were operating on 
three routes. Most of the LUTP operators are now joining the LTS. The services compete with 
minibuses which still operate under government controls. Correspondence reports no overloading 
with the drivers operating to schedules and not waiting for additional passengers for varying times 
at different bus stops. LTS supervisory staff arrange a boarding/alighting place for their buses at the 
busiest bus stops. In this way LTS buses are protected from the cowboy-style of minibus drivers. 
No decline in the number of minibuses is reported. This small scale start reflects an insistence on 
better quality full size buses, which are in short supply. Recently, the Government of the Punjab has 
requested the Federal Government to allow the import of duty free full size buses for LTS 
operation. 
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Plate 7.2a A full size bus under LTS operation in Lahore 
Plate 7.2h A full size bus under LTS upcratio" in Lahurc 
